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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides empirical evidence on the determinants of herding in US and China 
using both market and industry level data. Herding is examined based on market returns, 
volatility, trading volume and different market conditions, using the CSAD measure on daily 
data from 1990 to 2016.  
The findings for the US market demonstrate that herding does not exist. However, some 
herding becomes visible at the industry level. The results also demonstrate that there is 
limited evidence of herding during rising and declining markets days, which is more 
significant on days with low trading volatility and low trading volume. For different market 
conditions, the finding shows that herding is present at the market and industry level during 
the Dot com bubble and the Global Financial Crisis. The results for the Chinese markets 
provide evidence of herding at both the market and industry level, although it is more 
prevalent in Shenzhen stock exchange. Evidence further demonstrates that industry herding 
is more prevalent in the Shenzhen stock exchange when the market is declining, the trading 
volume is high, and volatility is low. After examining herding during the Asian crisis and 
Global financial crisis, the results demonstrate herding occurs during both crises at the 
market and industry level. Finally, the findings demonstrate that at the market level, US 
returns only has an impact on herding in Shanghai stock exchange. 
The results have implications for financial market investors and stock market regulatory 
authorities in both markets. For the US, it is important that investors know the impact of 
industry herding on specific industries, while regulatory authorities should encourage 
investors to diversify their sector investments. For the Chinese markets, the findings imply 
that participants in the Chinese stock markets (sectors) are irrational when they make 
investment decisions. Therefore, regulatory authorities should consider irrationality in their 
rule-making processes and market reforms.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction to the thesis 
1.1. Research background and motivation 
In the behavioural finance literature, herding arises when investors inclined to buy or sell 
based on their private information, overturn their decision after observing the direction of 
the market. Consequently, investors trade in the same direction and drive asset prices away 
from their fundamental values, resulting in excess market volatility (Nofsinger and Sias, 
1999). Although many empirical studies investigate herding in different markets and under 
different conditions (see, Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Gavriilidis, Kalinterakis and Leite-
Ferreira, 2013; Galariotis, Rong and Spyrou, 2015 and Zheng, Li and Chiang, 2017), there 
is inconclusive evidence of herding at the market (sector1) level for the US and Chinese stock 
markets respectively. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to further investigate herding 
and its patterns to gain additional insight into the factors that affect herding in these markets. 
This investigation is motivated by a few studies which are discussed in this section.  
The primary motivation of this thesis is the study by Christie and Huang (1995) that 
introduced the investigation of the potential impact of herding on equity returns which was 
then further investigated by Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000), Hwang and Salmon (2004), 
Tan, Chiang, Mason and Nelling (2008) among others. Christie and Huang (1995) propose 
that if investors herd, then equity returns will correlate with market returns especially during 
periods of extreme market movements. This proposition has been tested by many authors 
using returns from stock markets worldwide (Chang, et al., 2000; Tan, et al., 2008, Chiang 
and Zheng, 2010; Economou, Kostakis and Philippas, 2011; Galariotis, Rong and Spyrou, 
                                                 
1 It is important to point out that in terms of classification, industry is different from sector. On the one hand, 
industry is a general term that refers to a group of companies that provide similar products or services. On the 
other hand, sector refers to a segment of an economy. Though both terms, sector and industry are used 
interchangeably through this thesis, the industry definition is inferred.   
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2015; Bensaida, 2017).  Majority of these studies provide findings that suggest that herding 
is more prevalent in emerging markets, which could be due to the dominance by less 
sophisticated investors (Demirer and Kutan, 2006). There is also evidence that herding varies 
across different sectors (See, Lee, Chen, and Hsieh, 2013; Gebka and Wohar, 2013, Litimi, 
BenSaida, and Bouraoui, 2016; Andrikopoulos, Kallinterakis, Leite-Ferreira, and Verousis, 
2017 and Zheng, Li, and Chiang, 2017). More specifically, Lee, et al., (2013) find that 
herding in the Information Technology sector plays a role in herding in other sectors in the 
Chinese market. Gebka and Wohar (2013) provide evidence that herding is more significant 
in the Basic Materials, Consumer Services, and Oil and Gas industries. Litimi, et al., (2016) 
report that herding occurs during financial crisis periods in Consumer non-durables, Energy, 
Healthcare, Public Utilities, Technology, and Transportation. Andrikopoulos, et al., (2017) 
document industry effects in herding the Financials, Consumer Goods, Healthcare, 
Industrials, Oil and Gas, Technology, and Utilities. Zheng, et al., (2017) report that herding 
is prevalent in the Technology and Financial industries.  
Other empirical studies examine the determinants of herding in relation to rising (declining) 
market returns, periods of high (low) volatility and high (low) trading volume and report 
evidence of herding asymmetry. Tan, et al., (2008), Lee, et al., (2013) and Economou, et al., 
(2015) find that herding is more significant during periods of rising market returns. 
Conversely, Goodfellow, et al., (2009), Demirer, et al., (2010), Economou, et al., (2011) and 
Gavriilidis, et al., (2013) report that herding is stronger during periods of declining returns. 
There is also evidence that herding is stronger when volatility is high (See, Tan, et al., 2008; 
Javaira and Hassan, 2011; and Blasco, et al., 2012), and when it is low (See, Economou, et 
al., 2011; and Homles, et al, 2013). Moreover, trading volume exhibits asymmetric 
properties. Evidence provided by Tan, et al., (2008) and Gavriilidis, et al., (2013) document 
that herding is prevalent when trading volume is high, while Tan, et al., (2008) and 
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Economou, et al., (2011) find significant herding when trading volume is low. Despite the 
persistent evidence of herding asymmetry, some studies find that it is absent (See, Chang, et 
al., 2000 and Chiang and Zheng, 2010) and others (Chiang, et al., 2010 and Chiang, et al., 
2013) report mixed evidence of its presence.  Interestingly, in view of the abovementioned 
studies, the industry determinants of herding in the US and Chinese stock markets have not 
been investigated in depth.  Accordingly, this gap in the literature is addressed in this thesis 
to contribute to the growing literature on industry herding.  
The selection of the US and Chinese stock market is motivated by several factors. US was 
selected because it is home to the largest stock market in the world as well as the origin of 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2007-2008. Herding in the Chinese market is of interest 
because its unique segmented market structure which has been characterised by significant 
volatility (Yao, Ma and He, 2014). Another reason we select the Chinese market is because 
it is dominated by individual investors instead of institutional investors. In general, 
individual investors are deemed to less informed and inexperienced, therefore it can be 
argued these investors are more likely to herd than more informed institutional investors. 
Furthermore, we focus on industry herding because to the best of our knowledge only five 
studies investigate industry herding in the Chinese markets (Demirer and Kutan, 2006; 
Demirer, Kutan, and Chen, 2010; Lee, Chen and Hsieh, 2013; Yao, et al., 2014, and Zheng, 
et al., 2017).  
An examination of industry herding is interesting for several reasons: 
a) Choi and Sias (2009) argue that investors might be attracted by industrial characteristics 
when selecting their investment portfolio (for example the high level of investment in the 
Information Technology sector during the Dotcom bubble), b) Business managers and 
financial analysts make recommendations based on sector classification, and c) 
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Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) suggest that herds are more likely to surface in a group of 
stocks in an industry sector where investors encounter similar investment decisions and are 
able to discern the trade of others within the group. Evidence of herding at the industry level 
would indicate that investors follow each other in and out of the same industry, commonly 
termed as ‘flight to quality’ (Gebka and Wohar, 2013).  
Another source of motivation for this thesis is the mixed evidence of herding in both markets. 
For the US, while some studies do not find herding (see, for example, Christie and Huang, 
1995, Chang et al., 2000; Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Chen, 2013; Galariotis, Krokida, and 
Spyrou, 2016 and Lee, 2017). In contrast, Hwang and Salmon (2004), Litimi, et al., (2016); 
and BenSaida, (2017) detect herding in the US. For the Chinese market, while Demirer and 
Kutan (2006) and Fu and Lin (2010) find no evidence of herding, Tan, et al., (2008) find 
herding in Chinese A-share and B-share stocks in the rising (declining) market conditions. 
Also, Chiang and Zheng (2010), Lao and Singh (2011) Lee, et al., (2013) and Yao, et al., 
(2014) find that the Chinese market herds.  Research on both countries also provides mixed 
evidence on herding across industries. Christie and Huang (1995) find that herding is absent 
in the US market and industries. However, Litimi, et al., (2016) and BenSaida (2017) find 
evidence of herding during crisis periods in different sectors. Studies on herding in the 
Chinese industries find more mixed results, on the one hand, Demirer, Kutan and Chen 
(2010), Yao, et al., (2014), and Zheng, Li and Chiang (2017) report evidence of herd 
behaviour. On the other hand, Demirer and Kutan (2006) find that herding is absent. 
Following from these results there is an opportunity to enhance existing knowledge by 
investigating herding at the market and sector level in both markets.  
This thesis is also motivated by the studies of Bowe and Domuta (2004), Chiang and Zheng 
(2010), Mobarek, Mollar and Keasey (2014), Galariotis, et al., (2015) and Zheng, et al., 
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(2017), all of which inspired the analysis of herd behaviour during crises. This analysis 
facilitates the investigation of the effects of crises on herd behaviour pre, during and post 
crisis which has not been widely researched to date, as most of the aforementioned studies 
only focus on crisis periods.  
1.2. Research Questions 
The main research question this thesis is set out to answer is: 
What are the determinants of market and industry herding in major stock markets? 
The sub- research questions are: 
i) What are the determinants of market and industry herding in the US market? 
ii) What are the determinants of market and industry herding in the Chinese 
markets? 
1.3. Aims and objectives  
The primary goal of this thesis is to enhance the understanding of market conditions that 
influence herding in markets (sectors) using a developed and an emerging financial market. 
This goal leads to aims and objectives of this thesis which are as follows: 
1. To investigate the determinants of market and industry herding in the US (for which 
the S&P 500 index is used as a market proxy) by: 
 Investigating the existence of herding in the market and industries. 
 Investigating whether herding is higher (lower) during periods of rising 
(falling) stock markets, high (low) trading volume and high (low) market 
volatility. 
 Investigating herding pre, during and after the Dot com bubble and the GFC. 
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2. To investigate the determinants of market and industry herding in the Chinese 
markets (Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges) by:  
 Investigating the existence of herding in the stock exchanges and industries. 
 Investigating whether herding is higher (lower) during periods of rising 
(falling) stock markets, high (low) trading volume and high (low) market 
volatility. 
 Investigating herding pre, during and after the Asian crisis and the global 
financial crisis. 
 Comparing herding during two sub sample periods: 1996-2016 and 2011-
2016, to investigate whether herding varies with time. 
 Investigating whether the US influences herd behaviour in Chinese markets.  
1.4. Purpose of the thesis  
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the determinants of industry herd behaviour 
internationally, at both the market and the sector level. The determinants of herding in 
relation to market returns, trading volume and volatility will be examined in the US and 
Chinese stock markets. Herding will also be investigated during financial crises in both 
markets. Further, the impact of US returns on herding in the Chinese market will be 
examined. The thesis will employ daily for each market data from 1990 to 2016.  
The nature of this topic dictates the use of an inductive research approach. Therefore, in 
this thesis, industry herding pattern is investigated using the cross-sectional absolute 
deviation (CSAD) measure proposed by Chang, et al., (2000). More details will be 
discussed in the empirical chapters. With this purpose in view, the next section discusses 
the research implication and contribution. . 
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1.5. Research implication and contribution  
The investigation of herding challenges two assumptions of the Efficient market Hypothesis 
(EMH). First, the EMH states that informed investors trade based on the value of the stock, 
they buy undervalued stocks and sell overvalued stocks. Second, it also states that the stock 
markets are informationally efficient, securities reflect all available information. However, 
investors who herd differ from these assumptions by blindly copying the investment 
decisions of other investors2 (Devenow and Welch, 1996). In this case, herding could be 
motivated by a lack of private information, possession of low-quality information or the 
perception that other investors have superior information (Bikhchandani, et al, 1992). If 
other investors also copy then an information cascade is formed, which has a potential 
adverse effect on the aggregation of information into stock prices. Thus, these prices may 
not reflect all the available information as suggested by the EMH.  
The study of herding in financial markets is important for various reasons. From the 
investors’ perspective, evidence of herding means that trades are correlated, and this 
increases the co-movement of stocks returns. In essence, the benefit of diversification is 
reduced therefore investors will require more assets in to achieve the desired reduction in 
systematic risk, because at high levels of correlation the risk reduction benefits of 
diversification might be difficult to achieve (Chang, et al., 2000; Chiang and Zheng, 2010; 
Vieira and Pereira, 2015). For regulators, the herding effect on stock price movement may 
have a negative impact on the stock market (Demirer and Kutan, 2006). Tan, et al., (2008) 
argue that herding can boost market volatility and create arbitrage opportunities. In addition, 
investigating herding can further facilitate an understanding of investors’ investment trend 
and how it affects their investment decisions. For instance, fund managers are believed to 
                                                 
2 That is, they buy stocks that others are buying and sell stocks that others are selling 
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mimic the behaviour of other fund managers, and thus ignore their private information to 
protect their reputation (Devenow and Welch, 1996). It can also provide investors with better 
insight on how the prices of assets are determined in financial markets.  
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. The first empirical 
chapter tests for the determinants of industry herding in the US under different market 
conditions. It adds to the growing body of literature examining the tendency of US investors 
to herd towards specific industries when they make investment decisions (Litimi, et al., 
2016; BenSaida, 2017). Empirical evidence provided by Litimi, et al., (2016) and BenSaida 
(2017) have addressed herding in US sectors. However, both studies only focus on excessive 
market volatility. Moreover, this research investigates the effects of changing market returns, 
trading volume and volatility on industry herding during normal and crises periods, thus 
offering a more in-depth analysis. 
The second empirical chapter contributes to the existing literature on industry herd behaviour 
of investors in the Chinese markets (Demirer and Kutan, 2006; Tan, et al., 2008; Yao, et al, 
2014). Zheng, et al., (2017) carried out a closely related study. However, they focus on nine 
Asian markets and do not examine the effect of volatility on industry herding and time-
varying industry herding. Therefore, we build upon this study by focusing on the unique 
Chinese market. Specifically, similar to the first empirical chapter we investigate the effect 
of changing market returns, trading volume and volatility on industry herding during normal 
and crises periods. We exploit the time-varying nature of herding as an opportunity to test 
for its effect on market returns, trading volume and market volatility using a rolling window 
estimate. Further, we investigate whether the US market (industry) returns play a role in 
herding activity in the Chinese market (industry).  
9 
 
1.6. Outline of thesis  
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two presents the theoretical 
framework and the literature review, it discuss behavioural finance, the evolution from the 
efficient market hypothesis to behavioural finance, and finally, the theoretical framework 
for herding is discussed. Chapter three focuses on the research methodology. This chapter 
presents the research philosophy, research paradigm and research approach for the study, 
highlighting how each analysis was selected for the thesis. 
Chapter four is the first empirical chapter. This chapter examines industry herding in the US 
market. The chapter test for the presence of herding at the market and sector level in the US 
market. Further, this chapter also presents the hypotheses to be tested and the analysis of the 
empirical results. Chapter five is the second empirical chapter. This chapter examine 
industry herding in the Chinese markets. The chapter test for the presence of herding at the 
market and sector level in the two Chinese markets. This chapter also presents the hypotheses 
to be tested and the analysis of the empirical results for herding in the Chinese markets.  
The final chapter presents the concluding remarks to the thesis. This chapter discusses the 
implication of the empirical results, the limitation of the study and possible suggestions for 
further studies.   
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Chapter 2 Review of literature 
2.1 Introduction 
This section is set out to survey the academic literature on herd behaviour and its 
determinants under different market conditions. It aims to evaluate related literature to locate 
this research within existing knowledge. Notably, the theoretical and empirical literature on 
herd behavior is vast, as a result, this chapter cannot exhaustively survey every article 
published on the subject. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of core 
literature on herding towards the market consensus since they facilitate a conceptualisation 
of the theories and methodologies. Aside from research that provide a conceptual basis for 
this thesis, the chapter also discusses relevant empirical evidence on herding. Preference was 
given to studies that considered similar questions, methodologies, and sample periods that 
includes major crisis periods.   
 The review of literature highlights the existing gaps in knowledge and demonstrates the 
relevance of this thesis. It also demonstrates the importance of the research questions stated 
in chapter 1 which informed the research hypothesis for each empirical chapter. Further, this 
chapter discusses core methodologies employed in this area of research and then explains 
the choice of the methodology employed in this thesis.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows:  
Section 2.2 discusses EMH and the evolution of behavioural finance to provide a conceptual 
framework for this thesis.  Based on a critical evaluation of relevant literature, the 
relationship between herding, EMH and behavioural finance is highlighted. 
Section 2.3 provides a theoretical framework for this thesis by discussing seminal studies on 
herding. Specifically, this section defines key theories on herding, sources of herding and 
herding based on investor type.  
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Section 2.4 presents core methodologies and describes the methodology employed in this 
thesis.  It also discusses empirical evidence based on the chosen methodology.  
Section 2.5 highlights the gaps in literature to demonstrate the importance of this thesis and 
concludes the review.  
2.2. Conceptual Framework: Efficient market hypothesis and behavioural finance 
2.2.1. Efficient market hypothesis  
The efficient market hypothesis developed by Fama (1970) is a hypothesis of how the market 
functions. An efficient market is defined as a market in which all security prices always 
reflect all available information. According to Shleifer (2000) the proposition is based on 
three basic arguments:  
(i) Investors are rational and hence value securities based on its fundamental value. 
This means each security is discounted to reflect its net present value of future 
cash flow and risk characteristics. Therefore, security prices increase (decrease) 
in response to good (bad) news about the fundamental value of security prices. 
Prices are quickly adjusted on the arrival of new information. Consequently, 
security prices incorporate all available information. An implication of a fully 
efficient market is that it is impossible for investors to consistently earn above 
average risk-adjusted returns as all information is already reflected in the stock 
prices. Rational investors who are always logical in decision-making therefore 
populate an efficient market. 
 
(ii) Not all investors may be rational; therefore, secondly, the trades of irrational 
investors are random and cancel out each other, maintaining the market price 
equilibrium. Proponents of the EMH argue that since these trades are random, 
they will not have a significant effect on security prices. An important condition 
12 
 
for the trades of irrational investors to cancel out each other is that there is no 
correlation in trading strategies. Therefore, if investors herd, then there is a 
correlation and their trades will not cancel out.  
(iii)  If irrational investors with correlated trading strategies trade in the market, those 
of arbitrageurs counter this trade. Thus, eliminating the influence of irrational 
investors on market prices. For the EMH assumption to hold, arbitrage has to be 
unlimited. In broad terms, arbitrage can be defined as making a profit from price 
difference of a security. It involves buying and selling of the same security in 
different exchanges. Arbitrageurs cause price convergence by encouraging 
investors to buy (sell) undervalued (overvalued) assets until the increase 
(decrease) in demand eliminates the price difference and the price is forced to its 
fundamental value. Therefore, even when investors are irrational and their trades 
are correlated, provided close substitute securities are available, arbitrageurs will 
eliminate mispricing by ensuring securities are priced at their fundamental 
values.  
Primarily, the hypothesis focuses on the informational efficiency of capital markets. 
Empirically, the EMH has been classified based on different kinds of information that affect 
market prices into three forms: weak, semi-strong and strong market efficiencies. 
 Weak form EMH: asserts that current prices incorporate all information contained 
in past prices, therefore past prices cannot be used to predict future prices. 
  Semi-strong form EMH: states all publicly available and historical information are 
incorporated into security prices; it concludes that investors cannot profitably 
exploit this information. This form is based on the assumption that current security 
prices instantaneously adjust to the release of all new publicly available information.  
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 Strong form EMH: the strong form of the market efficiency hypothesis states that 
all current security prices ‘fully reflects’ all historical, publicly available and private 
information. Therefore, profit cannot be generated even if the information is not 
publicly known. The rationale behind it is that the market already anticipates this 
new information and may have incorporated it into security prices.  
The EMH has been widely criticised because investigations from research indicate that some 
of its assumptions are unrealistic. Therefore, research that challenges the EMH are reviewed 
in the next section.  
2.2.1.1. Challenges to the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Economists and psychologists in the field of behavioural finance have posed challenges to 
the theoretical assumptions of the EMH in relation to investor rationality and arbitrage. 
Indeed, questioning the core assumption of investor rationality presents a considerable 
challenge for the EMH theory. This section reviews schools of thought, which challenge 
these assumptions.  
1. Investor rationality 
Financial economic theories are based on the assumption that investors are fully 
informed and form their investment expectations following Bayesian rules. 
However, empirical evidence shows that investors follow the advice of financial 
experts, buy past winning stock and sell past losing stock as well as fail to diversify 
their portfolios (Kahneman and Riepe, 1998). Consequently, investors’ deviation 
from rationality or standard decision-making has led to a hot debate in economics 
research.  Research by Froot and Dabora (1999) provides evidence, which suggests 
that stock prices fluctuate due to the noise created by irrational investors. 
Furthermore, research provides evidence on activities by irrational investors such as 
confusion over ticker symbols, sentiment (over-reaction and under-reaction) and 
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increased investment in companies as a result of an internet related Dotcom name 
change (See: Rashes, 2001; Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005; Cooper, Dimitrov 
and Rau, 2001).  
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) argue that when judgments are made under 
uncertainty, the estimation of expected return could deviate from Bayes’ rule and 
other probability theories. Scholars have suggested some factors that influence 
rationality, most importantly bounded rationality (See, Conlisk, 1996; Dequech, 
2001; Kahneman, 2003). Simon (1997) defined bounded rationality as the notion that 
the rationality of an individual is limited to the available information and the 
cognitive ability of the individual. The author suggests that risk and uncertainty, 
access to only incomplete information and human computing capacity can influence 
bounded rationality.   
 
2. The direction of irrational trade: 
The second assumption of the EMH states that if irrational investors exist, they trade 
randomly, as these investors trade randomly with each other, their trades cancels out. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) provide psychological evidence that investors 
deviation from rationality does not occur randomly but in the same way. Because 
investors are influenced by similar beliefs; their investment decisions would be 
highly correlated. Thus, they would not trade randomly with each other; rather they 
would trade the same securities at approximately the same time (which is also known 
as herding). Consequently, their trades do not cancel out each other. Consequences 
of correlated trading strategies will be even more severe if these traders copy each 
other’s mistakes. In this respect, investor sentiment, reflected when investors make 
similar errors in judgment comes into play. 
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Empirical studies have demonstrated that both institutional and individual investors 
imitate each other, which can drive security prices away from their fundamental 
values. Regarding institutional investors, Sias (2004) provides strong indications that 
they follow each other in and out of the same securities. Consequently, there is a 
correlation between portfolio weights of securities of one- quarter, to that of the 
previous quarter, which in turn affects the demand for these securities. More recently, 
Choi and Skiba (2015) provide evidence of institutional investor herding in 
international markets. They find that herding was due to these investors utilising and 
interpreting the same information. For individual investors, Barber, Odean and Zhu 
(2009a) find their trade is systematically correlated, they buy and sell the same stocks 
month on month. They argue that this correlation may be motivated by psychological 
biases such as the representativeness heuristic, limited attention which prompts 
purchases of popular stocks and the disposition effect3. Barber, Odean and Zhu 
(2009b) also provide evidence of individual investor herding, the direction of their 
trade is persistent and highly correlated. They also find that individual investors have 
a tendency to buy (sell) the same stocks in one month as they did in the preceding 
month.  
3. The effectiveness of arbitrage: 
Market efficiency is dependent on the ability of arbitrageurs to correct prices 
distorted by correlated sentiment to fundamental values. For arbitrageur to achieve 
this, conditions supporting arbitrage must be present, i.e. the existence of close 
substitutes, no/minimal implementation costs and sufficiently long-time horizons for 
arbitrageurs to implement their strategy. However, Barberis and Thaler (2009) argue 
                                                 
3 Psychological biases are discussed in detail in a later section.  
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that arbitrage can be risky and costly and therefore impedes the ability of arbitrageurs 
to correct mispricing. These risks and costs are discussed below.  
 
a) Fundamental risk   
Fundamental risk refers to the risk that the negative news about the fundamental 
value of the stock result in losses. Theoretically, arbitrageurs can perfectly hedge this 
risk by purchasing substitute securities. Substitutes are rarely perfect, therefore 
fundamental risk cannot be eliminated.  
Barberis and Thaler (2003) argue that even if a perfect substitute exists, it may also 
be mispriced due to industry-wide mispricing. The authors use the the Royal Dutch 
and Shell shares to illustrate that shares with almost equal dividend payouts can trade 
at significantly different prices4. Two completely separate entities: Royal Dutch and 
Shell Transport decided to merge their interest in a 60: 40 ratio while remaining 
separate entities. Based on this ratio, it is therefore expected that if prices were equal 
to their fundamental values, the market value of the Royal Dutch shares ought to be 
constantly 1.5 times the value of the Shell equity. But, this was not the case, Royal 
Dutch shares were sometimes 35% undervalued relative to parity, and 15 % 
overvalued. Barberis and Thaler (2003), argue that this evidence is a clear case of 
mispricing due to limited arbitrage. As a result, of the mispricing, these two shares 
which were potentially good substitutes for each other cannot be used to create a 
perfect hedge against fundamental risk.   
 
 
                                                 
4 The difference in prices violates the law of one price. It implies that two assets with identical cash flows 
should have prices equal to the theoretical parity ratio.  
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b) Noise Trader Risk  
The noise trader risk is the risk that pessimistic traders who buy when the prices are 
high and sell when the prices are low cause mispricing to worsen. This risk occurs 
when fluctuations in investor sentiments drive prices further away from fundamental 
values after the arbitrageurs take their positions. From a theoretical perspective, De 
Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) argue that noise trader risk can arise 
even when arbitrageurs attempt to return prices to equilibrium by maintaining 
positions against the price direction from correlated trades of irrational investors. 
Taking up such risks could potentially result in losses for arbitrageurs and the 
inability to maintain their positions. When this occurs, arbitrageurs have a tendency 
to be risk averse and unwilling to take positions against the noise traders. Campbell 
and Kyle (1993), who discussed the effect of noise traders on arbitrageurs’ risk 
aversion, state that this risk aversion limits the effectiveness of arbitrage. 
Noise trading can, therefore, force asset prices to deviate from their fundamental 
value resulting in a long-term mean reversion effect. This mean reversion occurs 
when arbitrageurs realise that severe mispricing exists, causing asset price to revert 
to their fundamental values over a long horizon (De Bondt and Thaler, 1989).             
De Bondt and Thaler (1989) state that there is no evidence that arbitrageurs dominate 
the market, and further argue that in most cases noise traders may even be more 
influential than arbitrageurs. The effect of arbitrage is again limited. 
 
c) Implementation costs  
Arbitrage is implemented by short selling, however, it can be expensive due to costs 
such as implementation costs. Implementation costs refer to costs which includes 
transaction costs (for example commissions), bid-ask spread, costs of resources 
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required to find and exploit mispricing (Merton, 1987; Barberis and Thaler, 2003). 
There could be other monetary costs such as accounting policies and legal 
constraints. In some instances, these costs may exceed potential profits, which makes 
the exploitation of mispricing difficult for arbitrageurs.  
 
Overall, despite the challenges to the assumption of the EMH, supporters of EMH argue that 
although inefficiencies exist in the market sometimes, resources should not be dedicated to 
exploiting them as the market will always correct irrationalities. While these arguments are 
logical, there are still deviations from the EMH that remain unexplained by tests based on 
models that support the hypothesis. Indeed, from the beginning of the 1980s, financial 
market academics have discovered behavioural anomalies and puzzles unexplained by 
traditional finance theories. For example, excess volatility in stock markets (Shiller, 1981), 
stock price momentum in short time horizons (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) and positive 
feedback trading (Shiller, 1990) have featured prominently in the relevant debate. 
In response to these anomalies, a new approach to the financial market emerged: behavioural 
finance. Its concepts are examined in detail in the next section. 
 
2.2.2. Behavioural finance  
Traditional finance theories like the EMH and modern portfolio theory have failed to explain 
some puzzles and anomalies in the financial market. In response to these challenges, theories 
based on individual and social psychology have emerged to examine factors that influence 
asset-pricing models. Behavioural finance is one of the major theories that have provided an 
alternative approach to traditional finance. It studies the influence of psychology on human 
decision-making and argues that emotions and sentiment explain the mispricing of securities.  
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Behavioural finance has its roots in behavioural economics, a field that combines psychology 
and economics. The link between economics and psychology was established during the 
classical period of economics, with pioneering research from authors like Adam Smith, 
which suggested that behaviour such as self-interest could be explained by psychology. 
During the 1960s, cognitive psychology provided more insight on how individuals process 
information. In 1979, two psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky proposed a 
widely accepted model in behavioural economics: Prospect Theory. Prospect theory presents 
a deviation of decision -making from the expected utility function when decision makers are 
faced with uncertainty (Shefrin, 2000). The theory has been widely applied in behavioural 
finance for investigating deviations from rational thinking.  
One of the major successes of behavioural finance is the demonstration of the significant 
effects that the interaction of rational and irrational investors can have a long-term impact 
on asset prices. This success resulted from theoretical literature on the building blocks of 
behavioural finance: investor psychology and limits of arbitrage (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). 
Specifically, this section discusses an important aspect of behavioural finance: investor 
psychology, which is directly relevant to this thesis.   
2.2.2.1. Investor Psychology  
The objective of this section is to shed light on the influence of psychology on finance as a 
building block of behavioural finance. Investor psychology can help to explain investor 
financial decision-making and its influence on irrational behaviour. Psychology is a 
scientific field of study that examines the impact of an individual’s physical, mental and 
external environment on their behaviour (Rabin, 1998).  
Most often, in decision-making individuals base their judgment on heuristics due to limited 
knowledge of the particular probability that would lead to the best outcome (Gigerenzer, and 
Gaissmaier, 2011). From a behavioural finance perspective, heuristics is referred to as a 
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simple means of making complex decisions using the rule of the thumb. In other words, 
mental shortcuts taken by an investor confronted with different choices in uncertain 
conditions. Although heuristics aids decision-making, it could result in biases (Khaneman 
and Tversky, 1973).  Biases are intuitive thinking patterns originating from observation and 
generalisations that may lead to inaccurate judgment (Khaneman and Tversky, 1973). 
Biases, in turn, stem from beliefs and preferences (Barbeis and Thaler, 2003).  Relevant 
beliefs and preferences are discussed in the proceeding section. 
2.2.2.2. Beliefs 
Beliefs have been considered by many studies, thus, there exists a vast amount of literature 
that discusses it. As a result, this section focuses on beliefs that are more directly linked to 
herding.   
Representativeness 
Kahneman and Tversky (1972), define representativeness as a heuristic that formulates 
probability around uncertain events of a general population.  Essentially, decisions are made 
based on stereotypes rather than a detailed evaluation of probabilities (Shefrin and Staman 
2000). Representativeness can result in two major biases: base rate neglect and sample size 
neglect. Base rate neglect results from putting too little weight on background information 
when estimating the likelihood of an event. An example of ignoring base rate is when the 
luck of fund managers in picking investment is equated to skill. Indeed, a study by Wermers 
(2000) found that the US actively managed mutual funds, only outperformed the market 
benchmark index on a net return level. The second bias: sample size neglect sometimes also 
referred to as the law of small numbers occurs when an individual makes a judgement based 
on a sample without taking the sample size into consideration (Rabin, 2002). This means 
that they incorrectly assume that few data points are representative of the entire data set. For 
example, an investor might think that a financial analyst with three good stock picks in the 
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previous month is skilled, whereas, this assessment is the only representative of a small 
sample size (Barberis and Thaler, 2003).   
Representativeness is also associated with two other biases: the gambler’s fallacy and the 
‘hot hand’. Gambler’s fallacy is a mistaken belief that two events are statistically dependent 
whereas, the occurrence of one is independent of the occurrence of the other. For example, 
when observing the toss of a fair coin, people erroneously believe that after a consecutive 
outcome of heads, the next toss is likely to be a tail. The gambler’s fallacy stems from the 
belief in the law of small numbers, where people believe that a small sample must be 
representative of a larger population. Hence, an event like the toss of a coin is a self-
correcting process, a deviation in the direction of tails is required to restore equilibrium for 
it to be representative of the population (Rabin, 2002). In contrast, sometimes people 
mistakenly believe that previous success generated by a ‘hot hand’ is more likely to be 
replicated rather than reversed when, however, the successes are entirely random. Using the 
example of tossing a fair coin, people who believe that consecutive heads are generated by 
a ‘hot hand’ expect that heads will persist. These biases are applicable in finance. Research 
by Shefrin and Statman (1985) and Odean (1998) show that investors prone to gambler’s 
fallacy are likely to sell stocks past winning stocks because they believe that the performance 
will reverse. Other researchers (see, Cahart, 1997 and Sirri and Tufanno, 1998) show that 
fund managers buy fund shares with prior superior performance. These findings suggest that 
investors base their purchase decision on the belief that certain fund managers have ‘hot 
hands’.  
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Overconfidence 
Psychologists argue that people are generally overconfident and overestimate their abilities 
(see Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips, 1982). Barber and Odean (2001) state that 
overconfidence drives individuals to be overly optimistic resulting in two major illusions: 
the illusion of knowledge and the illusion of control. First, the illusion of knowledge is the 
tendency of individuals to believe that their ability to make accurate decisions increases with 
the amount of information that they possess. For instance, the illusion of knowledge could 
come from the internet, tips from colleagues or friends and financial analysts’ reports or 
opinions, however, it is difficult to ascertain if the information is true and complete. Indeed, 
research by Tumarkin and Whitlaw (2001) provides evidence that for the internet service 
sector, information embedded in user ratings did not predict trading volume or exhibit 
abnormal industry-adjusted returns, and consequently had no effect on stock prices. 
 Second, the illusion of control is defined as “An expectancy of a personal success 
probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would warrant” (Langer, 
1975, pp. 313). Consequently, individuals behave as though an event were based on skill 
and they can control the outcomes of chance events, especially when it entails factors relating 
to skill, such as competition, choice, and familiarity (Taylor and Brown, 1988). Hence, the 
presence of these factors increases confidence and risk taking.  In a seminal experiment, 
Langer (1975) provides evidence that people valued lottery tickets they selected by 
themselves more highly than randomly selected ones. In reality, the sale of lottery tickets in 
Massachusetts increased significantly when people could choose their lucky number instead 
of being given a random number as in the old system (Perlmuter and Monty, 1977).  The 
illusion of control is widespread and influences investment decisions, many new investors 
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prefer to trade by themselves rather than through a broker as it gives them an inflated sense 
of control over the performance of their trades (Barber and Odean, 2001).  
Barber and Odean (2002) analysed investors who changed from phone-based to online 
trading and find that they made more profit before than after the switch. They also find that 
these investors traded more actively, aggressively and speculatively after going online 
because they become overconfident and tend to overestimate the control they have over their 
successes. In addition, they propose that this overconfidence is partly due to the illusion of 
knowledge and illusion of control as they had access to large quantities of information, 
mostly manage their portfolios and could trade with ease. However, the resultant overtrading 
violates the traditional finance paradigm assumption of rationality. If investors were indeed 
rational, they would know that overtrading would rarely lead to greater profits as excessive 
transaction costs are also incurred with a corresponding increase in risk.   Research by Barber 
and Odean (2000) of over 66,000 households demonstrate that the most active traders 
underperformed the market benchmark. Thus, despite the compelling evidence not to 
overtrade, it is apparent that investors execute trades beyond what they should if they were 
indeed rational.  
Psychologists and behavioural economists have identified that self-attribution bias is a 
common source of overconfidence (Kahneman and Tversky, 1996). Self- attribution bias is 
an individuals’ tendency to give themselves credit for positive outcomes and credit external 
factors or bad luck for negative outcomes. Hirshleifer (2001) argues that self-attribution 
makes people overconfident rather than accurately evaluate themselves, as a result, those 
who become wealthy through successful investment decisions tend to become more 
overconfident.  
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Overconfidence can also be expressed in the hindsight bias. Hindsight bias or ‘The knew it 
all along effect” refers to an inflated certainty in predicting the probability of occurrence of 
a past event prior to its occurrence (Fischhoff, 1975).  In essence, in hindsight, individuals 
inflate the accuracy of their foresight, thus they believe an outcome is predictable even 
before it occurs. For example, an individual who is told to guess the outcome of a fair coin 
toss before it is tossed guesses a head and a tail is obtained. If after the toss, the individual 
states that he/she knew that it would be a tail, then he/she has expressed the hindsight bias. 
The hindsight bias is a robust phenomenon evident in many fields including finance. Biais 
and Weber (2008), report that hindsight biased investment bankers were unable to remember 
the extent of their uncertainty when asked to select initial estimates before observing 
outcomes, and therefore made lower volatility estimates than their unbiased peer. Also, these 
bankers earned far less than their peers, hence the bias created a discrepancy between their 
actual performance and perceived performance.  
The effect of overconfidence becomes more severe, especially in bull market conditions. 
Bull markets are characterised by rising security prices and investors tend to become 
overconfident that the prevailing conditions will persist. However, this collective 
overconfidence may contribute to a subsequent economic crisis. In an analysis of the recent 
global financial crisis, Avgouleas (2009) argues that the enormous credit expansion led to 
the crisis. Moreover, the author suggests the credit expanded because market regulators 
became increasingly overconfident that the market would continue to be liquid for the 
foreseeable future. 
Optimism (and wishful thinking) 
Optimism (and wishful thinking) stems from overconfidence.  Most people tend to hold 
optimistic albeit unrealistic views about their abilities and the future (Thaler, 2000). Another 
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belief related to this bias is systemic planning fallacy: individuals often have a tendency to 
underestimate the completion time for a task (Barberis and Thaler, 2003).  
Many economic phenomena originate from optimism; it can lead to under-reaction of stock 
prices to public news, over-reaction to good or bad news (Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1998), an inflation of asset prices in the presence of short-sales restrictions (Chen, Hong, 
and Stein, 2002) and agents overestimating the return on their investment in portfolio 
selection (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005). 
Cognitive Dissonance 
Cognitive dissonance theory posits that people like to act in a way that is in line with their 
beliefs and values and as such may be uncomfortable in maintaining inconsistencies 
(Festinger, 1957). Consequently, individuals have a tendency to either alter their past values 
or beliefs or attempt to rationalize their choice. In the financial investment context, this 
theory can apply when investors seek to justify contradictory behaviours so that they flow 
from personal beliefs. For instance, recently more investors have altered their beliefs from 
traditional forms of investing to ethical investment strategies. Goetzmann and Peles (1997) 
examined the empirical implication of cognitive dissonance on mutual fund investors. They 
find that these investors may be subject to psychological influences like cognitive dissonance 
specifically in making buy or sell decisions and portfolio selection. 
  
2.2.2.2. Preferences 
Preferences are a vital part of decision-making. In behavioural finance, preferences are 
analysed based on how investors make decisions regarding the future under conditions of 
uncertainty, or how they evaluate risky gambles (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). The traditional 
utility framework, the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) posits that when faced with risk, 
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decision makers are rational and choose the prospect that maximizes their expected utility. 
Under the EUT theory investors’ risk preferences are captured by the shape of the utility 
function; whereby, the shape is concave if the investor is risk-averse and convex if risk 
seeking. In addition, decisions are made based on outcomes of wealth and probabilities under 
risky conditions. An argument against EUT is that it focuses on how decisions should be 
made under uncertainty and not how they are actually made. 
2.2.2.2.1. Prospect Theory 
Challenges to the EUT were highlighted by paradoxes such as the Ellsberg (1961) paradox5 
and Allais (1953)6 paradox which, represented deviations from the EUT and thus led to the 
postulation of an alternative framework for decision under risk; the Prospect Theory (PT) 
postulated by Tversky and Kahneman (1991). Tversky and Kahneman (1991) argue that the 
EUT did not properly describe how individuals make decisions in risky conditions, thus 
failed to predict the decision-makers’ choice. PT posits that individuals are not always 
rational; and thus, (i) evaluate outcomes such as gains and losses relative to a reference point 
(ii) are loss averse; more sensitive to losses than equivalent gains, (iii) are risk averse for 
gains and risk-loving for losses. PT attempts to represent how individuals evaluate risky 
gambles (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). It suggests that when individuals are presented with 
choices between two or three alternatives, they behave in a way that mirrors maximising an 
s-shaped function as illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
                                                 
5 This is a paradox in decision making under conditions of uncertainty which states that in situations of 
ambiguous probability, agents prefer to bet on known probabilities rather than unknown probabilities 
(Ellsberg, 1961). Thus, agents seek (avoid) ambiguous probability in the domains of losses (gains). 
 
6 According to this paradox, agents tend to irrationally change their decisions among a set of outcomes when 
the probability of the reward in each option is reduced by a common ratio. This change may be motivated by 
the fear of regret, i.e. they anticipate that their choice can potentially lead to regret.  
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Although similar to the value function in the EUT, the value function in the PT is defined 
based on gains and losses instead of final wealth. Therefore, it predicts that people value 
utility based on gains and losses differently when the expected final wealth is the reference 
point, regardless of whether or not the reference point is updated (Grinblatt and Han, 2001). 
This means that losses in relation to the reference point (usually the purchase price), have a 
greater emotional impact than equivalent gains cause satisfaction which implies loss 
aversion.  
Mental accounting pioneered by Thaler (1983), explains how decision-makers use a 
cognitive process to set reference points for the accounts that determine gains and losses. 
Thaler (1983) further states that mental accounting enables decision-makers to record, 
summarise, and analyse their financial transactions.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 The value function proposed Tversky and Kahneman (1991). 
Source: Tversky and Kahneman (1991). 
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Framing of the monetary outcomes obtained from these transactions is an important aspect 
of mental accounting. Framing, which can be either narrow (based a single transaction) or 
broad (based on a spending category) influences the reference point. However, Grinblatt and 
Han (2005), argue that decision-makers have a tendency to engage in narrow framing and 
ignore the relationship between these mental accounts.Consequently, motivated by the need 
for gains, their evaluation of new investments is only focused on individual accounts rather 
than a broad consideration their overall position.  Indeed, Barberis and Huang (2001) suggest 
that investors are either concerned about whole portfolio or the value of each stock in their 
portfolio and therefore disregard correlations.  
Further, the PT explains how decision-making is influenced by the context in which options 
are presented: framing. Framing is a cognitive bias that is observed when individuals’ 
decisions are dependent upon how the options are presented. Specifically, the PT predicts 
that individuals are likely to be risk averse when faced with a decision that is framed 
positively (for instance as a gain) and risk seeking when a decision is negatively framed (for 
instance as a loss).  
Studies by Shefrin and Statman (1985) and Odean (1998a) show that the PT has direct 
implications on a cognitive bias: the disposition effect. The disposition effect refers to a 
tendency that people would rather avoid losses and seek to realise gains in decision-making 
situations. Shefrin and Statman (1985) find evidence that investors are more likely to sell 
winner stocks and hold loser stocks. Consequently, people avoid actions that can result in 
regret or losses in favour of actions that can result in gains or pride. Consistent with the 
disposition effect, Odean (1998a) and Barber and Odean (1999) find that US investors were 
more willing to sell winners while holding on to losing investment. Grinblatt and Han (2002) 
argue that the disposition effect has implications for the equilibrium of stock prices, past 
29 
 
winner stocks may subsequently outperform past losers due to under-reaction to public 
information when there is a higher demand for losing stock. 
In order to illustrate how the PT is applied in investor decision-making, Barber and Odean 
(1999), give an example of an investor who purchases a stock in anticipation that the 
expected return will exceed the risk. If the investor uses the purchase price of the stock as 
the reference point and the value of the stock appreciates, the shape of the value function 
will become more concave. This shows that s (he) is more risk averse. Conversely, if the 
stock price declines, the value function becomes convex in the risk-seeking region. At this 
point, the investor will still hold the stock regardless of if its expected return is below 
expectation. Therefore, s (he) would rather only sell the stock when the expected return in 
their own expectation is lowered despite the decline in prices. In essence, the investor has an 
irrational tendency to sell quickly when the stock appreciates but do not sell when the prices 
decline.  
Overall, the PT demonstrates how people make decisions under risk by using practices that 
deviate from rational behaviour. People make decisions under risk by based on loss aversion, 
losses have greater emotional impact than gain, and thus people select options where gains 
are probable. Moreover, they set up mental accounts for evaluating options narrowly, 
without considering the relationship between different accounts. Furthermore, in many 
situations, people exhibit framing; they tend to be risk averse when faced with a decision 
that is framed positively and risk seeking when a decision is negatively framed. Finally, the 
PT explains the disposition effect: people prefer gains to losses and become more risk-averse 
after they have made gains and more risk loving after they have made losses.  
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 2.2.2.4. Collective behaviour 
The biases discussed so far have focused on individual decision-making. An important 
question, however, is how these biases affect collective behaviour. Collective behaviour can 
potentially affect asset prices and even create new biases (De Long, et al., 1990). According 
to Le Bon (1947) the fact that heterogeneous individuals have been formed into groups 
creates in them a collective mind that makes them think and act similar to members of the 
group than they would in isolation. Galbraith (1993) documents the effects of collective 
behaviour in recent episodes in the financial market. Nofsinger (2001) demonstrates how the 
limited knowledge of investors prompts searches for investment financial advice in 
investment decision-making. This information makes them overly optimistic and in turn 
attracts other investors. The popular consensus drives prices away from their fundamental 
values, the prices further rise until it returns to the market equilibrium. The Dot com bubble 
is a clear example of how collective behaviour drives prices.  
2.2.3. Behavioural finance versus efficient market hypothesis 
The purpose of this section is to compare the three basic assumptions of the EMH to the 
assumptions of behavioural finance. The rationality assumption is compared to behavioural 
finance and heuristics. Thereafter, the random walk of prices is compared to observed price 
patterns.  
2.2.3.1. Investor rationality versus biases and heuristics  
The EMH assumes that individuals are rational, meaning they make optimal decisions that 
maximise their expected utility. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that a direct implication 
of this is that, prices reflect all available information; so private information cannot be 
exploited to earn excess returns above the market portfolio. In contrast, behavioural finance 
argues that individuals’ decisions under uncertainty are influenced by biases and heuristics. 
Some biases and heuristics were discussed in detail in the previous section, as such, only a 
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brief summary is carried out here. Heuristics are mental shortcuts for making complex 
decisions, which may involve on focusing on a specific aspect as the expense of others. It 
could result in errors such as biases (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973).   Biases are intuitive 
thinking patterns originating from observation and generalisations that may lead to 
inaccurate judgment.  
2.2.3.2. Random walk of prices versus observed price patterns 
The rationality assumption is associated with the random walk hypothesis. It posits that stock 
prices follow a random walk and implies that successive price movement is independent. 
Thus, these prices are unpredictable, and no patterns can be observed. Empirical evidence 
from Fama (1965) and Seiler and Rom (1997) to determine whether stock prices followed 
random walks showed strong support for the model.  
More recent evidence discovered some price patterns in both the short and long run that 
violates the random walk hypothesis and asset pricing models. These patterns are referred to 
as anomalies, defined as empirical evidence that present deviations from standard asset 
pricing behaviour (Schwert, 2003). Interestingly, some anomalies happen only once, while 
others vanish, reverse or persist.  Evidence of anomalies raises issues of whether anomalies 
are merely random or represent profitable opportunities, which have not been eliminated by 
arbitrage (Schwert, 2003). 
Short-run price patterns have been tested by measuring short-run serial correlations between 
successive price changes (for example see Fama, 1965 and Seiler and Rom, 1997). These 
studies found zero correlation between these price movements, implying that future prices 
cannot be predicted from past prices. However, Lo and MacKinlay (1988) provide empirical 
evidence of positive short-run serial correlation for weekly US stock returns examined, 
implying the predictability of stock price from past returns and thus reject the random walk 
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hypothesis. Besides, studies by Allen and Karjalainen (1999) and Lo, Mamaysky and Wang 
(2000) find that price movement follows technical patterns. Indeed, Jegadeesh (1990), 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Rouwenhorst (1998) and more recent evidence by Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2001) have documented evidence of excess returns earned using this strategy, 
which poses a strong challenge to the EMH. The weak form of the EMH posits that all stock 
prices incorporate all past information. However, according to behavioural finance, evidence 
of under-reaction of stock prices to news over short time horizons violates this form of 
market efficiency. Therefore, this slow reaction to news results in stock prices exhibiting a 
positive serial correlation.  
Some studies document long-run price reversal whereby past long-run losers outperform 
past-long run winners. One of the pioneering studies in this respect is DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985), who find evidence of negative serial correlation of stock returns over long horizons. 
Notably, they find that over a five-year period stocks with poor prior performance exhibit 
subsequent superior performance and vice versa. Similarly, Fama and French (1988) and 
Poterba and Summers (1988) find mean reversion in stock returns and predictability over 
long horizons. A behavioural explanation for this predictability is based on investors over-
reacting to news. De Bondt and Thaler (1985), proposed the over-reaction hypothesis where 
investors tend to over-respond to the earnings-related news. This hypothesis suggests that 
asset prices temporarily deviate from fundamental values due to waves of optimism and 
pessimism. As a result, investors irrationally make decisions based on recent news 
announcement instead of updating their beliefs in conformity to Bayes’ law.  
The review of empirical literature thus far clearly demonstrates the relevance of behavioural 
finance in providing insights on market anomalies and puzzles. It can be concluded that it 
plays an importance role in modern finance as indicated by the findings of the above studies.  
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2.3. Theoretical Literature 
2.3.1. Theories on herding: Why do investors herd? 
The tendency of people to herd may seem to be apparently irrational, such as a desire to act 
in conformity to a group. This tendency has led to questions on whether people who engage 
in herd behaviour act on purpose or are completely unaware of their behaviour, a question 
that is difficult to answer in reality. In an attempt to answer this question, academic 
researchers (see, Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000)) explain the motives behind herding in 
two dimensions – intentional and spurious. This section examines the relevant literature on 
these two dimensions.  
2.3.1.1. Intentional herding  
Intentional herding involves a deliberate intent by investors7 to mimic the investment 
decisions of each other regardless of their private information (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 
2001). Kremer and Nautz (2013), state that this type of herding leads to excess the volatility 
of asset prices8, destabilise financial markets and therefore potentially create/contribute to 
bubbles and crashes. Thus, intentional herding can lead to market inefficiency by driving 
assets away from their fundamental values. To understand intentional herding, it is important 
to know the factors that motivate such strategy. Using theoretical literature, these factors are 
examined in subsequent the sub-sections below.  
2.3.1.1.1. Sources of intentional herding  
Informational cascade 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), demonstrate that when an individual investor 
observes the trade patterns of predecessors, s /he can make a decision to mimic the choice 
                                                 
7 These investors may deem themselves as lesser informed or have lower ability than their peers.  
8 See, for example empirical evidences provided by Morris and Shin (1999) and Persaud (2000)  
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of these investors even if it conflicts with his/her own information. An informational cascade 
occurs when investors ignore their private information signals. The central idea is that 
individuals can glean important information by observing others trade.  
Banerjee (1992) argues that if the information signal is incorrect, then the wrong information 
will filter through the market and might sway other investors to invest. Banerjee (1992) gives 
an example of how herding takes place. If a hundred people set out to eat at two restaurants 
A and B next to each other with known probabilities of 51 percent that A is better than B, 
49 percent that B is better than A. In addition, they have information that restaurant A is 
better than B. People arrive in the restaurant in sequence and make their decisions based on 
their predecessors.  Assuming 100 out of the 99 people had information that restaurant B 
was better than A, then only one person would go to A. However, if the second person sees 
the choice that the first person made and goes to A instead of B, then s (he) has ignored 
his/her information. If the third person follows him/her then everyone would end up at 
restaurant A even when he had information that restaurant B was better. In essence, the 
second person’s decision to ignore his/her personal information and follow the herd led 
others to make the wrong choice. This wrong choice made by ignoring one’s information 
and imitating others is described as “herd externality”. Bikhchandani, et al., (1992) contend 
that regardless of the social appeal of the result, the cognition behind it might be rational.  
Moreover, Hirshleifer, David and Teoh (2003) state that this kind of herding impedes 
information aggregation because it is difficult to detect the source of information that the 
herd is acting on. In stock markets, asset returns are determined by the information that can 
be deduced from market variables such as prices and volumes. However, in the presence of 
cascades, either the private information may not be reflected in prices or individuals may 
decide to imitate others possibly decreasing the amount of both private and public 
information (Hirshleifer, et al., 2003).   
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In an experimental research, Avery and Zemsky (1998) demonstrate that informational 
cascade as a source of herding is impossible if simple information structures and trade 
settings are assumed.  Conversely, herding is only possible in complex information 
structures and in uncertainty which may affect security prices and lead to the formation of 
price bubbles. Cipriani and Guarino (2005) obtained similar results in a laboratory 
experiment where they find that herding rarely occurs in a frictionless market where 
participants’ trade based on information. They observe that sometimes subjects may ignore 
their private information or pursue a contrarian trading strategy. Furthermore, they suggest 
that herd behaviour maybe better understood by examining other possible explanations such 
as reputational concerns (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). 
 
Reputational-based herding  
The agent-principal relationship can also lead to herd behaviour in investment decisions. The 
performance assessment of fund managers (agents) by their clients (principals) is often 
measured in relation to other managers (See for example Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 
1992). As a result, these agents are interested in what other traders do, hence inclined to 
ignore their own private information and make investment decisions based on imitation. 
Keynes (1936, p.158) argues that this might be motivated by the conventional wisdom that 
‘It is better for reputation to fail conventionally that to succeed unconventionally’.  
The study of Scharfstein and Stein (1990) was seminal in demonstrating that reputational 
concerns can result in herd behaviour. They assume that the economy consists of two 
managers faced with investment decisions. They may have a high or low ability that is 
unknown to themselves or observers. Observers may infer the ability of the managers in 
relation to their investment decisions, which in turn determines their remuneration. As a 
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result, the high ability managers will observe correlated trade signals about investments, 
whereas the low ability managers observe noise. With this type of information structure, in 
herding equilibrium, reputation depends on the action of others, which, creates an incentive 
to herd. Therefore, it is assumed that the first manager trades on their own signal and the 
second manager imitates him/her. If both managers invest based on their own signal, 
observers would accurately infer that both managers had different signals, and thus infer that 
they both have low ability.  Conversely, if the second manager makes the same decisions as 
the first manager and the outcome is poor, then observers would infer that both managers 
are probably high quality and the poor outcome occurred by chance. Therefore, they 
conclude that it is better for reputation to fail as part of the herd than to succeed as an 
individual.  
While Scharfstein and Stein (1990) describe a setting where agents follow the trade of high 
ability agents, Zwiebel (1995) takes an alternative approach that explores a setting where the 
agent with superior information has to decide whether to be a leader in deviating from the 
herd. In Zwiebel’s model, the manager’s ability is measured relative to the market 
benchmark; therefore, reputation depends on outperforming the market rather than other 
managers. As a result, managers may become loss averse and shun superior projects that 
would result in a greater discrepancy between their performances relative to others in the 
industry.  This approach suggests that herding might occur where some managers reduce the 
risk of their portfolios relative to the market benchmark, whereas others intentionally deviate 
from the benchmark.   
In some principal-agent models, managerial incentives such as compensation schemes can 
also lead to herd behaviour in managers.  
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Compensation-based herding  
Compensation schemes dependent on the absolute or relative performance of managers have 
been designed to align the interests of principals and agents. However, some investment 
managers have a tendency to herd when their compensation is depends on their performance 
relative to the performance of other managers, this may result in a distortion of incentive and 
inefficient portfolio allocation (Maug and Naik, 1995).  
In their model, Maug and Naik (1995) consider a risk-averse fund manager whose 
compensation is dependent on his/her own performance relative to a performance 
benchmark. The benchmark may be the performance of other investors or the market 
portfolio. In a situation where the fund manager and the benchmark both have imperfect 
private information about asset returns, informational efficiency can motivate the agent to 
imitate the benchmark such that his/her investment portfolio is similar to the benchmark’s 
portfolio. Moreover, the compensation contract also provides an additional incentive for the 
agent to ignore his or her own information and herd towards the benchmark. As the 
compensation of the fund manager decreases, if he/she underperforms, his/her portfolio will 
be correlated to the benchmark’s portfolio.  In addition, benchmarking can also drive the 
manager to trade during periods where s/he would not have traded if he/she were managing 
their personal portfolio.  
2.3.1.2. Spurious Herding 
Spurious herding occurs when investors make similar decisions because they share the same 
fundamental-driven information or stock preferences (Devenow and Welch, 1996). In other 
words, correlated trade occurs without investors imitating each other. Spurious herding is 
consistent with market efficiency because it is driven by changes in asset fundamentals 
(Caparrelli, D’Arcangelis and Cassuto, 2004). There are two sources of spurious herding: 
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relative homogeneity and characteristic trading. These sources are discussed in the sub-
sections below.   
 
Relative Homogeneity  
Relative homogeneity refers to common factors among fund managers which can result in 
similar investment decisions (De Bondt and Teh, 1997). For example, most fund managers 
have similar educational background and professional qualifications (Kremer and Nautz, 
2013). Further, their investment decisions may be made based on similar sources of 
information 9 or by using similar indicators (Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman, 1994; 
Wermer, 1999). Market risk is another factor that can induce homogeneity, fund managers 
are exposed to the same market risk and tend to trade in similar directions (Broeders, Chen, 
Minderhoud and Schudel, 2016). In addition, these managers are also subject to similar 
regulatory frameworks. For example, Olivares (2008) provides evidence that the regulation 
on Chilean pension funds which requires managers to yield a minimum guaranteed return 
resulted in funds holding the same portfolios. They argue that the regulation significantly 
increased the correlation of asset allocation among fund managers because they were 
motivated reputational reasons. Studies have also found that fund managers also react to 
endogenous shocks in the same way.  For example, Broeders, et al., (2016) find that Dutch 
pension funds react similarly to endogenous shocks such as changes in pension fund 
regulation. They also find that pension funds have similar portfolio rebalancing strategies, a 
finding further confirmed by Blake, Sarno and Zinna (2017). More specifically, Blake, et al., 
(2017), report that pension funds in the U.K. rebalance their portfolios in line with asset 
weight restrictions in the short term.   
 
                                                 
9 For example, financial ratios 
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Characteristic Trading 
Characteristic trading also known as style investing occurs when investors base their 
selection of stocks or portfolios on certain characteristics or styles (Andrikopoulos, et al., 
2017). Institutional investors use characteristics such as size, value/growth, sector and past 
performance to formulate their views and investment strategies (Kalinterakis and Gregoriou, 
2017). Indeed, empirical research provides evidence of the manifestations of these 
characteristics. Gompers, and Metrick (2001) find that institutional investors have a 
preference for larger stocks, however later studies by Bennett, Sias and Stark (2003) and 
Sias (2004) report that institutional investors have shifted their preference to smaller stocks.  
Further, Froot and Teo (2008), report that institutional investors reallocate their portfolios 
across size, value/growth and sector styles. Choi and Sias (2009) document that institutional 
investors herd across industries, they buy/sell stocks from the same industries which is 
consistent with style investing.  
There is also evidence of investing based on past performance which can be either 
momentum or contrarian. The former refers to buying (selling) past winning (losing) stocks 
while the latter refers to buying (selling) past losing (winning) stocks.  Numerous studies 
show that institutional investors utilise both strategies (Grinblatt, et al., 1995; Sias, 2004; 
Choi and Sias, 2009; Jegadeesh, and Titman, 1995; Baytas and Cakiki, 1999; Kaniel, Saar 
and Titman, 2008). According to Falkenstein (1996), mutual funds also share a preference 
for stocks with other characteristics such as high liquidity, highly visible stocks amongst 
analysts and low transaction costs. Ultimately, the implication of forming investment 
strategies using specific characteristics is a correlation in trading strategy which is not based 
on the copying decisions of other investors (i.e. intentional herding).  
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Rational versus Irrational Herding 
There are two opposing views on herding: rational and irrational herding (Devenow and 
Welch, 1996). The rational view suggests that herding can be driven by principal-agent 
concerns or the ability to infer information from prior trades of other investors. Principal-
agent concerns, observed in agents (for example fund managers, stock market traders and 
investment analysts) stems from their need to protect their reputation or compensation 
because their performance is evaluated comparatively. Therefore, they prefer to ignore their 
information and either copy a higher ability manager to prove quality or copy to avoid being 
exposed as being incompetent (Devenow and Welch, 1996). The irrational view is based on 
investor psychology, it suggests that investors ignore their information and follow each other 
like lemmings (Devenow and Welch, 1996).  
Psychological biases and heuristics10 have been found to influence herding (Barber, Odean 
and Zhu, 2009b). There is evidence that investors tend to have a preference for investing in 
domestic as opposed to foreign securities, this preference is known as home bias (See, Feng 
and Seasholes ,2004; Seasholes and Zhu, 2010) Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) and Zhu 
(2003) provide evidence that US investors invest approximately 30% of their portfolios in 
companies with headquarters close to their homes,  Feng and Seasholes (2004) report a 
similar pattern for investors in mainland China, they invest more in firms in their province. 
If agents/investors in a locality are home biased in selecting stock for their portfolios, their 
counterparts will herd mimicking this home bias.   
Seasholes and Zhu (2010) contend that home bias is motivated by advantageous information 
asymmetry, investors can exploit undisclosed information for domestic securities. 
                                                 
10 Recall that a detailed discussion of heuristics and biases has been conducted in section 2.2.2. Therefore, the 
discussion here focuses on those that relate to irrational herding.   
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Alternatively, the home bias may be driven by other psychological biases such as familiarity 
bias, recognition heuristics and conformity. Regarding familiarity bias11 Huberman (2001) 
finds that investors tend to invest in their local Regional Bell Operating Company (RBOC) 
than any others and argue that this bias is induced by familiarity. In a study that investigates 
the use of recognition heuristics12 for portfolio selection, Boyd (2001) reports that 
participants tended to select stocks with highly recognisable names as potential winning 
stocks. Hirshleifer, (2001), states that people tend to conform to the behaviour of others. In 
relation to home bias, when a community dominated by inherently home biased 
agents/investors, there is an increased tendency of others to follow the group norm.  
Conservatism bias which refers to slow response to new information is also a key 
characteristic of irrational herd behaviour. Hirshleifer, (2001), highlights that a possible 
explanation for conservatism bias is the cost of processing new information. As such, 
information that is difficult to process is weighed less in decision-making. Investors also 
make decisions using the representative heuristic, which can cause them to chase trends or 
perceive non-existent patterns. Barber, et al., (2009a) suggest that investors motivated by 
this heuristic focus on buying past winning stocks and selling past losing stocks. Rabin 
(1998) contend that the hot hand and gambler’s fallacies are linked to the representative 
heuristics.  
Investors who are driven by the former are encouraged to herd because after observing 
purchases (sales) trades of other participants, they think that the trend will persist and thus 
mimic the purchases (sales) of their predecessors. Conversely, investors motivated by the 
                                                 
11 Familiarity bias occurs when investors prefer securities that they are more familiar with 
12 Recognition heuristics is a decision-making strategy in which investors choose stocks based on recognition 
retrieved from memory.  
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latter are inhibited from herding and trade in the opposite direction because they believe that 
the recent trend will reverse (Rabin and Vayanos, 2009).  
Irrational herding can also be driven by the illusion of control, individuals think that they 
have control of random events (Kahneman and Riepe, 1998). Moreover, Quiamzade and 
L’Huillier, (2009), suggest that individuals influenced by the illusion of control interpret the 
actions of others in a way that is predictable. In a market setting, investors influenced by this 
illusion tend to believe that other investors are similarly influenced. Consequently, these 
investors deduce information from the trades of other investors since they assume that the 
latter’s trades are based on relevant information rather than random information. Therefore, 
this illusion of control motivates herding.  According to Prast (2000), there are two concepts 
that may explain irrational herding: cognitive dissonance and congruity. Cognitive 
dissonance makes individuals seek information that confirms of the belief that they have 
made the right choice (Festinger, 1957). In a financial market setting, cognitive dissonance 
may explain herding, whereby investors who encounter dissonance make themselves feel 
more comfortable by assuming that preceding investors made similar decisions 
consequently, these investors engage in sequential herd behaviour. Congruity is a cognitive 
consistency which indicates that people have a biased attitude towards information and 
neglect any information that is inconsistent with their existing belief. Prast (2000), suggests 
that investment analysts and fund managers affected by congruity are biased in the way they 
gather and interpret information and are further encouraged to make decisions that align with 
their earlier beliefs even disregard new information that could alter this belief. Lastly, limited 
attention (being able to process a limited amount of information at a given point in time) can 
also contribute to irrational herd behaviour.  
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When faced with vast amounts of information concerning stocks, investors with limited 
attention tend to limit their search to stocks which have recently attracted their attention 
(Barber, et al., 2009a). According to Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) investors even focus their 
attention on popular but incompetent analysts because they wrongly associate popularity 
with ability. In particular, limited attention is pronounced in periods of market stress (e.g. 
during a crisis), as such conditions can prompt investors to focus their attention on market-
level information rather than asset-level information. Peng (2005) shows that in periods of 
uncertainty investors have limited information processing capacity, thus they allocate this 
information capacity across various sources to minimise the overall uncertainty of their 
portfolio. Therefore, limited attention can induce irrational herding when investors neglect 
how their predecessors make their information preferences and herd with them.  
 
2.3.2. Herding: Institutional investors versus individual investors                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Empirical literature examines herding in two strands. One strand examines herding in 
institutional investors, while the other considers herding in individual investors. According 
to Chang (2010), herding is more prevalent among institutional investors because they have 
financial information/trading information advantage. Wermers (1999) posed two questions 
concerning these investors: first, do institutional investors herd when they trade assets? 
Second, do individual investors follow the investment pattern of other investors? These 
questions provide more insight into herding behaviour of investors. Hence, Wermers (1999) 
proposed four theories in herding literature, which provide explanations for the herding 
behaviour of institutional investors. First, managers may neglect information gained from 
private research and herd in order to protect reputation (See Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). 
Second, managers may invest based on the same information, resulting in informational 
cascades (see Banerjee, 1992). Third, managers may trade in the same direction by utilising 
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private information before that of market analysts (See Hirshleifer, et al., 1994). Fourth, 
institutional investors may exhibit similar aversions based on, for example, liquidity or 
analyst coverage and momentum trading (See Falkenstein, 1996). The first two theories are 
based on intentional herding while the subsequent two are based on spurious herding.  
Concerning the herding behaviour of individual investors Shiller (2003) indicates that 
recommendations from market analysts, brokerage houses, and arrival of fundamental 
information may influence their investment decisions.  
2.4. Empirical Evidence for herding  
For over two decades, herding has attracted increasing attention from finance academics 
(Galariotis, et al., 2015), with empirical evidence focusing on one of two strands. The first 
strand pioneered by Christie and Huang (1995) tests for herd behaviour by measuring the 
cross-sectional dispersion of individual equity returns relative to the overall market return. 
The second examines the herd behaviour among institutional investors using transaction data 
(Lakonishok, et al., 1992; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999).  
Starting with the first strand, Christie and Huang (1995) conducted a seminal study which 
investigates the presence of herd behaviour during periods of market stress. The authors 
developed a Cross-Sectional Standard Deviation (CSSD) of returns13 model, a linear model 
that measures the cross-sectional dispersion of returns towards the aggregate average market 
return. It is based on the rationale that investors have a tendency to ignore their information 
in favour of the market consensus during periods of market stress. Thus, these investors have 
a propensity to herd during such periods. The CSSD model was tested using daily and 
monthly data for the US market; it provides evidence of the absence of herding at the market 
and industry levels during periods of extreme price movement. Interestingly, when the 
                                                 
13 Returns here refers to the logged equity excess return  
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authors investigate herding asymmetry during periods of market stress, they find herding 
increases when the market is rising relative to when it is declining.  
The methodology developed by Christie and Huang (1995) was criticised by Chang, et al., 
(2000) because it does not incorporate deviations from a linear relationship in the market. 
 (Gebka and Wohar, 2013). They argue that the linear relationship will be eliminated in the 
presence of herding and thus become nonlinear or even decrease in certain market 
conditions. Based on this intuition, Chang, et al., (2000), developed an alternative measure 
for herding using the Cross-Sectional Absolute Deviation (CSAD). They examine herding 
in developed (US, Hong Kong, Japan) and developing countries (South Korea, Taiwan) and 
only find herding in developing markets. Chang, et al., (2000) also examine possible 
asymmetric effects, consistent with Christie and Huang (1995) they find that for all markets 
examined, herding is more prevalent in up market conditions than in down market 
conditions. 
Gleason, Lee and Mathur (2003), employ the CSSD model to investigate herding in thirteen 
commodity futures contracts traded on three European exchanges14. Like Christie and Huang 
(1995), they report that herding is absent. However, in contrast to Christie and Huang (1995) 
and Chang, et al., (2000), they report that the cross-sectional return dispersion increases 
rather than decreases during up and down-market periods.  
Using tick data for Exchange Traded Funds from the S&P 500 index from 1999 - 2002, 
Gleason, Mathur and Peterson (2004), utilise the CSSD and the CSAD models, as well as 
modified versions of both models. They provide evidence that cross-sectional returns 
increased during rising and declining markets, which implies the absence of herding. 
Interestingly, they find that investors in ETFs herd away from the market consensus during 
                                                 
14 The study was carried out using data from the following exchanges: London Futures and Options 
Exchange, International French Futures and Options Exchange, Agricultural Futures Market Amsterdam.  
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periods of market stress. They also investigate the reaction to news and report a weak 
asymmetric reaction to news during rising and declining markets.  
 Hwang and Salmon (2004) criticised the CSSD model. They argued that herding could also 
occur without significant movement in the return of the overall market, therefore, using this 
assumption could result in misleading conclusions. Furthermore, they contend that it is 
difficult to define ‘extreme’ price. Consequently, Hwang and Salmon (2004) developed an 
alternative measure for herding based on the movement in fundamentals that focuses on the 
cross-sectional dispersion of beta rather than market returns. The authors document evidence 
of herding in US and South Korea, which is more pronounced prior to and after crises periods 
examined. However, a major drawback of this method is that it only focuses on factor 
sensitivities of stocks and would only be of interest to investors with diversified portfolios, 
who are concerned about reducing their exposure to specific risk. 
Caparrelli, et al., (2004) examine herding in the Italian market during the period between 
1988 and 2001. Employing the CSSD, CSAD and Hwang and Salmon (2004) models, they 
find mixed evidence of herding. More specifically, results for the CSSD model are 
inconsistent with herding, both in normal and extreme market states. For the overall sample, 
the CSAD model yields results inconsistent with herding, the cross-sectional dispersion of 
returns is stronger during up market periods. Lastly, for the Hwang and Salmon (2004) 
model, they document evidence of herding, which more significant prior to a market crash.   
For the Chinese market, Demirer and Kutan (2006) examine herd behaviour under different 
market conditions. They employ the CSSD model on stocks listed on the SZSE and SHSE 
between 199315 and 2001 at the firm and sector levels and find no evidence of herd behaviour 
at both levels.  Further empirical results suggest that equity return dispersions are more 
                                                 
15 1994 for Shenzhen  
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significant during periods of market stress, with these dispersions lower when the market is 
declining than when it is rising, indicating more correlation in returns when the market is 
declining. They find consistent results when they test for robustness using the 1997 Asian 
crisis. 
Henker, Henker and Mitsios (2006) argue that most studies produce evidence that herding is 
absent because of the use of inadequate data frequencies, hence, they propose testing herding 
using high frequency intraday data.  Applying adapted versions of the CSSD and CSAD 
models, they examine herding at the market and industry level for a sample of 200 largest 
Australian stocks for the years 2000-2002 and find general evidence that is inconsistent with 
intraday herding for both models. However, they report that herding exists in the Property 
Trust sector and explain that it may be ascribed to the sector being perceived as a ‘safe haven’ 
during the Dotcom bubble. In addition, Henker, et al., (2006) document mixed evidence for 
herding asymmetry, the level of cross-sectional return dispersion increases and is more 
significant in down market conditions.  
Tan et al., (2008) investigate herd behaviour in dual-listed Chinese A-share and B-share 
stocks using the CSAD model and find evidence of herding. They also investigate herding 
asymmetry and report herding in both A and B shares within both stock exchanges and find 
that investors tend to herd more when the market is rising, the trading volume is high and 
return volatility is high. In relation to the different data frequencies, they find lower levels 
of herding for weekly and monthly data compared to daily data, which is consistent with 
Christie and Huang’s (1995) point that herding is a short-lived phenomenon16.  Like Demirer 
and Kutan (2006), their robustness test using the 1997 Asian crisis shows that it did not 
influence herd behaviour. 
                                                 
16 Christie and Huang (1995) report higher level of dispersion for monthly data and explain that with monthly 
data, investors have a longer period to deviate from the mean 
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 Using daily data for 10 most traded stocks on different international markets from 1998 to 
2004,17 Blasco and Ferreruela (2008) report significant evidence of herding only for Spain, 
this herding persists during both periods of crises and tranquil periods. They employ a variant 
of the CSSD model which is compared to the CSSD of a notional stock market devoid of 
intentional herding. Moreover, they only find limited evidence of herding in the other 
markets.  
Caporale, Economou and Philippas (2008) investigate herding in the Greek market before 
and after the 199918 stock market crash using the CSSD and CSAD models and find 
significant herding for the period between 1998 and 2007. When they test for herding 
asymmetry, they find that it is more significant during up market.  Further, consistent with 
the proposition that herding is a short-lived phenomenon, they find more significant levels 
of herding for daily data compared to lower data frequencies. Besides, the authors discover 
that herding diminishes after 2002 due to the regulatory reforms in the Greek market.  
Goodfellow, Bohl and Gebka (2009) test for herding in the Polish market. This market is 
particularly interesting because it has two parallel trading platforms, one dominated by 
institutional investors and the other dominated by individual investors, enabling the authors 
to determine the investor type that is more prone to herding.  Their findings indicate that 
individual investors herd more significantly during down-markets than during up-markets, 
which they attribute to investor sentiment when returns decline. Moreover, institutional 
investors do not herd regardless of the market condition.  
                                                 
17 France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Spain, the U.S. and the U.K. 
18 They use daily, weekly and monthly data frequencies 
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Cajueiro and Tabak (2009) utilise the CSAD model to investigate herding in the Japanese 
stock market over the period 2000 through to 2006 and herding is observed during periods 
of market stress.  
By employing daily market and industry data for 18 countries19 for the 1988-2009 period, 
Chiang and Zheng (2010) use the original version of the CSSD model and a modified version 
of the CSAD model20 and find evidence of herd behaviour in all markets except the U.S. and 
Latin American markets. Notably, they find that US returns have an impact on the returns of 
other markets which is more significant in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, China and Hong Kong, 
indicating that these markets herd around the US market. When they examine herding in up 
and down-market days, they report that herding is more prevalent in up markets than in down 
markets specifically in China, Japan and Hong Kong. In addition, the authors investigate 
herding during tranquil and crisis (1994 Mexican crisis, 1997 Asian crisis, the 1999 
Argentine turmoil and 2008 credit crisis) periods, they document that the crisis triggers 
herding in the country it originates and then it spreads to neighbouring markets. Furthermore, 
they find that herding surfaces in the Latin American and US markets during crisis periods. 
Demirer, Kutan, and Chen, (2010), investigate herding in the Taiwanese market using daily 
return for 689 stocks categorised into sectors, from 1995 through to 2006. Using the CSSD, 
CSAD and Hwang and Salmon (2004) models they find mixed evidence of herding. For the 
first model, herding was absent in all sectors except Electronics. However, the other two 
models provide significant evidence of herding in all sectors examined. It’s important to note 
that these results further support the view that models based on the assumption of a non-
                                                 
19 They are as follows: the developed markets: Australia, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, the U.K., and 
the U.S.; Latin American markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico; Asian markets: China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
20 Modified to account for herding asymmetry under different market conditions  
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linear relationship between the return dispersion and the market return are for reliable for 
detecting herding. They also find that herding is stronger when the market is declining.  
Fu and Lin (2010) investigate herd behaviour and investors’ reaction to news in the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen composite indexes using monthly data from 2004 – 2009. They employ both 
the CSSD and CSAD models and find no evidence of herding. Although they do not find 
evidence of herding, consistent with previous studies, their results reveal an asymmetric 
relationship where investors tend to engage in herd behaviour when the market is declining. 
Based on previous studies demonstrating that herding is a short-lived phenomenon, it can be 
argued that a possible explanation for the absence of herding found in Fu and Lin (2010)’s 
study may be due to the monthly frequency of the data explored (Christie and Huang, 1995; 
Tan, et al., 2008). 
Chiang, et al., (2010) employ a quantile regression analysis21 and a least squares method to 
test for herding using daily returns and turnover ratios for all firms listed on the SZSE and 
SHSE over the period 1996-2007. Both tests were conducted using the CSAD model. For 
the least squares method, they only report herd behaviour in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share 
markets, with no evidence of herding in the aggregate market. Further, they investigate 
herding asymmetry based on and document evidence of herd behaviour in A-share markets 
during rising and declining conditions, while B-share market investors herd only in declining 
conditions. Their results for the quantile regression analysis provides supporting evidence of 
herding for both A and B share investors conditional on the return dispersion in the lower 
quantile regions22.   
                                                 
21 Quantile regression separates the data into quantiles with the aim of testing for co-movements between 
return dispersions and the market return in different quantiles. The authors argue that this method reduces 
common issues such as statistical errors and outlier sensitivity. 
22 The authors use 5 quantiles: 10%, 25%, 50%, 70%, and 90%   
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Lao and Singh (2011) examine herd behaviour in Chinese and Indian23 stock markets using 
Tan, et al.,’s (2008) version of the CSAD model. They find evidence that herding is present 
in both markets and is more significant during periods of extreme price movement. However, 
they find that both markets show distinct herding trends.  Herding is greater in the Chinese 
market when the market is declining, and the trading volume is high24. In contrast they find 
that herding occurs during up market periods in the Indian market. In addition, they find that 
different from China there is no relationship between herding and trading volume in the 
Indian market. Moreover, they report that herd behaviour is more prevalent in the Chinese 
market during the GFC25, whereas they failed to find evidence of herding in the Indian 
market during the crisis. They explain that the dominance of institutional investors in the 
Indian market results in a decrease in speculative investment and thus contributes less to 
herding during the crisis.  
By applying daily returns data for the Portuguese, Italian, Spanish and Greek market from 
1998-2008, Economou, et al., (2011) document mixed evidence of herding using the CSAD 
model. More specifically, they find that herding is present mainly in the Greek and Italian 
markets, but absent in the Spanish market, while the Portuguese market presents mixed 
evidence. As part of their study, the authors investigate herding asymmetries in relation to 
market returns, trading volume and the volatility of market returns. They find evidence of 
significant herding asymmetry in high and low market returns, high and low trading volume 
and volatility. Further, Economou et al., (2011) examine whether it is stronger during the 
GFC and fail to find evidence that it is stronger during this period. Finally, following Chiang 
                                                 
23 For China they apply daily data from top 300 firms listed on the Shanghai A-share index and for India they 
apply daily data from the top 300 firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange for the period 1999 to 2009.   
24 The authors explain that the observed asymmetry may be due to the dominance of inexperienced individual 
investors in the market who try to avoid losses during extreme periods by herding with the market.  
25 The authors suggest that the observed herding may be due to the contagion effect stated by Chiang and 
Zheng (2010).  
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and Zheng (2010), they investigate the impact of US returns on herding for the four markets 
in their study and did not find supportive evidence of its impact.  
Chiang, Tan, Li and Nelling (2013) propose a time-varying approach which uses a Kalman-
filter-based model to measure dynamic herding. When they employ the conventional static 
regression approach on daily individual stock returns for 10 Pacific-Basin markets 
(Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea 
Thailand, Taiwan and the U.S.) from 1997-2009, they find evidence of herding in all the 
markets. Interestingly, the finding for the time-varying approach is consistent with the static 
approach, herding is present in all the markets except the US market. Thus, the authors argue 
that herding is time varying. In addition, they report an interdependence of herding in the 
markets examined.  
Using daily market and sector data for 32 international stock markets26, Gebka and Wohar 
(2013), employ the CSSD and CSAD models for 1998-2012 period and fail to find evidence 
of herding internationally27. Instead, they discover ‘negative herding’, whereby the cross-
sectional dispersion of returns is significantly higher, which implies that market participants 
largely ignore the market consensus and follow the investment pattern of dominant investors. 
Further, they explain that this behaviour can be associated with three phenomena localised 
herding, excessive ‘flight to quality’ and overconfidence. Localised herding occurs when 
market participants simultaneously move in and out of markets, excessive ‘flight to quality’ 
refers to when market participants move their investments from risky assets to more secure 
ones during times periods of excessive volatility, and overconfidence makes investors rely 
on their stock-picking skills rather than the market consensus. At the sector level, the authors 
                                                 
26 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, France, Greece, 
Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan. Korea, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, U.K. and U.S.  
27 They obtained similar results when the employ the quantile regression method.  
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observe that herding is significant in Basic Materials, Consumer Services and Oil and Gas. 
When they investigate herding asymmetry, they find that cross-country return dispersion is 
more significant in up market conditions. Lastly, they find that herd is not more significant 
during crisis periods.  
Similar to Demirer, et al., (2010), when Chen (2013) applied the CSSD, CSAD and state 
space model (proposed by Hwang and Salmon, 2004) to stocks traded in 69 countries, they 
report herding for the CSAD and state space model. The authors argue that the inconsistent 
results for the CSAD model compared to other studies might be due to the larger number of 
countries in their sample.  
Philippas, Economou, Babalos and Kostakis (2013) investigate herding in US Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REIT) for the period 2004-2011, using the CSAD model. Their empirical 
evidence show that herding occurred during the 2004-2009 period, which they attribute to 
investor sentiment and adverse macro conditions related to the conditions of the real estate 
market.  
Using a modified version of the CSAD model 28Luo and Schinckus (2015) examine herding 
asymmetry in rising, declining and extreme market conditions using daily data from 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2006 to 2012. In line with Chiang and Zheng 
(2010), Lao, and Singh (2011), they find that herding is more prevalent in declining market 
conditions. The authors observe that herding is more significant in B- shares when the market 
is rising.  In contrast, herding is prevalent in declining market conditions for A-shares. They 
obtained similar results for extreme market conditions. 
Empirical evidence on industry herding in the Chinese market indicates that it varies across 
industries. Lee, et al., (2013) conducted an analysis of industry herd behaviour and market 
                                                 
28 They combine the original version of the model with Tan et al’s., (2008) methodology 
54 
 
states, applying Chiang and Zheng’s (2010) CSAD specification on daily returns for 1,863 
A-shares listed on Shanghai stock exchange. Different from Demirer and Kutan (2006), they 
report strong evidence of herding at the firm level and obtain similar results for the 22 sectors 
in both exchanges29. They show that all sectors except Agriculture, Chemicals, Machinery, 
Metals & non-metals, Petrochemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Textiles, Social services, and 
Wholesale & Retail trade herd with the IT sector30. Further, they find that the Shenzhen 
market herds more than the Shanghai market, which supports the argument that the Shanghai 
market is more sophisticated and thus demonstrates the characteristic differences between 
both exchanges.  
Yao, et al., (2014) investigate herding in Shanghai and Shenzhen A and B shares at the 
market and industry level and find that herding occurs in both exchanges but is more 
significant in the B-share market with no evidence of herding in the all industries portfolio31. 
However, they document that herding is prevalent at the individual industry level, with the 
strongest level of herding reported in Social Services and Media industries. Their results also 
show positive herding in Agriculture and Mining industries with no evidence of herding in 
Financial Services (possibly due to heavy regulation). Yao, et al., (2014) also test for herding 
asymmetry under different market conditions and find that consistent with Demirer and 
Kutan (2006) herding is persistent when market returns decline.  
In an investigation of herding in European markets (France, Germany, Denmark, Norway, 
Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain (also known as the PIIGS), 
Mobarek, et al., (2014), only report strong evidence of herding during crises and asymmetric 
market conditions. More specifically, they find herding variation during crises. Continental 
                                                 
29 This may be due to the difference in time span and sample size in both studies 
30 That is the dispersion of the returns in the IT sector plays a role in herding in these sectors  
31 They used a modified version of the CSAD model, which includes the arithmetic mean of the market 
return to eliminate multi collinearity between the explanatory variables.  
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countries herd more during the GFC, Nordic countries during the Eurozone crisis and PIIGS 
herd during both. In relation to asymmetry, they find that Germany, Greece, Portugal and 
Sweden have a greater tendency to herd when market returns are negative, Ireland and 
Norway during low volume periods and Denmark, Greece and Sweden during both high and 
low volatility periods. They conclude that markets with similarities herd in similar ways.  
Galariotis, et al., (2015) used both the CSSD and CSAD methods to examine herding and 
find that it is absent from the S&P 100 index. Interestingly, they find that herd formation in 
the US market takes place after the release of important macroeconomic news. Similarly, 
Galariotis, et al., (2016) employ the CSSD and CSAD model and find no evidence of 
herding.  
As part of their study, Hillard and Zhang (2015) investigate the presence of herding in the 
SZSE and SHSE during different periods from 2002 to 2012. They find herding in both 
exchanges for the whole period. However, herding is stronger in the 2002 to 2005 period 
compared to the 2007 to 2012 period. The authors point out that their results suggest that the 
reforms32 carried out by the China Securities Commission improved informational efficiency 
in the market.  
Herding has also been investigated in frontier markets. Using data from the Mongolia stock 
market between the period 1999-2012, Erdenetsogt and Kallinterakis (2016), find significant 
evidence of herding which is persistent regardless of the direction of the market’s returns, 
the level of trading volume and the US market’s returns. Additionally, they find evidence of 
herding before and after but not during the GFC. Similarly, Guney, Kallinterakis and Komba 
                                                 
32 Four major reforms which have been carried out recently are: 1) the 1996 reform: a market stabilisation 
measure was introduced that imposed a price limit on stock price movements; 2) the 1999 reform: the securities 
law was implemented to strength corporate governance; 3) the 2001 reform: the trade restriction which 
prevented Chinese residents from investing in B shares was removed; 4) the 2002 reform: a Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors System was created to allow foreign investors to invest in A-shares. 
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(2017) investigate herding in 8 African frontier markets (BRVM33, Botswana, Ghana, 
Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia) over the period 2002-2015 and document 
evidence of herding. They contend that the evidence of herding can be attributed to low 
levels of transparency which in turn reduces the quality of information and thus increases 
investors’ propensity to mimic their peers. They also investigate herding asymmetry with 
respect to market return and volatility, and only report evidence of asymmetry for market 
volatility which is more significant during periods of low volatility. Furthermore, they find 
evidence of herding before, during and after the GFC for all markets expect Botswana (only 
herded before the crisis). Lastly, they find limited evidence that US and South African 
returns induce herding across all the 8 markets.   
It is important to point out that majority of the studies based on modified versions of the 
CSSD and CSAD model or other models find evidence of herding. Some studies have 
modified the CSSD and CSAD model by adding explanatory variables such as volume and 
volatility to examine whether they trigger herding.  
Litimi, et al., (2016) modify the CSSD and CSAD to include potential triggers of herding 
such as volatility, volume and sentiment. They test these models using market and sector 
data for all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ and find evidence of herding for 
the modified CSAD34. For the sectors, the modified version of the CSSD model provided 
evidence of herding in the Basic industries, Healthcare and Utilities sectors. For the CSAD 
model, herding is only reported in the Public utilities and Transportation sectors, while for 
the modified version they find herding in Public utilities, Transportation, Energy, and 
Healthcare sectors. They also provide evidence that while volatility affects herding in all 
                                                 
33 BRVM is an abbreviation for Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières a cross border exchange consisting 
of Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
34 There is not sufficient evidence of market level herding using the modified CSSD model  
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sectors, volume affects herding in only 5 sectors (Basic industries, Energy, Health care, 
Public utilities and Transportation). In addition, they provide empirical evidence that the 
presence of herding in the US market has contributed to the bubbles and financial crises from 
the 1987 Black Monday till the recent GFC.  
BenSaida (2017) conducted a study using similar data as Litimi, et al., (2016), they modify 
CSAD model by including variables to capture trading volume and investor sentiment. They 
only find herding in the Healthcare and Public utility sectors. Interestingly, during crisis 
periods they find herding in 10 out of the 12 sectors examined and argue that US investors 
blindly mimic other investors in such periods.  
Vo and Phan (2017), investigate herding in the Vietnamese market using daily, weekly and 
monthly data for 299 companies over the period 2005-2015. They utilise the CSSD and 
CSAD models and find evidence of herding for daily and weekly data, which supports the 
proposition of Christie and Huang (1995) that herding is a short-lived phenomenon. They 
also report evidence of herding during up and down-market conditions. The authors suggest 
that investors in the Vietnamese market herd during up-markets because of the market’s 
limited information transparency regarding its institutional investors, while herding during 
down-markets is prompted by the poor quality of the information in published accounts. 
Additionally, they find herding in both high and low trading volume states. Evidence of 
herding is also reported before and after but not during the GFC crisis.  
By employing a modified version of the CSAD model35 on data from the US market, 
Bekiros, Jlassi, Lucey, Naoui, and Uddin (2017), document time-varying dynamic herding 
which is significant in extreme market conditions. Notably, they find that herding is mainly 
significant before the crisis rather than during or after it. They point out that this evidence is 
                                                 
35 The model is modified to include volatility as a metric for agents’ risk assessment 
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inconsistent with previous studies and may be due to the use of the quantile regression 
approach.  
Zheng, et al., (2017) examine industry herding in nine Asian markets (China, Korea, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Taiwan) using daily data for the period 1993 to 2013. They test for 
herding using the CSAD model and the model developed by Chiang and Zheng (2010) and 
report herding in major industries across all the markets. For the Chinese market, they find 
herding in all industries except Utilities, with herding more significant in the Technology 
industry consistent with Lee, et al., (2013). Similar results were also obtained for the 
Japanese, Korean and Hong Kong markets. Zheng et al., (2017) also investigate the influence 
of the U.S. market on herding and find evidence that implies that Japan and Korea herd more 
with the U.S than the other markets. When they investigate herding asymmetry in relation 
to market return and trading volume, they find that Japan, Korea and Taiwan herd when the 
market is declining and is prevalent during days with low trading volume. They conclude 
that herding is more likely to occur in concentrated industries such as Industrial Goods. The 
authors obtain mixed evidence of herding during crisis and tranquil periods, however, the 
Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese markets herd more during crises.   
Andrikopoulos, Kallinterakis, Ferreira, and Verousis (2017), test for intraday herding on the 
Euronext for the 2002-2010 period at the market and industry levels, using the CSAD model, 
they document evidence of herding for the group. Specifically, they find that herding is 
prevalent in all the countries (Belgium, France and Portugal) except Netherlands. The 
authors attribute the lack of herding in the market to the dominance of sophisticated foreign 
investors who base their investment decisions on international market conditions as opposed 
to domestic conditions. Moreover, they report evidence of industry herding in sectors 
(Financials, Healthcare, Oil and Gas and Utilities) with the largest market capitalisation, 
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indicating a size effect. Lastly, they observe herding before, during and after the GFC, 
though it is less significant during the crisis.  
Li, Liu and Park (2017) develop time-varying models based on the CSAD model to test for 
herding in the Chinese market. Using daily price returns from the CSI 300 index36 stocks, 
they find weak evidence of herding with the static model. However, the coefficient of the 
time-varying model show that herding is present between 2006 and 2010 and the second half 
of 2014. Relating to herding in market conditions, they document evidence that investors 
only herd during turbulent periods, particularly during the GFC.  
Utilising the CSAD and enhanced CSAD models, Kabir (2018) investigates herd behaviour 
of investors in the US financial industry37 during the 2008 financial crisis to identify whether 
investors herd towards the financial sector/ its sub-sectors/ the market. For the CSAD model 
they provide evidence that investors herd towards the financial sector, with higher levels of 
herding in Savings and Loans Institutions. The findings for the enhanced model show 
significant levels of herding, which implies that herding is affected by market conditions and 
volatility. Further, Kabir (2018) reports that the financial crisis did not increase the level of 
herding. 
Recently, researchers have focused on investigating herding in the excessively volatile 
cryptocurrency market (Bouri, Gupta, Roubaud, 2018), and have found mixed evidences on 
its existence. For example, Vidal-Tomas, Ibanez and Farinos (2018) investigate herding in 
the cryptocurrency market using the CSSD and CSAD models and fail to detect herding. 
Nevertheless, when they investigate herding asymmetry, they find that herding is significant 
when the market is declining. Similarly, Bouri, et al., (2018), fail to find herding using these 
                                                 
36 The index consists of the 300 most liquid A shares on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock Exchanges 
37 Specifically, commercial banks, savings and loans institutions, and investment and insurance companies.  
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models, however, when they use a rolling window regression approach, they find evidence 
of dynamic herding. They argue that due to the nonlinearities, static models are unsuitable 
for investigating herding in cryptocurrencies. Kaiser and Stockl (2019), provide contrasting 
evidence, they find herding in the cryptocurrency market when they employ the CSSD and 
CSAD models. They explain that their contrasting results is due to the survivorship bias and 
small data sample used previous studies.  In the same spirit, Kallinterakis and Wang (2019) 
find significant evidence of herding which is asymmetric especially during rising markets, 
high trading volume and low volatility days. 
Some important issues arise from the review of empirical evidence on herding at the 
aggregate level. First, the examined evidence reveals that models which account for non-
linearities between return dispersions and market returns are more reliable for explaining 
herding than models that are based on a linear relationship. The characteristics of the market 
microstructure may result in non-linear behaviour of returns due to the difficulties in 
executing arbitrage transactions (e.g. restrictions on short selling, differences between stock 
markets and derivative markets) [Antoniou, Ergul and Holmes (1997)]. Non-linearities could 
also occur because of market imperfections, for example transactions costs which may 
prevent investors from trading. Hence, they only trade when it is profitable, resulting in a 
clustering of return which may impact herding. Antoniou, et al., (1997) point out that 
investor irrationality could also lead to non-linearity. Investor irrationality is at odds with 
the finance theory that assumes investors are rational, risk averse and capable of processing 
relevant information relating to assets in an unbiased manner.  Yet, as earlier discussed 
investors may exhibit biases such as overconfidence and take on excessive risk. Thus, linear 
models may be inadequate for explaining the relationship between returns. These reasons 
for nonlinearities buttresses why linear models fail to adequately explain herding, hence non-
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linear models such as the CSAD provide more reliable evidence of herding as opposed to 
the CSSD model.  
Second, empirical research has revealed that emerging markets are more prone to herding 
than developed markets (see for example Chiang and Zheng (2010)). Thus, some studies 
have cited factors that provide possible explanations for the prevalence of herding in these 
markets. According to Chang et al., (2000), the existence of herding might be due to a high 
degree of government intervention in issues relating to monetary policy. In addition, they 
suggest that scarcity of accurate information disclosure can also explain herding whereby 
scarcity of fundamental firm specific information may cause investors in these markets 
concentrate more on macroeconomic information. Another possible explanation could be the 
impact of the dissemination of global investment information. For example, Chiang and 
Zheng (2010) argue that investors in Asian markets tend herd because they track 
international news and make investment decision informed by those of U.S. institutional 
investors. Lee et al., (2013) contend that herding may due to inherent characteristics of 
emerging markets such as inadequate corporate governance, dominance of less-educated 
investors, insider trading and weak financial market regulation. Yao et al., (2014) argue that 
it may be attributed to low transparency of emerging markets whereby financial reporting is 
relatively less stringent and information is costly to acquire, thus increasing investors’ 
propensity to mimic the actions of each other. Finally, the studies have shown that the 
presence of thin trading38 in emerging markets conceals the degree of herding. Kallinterakis, 
Kratunova (2007) and Andronikidi, Kallinterakis (2008) report that thin trading induces bias 
in the estimation of trading models for the Bulgarian and Israeli market respectively. Both 
                                                 
38 Thin trading occurs when there is low trading volume because of lack of buy (sell) orders. It can induce 
serial correlation of market returns and biased estimators (Antoniou, et al., 1997).  
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authors adjusted the returns to account for thin trading and report it caused herding to be 
more persistent.  
Lastly, relevant research reveals that herding is affected by the occurrence of financial crises 
(Hwang and Salmon, 2004). For example, some studies (Hwang and Salmon, 2004; Bowe 
and Domuta; Economou, Katsikas and Vickers, 2016) report that herding dissipates during 
crises, while other studies find that herding increases during crises (Chiang and Zheng, 2010; 
Lao and Singh, 2011, Mobarek, et al., 2014; Economou, et al., 2015; Zheng, et al., 2017). 
There are possible explanations for the effect financial crises have on herding. Kallinterakis 
and Gregoriou (2017) explain that crises expose fundamentals, which changes the consensus 
on which market participants herded on pre-crisis and consequently results in a new 
consensus that informs the herding of these participants. The authors further explain that the 
change in the consensus prior to the crisis is a possible explanation for the dissipation of 
herding post crisis, in contrast the new consensus results in an increase in herding tendency 
post crisis. Another possible explanation for the increase in herding post crisis could be due 
to investors who enter the market in anticipation of its recovery. But the market might still 
be risky due to post crisis excess volatility, hence investors who are risk-averse are prone to 
herding with other investors (Vo and Phan, 2017). Interestingly, contrary to prior literature 
(see and Tan, et al., 2008 and Economou, et al, 2011) that suggests that herding should be 
more pronounced during crises, some studies report that (see Demirer and Kutan, 2006, 
Philippas, et al., 2013; Yao, et al., 2014) herding is absent during financial crises. These 
studies may have failed to find herding because high market volatility during crises makes 
it difficult for investors to view the direction of the market hence, they are unable to herd 
towards the market consensus (Gavriilidis, et al., 2013). In contrast, Gavriilidis, et al., (2013) 
point out that in tranquil market conditions, investors can clearly view the market consensus 
and herd towards it.  
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Besides the research based on aggregate data, there has also been extensive amount of 
research based on transaction data of markets investigating herding. Lakonishok et al. (1992) 
conducted a seminal study using the LSV measure they developed to examine herding in 
769 U.S. tax-exempt funds39 from 1985-1989. They find weak evidence of herding for stocks 
with smaller market capitalization, while they find insignificant evidence of herding for 
larger capitalization stock. In the same spirit, Grinblatt, et al., (1995) find weak evidence of 
herding for 155 U.S. mutual funds from 1974-1984. Wermers (1999) investigates the 
relationship between mutual fund herding and stock prices using data for U.S. mutual funds 
from 1974 to 1994 and finds that smaller stocks exhibit higher level of herding whereas 
average stocks showed slight herding behavior. In a study of all NYSE companies from 
1977-1996, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) provide evidence of herding; however, institutional 
investor herding had more impact on returns than individual investor herding. Similarly, 
Jones, et al., (1999) report evidence of herding for U.S. institutional investors over the period 
from 1984 to 1993.  
 Evidence from studies that examine institutional investor herding in emerging markets 
indicate mixed evidence of herding in these markets especially in the aftermath of the Asian 
Crisis. Using data of foreign investors from 1996-1997, Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999), report 
that they herded more before the 1997 Asian crisis compared to during it. Kim and Wei 
(2002a) also investigate the herd behavior of offshore and onshore institutional and 
individual investors in the Korean market and document that onshore funds herd more 
compared to foreign institutional investors during the Asian crisis. These results are 
corroborated by Kim and Wei (2002b) who investigate herding of foreign investors in Korea 
                                                 
39 These funds were predominantly pension funds. All the funds in the sample were managed by 341 fund 
managers. 
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before and during the Asian crisis, they find that offshore foreign investors are more likely 
to herd than their domestic counterparts.   
Sias (2004) develop a new measure to detect herding using U.S. data for the period 1983-
1997 and find that institutional investors herd. Other studies in different countries and 
markets also provide evidence of institutional herding: Indonesia (Bowe and Domuta, 2004); 
Chile (Olivares 2008); U.K. (Wylie, 2005; Blake, Sarno and Zinna, 201740); Poland 
(Voronkova and Bohl, 2005), Japan (Chang and Dong, 2006), Taiwan (Chen and Hung, 
2006, Hung, Lu and Lee, 2010; Lu, Fan and Nieh, 2012); Germany (Walter and Weber, 
2006, Oehler, and Wendt, 200941, Kremer and Nautz, 2013), Spain ( Blasco and Ferreruela, 
200842, Agudo, Sarto and Vicente, 2008; Gavriilidis, et al., 2013); Portugal ( Lobao and 
Serra, 2007; Homles et al., 2013); U.S. (Choi and Sias, 2009); Hong Kong (Zhou and Lai, 
2009), India (Lakshman, Basu and Vaidyanathan, 2013).  
There are two interesting findings from the reviewed empirical evidence. First, a size effect 
is evident in institutional herding. Some studies (e.g. Lakonishok, et al., 1992; Grinblatt, et 
al., 1995) report that herd behaviour is more significant in small market capitalisation stocks. 
This finding can be attributed to the information risk (due to the low analyst coverage of 
these stocks) which characterises to these stocks, and consequently results in low trading 
volume (Kallinterakis and Gregoriou, 2017). Low trading volume increases investors’ 
tendency to herd as they are likely to mimic the trading decisions of their peers. 
Contrastingly, other studies (e.g. Wylie, 2005; Kremer and Nautz, 2013) find that herding is 
more significant among large capitalisation stocks, this could be due to market regulations 
that require institutional investors to invest in companies with specific characteristics (See 
                                                 
40 They investigate herding in U.K. pension funds 
41 They investigate herding in bond markets, the evidence of herding is weaker than stock markets.  
42 Other countries examined were Germany, United Kingdom, United States, Mexico, Japan, Spain and 
France. However, they only find significant evidence of herding in Spain.  
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Voronkova and Bohl, 2005; Olivares 2008). Some of these characteristics include investing 
in larger stocks, this can lead to herding because these investors investing in similar stocks. 
In like manner, the performance of institutional investors is often linked to benchmarks such 
as indices, which increases their tendency to mimic the portfolio composition of these 
indexes (Walter and Weber, 2006). 
Lastly, herding has been found to be more significant in emerging markets compared to 
developed markets. A possible explanation for this is information asymmetry, whereby as 
earlier stated, emerging markets often have low quality information about fundamentals, 
which prompts institutional investors to neglect the market information and mimic their 
peers (Kallinterakis and Gregoriou, 2017).  
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Table 2.1 Related evidence on herding in the US market 
Author                  Data Sample  Purpose Method Result 
Christie and 
Huang (1995)  
Daily from 
1962-1988 
monthly from 
1925-1988 
 
 NYSE and Amex 
firms, 12 industries 
Tests for 
herding by 
investigating 
whether 
dispersions are 
significantly 
lower than 
average during 
periods of 
market stress. 
CSSD No herding is reported at the firm and sector 
level. During declining markets, when herding 
is expected to be significant, return dispersion 
is consistent with the predictions of rational 
asset pricing models.  
Chang, et al., 
(2000) 
Daily returns 
from 1963-
1997 
NYSE and Amex 
firms 
Herding 
behaviour in 
US, Hong 
Kong, Japan, 
South Korea, 
and Taiwan   
CSAD Herding is absent, during periods of extreme 
price movements. Return dispersion is higher 
when the market is rising than when it is 
declining. 
Hwang and 
Salmon (2004) 
Daily returns 
from 1993-
2002 
US (S&P500) and 
Korea (KOSPI) 
Measures and 
detects herding 
during market 
stress.  
State-space 
model  
Herd formation exists both when the market is 
rising and when it is declining. The Russian 
crisis helped to reduce herding and returned the 
market to equilibrium.  
Chiang and Zheng 
(2010) 
Daily returns 
from 1998-
2009 
Stock exchanges in 
18 countries  
Herding in 
international 
stock markets 
CSAD No evidence of herding in the US market. No 
evidence of herding asymmetry in up and down 
market conditions. US market herds during 
crisis periods.  
Chen (2013) Daily returns 
from 200-
2009 
35,328 stocks 
traded in 69 
countries.   
Herd behaviour 
in international 
stock markets 
CSSD, CSAD, 
Hwang and 
Salmon’s state-
space model.  
No evidence of herd formation using the CSSD 
model but finds herding using the CSAD and 
state-space models.  
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Galariotis, et al., 
(2015)  
Daily returns 
from 1989 
2011. 
 
S&P100 and 
FTSE100  
Does the release 
of 
macroeconomic 
news affect 
investor herd 
behaviour? 
CSAD estimated 
using a rolling 
regression 
method 
US market herds when macroeconomic news is 
released. US investors herd due to fundamental 
and non-fundamentals in different crises 
conditions.  
Galariotis, et al., 
(2016) 
Daily returns 
from 1997 to 
2009. 
France, Germany, 
Japan, UK, and 
US.  
The effect of 
liquidity of herd 
behaviour  
CSAD and 
Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity 
measure.  
No evidence of herding in the US market, but it 
becomes visible when liquidity is controlled 
for.  
Litimi, et al., 
(2016) 
Daily returns 
from 1985-
2013.  
All firms in the on 
NYSE/AMEX/NA
SDAQ (4,183) 
Does herding 
play a role in 
excess volatility 
in US sectors? 
CSSD, CSAD, 
Vector 
Autoregressive 
model (VAR), 
modified CSAD.   
No evidence of herding using in CSSD model, 
but the modified CSAD provides evidence of 
herding. It is prevalent in 8 out of 10 sectors. 
Only two sectors herd using the modified 
CSAD. Herding and trading volume affect 
market volatility.    
BenSaida (2017)  Daily and 
returns from 
1985-2015 
All firms in the on 
NYSE/AMEX/NA
SDAQ (4,183) 
divided into 12 
sectors. 
Examines the 
effect of 
herding on 
excessive 
idiosyncratic 
volatility in US 
industries. 
 CSAD, modified 
CSAD 
According to the CSAD model, herding is 
absent in all US sectors, however the modified 
version shows that herding is present in 10 out 
of 12 sectors. Trading volume does not trigger 
industry herding but reduces the conditional 
volatility at the market level and in some sectors.  
Herding in only present in the whole market 
during crises and bubbles.  
BenMabrouk and 
Litimi (2018) 
Daily firm 
level and 
sector level 
returns from 
2000-2017 
All listed stocks in 
the US market. 
Examines 
sectorial 
herding during 
extreme oil 
market 
movement.  
CSAD  No evidence of industry herding, but herding 
occurs during downward extreme oil market 
movements.  The market herds based on 
information from the oil market. 
Kabir (2018) Daily data 
from 2003-
2012 
US commercial 
banks, savings and 
loan (S&Ls) 
institutions, 
investment, and 
insurance banks.  
Did investors in 
the US financial 
industry herd 
during the 
financial crisis?  
CSAD 
 
Investors in commercial and investment banks 
spuriously herd during the crisis. S&Ls and 
investment banks intentionally herd when 
volatility is high.  
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Table 2.2 Related evidence on herding in the Chinese markets 
Author                  Data Sample  Purpose Method Result 
Demirer and Kutan 
(2006)  
Daily firm and 
industry returns 
from 1999-2002  
 
 375 stocks listed on 
Shanghai and 
Shenzhen  
Does herding exist in 
the Chinese markets? 
CSSD Herding does not exist in the Chinese 
market at the firm and sector level. No 
herding during the Asian crisis.  
Tan, et., (2008) Daily, weekly and 
monthly returns 
from 1994-2003 
87 dual-listed firms 
A- and B-share stocks 
Herding in dual-listed 
A and B-share stocks  
CSAD Evidence of herding in rising and 
declining market conditions. A-share 
investors in SHSE herd more under 
rising markets, high trading volume 
and high volatility conditions. No 
evidence of asymmetry in B share 
markets. No herding during the Asian 
crisis.  
Fu and Lin (2010) Monthly returns 
from 2004-2009 
Shanghai and 
Shenzhen composite 
indexes  
Herd behaviour and 
investors’ asymmetric 
reaction to good and 
bad news 
CSSD and 
CSAD  
No evidence of herding. Asymmetric 
rherding is more prevalent during 
declining market conditions. 
Chiang and Zheng 
(2010) 
Daily returns from 
1998-2009 
18 countries  Herding in 
international stock 
markets 
CSAD Evidence of herding in the Chinese 
market. Return dispersions of the US 
markets provide more insights on the 
observed herding. No evidence of 
herding in the Chinese market during 
GFC.  
Chiang et al. (2010) Daily returns from 
1996-2007 
SHSE and SZSE A- 
and B-share stocks 
Herd behaviour in 
Chinese stock markets 
CSAD, 
quantile 
regression 
Evidence of herd behaviour in both A-
share and B-share groups which is 
conditional on the dispersions of 
returns in the lower quantile region. 
Lao and Singh (2011) Daily and Weekly 
1999-2009 
Shanghai A-Share  
 
Herd behaviour in 
Chinese and Indian 
stock markets 
CSAD Herding is more significant when 
the market is declining, and the trading 
volume is high. No evidence of herd 
formation using weekly data. 
Significant herding during GFC.  
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Chiang, et al., (2012)  Daily industry and 
market price 
returns from 1996 
to December 
2008.  
 
China, Hong Kong, 
Japan, and the United 
States.  
Does herding 
behaviour in Chinese 
markets react to global 
markets? 
CSAD 
estimated 
using a rolling 
regression 
method 
Chinese markets exhibit herding 
behaviour at both firm data and 
industry level. They employ a rolling 
regression method to estimate the 
herding equation, and report that the 
herding coefficient displays a time-
varying property.  
Chiang, et al., (2013) Daily from 1997 
to 2009. 
Australia, Hong 
Kong, Japan, 
Singapore and the 
United States, China, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, 
South Korea, 
Thailand, and 
Taiwan. 
Does investor herding 
behaviour in Pacific-
Basin equity markets? 
Kalman-filter-
based model 
Herding is present using the CSAD 
model, but it is absent using the time-
varying approach and present in both 
rising and falling markets.  
Lee, et al., (2013) Daily returns from 
2001-2011 
A-share market Do investors follow 
each other in and out 
of the same industries 
in Chinese A-share 
markets? 
CSAD Strong evidence of herding which is 
significantly influenced by the stock 
return dispersion of the Information 
Technology sector. Industry herding is 
more significant in the SZSE, and it is 
more significant in some sectors in the 
SHSE in bull market conditions.  
Yao, et al., (2014)  Daily and weekly 
returns from 1999-
2008 
All listed firms A and 
B shares in SZSE and 
SHSE 
Examines the 
existence and 
prevalence of herding 
in a segmented market 
setting  
CSSD, CSAD Herding is only reported in the B-share 
markets, and it is more prevalent at the 
industry level. Herd behaviour is more 
pronounced in declining market 
conditions for the A-share markets and 
the Shanghai B-share market. Herding 
is absent during the GFC. 
Luo and Schinckus 
(2015) 
Daily data from 
2006-2012 
SZSE and SHSE Investigates herding 
asymmetry in bull, 
bear and extreme 
market conditions  
CSAD Herding is prevalent in bullish states 
for B-shares while a bearish situation 
generates herding for A-shares.   
 
Hillard and Zhang 
(2015) 
Daily data from 
different time 
periods between 
2007 -2012 
SZSE and SHSE Examines the size, 
price-to-book effects 
and herding in Chinese 
markets.  
 
CSAD Provides evidence of strong size 
effects but not price- to-book effect. 
Herding behaviour is prevalent 
between 2002 and 2012 but decreases 
after 2006.  
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Zheng, et al., (2017) Daily data from 
1993-2013 
Japan, China, South 
Korea, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Thailand 
Examines industry 
herding for nine Asian 
markets. 
CSAD Herding exists in the Chinese market 
but is more prevalent at the industry 
level. All industries herd except the 
Utility industry. The reported industry 
herding is more pronounced in down 
markets and low trading volume 
markets. China herds with the US 
market.  
Li, et al., (2017)  Daily returns from 
2006-2015 
CSI 300 index stock Investigates herding in 
the Chinese market 
using several time-
varying coefficients  
Time-varying 
CSAD 
Weak evidence of herding using 
CSAD. More evidence of herding 
behaviour during turbulent than in 
tranquil periods. Using the time-
varying fixed-coefficient regression 
model. US return dispersion had a 
strong influence on Chinese stock 
markets before 2015 but not in 2015.  
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2.5. Conclusion  
The extensive review of relevant behavioural finance literature that has been carried out in 
this chapter has demonstrated that as a field, it challenges traditional finance assumptions. 
Specifically, it mainly challenges the rationality assumption by revealing that investors are 
influenced by non-rational factors such as biases and they use heuristics to simplify 
investment decision making when faced with complexities. Consequently, these biases and 
heuristics are evident in their individual trading strategies as well as collectively. Subsequent 
empirical chapters provide novel insights on herding, a persistent behavioural pattern 
motivated by various factors as earlier discussed.  
The first empirical chapter investigates the determinants of industry herding in the US stock 
market. The reviewed empirical evidence yields interesting findings on herding in the US as 
summarised in Table 2.1 below.  At the market level, the mixed evidence has been largely 
due to the methodology employed in the study.  On one hand, studies that used the CSSD 
and CSAD models obtain results inconsistent with herding, on the other hand, results 
consistent with herding were obtained using Hwang and Salmon’s (2004) state space model. 
When the effect of crisis on herd behaviour was examined, the results were also mixed, with 
some studies finding no herding during crisis (for example Christie and Huang, 1995), with 
evidence of herding only recorded during the GFC crisis mainly because the crisis originated 
from there (for example BenSaida, 2017). Furthermore, evidence on industry herding 
asymmetry is limited. The few studies which have focussed on industry herding only find 
herd behaviour mainly in nonfinancial industries such as the Healthcare and Public utilities 
sectors.  
Overall, the evidence reveals the empirical issues relating to herding at the market and sector 
level. Following from these evidences, we would expect to find herding at the industry level 
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and during crises but not at the market level. In addition, we expect to find herding 
asymmetry at both the market and industry levels. Indeed, the anticipated lack of herding the 
market is consistent with the reviewed evidence that herding is not significant in developed 
markets (Chiang and Zheng, 2010). Despite the numerous studies that investigate herding in 
the US, there is sparse in-depth research herding conditioned upon rising and declining 
market returns, high and low trading volume and volatility as well as crisis.  
The final empirical chapter investigates the determinants of herding in the Chinese market. 
The papers examined in this section highlight the inconclusive evidence of herding in the 
Chinese market and its determinants (see Table 2.2). The differences in the results may be 
due to the methodology employed, the data frequency or the sample period. The 
determinants of herding have also produced mixed findings especially with regards to market 
return and trading volume. Studies like Demirer and Kutan (2006), Fu and Lin (2010), Lao 
and Singh (2011) find that the market herds when market returns are declining. In contrast, 
Tan, et al (2008), Chiang and Zheng (2010) and Lee, et al. (2013) document herding when 
the market is rising. On the one hand, Chiang and Zheng (2010) point out that they do not 
find evidence that trading volume foments herding, and on the other, Tan, et al., (2008) 
report that both Shanghai and Shenzhen A and B-share markets herd in high trading volume. 
Studies also find evidence that other factors that influence herding in the Chinese market 
such as US returns (Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Luo and Schinckus, 2015; Li, et al., 2017), 
release of new information (Chiang, et al., 2013), regulatory reforms (Li, et al., 2017), GFC 
(Lao and Singh, 2011 and Yao, et al., 2014) and returns of the information technology sector 
(Lee, et al., 2013). In addition, studies report that herding is more significant at the industry 
level (Lee, et al., 2013, Yao, et al., 2014 and Zheng, et al., 2017). Based on the empirical 
evidences examined which documents that herding is more significant in emerging markets, 
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we expect to find herd behaviour during crises and asymmetric market conditions at the 
market and industry levels.   
We believe that these chapters will contribute to behavioural finance as it fills research gaps 
in the industry herding literature. In addition, it provides important implications for investors 
because when herding is present, they experience reduced benefits of diversification. 
Furthermore, our results are of interest to policy makers and stock market regulatory 
authorities because of the potential destabilising impact of herding in the market. Therefore, 
an examination of industry herding provides beneficial insights on its determinants in a 
developed and an emerging market.  Lastly, in view of the recent US-China trade war, the 
examination of the impact of US returns on herding in the Chinese market bears important 
implications on the effect of their trading relationship on investor behavioural patterns.  
Overall, the literature in the chapter has provided a basis for this thesis and identified the 
gaps in literature. The next chapter discusses the philosophical underpinnings of this thesis.   
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Chapter 3 Research Philosophy 
3.1. Introduction 
Research is usually conducted based on relevant research philosophy, research methodology 
and research design with the central aim of answering the research question and 
consequently the research objective. In the previous chapter, we reviewed relevant literature 
and stated the research questions. This chapter has been set out to discuss the research 
philosophy and research methodology employed in this thesis.  
Section 3.2 discusses relevant research philosophies and philosophical paradigm employed 
in this thesis. Section 3.3 highlights and justifies the research approach. 
3.2. Research Philosophy 
According to Blaxter, Hughes and Tight (2006) research philosophy relates to a belief 
regarding how data is gathered, analysed and used. TerreBlanche, Durreheim and Painter 
(2006) suggest that research philosophy can be examined in three major ways: epistemology, 
ontology and methodology. Epistemology pertains to the relevant theory of knowledge that 
establishes the relationship between the knower and what could be known (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994). Ontology focuses on reality and how it is interpreted (Blaxter, et al., 2006). 
Methodology refers to how research is conducted (Blaxter, et al., 2006).  
Different philosophical scholars have developed theoretical classifications of research 
philosophies. For example, Ritchie and Lewis (2003) classify ontology into realism, critical 
realism, relativism, idealism and materialism. In contrast, Guba and Lincoln (1994) adopt a 
perspective of positivism, interpretivism realism and pragmatism. Although these 
philosophies are based on different perspectives and assumptions, they are mainly based on 
similar broader philosophies.  
The two major theoretical perspectives of research philosophy in social sciences are 
positivism and interpretivism. Other perspectives include postmodernism, feminism and 
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critical enquiry. Positivism, the theoretical perspective applied in this thesis is discussed in 
the section below.  
3.2.1. Positivism  
A French philosopher August Comte originated the positivist perspective. He argued that all 
human behaviour could be understood through observation of objective reality. Thus it 
consists of what is measurable by the senses which can be obtained through observation and 
experiments. The central theme of positivism is that knowledge exists independent of the 
researcher. Therefore, observations should be measurable and repeatable (Levin, 1988). To 
achieve this, scientific enquiry is used to gather data (Blaxter, et al., 2006). This scientific 
enquiry is conducted through various methodologies including deduction, quantitative 
analysis, laboratory experiments, nomothetic experiments and confirmatory analysis 
(Kothari, 2004). Positivists believe that human behaviour is passive and dependent on the 
external environment.  
The dominant methodological approach in modern finance is inspired by the positivist 
philosophy (Frankfurter and McGoun, 1999).  This school of thought includes the EMH and 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Ardalan (2008) argues that research in finance takes 
a functionalist paradigm, which is also inspired by positivism and suggests that social issues 
have rational explanations. It assumes that the scientist is objective and analyses 
phenomenon through scientific methods, thus individuals play a passive role, and the 
external environment determines their behaviour.  
Kolb (2010) criticised the dominance of positivism in finance research. The author argued 
that the positivist view is not appropriate for a field like behavioural finance, which 
challenges the rationality assumption. Consequently, research in finance is confined to a 
perspective that is based on unrealistic assumptions about human nature. Lucey (2000), 
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advocates for an approach in finance research that includes aspects of human behaviour to 
facilitate the study of interactions between theoretical development, empirical evidence and 
research methods. However, there is no contention that advocates for the use of positivism 
as the mainstream philosophy in finance, the choice of methodology is solely based on 
judgment and the context of enquiry (Fidlay and Williams, 1981).  
Another problematic area in the positivist paradigm employed in finance is the dichotomy 
between facts and values. Lagoarde-Segot (2015) states: “facts’ are tangible, measurable and 
verifiable, whereas ‘values’ belong to the metaphysical realm, and, as such, cannot be the 
object of rational inquiry” (p.4).  Putnam (2002) responds to the critique of the fact/value 
dichotomy by asserting that facts stem from initial beliefs and knowledge on how the world 
is perceived and is summed up in values. Lagoarde-Segot (2015) argues that research 
questions in finance have facts embedded with decisions based on values. This thesis can be 
used as an example to demonstrate the interrelationship between facts and values. On the 
one hand, the thesis aims to investigate the determinants of industry herding in the US and 
Chinese markets. Herding is investigated using empirical data analysis, whereby the data 
can be regarded as ‘fact’, which is tangible and verifiable. On the other hand, an important 
aspect of this thesis examines the practical implications of herding for investors and policy 
makers. Therefore, the research seeks to demonstrate how the herding phenomenon can 
inform investors’ decision making and market regulation. The implication of the herding 
phenomenon can be interpreted as the value of the thesis.   
In line with previous research in finance, the underpinning philosophy for this thesis is 
positivism. We acknowledge the arguments against this philosophy, but we believe that all 
philosophies are valuable depending on the focus of the study. Our focus is that the 
philosophy should be relevant to our research questions set out in chapter two. The 
characteristics of positivism applied in this study are displayed in Table 3.1.   
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Table 3.1 Characteristics of positivism 
Feature Description  
Purpose of research  Understand the factors that could impact industry herding 
Ontology  Only scientific knowledge can reveal the reality 
 Reality can be explored through observation and 
experiments  
 The evidence is described based on scientific methods 
 The behaviour of the individuals observed in the 
research is controlled by the external environment 
 
Epistemology  Knowledge is obtained through a process of 
quantification 
 Supportive empirical evidence of theory or hypotheses 
is obtained from statistical methods 
 A deductive approach which involves the use of a 
testable hypothesis is followed 
 There is no interaction between the inquirer and the 
inquired  
 Aims to establish a causal relationship between 
variables 
Methodology  Quantitative method  
 Data is collected from the stock market database, 
DataStream 
 The values of the researcher are not reflected in the 
research 
 
The emphases in the methodology are the relationship between variables, analysis of 
empirical evidence, independence (Gray, 2014).  
3.3. Research Approach  
There are two major research approaches: quantitative research and qualitative research. 
Quantitative research focuses on studying natural phenomena while qualitative research 
focuses on social and cultural phenomena. Both quantitative and the qualitative methods are 
used in finance research. However, the quantitative research is more dominant (Ryan and 
Julia, 2007). Neither of these methods is superior to the other, the choice of method is 
determined by the context, focus and nature of research questions.  The quantitative research 
is based on the empiricist paradigm and therefore focuses on investigating the cause and 
effect of social occurrences and employs empirical data, rejection/confirmation of 
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hypotheses and logical interpretation. Hence, the quantitative method implies that the 
emphasis is on testing theories or hypotheses with the aim of improving them as opposed to 
proving them. The research process involves the collection of data based on the theory or 
hypotheses to be tested to which statistical methods are applied, and the results are typically 
displayed in graphs or tables.  The thesis is about the determinants of industry herding, to 
gain insights into the factors that drive herding in industries. Herding is determined by 
investigating the relationship between market returns and the cross-sectional absolute 
deviation of stock returns. Thus, the research process involves formulating hypotheses and 
collecting data from on stocks followed by data analysis and interpretation. Then results 
obtained are displayed in tables and graphs. We have found that the quantitative description 
of the relationship in question and a deductive analysis of data as the most suitable for this 
research because it enhances objectivity.  
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Chapter 4 Herding and its determinant in the US stock market: A sectoral analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results for the impact of market conditions on industry 
herd behaviour by testing for its presence in the US stock market. There is considerable 
amount of research on herding towards the market consensus in various stock markets at the 
market and industry levels (Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Gebka and Wohar 2013; Mobarek, et 
al., 2014; Andrikopoulos, et al., 2017; Zheng, et al., 2017).  Notwithstanding, few have 
focused on industry herding in the U.S. While investors in the U.S. market tend to herd more 
at the industry level, the empirical evidence on industry herding is still sparse (Litimi, et al., 
2016). In fact, Litimi, et al., (2016) and BenSaida (2017) fail to find evidence of herding in 
the U.S. stock market but find significant herding at the industry level during periods of 
market turmoil. Although these studies provide significant results of industry herding, they 
lack an in-depth analysis of the determinants of industry herding. Consequently, there are 
some unanswered questions. Specifically, in investigating industry herding we question 
whether it is conditional upon market returns, trading volume and volatility.  
Using the CSAD model developed by Chang. et al., (2000), we conduct our research on the 
sample of all firms listed on the S&P 500 index from January 1990 to October 2016. We 
investigate herding at the market and sector level. At the sector level, we use a classification 
of all the firms into 19 industries. To facilitate our study on industry herding, we examine 
the effect of rising (declining) market return, high (low) market volatility and trading 
volume. To further examine the effect of crises on market and sector herding, we select two 
crises which originated from the US: the Dot com bubble and the Global Financial crises. 
Our findings reveal the following. We find that there was no herding at the market level. 
However, there is evidence for herding at the sector level, particularly in the Healthcare, 
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Industrials and Oil and Gas sectors. This evidence of herding reveals the tendency of U.S. 
investors to herd in and out of the same sectors. The findings are discussed in details in 
section 3.4. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section sets out the hypotheses for each 
research objective. Thereafter, the herding measure is discussed. Next, the empirical results 
are presented and discussed. Lastly, the implications of the study are provided. 
4.2. Hypotheses development 
4.2.1. Industry Herding 
Majority of the studies on herd behaviour based on the US market have found that herding 
is absent in the market (Christie and Huang, 1995; Chiang and Zheng, 2010). But do groups 
of US investors buy and sell stocks of the same industry over a period? If the answer to this 
question is affirmative, then we would expect that the otherwise absence of herding in the 
market would be found around specific industries.  
There are a few theoretical explanations why investors choose to engage in herd behaviour. 
These explanations are based on the investors’ motive which can be intentional or 
unintentional, purposefully following the crowd’s decision is termed as intentional herding 
while unintentional herding is accidental (Bikhchandani and Sharma,2001). Some investors 
could be driven to herd intentionally because of the expectation of a career/reputational 
payoff (Trueman, 1994), where low-ability managers try to protect their reputation by 
mimicking the investment decision of better managers because they are evaluated relative to 
the performance of their peers. As a result, their low- ability is not incorporated in the 
individual assessment process and thus difficult to detect whether the manager picked a 
successful investment or mimicked their peers (Scharfstein and Stein ,1990). An expectation 
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of informational payoff is another motive for intentional herding and it occurs when an 
investor imitates other investors because he perceives that they possess superior information 
(Devenow and Welch, 1996). When it gets to a point where these investors completely 
ignore their own private information, in favour of those of their predecessors an 
informational cascade is formed (Banerjee, 1992). This may eventually lead to informational 
inefficiency because the available aggregate information which is incorporated into security 
prices does not accurately reflect the sequence of decisions. Investors, particularly fund 
managers may also be driven to herd because their compensation is often measured relative 
to a market benchmark (Maug and Naik, 1996).   
Unintentional herding occurs when investors independently take similar investment 
decisions because of the information signals they receive (Froot, et al., 1992). Characteristic 
trading is another example of unintentional herding, whereby, investors such as funds select 
stocks based on investment style (for example industry) and stock characteristics (for 
example past performance) (Economou, et al., 2015). In fact, industry herding can be linked 
to characteristic trading where investors select stocks based on industry membership. A 
major implication of this kind of trading is a correlation in prices of assets without a 
corresponding change in fundamental value (Barberis, and Shleifer 2003). Relative 
homogeneity also promotes spurious herding because it can result in similar investment 
decisions due to congruities such as educational background and regulatory framework 
(Holmes, et al., 2013). Consquently, these congruities generate collerated trades without the 
intent to copy others.  
Investors are motivated to herd due to several reasons. From a behavioural perspective, they 
may be motivated to herd in the prescence of overconfidence bias (propounded by Daniel, 
et al., (1998)). For example, investors may keep investing in an industry where they have 
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obtained a positive return because they believe they possess superior stock picking skills, 
which leads them to take more risks.  Industry herding can also be driven by the 
representative heuristic and conversavatism bias (presented by  Kahneman & Tversky 
(1972)). In the former case, an investor may prefer to invest in an industry that had 
abnormally high prior returns (that they extrapolate the retuns for the whole industry), which 
destabilses stock prices. In the later case, investors may favour prior positive (negative) 
information about a particular industry over new information.  
Andrikopoulos, et al., (2017) suggest that industry herding can also be motivated by other 
reasons including benchmarking, sector dominance, style investing and fads. Several funds 
such as exhange traded funds strictly follow the sectors in their benchmark-indexes, thus this 
can increase the investment in these sectors and consequently herding (Gleason, et al., 2004). 
There is evidence that investors exhibit a familarity bias, they prefer sectors that dominate 
their country’s economy because they are more familiar with these sectors ( Gavriilidis, et 
al., 2013). Barberis and Shleifer (2003) suggest that investors group stocks into ‘styles’ 
based on their similarities. Style investing can foment herding when institutional investors 
reallocate styles based on current positive performance (Choi and Sias, 2009). Bikhchandani, 
et al., (1998) suggests that investors are driven by fads. Fads can create herding whereby 
investors invest in specific sectors because their populatity, for example, the populaity of 
technology stock during the Dotcome bubble period.  
Following from these motivations to herd, it is therefore important to investigate the 
presence of herding in the US market (sector). This can be stated in the following hypothesis:  
H1. There is no herding effect in the US market/ industry.  
If industry herding is present in market/sector returns then we would expect a nonlinear 
relationship between the cross-sectional dispersion and the market return, that is, a 
disaproportionate increase (decrease) in the dispersion with the market return. 
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4.2.2. Determinants of Industry Herding  
The approach suggested by Tan, et al., (2008) will be applied to investigate the asymmetric 
patterns that can be observed in the presence of herding at different levels of market return, 
volatility and trading volume. The rationale behind measuring this asymmetric pattern is that 
the changes these factors are pronounced during periods of market stress. Thus, the response 
to these changes can potentially explain the level of herd behaviour under different market 
conditions.   
Market/sector return: 
Research provides evidence that herding varies depending on whether the market is rising 
or declining (Demirer, et al., 2010; Economou, et al., 2011; Gavriilidis, et al., 2013; 
Economou, et al., 2015a; Zheng, et al., 2017). However, it has been observed that investors 
have a propensity to herd when market returns are declining than in rising conditions 
(Gavriilidis, et al., 2013; Ecomonou, et al., 2011). A possible explanation for this behavior 
is that loss aversion is more pronounced when market returns are declining, thus investors 
are driven by the psychology that potential losses when the market is declining looms larger 
than potential gains when the market is rising (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Consequently, they are driven to herd more during periods of declining market returns.  Fund 
managers also herd more when market returns are declining (Gavriilidis, et al., 2013). More 
specifically, low-ability fund managers who are evaluated relative to their peers may prefer 
to mimic the investment decisions of their better peers (Gavriilidis, et al., 2013). Scharfstein 
and Stein (1990) termed this behaviour as the “sharing the blame” effect in which low-ability 
managers mimic the behaviour of better managers to be perceived as smart even when they 
are observing the same market signals. Such behaviour makes it difficult to assess the 
performance of managers. In contrast, periods of rising market return can also prompt 
optimistic investors to herd, because they believe that prices will continue to rise and thus 
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decide to ride the presumed upward trend in the market (De Long et al., 1990). From an 
institutional investor perspective, low-ability managers might prefer to copy the trades of 
their better peers when returns are rising, since a poor performance during such periods can 
potentially reveal their low ability (Economou, et al., 2015b). Therefore to investigate 
whether herding is impacted by market/sector returns, we specify the following hypothesis. 
H2a: Industry herding is contingent upon market/sector returns 
If industry herding is contingent upon market/sector returns, then we would a expect 
relationship between herding and market returns with differences in periods rising and 
declining returns. The empirical evidence on the relationship between herding and market 
returns have been mixed. On the one hand, Demirer, et al., (2010), Economou, et al., (2011), 
Gavriilidis, et al., (2013), Mobarek et al. (2014); Yao, et al., (2014), Economou, et al., 
(2015a) find that herding is more prevalent during declining markets. On the other hand, 
Economou, et al., (2015a) and Economou, et al., (2015b) report herding when market returns 
are rising. Other studies like those of Chiang, et al., (2010) and Zheng, et al., (2017), find 
evidence of herding in both rising and declining markets.  
Market/sector volatility: 
Periods of high volatility and information flow may increase the propensity to herd (Gleason, 
Mathur and Peterson, 2004). Investors make investment decisions based on the information 
generated in stock markets which stock prices have already responded to, in periods of high 
levels of information flow these prices can become more volatile (Gavriilidis, et al., 2013). 
During such periods, some investors may have difficulty in obtaining reliable information 
and prefer to follow the herd. In addition, the rise of information flow during highly volatile 
markets may also make information processing more difficult, thus making herding tempting 
for less skilled investors. Herding can also take place during periods of low volatility as the 
tranquility in the market makes the trade of others more visible (Gavriilidis, et al., 2013). 
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Moreover, research provides evidence that herding is prevalent when market volatility is 
high (see Economou, et al., 2015b) and when it is low (see Economou, et al., 2015b). Given 
the relationship between herding and market volatility, the mixed evidence leads to the 
following hypothesis.  
H2b: Industry herding is contingent upon market /sector volatility 
If industry herding is contingent upon market/sector volatility, then we would expect a 
relationship between herding and volatility with differences in periods of high and low 
volatility.   
Market/sector volume: 
Research has shown that herding is significant when trading volume is high (for example, 
Tan, et al., 2008), therefore we focus on determining if changes in volume affects industry 
herd behaviour. High trading volume can contribute to herding when investors trade vastly 
on a stock. For example, if an investor perceives that a stock is highly profitable, they would 
increase their investment in the stock, hence increasing its liquidity. Other investors who are 
uncertain about the future profitability, invest in the stock based on its liquidity neglecting 
their private information, leading to a herd formation.  Low trading volume can also boost 
herding because during such periods, investors tend to solely focus on stocks with sufficient 
trading volume and as a result trading becomes clustered (Economou, et al., 2015a).  
It is important to point out that although many studies report significant herding during 
periods of high volume, some studies like those of Tan, et al. (2008) and ( Economou, et al., 
(2011) provide evidence of herding during periods of low trading volume. This mixed 
evidence leads to the following hypothesis.  
H2c: Industry herding is contingent upon market/sector volume.  
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If industry herding is contingent upon market/sector volume, then we would expect a 
relationship herding and volume with differences in behaviour in periods high and low 
volume.   
4.2.3. Herd behaviour in periods of crisis  
Research by Christie and Huang (1995) suggests that herding is more prevalent during 
periods of market stress marked by extreme stock price movement. However, the empirical 
evidence of herding during crisis is mixed with authors such as Chiang and Zheng (2010) 
and Mobarek et al., (2014) finding that herding is more prevalent following a crisis while 
other authors like Choe et al., (1999) and Hwang and Salmon (2004) demonstrate that 
herding decreases following crises. 
 It is reasonable to suggest that investors may be driven to herd during a crisis due to 
increased uncertainty regarding the future value of assets during such periods.  In contrast, 
herding may decrease following a crisis due to increased liquidity in the stock market 
(Economou, et al., 2015). Crises have been associated with bubbles. Indeed, Ball (2009) 
argues that crises occur when asset bubbles are not detected. Shiller (2003) points out that 
bubbles can be examined from two perspectives: Rational and irrational. Santos and 
Woodford (1997) explain that rational (or asset pricing) bubbles occur when the price of an 
asset exceeds its fundamental value, that is, it also has a bubble component. Irrational 
bubbles occur when prices rise above a level than can be rationally explained due to 
exaggerated beliefs about the future stock earnings or capabilities of new technologies. 
According to the finance literature, investor irrationality is a major cause of bubble bursts. 
Bubble bursts occur as means by which the market corrects prices to their fundamental 
values (Abreu & Brunnermeier, 2003). During the bubble building phase, uncertainty drives 
investors to make investment decisions based on herd instincts and psychological biases 
rather than the fundamental value of the asset.  
87 
 
Behavioural finance literature has offered some explanations on bubble formation. These 
theories have been classified into investor beliefs and preferences. From the beliefs 
perspective, there are three major theories. The first theory is based on the argument that 
bubbles are formed in the presence of short selling constraint and when investors have 
diverging views regarding the prospective value of assets (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). 
According to Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) if there are short selling restrictions and some 
investors are optimistic while the others are pessimistic about the prospective value of the 
asset. Then asset price will only reflect the price expectation of the optimistic investors, the 
pessimistic investors will refuse to invest. As a result, the asset will be overvalued because 
these optimistic investors believe that they can sell at higher prices to other optimistic 
investors. The second belief based-theory of bubble formation proposes that investors who 
exhibit the extrapolation bias can create bubbles by overvaluing assets. Extrapolation bias 
has the tendency to overweigh past returns or growth rates when making investment 
decisions (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). The third theory argues that investors’ overconfidence 
particularly on the accuracy of their investment predictions (Daniel, et al., 1998) can result 
in overvaluation of assets. As earlier stated, overconfidence can make investors think that 
their valuation of the fundamentals of an asset is reliable.  
From the preference perspective, there are two major theories. The first theory is based on 
the house money effect first proposed by Thaler and Johnson (1990). It refers to when 
investors become less risk-averse after a profitable investment. This motivates them to invest 
more, thus pushing asset prices further away from its fundamental value. The second theory 
is based on Barberis and Huang’s (2008) proposition that bubbles tend to occur in assets 
associated with new technology. They explain that because investors regard investments as 
lotteries, therefore they will receive lottery-like gains if the new technology is successful. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1972) argue that this preference occurs when people overweigh 
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low probabilities which makes investments attractive and may result in the overvaluation of 
assets. The Dot com bubble can be interpreted using this argument, investors may have 
caused overvaluation of Internet Technology stocks because they expected to obtain lottery-
like gains if the technology was successful. 
In relation to herding in industries, Gebka and Wohar (2013) argue that during periods of 
uncertainty a ‘flight to quality’ might occur where investors may rebalance their portfolios 
in which they shift from investing in more risky industries to less risky ones.    
As a result, of the differences in herd behaviour following crises periods, our final 
hypotheses examine the effects of the Dotcom bubble and the GFC crises on herd behaviour 
in the US market (sector). The hypothesis is as follows:   
H3: herd behaviour is stronger during the Dot com bubble period 
The Dot com started by the advent of the internet led to a large investment in a new company 
called Netscape communications. The evolution of the internet gave rise to other fast 
growing ‘Dot com companies’ which saw increased investments from investors and made 
the value of these stocks rise quickly. As the number of companies continued to grow, 
investors ignored the fundamental value of the stocks and followed the crowd, including 
sophisticated investors (for example fund managers) who planned to ride to bubble and exit 
the market promptly before it crashed. Indeed, Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau (2001) provide 
evidence that changes to internet-related names, dubbed the dotcom effect produced 74 per 
cent abnormal returns ten days subsequent to the announcement.  
 In 1996, the then Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan in a speech described the 
soaring stock prices of ‘Dot com’ companies as ‘irrational exuberance’. These companies 
grew fast too quickly without sustained profitability resulting in losses. In March 2000, 
Internet Technology stocks crashed after investors suddenly realised that these stocks were 
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overvalued and frantically sold their stocks leading to a collapse in the sector which saw 
approximately 800 companies vanish (Goodnight and Green, 2010). The market did not fully 
recover from the crash until October 2002.  
The Dot com provides evidence of how investors’ irrationality driven by herd instinct and 
psychological biases led to the deviation of Technology stocks from its fundamental value. 
Indeed, studies that examine herding during the Dot com bubble provide evidence of its 
existence (Galariotis, et al., 2015; Litimi, et al., 2016; BenSaida, 2017). Bubbles are typically 
divided into three phases: the pre-bubble, the bubble (when the bubble occurs) and the 
bubble burst (stock market downturn). If herding is stronger following these periods, we 
expect to find differences in herd behaviour pre, during and post bubble.  
H4: herd behaviour is stronger during the GFC crisis period.  
Almost 8 years after the Dot com bubble another bubble burst occurred in the US Real Estate 
sector which triggered the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis. Some authors suggest that the 
Dot com bubble helped to create the housing bubble because after the crash investors turned 
to the Real Estate stocks as a secure investment alternative (Wheale and Amin, 2003; 
DeLong and Magin, 2006 and Goodnight and Green, 2010). Between October 2002 and 
October 2006, house prices rose by 31.6 percent. According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
(2011), prices rose in the housing market because of the increased demand for mortgages. 
Also, homeownership gradually increased until it reached its peak at of 69.2 per cent in 2004 
(Financial Crisis Inquiry, 2011). However, the bubble began to burst in 2007 when interest 
rates began to rise accompanied by an increase in risk premium which discouraged investors 
from investing. Housing prices plummeted followed by a massive sale of mortgaged assets. 
The collapse of the investment bank, Lehman Brothers in September 2008 also contributed 
to a wave of global panic selling.  
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Although, herding is supposed to be more significant during crises, the empirical evidence 
of herding during the GFC demonstrates that this may not always be the case. Yao, et al., 
(2014) and Vo and Phan (2017) find that herding is absent during the crisis, while Chiang 
and Zheng (2010), Lao and Singh (2011), and Zheng, et al., (2017) find evidence of herding 
during the crisis. However, other studies (Economou, et al., 2011; Gebka and Wohar, 2013; 
Philippas, et al., 2013; Kabir, 2018) document that herding is not stronger during the GFC, 
while Andrikopoulos, et al., (2017) find that it is less significant during the crisis. In contrast, 
Galariotis, et al., (2015), Litimi, et al., (2016) and BenSaida (2017) report that the GFC 
triggered herding.  In relation to the US market, Chiang and Zheng (2010) and Galariotis, et 
al., (2015) find that investors in the US markets examined herd during the GFC. It can be 
therefore hypothesised that investors in the US markets have a tendency to herd towards the 
market consensus during the GFC. Like the, Dot com bubble, we examine herding pre, 
during and post GFC. If herding is stronger following these periods we expect to find 
differences in herd behaviour pre, during and post crisis. 
4.3. Data 
For the empirical analysis, we use daily prices for all S&P50043 constituents stock between 
January 1990 and October 2016, to incorporate periods of significant volatility in the US 
market: the 1997 Dot Com boom and the 2008 credit market crisis. This is in line with 
previous studies which provide evidence that herding behaviour is more plausible during 
periods of extreme market movement. The S&P500 index, popularly known as the gauge of 
the US market is based on the market capitalization of 500 leading US stocks listed on the 
NYSE or NASDAQ. The index has a total market capitalization of approximately $ 23.87 
trillion44 (as of July 2018) and it covers approximately 80 % of the available US total equity 
                                                 
43 S&P500 is used as a proxy for the US market 
44 Source: S&P500 factsheet  
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market capitalisation. The local currency daily closing prices and trading volume data for 
both market and sector levels are obtained from Thomson- Reuters DataStream database.  
Due to limited availability of data, the 19 major sectors examined based on the DataStream 
sector classification are Automobile, Banks, Basic Resources, Chemicals, Construction, 
Consumer Services, Financials, Healthcare, Industrials, Insurance, Media, Personal & 
Household, Real Estate, Retail, Travel and Leisure, Oil and Gas, Utilities, 
Telecommunications, and Technology which amount to 6,991 daily observations of 505 
individual firm stock prices. 
We select two crises which originated from the US: the Dot com bubble and the Global 
Financial crises. We split the whole sample into pre, during and post herding. For the Dot 
com bubble period, our sub samples are: Pre-Dot com bubble phase (01/01/1990 - 
31/12/1994), Dot com bubble (01/01/1995 - 10/03/2000), Dot com bubble crash (13/03/2000 
- 9/10/2002). For the Global Financial Crisis, we have: Pre-crisis (01/05/2002- 31/07/2007), 
Crisis (01/08/2007 - 30/03/2009) and Post crisis: (01/04/2009 - 11/10/2016). Various 
researchers have studied dating of the crisis. We date the pre-crisis phase from 01/05/2002 
to 31/07/2007. This based on Philip and Yu’s (2011) and Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas’s 
(2008a) assertion that the bubble in the real estate market emerged in May 2002, when the 
interest rate on 10-year US government bonds fell below 2%. Our crisis phase commences 
from 01/08/2007 to 30/03/2009. We choose this phase in line with Beltrattia and Stulz (2012) 
and Philip and Yu (2011) who suggest that the onset of the crisis was the beginning of August 
2007 after Bear Stearns liquidated two of its hedge funds. The endpoint of the crisis was 
chosen based on the Bank of International Settlements (BIS, 2009) timeline. The post-crisis 
phase refers to the period between 01/04/2009 and 11/10/2016. 
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STATA software package was used for regression tests to determine the relationship 
between industry herding and the market return, volatility and trade volume.  
4.4. Research Methodology 
4.4.1. Model specification 
Christie and Huang (1995) conducted a seminal study to test for herding towards the market 
consensus. They developed a methodology, the CSSD which is based on the intuition that 
when the dispersion of returns is low in relation to their cross-sectional average, it implies 
that investors ignore their information and herd with the market consensus. It is defined 
using the following equation: 
𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1D𝑡
UP + 𝛽2𝐷𝑡
𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 + 𝜀𝑡        (1) 
Where 𝛽0  is the average dispersion of the sample excluding the regions covered by the 
dummy variables. The dummy variable D𝑡
UP takes the value of one if the market return on 
day t lies in the extreme upper tail of the distribution and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝑡
𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 takes the 
value of one if the market return on day t lies in the extreme lower tail of the distribution and 
zero otherwise. Negative and significant 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 coefficients implies herd behaviour. 
CSSD is calculated as follows 
𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑡 =
√∑ (𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑟𝑚,𝑡  )
2𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛−1
        (2) 
Where ri,t   is the return
45 on firm i on day t and 𝑟𝑚,𝑡   is the cross-sectional average of the n 
returns in the market portfolio on day t. While, this methodology is intuitive, it suffers from 
some drawbacks. First, it appears to only capture herding during extreme price movement 
conditions and thus ignores the possibility that herding might also occur during periods of 
market stability (Hwang and Salmon, 2004). Second, the model is based on the linear 
                                                 
45 The return is calculated by taking logarithmic difference of the closing stock prices  
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relationship between CSSD and market returns; but, when herding is present this relationship 
no longer holds and becomes nonlinear (Chang, et al., 2000). Chang, et al., (2000) argue that 
investors tend to follow the market trend uniformly during periods of significant price 
movements, increasing the correlation among stock returns. Therefore, this would result in 
a less than proportional increase (decrease) in the corresponding dispersion of asset returns. 
Under these conditions, the relationship between the CSAD and the market return is 
expected to become nonlinear. Consequently, the authors develop an alternative non-linear 
approach, CSAD.  
To detect herding, the CSAD measures its presence by assessing the observed return of all 
stocks and the cross-sectional average return; a statistically significant negative (positive) 
coefficient indicates the presence (absence) of herd behaviour. Gebka and Wohar (2013), 
argue that positive γ2 coefficients, also suggests the presence of ‘negative herding’ whereby 
during periods of extreme price movements, the dispersion of returns is lower rather than 
higher than the predictions of rational asset pricing models, signifying that investors largely 
do not ignore their private information in favour of the market consensus. 
To overcome the drawbacks of the CSSD model, we use the CSAD model to test for herding 
as stated in H1.  
 
It is specified as follows: 
       𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 =
1
𝑁
 ∑ |𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡|
𝑁
𝑖=1                                                                                                        (3)   
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the log differenced return on stock i at time t, N is the number of stocks the 
market and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average of market returns at time t. 
The base model to test for herding is estimated by the following regression:  
    𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡                        (4)        
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where|𝑅𝑚,𝑡|is the market (sector) return used to capture the nonlinearity in the 
relationship, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  is the squared market return, α is the constant, γ1, and γ2 are coefficients 
and εt is the error term at time t. Therefore, if herding is absent, then we expect γ1 > 0 and γ2 
> 0 in equation (2). It is important to point out that, this model allows us to capture the linear 
and non-linear relationship between the cross-sectional dispersion of returns and the absolute 
market returns.   
Following Gebka and Wohar (2013) the level of dispersion for the model is estimated for 
each industry sector and the aggregate market. It is reasonable to expect that industry herding 
may be affected by market conditions characterised by market returns, volatility and trading 
volume. This further prompts us to test whether herding is contingent upon high and low 
market return, market volatility and volume. 
To test hypothesis H2a, the specification of the Tan, et al., (2008) by Chiang and Zheng 
(2010) which is regarded as more robust is implemented. To achieve this, we estimate the 
following model: 
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝑢𝑝|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑝)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝑢𝑝(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝛾4  (1 −
𝐷𝑢𝑝)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡                              (5) 
𝐷𝑢𝑝  is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for days with positive market returns and a value 
of 0 for days with negative market returns, α is the constant, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 are coefficients. 
The coefficients of interest are γ3 and γ4. Therefore, in the absence of herding effects, we 
expect γ 3 > 0 and γ 4 > 0 in equation (3) and statistically insignificant. If herding effects are 
prevailing, we expect γ 3 < 0 and γ 4 < 0 and statistically significant, with γ 3 < γ 4 if these 
effects are more significant on days with positive market return. Specifically, to confirm the 
presence (absence) of herding, the coefficients of interest must be negative (positive) and 
statistically significant. 
To test for the second hypothesis, H2b, the following model is estimated: 
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 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ |𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 +
𝛾4  (1 − 𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                        (6) 
Where𝐷𝜎
2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ is 1 for days with high market volatility and 0 otherwise. Volatility is 
defined as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the previous 30 day moving average. 
In line with Tan, et al., (2008) volatility is calculated as the square of the market return 
[reflected through  (𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 in Eq (6)]. If herding is absent, then we expect γ 1 > 0 and γ 2 > 
0 in equation (4). If herding is present, then we expect γ 3 < 0 and γ 4 < 0 and statistically 
significant, with γ 3 < γ 4 if these effects are more evident during days with high market 
volatility.  
To test for the third hypothesis, H2c, the following model is estimated: 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ |𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 +
𝛾4  (1 − 𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                     (7) 
𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ  is 1 for days with a high trading volume and 0 otherwise. Trading volume is 
defined as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the previous 30 day moving average. 
A cross-sectional dummy variable regression proposed by Chiang and Zheng (2010), a 
modification of the Chang, et al., (2000) measure, will be used to measure if herding is more 
apparent in periods of financial crisis. To measure this, we estimate equation (3) with for 
each of the sub-sample periods. Therefore, if the effect of herding is more prevalent during 
the crisis periods then we expect 𝛾2  < 0 in equation (3) and statistically significant. 
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4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 4.1 Summary statistics: average daily market return and cross-sectional 
standard deviations, US  
Industry 
No of 
Firms Mean Maximum Minimum Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A: daily market 
return       
Market (All 
industries) 505 0.039% 10.670% -10.719% 1.130% -0.4062 10.707 
Automobile  8 0.031 11.707 -11.248 1.555 -0.1884 5.913 
Banks 17 0.023 11.435 0.000 0.719 4.4800 38.353 
Basic Resources 5 0.009 16.421 -16.678 1.770 -0.2093 8.119 
Chemicals 14 0.030 12.133 -12.359 1.353 -0.3996 9.180 
Construction 9 0.040 11.423 -15.666 1.510 -0.2961 7.174 
Financials 28 0.050 15.067 -16.392 1.681 -0.2204 11.063 
Food & Beverage 22 0.039 8.235 -6.911 0.920 -0.0235 5.614 
Healthcare 51 0.051 11.771 -8.046 1.148 -0.4011 5.802 
Industrial Goods 72 0.043 9.731 -9.951 1.155 -0.2752 7.136 
Insurance 22 0.028 14.453 -17.777 1.477 -0.3598 19.835 
Media 18 0.038 12.898 -10.648 1.457 -0.1031 7.010 
Oil & Gas 36 0.031 19.472 -18.708 1.713 -0.4616 11.197 
Personal & 
Household 33 0.043 8.324 -8.664 1.174 -0.2441 6.000 
Real Estate 28 0.033 20.532 -19.293 1.492 -0.1090 28.618 
Retail 40 0.051 11.115 -9.010 1.281 -0.0285 5.395 
Technology 50 0.057 15.206 0.000 1.860 0.0341 1.510 
Telecommunication 5 1.336 10.754 -9.755 1.432 -0.0827 5.403 
Travel & Leisure 18 0.046 15.865 -24.452 1.594 -0.6020 12.636 
Utilities 29 0.017 12.670 -10.046 1.039 -0.1428 12.349 
 
Panel B: cross-sectional standard 
deviation       
Market (All 
industries)  1.310% 5.503% 0.000% 0.572% 1.090 4.111 
        
Automobile  0.0109 0.0883 0.0000 0.0001 2.2124 9.7230 
Banks  0.901 19.852 -22.887 1.889 -0.128 25.032 
Chemicals  0.936 12.604 0.000 0.496 3.031 47.295 
Basic Resources  1.202 8.385 0.000 0.817 2.009 7.429 
Construction  1.095 24.610 0.000 0.762 5.845 135.594 
Financials  1.170 7.800 0.000 0.685 1.924 8.137 
Food & Beverage  1.036 6.867 0.000 0.537 1.474 6.960 
Healthcare  1.397 4.938 0.000 0.679 0.751 1.452 
Industrial Goods  1.101 5.660 0.000 0.521 1.012 3.585 
Insurance  0.928 12.710 0.000 0.723 4.845 42.395 
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Media  1.100 8.005 0.000 0.680 1.908 7.280 
Oil & Gas  1.194 6.235 0.000 0.540 1.065 4.215 
Personal & 
Household  1.241 5.270 0.000 0.588 1.030 3.187 
Real Estate  0.988 9.029 0.000 0.628 2.918 17.355 
Retail  1.395 12.156 0.000 0.690 1.348 10.390 
Technology  1.643 6.378 -11.461 0.863 0.918 4.051 
Telecommunication  0.005 18.237 0.000 1.092 3.554 27.178 
Travel & Leisure  1.359 10.997 0.000 0.832 2.659 21.186 
Utilities   1.114 9.652 0.000 0.628 3.209 23.911 
 
Note:  
This table presents the average daily market return 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 (Panel A) and cross-sectional absolute 
standard deviation (CSAD) (panel B) for the market (all industries) and the nineteen individual 
industries for the sample period (Janaury1990- October 2016). 𝑅𝑚,𝑡  is defined as the cross-sectional 
average of daily returns. CSAD is defined by the measure   
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 =
1
𝑁
 ∑|𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡|
𝑁
𝑖=1
  
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the logged differenced return on stock i at time t and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average 
of market returns at time t. 
 
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for average daily log market returns, the daily CSAD 
for the market (all industries), the nineteen individual industries as well as the number of 
firms in each industry. Examining Panel A, we observe that the average market daily returns 
for all industries are 0.039% with values ranging from -10.719% to 10.670% and a high 
standard deviation (and therefore high volatility) of 1.130%. The high standard deviation 
may imply that the market has an unusual cross-sectional variation resulting from unusual 
news or shocks in the market.  The number of firms in each sector range from 5 to 72. The 
daily mean returns for the industry range from 0.009% (Basic resources) to 1.336% 
(Telecommunications) with their standard deviations ranging from 0.719% (Banks) to 
1.860% (Technology). The low standard deviation for the Banking sector may be due to its 
characteristic highly regulated nature. The high standard deviation for the Technology sector 
indicates the riskiness and volatility of the sector. In addition, it may also reflect the 
popularity of the Internet stocks during the 1990s. The Banking sector has the highest 
kurtosis value, which implies that its returns have large frequencies around the centre and 
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tail of the distribution. The high kurtosis may be due to the extremely high profitability in 
the Banking sector before the financial crisis (Tregenna, 2009).  
The minimum and maximum industry daily returns values range from to -24.452 (Travel 
and Leisure) to 20.532 % (Real Estate). The skewness is negative for the market and most 
sectors. The distribution for the daily market return and sectors is leptokurtic.  
The CSAD is a measure of dispersion, therefore it tends to increase as the returns deviate 
from the market return. Panel B shows that the market CSAD has a mean value of 1.310% 
showing that the returns do not move in unison with the market. The minimum and 
maximum values range from between 0% to 5.503%, the standard deviation is a high value 
of 0.572%.  The descriptive statistics are similar to those reported by Chiang and Zheng 
(2010) who report a mean of 0.8486%, the minimum value of 0.2891% maximum value of 
4.754 % and a standard deviation of 0.4185%. Noticeably, the kurtosis for the Construction 
sector is high, this indicates large shocks are likely to be present in the sectors’ returns. The 
high kurtosis value may also be associated with the boom in the US economy especially in 
the pre-crisis period. 
Across industries, the mean value range between 0.011% (Automobile) to 1.643% 
(Technology). The low mean for the Automobile sector may indicate a co-movement among 
its stocks, while the high mean value for the Technology sector implies a high variation of 
industrial returns compared to other sectors.  
The minimum and maximum range between 0% (for most industries) and 24.61% 
(construction), the standard deviation have values between 0.496% (Chemicals) and 1.889% 
(Banks). Most of the CSADs are positive and therefore highly skewed. The distribution for 
the CSAD and sectors is leptokurtic. 
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4.5.2. Industry herding and its determinants 
 4.5.2.1. Empirical results for market herding  
Equation (4) was estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine 
whether investors in the US stock market exhibit herd behaviour for the period 1990 through 
to 2016. As previously stated, a negative (positive) statistically significant value of the 
regression coefficient for 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  that is 𝛾2 indicates the presence (absence) of herd behaviour. 
Table 4.2 presents the results from the estimation of equation (3). 
The results of the analysis show that the value of 𝛾2 is positive and statistically insignificant. 
This suggests that there is no nonlinear relationship between market returns and CSAD. 
Specifically, consistent with H1, there is no herding effect in the US market. The absence of 
herding in the US market may be due to the sophisticated investors’, high degree of 
regulation in the financial market and transparency in financial reporting. In general, our 
results are consistent with those obtained by other authors using the CSAD model. Our 
results are consistent with those reported by Chang, et al., (2000), who test for herd 
behaviour using the daily stock data of all firms listed on NYSE and AMEX for the period 
1963 to 1997. They explain that their results may be due to the high government involvement 
and efficient information disclosure at the firm level. In addition, our results support those 
of Chiang and Zheng (2010), who report no evidence of herding in the US market. They 
suggest that the lack of herding may originate from the different views of financial 
companies or the media, which reduces investor homogeneity and consequently, the 
tendency to herd. Our results are also in line with recent evidence by Galariotis, et al., (2015), 
Lee (2017), Bohl, et al., (2017) and BenMabrouk and Litimi (2018) that use the CSAD model 
and find no evidence of herding in the US market.   
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Notably, our results contrast with the evidence provided by BenSaida, et al., (2015) and 
Litimi, et al., (2016) who find inconclusive evidence of herding when they employ daily data 
from firms in the US stock market. The difference in the results obtained from the study of 
BenSaida, et al., (2015) may be due to their use of a shorter sample of 4 years.  
Our results are also different from those obtained by Hwang and Salmon (2004) who use an 
alternative methodology for detecting herding that measures the cross-sectional dispersion 
of the factor sensitivity of assets within a market. They find evidence of herding in the S&P 
500 index dependent on the return volatility and the level mean return. 
Table 4.2 Estimates of herding for the overall US market 
Estimated 
parameters     α    𝛾1                                                        𝛾2 Adj. R
2 
  0.0107 0.3254 0.2216 25.08% 
  
        
(115.9)*** (25.68) *** (0.93)   
  
Note: Table 4.2 reports the estimates from the following equation: 
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡  
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average of market returns in at time t, the squared market return 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  is used to capture the nonlinearity in the relationship, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute 
deviation of returns for the market, α is the constant, γ1, and γ2 are coefficients, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error 
term at time t. The equation is estimated for the 01/01/1990 to 16/10/2016. T-test statistics based on 
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
4.5.2.2. Empirical results for industry herding  
On analysis of sector level data, some evidence of herding becomes visible. Equation (4) is 
used to examine whether US investors herd in and out of industries. An analysis of the 
regression results presented in Table 4.3 shows mixed results for the presence of herding at 
the sector level. Negatively significant 𝛾2 coefficients are reported in Healthcare, Industrial 
Goods, Oil and Gas, Retail and Technology sectors indicating that the CSAD decreases with 
the size of the market return. Among these industry sectors, we observe that Healthcare and 
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Oil and Gas have the strongest degree of herding. This herding may be because of 
information based herding observed in these industries possibly driven by industrial 
characteristics such as firms’ market capitalisation (Hoitash and Krishnan, 2008).  
Moreover, it is interesting that the Healthcare sector has the highest degree of herding, given 
that it is the fourth largest sector in the US economy46. This could be perhaps due to quick 
reaction to the announcement of good and bad news regarding the pharmaceutical industry 
for example, which could increase herding. Given that the US Healthcare has experienced 
reforms with each administration, its investors may face increased investment risk. 
Consequently, from an investors’ perspective, this implies that investors who focus on the 
Healthcare sector can achieve the same sector performance by investing fewer stocks 
(Demirer, et al., 2010). Herding observed in the Oil and Gas sector is interesting, given that 
the US is the third largest oil producing country in the world47.  
Overall, there is limited evidence of herding across the sectors. Our evidence supports those 
of Gebka and Wohar (2013) who do not find evidence of herding in the worldwide equity 
markets examined but detect herding specifically in the Basic Materials, Consumer Services 
and Oil and Gas industries. In contrast, our results are inconsistent with those obtained by 
Christie and Huang (1995), who find no evidence of herding across all US sectors examined. 
However, when they compare the magnitude of coefficients obtained across industries, they 
find that the Utility industry which is highly regulated reported the lowest level of dispersion. 
Our results are also different from Choi and Sias (2009) who examined US institutional 
industry herding and find evidence that they herd in and out of industries. They suggest that 
this herding may be driven by stock herding. On the contrary, the results we obtain show the 
reverse may be the case, as herding is only observed at the sector level and not the market 
                                                 
46 Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2016  
47 Source: US Energy Information Administration,2016 
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level. Furthermore, our evidence differs from the results obtained by Litimi, et al., (2016), 
who tested a modified version of the CSAD model and report negatively significant 𝛾2   
coefficients for only two sectors: Public Utilities and Transportation. They argue that US 
investors herd based on information on the market condition rather than the sector return. 
Further, our results are in contrast with the recent evidence provided by BenMabrouk and 
Litimi (2018), who find no herding in US sectors. Interestingly, they find that the sectors all 
exhibit ‘negative herding’ which implies that investors massively ignore the industry 
consensus as a group. Owing to the uniqueness of this study, the inconsistent results 
compared to other US based studies may be due to differences in methodology, sample size 
and research focus.   
From the context of other developed markets, our results are also from different Henker, et 
al., (2006) who find no evidence of industry sector herding in all but the Property Trusts 
sector of the Australian market using intraday data. They argue that their results imply that 
investors in the Australian market have sufficient flow of firm-specific information. 
International evidence reported by Gebka and Wohar (2013) finds herding in sectors such as 
Oil and Gas, Basic Materials and Consumer Services. 
Table 4.3 Estimates of herding in US sectors 
Industry                      α         𝛾1                         𝛾2                    Adj. R
2   
Automobile  0.0077 0.2759 0.9365 25.76% 
 (62.10)
*** (20.84) *** (4.27) ***  
Banks 0.0062 0.2323 0.6457 41.40% 
 (65.99)
 *** (29.52) *** (9.89) ***  
Basic Resources 0.0085 0.2966 -0.1643 20.25% 
 (59.79)
 *** (24.18) *** (-1.04)  
Chemicals 0.0075 0.1936 0.7699 22.40% 
 (90.51)
 *** (20.68) *** (5.01) ***  
Construction 0.0085 0.1702 3.2400 26.65% 
 (67.33)
 *** (13.11) *** (15.63) ***  
Financials 0.0084 0.3047 -0.0385 31.75% 
 (80.25)
 *** (31.39) *** (-0.32)  
Food & Beverage 0.0081 0.3528 -0.0945 17.60% 
 (82.00)
 *** (21.42) *** (-0.21)  
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Healthcare 0.0111 0.3922 -2.0876 14.32% 
 (88.12)
 *** (23.18) *** (-5.58) ***  
Industrial Goods 0.0090 0.2782 -0.9514 15.48% 
 (97.16)
 *** (21.55) *** (-3.48) ***  
Insurance 0.0062 0.2979 1.8752 52.64% 
 (71.40)
 *** (31.76) *** (17.19) ***  
Media 0.0078 0.3324 -0.2048 25.68% 
 (68.48)
 *** (26.53) *** (-0.97)  
Oil & Gas 0.0096 0.2129 -0.3827 19.27% 
 (106.04)
 *** (27.87) *** (-4.23) ***  
Personal & Household 0.0097 0.3395 -0.2157 22.87% 
 (94.06)
 *** (23.51) *** (-0.68)  
Real Estate 0.0074 0.2910 0.1113 34.66% 
 (86.56)
 *** (32.32) *** (1.24)  
Retail 0.0108 0.3735 -1.0577 19.20% 
 (87.15)
 *** (23.98) *** (-3.31) ***  
Technology 0.0117 0.3872 -0.7800 28.05% 
 (78.96)
 *** (28.35) *** (-3.66) ***  
Telecommunication 0.0069 0.6121 2.1903 46.29% 
 (42.94)
 *** (32.72) *** (6.30) ***  
Travel & Leisure 0.0098 0.3227 0.9566 28.91% 
 (76.21)
 *** (29.43) *** (7.30) ***  
Utilities 0.0085 0.3555 1.6473 27.84% 
  (85.80) *** (25.46) *** (6.23) ***    
 
 
Note:  
Table 4.3 reports the estimates from the following equation    
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the average value of sector return in each sector, the squared market return 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 is used 
to capture the nonlinearity in the relationship, α is the constant, γ1, and γ2 are coefficients, and εt is 
the error term at time t, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns for the market, the 
equation is estimated over the whole sample period for each sector. We utilize the DataStream 
industry classification. T-test statistics based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
In comparison to evidence obtained for developing markets our results are similar to the 
findings of Gavriilidis, et al., (2013) for Spanish mutual funds, who only document 
significant herding in Consumer services, Industrials and Technology sectors (a sector where 
we also find herding) out of the 9 sectors examined. However, our results are different from 
those reported for the Chinese sectors by Demirer and Kutan (2006) and find no evidence in 
support of herd formation.  
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The above results demonstrate that US investors do not herd at market level. Evidence from 
the sector level indicates limited evidence of herding. Next, we investigate herd behaviour 
based on market return, volatility and trading volume for the overall market and individual 
sectors.  
4.5.3. Determinants of industry herding  
Previous studies have examined return asymmetries (Tan, et al., 2008; Gleason, et al., 2004). 
Christie and Huang (1995) argue that herd behaviour is more prevalent during periods of 
extreme price movements. Moreover, in a seminal study, Tan, et al., (2008) suggested that 
asymmetry in herd behaviour is possible, contingent on whether the market return is rising 
or declining, high (low) volatility and trading volume. Therefore, we examine the 
determinants of industry herding by estimating possible asymmetric effects of herd 
behaviour based on the direction of the market and levels of volatility and trading volume at 
both the market and sector levels. The empirical results are discussed in the sections below.  
 
4.5.3.1. The effect of market returns on herding 
To examine whether herding is contingent upon rising or declining market returns, a dummy 
variable as specified in Equation (5) is used to capture the differences in the CSADs. 𝛾3  and 
𝛾4   represent the coefficients for rising and declining market conditions respectively.  
Table 4.4 presents the market-wide results of herding conditioned upon market returns. The 
evidence suggests that in rising market conditions, the coefficient 𝛾3   is positive and not 
statistically significant, indicating that there is no evidence of herding. The results show that 
there is no difference in the CSAD in rising or declining markets. This finding is in line with 
the predictions of rational asset pricing models that asset dispersion increases during periods 
of significant price movement (Demirer and Kutan, 2006).  
 
105 
 
Table 4.4 Estimates of herding in rising and declining markets, US 
Estimated  
Parameters α 𝛾1            𝛾2  𝛾3      𝛾4      Adj. R
2                
 0.0107 0.3394 0.3093 0.3699 0.2024 25.18% 
   (115.81) *** (22.04) *** (20.45) *** (1.12) (0.67)   
 
Note: Table 4.4 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝑢𝑝|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑝)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝑢𝑝(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝛾4  (1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑝)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
Dup is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for days with positive sector returns and a value of 0 
otherwise, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the sector’s average return, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of 
returns for the market, α is the constant, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 are coefficients and 𝜀𝑡is the error term at time t.  
The equation is estimated over the whole sample period. ***, ** and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Likewise, during declining market conditions, the coefficient 𝛾4 is positive and not 
statistically significant. The results also indicate that there is no evidence of herding. From 
these results, it appears that there is no asymmetric relationship between herding and market 
condition. Hence, there is no difference between herd behaviour in rising or declining market 
returns. Contrary to H2a, there is no evidence that herding is contingent upon market returns. 
It is interesting to note that when the coefficients of 𝛾3 and 𝛾4 are compared, the 𝛾4 coefficient 
is smaller suggesting that the increase in dispersion is greater in rising than in declining 
market conditions. Thus, this gives an indication that during periods of extreme price 
movements, the equity returns dispersion increases. These results also show that US 
investors do not exhibit herd behaviour in response to rising or declining market returns.  
Our findings are in line with those of Chang, et al., (2000) who report that the US has the 
highest rate of increase in dispersion in up markets than down markets. They explain that it 
may be due to directional asymmetry (proposed by McQueen, Pinegar and Thorley,1996), 
whereby large and small US stocks react quickly to negative macroeconomic news, however, 
some small stocks adjust slowly to positive macroeconomic news. In the same light, our 
results are similar those obtained by Demirer and Kutan (2006), who investigate herding 
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using the Chinese stocks listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and find that 
return dispersions are much lower during declining market condition than rising conditions, 
indicating that investors tend to follow the market consensus known as ‘flight to safety'. 
However, our findings challenge the evidence obtained by Henker, et al., (2006) who 
document a greater increase in dispersion for declining market conditions for the Australian 
market.  
These results are different from the predictions of herding which suggests that the level of 
equity returns dispersion decreases during periods of market stress. Also, our results do not 
support the prediction that the tendency to herd is higher during rising market conditions due 
to overconfidence (Daniel, et al., 1998; Staman, et al., 2006). Similar results were also 
obtained by Chang, et al., (2000) and Chiang and Zheng (2010) for the US market for rising 
or declining market returns.  
Our result is at odds with those from studies on developing markets that mainly report 
herding asymmetry. Goodfellow, et al., (2009) investigate the trading behaviour of investors 
in the Polish stock market during rising and declining market conditions. They find that 
investors herd mostly during declining market conditions. Similarly, Zhou and Lai (2009) 
find that herding in the Hong Kong Composite market is more prevalent during declining 
market conditions. Demirer, et al., (2010) examine herding in the Taiwanese stock market, 
according to their results, herding is more prevalent in periods of declining market 
conditions. The authors explain that this may be due to loss aversion during periods of market 
decline which causes investors to have a greater propensity to avoid losses than make gains. 
Economou, et al., (2011) report that with exception of the Greek market, all other markets 
(Spanish, Italian, Portuguese) examined herd in declining market conditions. Similar results 
were obtained for Spanish funds by Gavriilidis, et al., (2013), who report significant herding 
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during periods of negative market returns. For Portuguese funds, Homles, et al., (2013) 
report that herding is more dominant during periods of market decline.  
In contrast to these findings, Tan, et al., (2008) provide empirical evidence that for dual-
listed Chinese A-share and B-share stocks, herding occurs in both rising and declining 
market conditions. Likewise, Guney, Kallinterakis and Komba (2017) examine herd 
behaviour in 8 African frontier markets and report that herding occurs in both up and down-
market conditions.  
Overall, our results provide consistent evidence that the highest level of return dispersion 
occurs during rising market conditions. For other developed markets, the dispersion 
increases during declining market conditions. The results we obtain may be different from 
those obtained in other developed market due to unique market structures of each market. 
(For example, stock market regulations).  
 
Table 4.5 Estimates of herding for sectors in rising and declining markets, US 
Industry               α           𝛾1                   𝛾2                           𝛾3          𝛾4                   
      
Adj.R2  
      
Automobile  0.0077 0.3173 0.2355 0.1168 1.7042 25.99% 
 (62.08)
 *** (20.21) *** (15.04) *** (0.40) *** (6.13) ***  
Banks 0.0062 0.2341 0.2301 0.6551 0.6411 41.38% 
 (65.76)
 *** (23.15) *** (24.73) *** (6.99) *** (8.03) ***  
Basic Resources 0.0085 0.3013 0.2919 0.0955 -0.3720 20.37% 
 (59.79)
 *** (20.83) *** (19.81) *** (0.46) *** (-1.80) *  
Chemicals 0.0074 0.2420 0.1643 -0.5535 1.5230 23.03% 
 (89.94)
 *** (20.72) *** (15.06) *** (-2.38) ** (8.36) ***  
Construction 0.0083 0.2695 0.1208 0.7188 4.4901 27.70% 
 (66.21)
 *** (16.31) *** (8.10) *** (2.22) ** (18.73) ***  
Financials 0.0084 0.3251 0.2799 -0.0121 0.0111 32.02% 
 (80.24)
 *** (27.09) *** (24.40) *** (-0.07) (0.07)  
Food & Beverage 0.0080 0.3613 0.3550 0.5837 -1.2067 17.78% 
 (81.72)
 *** (19.35) *** (17.23) *** (1.06) (-1.83) *  
Healthcare 0.0110 0.4053 0.3778 -1.7840 -2.2119 14.41% 
 (87.95)
 *** (21.05) *** (17.93) *** (-3.70) *** (-4.37) ***  
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Industrial Goods 0.0090 0.2826 0.2715 -0.6996 -1.0974 15.53% 
 (97.10)
 *** (18.24) *** (17.64) *** (-1.88) * (-3.17) ***  
Insurance 0.0062 0.2883 0.3064 1.9698 1.7993 52.64% 
 (71.26)
 *** (4.35) *** (27.48) *** (12.51) *** (13.56) ***  
Media 0.0078 0.3647 0.2957 -0.3730 0.0586 26.00% 
 (68.56)
 *** (25.27) *** (19.04) *** (-1.42) (0.20)  
Oil & Gas 0.0096 0.2240 0.2022 -0.5264 -0.2623 19.30% 
 (105.98)
 *** (24.23) *** (22.09) *** (-3.99) *** (-2.34) *  
Personal& 
Household 0.0097 0.3471 0.3227 0.2440 -0.3733 23.04% 
 (94.14)
 *** (20.03) *** (18.97) *** (0.56) (-0.96)  
Real Estate 0.0074 0.2821 0.3039 0.2576 -0.0896 34.69% 
 (86.37)
 *** (25.92) *** (26.59) *** (2.31) ** (-0.70)  
Retail 0.0108 0.3857 0.3644 -0.6531 -1.5834 19.43% 
 (87.14)
 *** (21.34) *** (19.25***) (-1.63) (-3.63) ***  
Technology 0.0116 0.4130 0.3579 -1.0309 -0.4329 28.16% 
 (78.63)
 *** (26.61) *** (20.44) *** (-4.16) *** (-1.34)  
Telecom 0.0069 0.6612 0.5629 1.3267 3.0614 46.41% 
 (42.95)
 *** (29.83) *** (25.38) *** (2.93) *** (6.83) ***  
Travel & Leisure 0.0097 0.3858 0.3064 -0.2837 1.1686 29.13% 
 (72.38)
 *** (22.52) *** (24.10) *** (-0.87) (8.47) ***  
Utilities 0.0086 0.3570 0.3084 0.5596 3.8208 28.48% 
  (86.52) *** (21.89) *** (17.37) *** (1.80) (9.43) ***   
 
Note:  
Table 4.5 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝑢𝑝|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑝)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝑢𝑝(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝛾4  (1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑝)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
Dup is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for days with positive sector returns and a value of 0 
otherwise, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the average value of sector return in each sector, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the cross-sectional 
absolute deviation of returns for the sectors, α is the constant, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 are coefficients and εt is 
the error term at time t.  The equation is estimated over the whole sample period. T-test statistics 
based on Newey-West. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Table 4.5 presents results for the industry sector CSADs in rising and declining price 
movements. Again, the results are similar to those obtained for herding in industry sectors. 
During upmarket conditions, negative statistically significant 𝛾3   coefficients of interest are 
reported in the Chemicals, Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Oil and Gas and Technology 
sectors. Evidence of herding is strongest in the Technology and Oil and Gas sectors. 
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Interestingly, the highest level of herding is observed in the Technology industry rather than 
the Healthcare sector reported in previous results.  
In declining markets, negative statistically significant 𝛾4   coefficients of interest are reported 
in the Basic Resources, Food and Beverage, Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Oil and Gas and 
Retail. Basic Resources and Food and Beverage industries show the highest level of herding.  
In contrast to H2a, there is limited evidence that herding is contingent upon sector returns.  
 It is interesting to note that herding occurs in the Healthcare and Industrial Goods sectors in 
both up and down-market states. This gives an indication that investors in these sectors herd 
irrespective of the market condition. Due to lack of empirical evidence on herding (to the 
best of our knowledge) conditioned upon the market return for the US, our results are 
compared to the findings of non-US based research.  
Again, our results are significantly different from those obtained from developing markets. 
Gavriilidis, et al., (2013) provide evidence of significant herding in the Spanish Consumer 
Services, Financials and Industrial sectors during quarters of low market /sector returns. In 
contrast, Demirer and Kutan (2006), find lower return dispersion during declining market 
conditions in most sectors with some sectors having a dispersion that is 50 percent smaller 
in down markets than in up markets.  Demirer, et al., (2010), document herding mainly 
during down markets for the sectors examined. Gebka and Wohar (2013) find a significant 
difference in the level of herding for up and down markets. In up markets, they report herding 
in Financials and Industrials, while no evidence of herding is reported in down markets. 
4.5.3.2. The effect of volatility on herding  
Gavriilidis, et al., (2013) state that periods of increasing volatility may lead to an 
environment with a excessive information whereby less skilled managers prefer to mimic 
their more skilled counterparts. The high flow of information may make information 
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processing difficult. Conversely, in periods of decreasing volatility, these less skilled 
managers may be prompted to herd due to the ease with which the trades of more skilled 
managers can be observed. This can be explained by the increased visibility that such periods 
entail.  
Finding a relationship between herding and volatility will provide evidence on whether 
volatility has an asymmetric effect on herding. To examine this relationship, we use a 
dummy variable as shown in equation (6) to capture a possible asymmetric relationship 
between CSAD and return volatility. The findings for the overall market are presented in 
Table 4.6.  
 
Table 4.6 Estimates of herding during periods of high and low volatility for the 
overall US market 
Estimated 
Parameters α 𝛾1               𝛾2    𝛾3         𝛾4        Adj. R
2                
  0.0099 0.3054 0.6365 0.6574 -4.4121 27.95% 
  (92.54) *** (23.84) *** (21.84) *** (2.78) *** (-4.04) ***   
 
Note: Table 4.6 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ |𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝛾4  (1 −
𝐷𝜎
2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where Dσ2-High is 1 for days with high market volatility and 0 otherwise, based on the previous 30-
day moving average. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market’s average return, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute 
deviation of returns for the market, α is the constant, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 are coefficients and εt is the error 
term at time t.  The equation is estimated over the whole sample period. T-test statistics based on 
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
An analysis of the results reveals that herd behaviour is only present in low volatility periods, 
the coefficient for 𝛾4  is negative and statistically significant. This implies that herding is 
more likely on days with low volatility, which supports the argument of Holmes, et al., 
(2013) that investors tend to herd more during periods of low volatility. Holmes, et al., 
(2103) explain that investors tend to herd during this period because the direction of the 
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market is clearer direction, so they can easily follow the market consensus. Moreover, this 
result contrasts with the H2b hypothesis which predicts that herding is contingent upon 
market volatility for the US market. Our results support the findings of Economou, et al., 
(2011) who document herding in low volatility periods for the Italian and Portuguese 
markets. Our results are also in line with those obtained by Holmes, et al., (2013) for the 
Portuguese stock market using mutual fund data, where herding is more prevalent during 
periods of declining market volatility. 
Our results are in contrast with evidence from developing markets. Tan, et al., (2008) provide 
evidence for the Chinese stock market where herding is only documented in periods of high 
volatility. Similarly, Blasco, et al., (2012) find that investors in the Spanish stock market 
herd more during periods of high volatility.  Guney, et al., (2017), report that most markets 
in their sample display herd behaviour during periods of both high and low volatility, with 
herding more pronounced during periods of low volatility. We now examine the effect of 
high (low) volatility on herding at the sector level. 
 
Table 4.7 Estimates of herding for US sectors in periods of high and low volatility 
 
Industry                   α               𝛾1             𝛾2           𝛾3    𝛾4         Adj. R
2                    
Automobile  0.0073 0.2479 0.3747 1.3626 3.4226 27.35% 
 (48.63)
 *** (18.24) *** (11.91) *** (6.18) *** (2.99) ***  
Banks 0.0058 0.1840 0.3778 0.9406 1.1222 45.07% 
 (53.88)
 *** (22.65) *** (19.61) *** (14.47) ***  (2.76) ***  
Basic Resources 0.0077 0.2932 0.5014 -0.0063 -3.0514 21.35% 
 (45.26)
 *** (23.51) *** (17.76) *** (-0.04) (-3.93) ***  
Chemicals 0.0069 0.1893 0.3785 0.9499 -2.5247 23.89% 
 (70.61)
 *** (19.85) *** (17.11) *** (6.19) *** (-3.24) ***  
Construction 0.0078 0.1579 0.3508 3.5176 1.5373 27.70% 
 (51.64)
 *** (11.88) *** (11.00) *** (16.90) *** (1.32)  
Financials 0.0074 0.2888 0.5831 0.2313 -3.6816 34.78% 
 (60.62)
 *** (29.31) *** (24.50) *** (1.92) * (-5.24) ***  
Food & Beverage 0.0074 0.3462 0.6618 0.5326 -7.1843 19.41% 
 (60.80)
 *** (0.54) (15.97) *** (1.17) (-2.65) ***  
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Healthcare 0.0097 0.4023 0.8912 -1.6165 -16.9343 17.27% 
 (63.37)
 *** (23.39) *** (21.02) *** (-4.35) *** (-7.79) ***  
Industrial Goods 0.0083 0.2701 0.5480 -0.5496 -7.1753 17.38% 
 (75.63)
 *** (20.52) *** (17.96) *** (-2.01) *** (-5.22) ***  
Insurance 0.0057 0.2450 0.4817 2.3238 3.4356 56.33% 
 (57.83)
 *** (25.98) *** (21.86) *** (21.78) ** (5.77) ***  
Media 0.0070 0.3209 0.5792 0.1535 -4.7197 27.33% 
 (51.88)
 *** (25.09) *** (19.98) *** (0.73) (-4.49) ***  
 
 
Oil & Gas 
 
 
0.0090 
 
 
0.2114 
 
 
0.3561 
 
 
-0.3051 
 
 
-2.2187 
 
 
20.54% 
 (85.32)
 *** (27.35) *** (20.37) *** (-3.38) *** (-5.32) ***  
Personal & 
Household 0.0091 0.3206 0.5657 0.3238 -2.7346 24.61% 
 (73.95)
 *** (21.80) *** (17.20) *** (1.03) (-1.87) *  
Real Estate 0.0072 0.2530 0.3760 0.3417 1.4465 36.77% 
 (74.28)
 *** (27.32) *** (17.98) *** (3.80) *** (3.29) ***  
Retail 0.0096 0.3620 0.7875 -0.3917 -9.5840 22.55% 
 (64.61)
 *** (22.97) *** (21.33) *** (-1.24) (-5.82) ***  
Technology 0.0098 0.3634 0.8472 -0.0369 -8.0505 33.32% 
 (54.99)
 *** (26.29) *** (24.20) *** (-0.18) (-6.56) ***  
Telecommunication 0.0057 0.6124 0.9963 2.6203 -8.6854 47.27% 
 (29.76)
 *** (31.85) *** (22.42) *** (7.47) *** (-4.70) ***  
Travel & Leisure 0.0087 0.3154 0.6111 1.1241 -1.7207 31.46% 
 (53.34)
 *** (27.69) *** (17.21) *** (8.63) *** (-1.27)  
Utilities 0.0076 0.3210 0.7081 2.2690 1.5347 32.46% 
  (64.88) *** (22.87) *** (20.03) *** (8.78) *** (0.91)   
 
Note: Table 4.7 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ |𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝛾4  (1 −
𝐷𝜎
2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where Dσ2-High is 1 for days with high sector volatility and 0 otherwise, based on the previous 30-day 
moving average. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the average value of sector return in each sector, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the cross-
sectional absolute deviation of returns for the sectors, α is the constant, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 are coefficients 
and εt is the error term at time t.  The equation is estimated over the whole sample period. T-test 
statistics based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
The evidence for the industry sectors is presented in Table 4.7. Notably, there is no evidence 
of herd formation during periods of high volatility in most sectors except for Healthcare, 
Industrial Goods and Oil and Gas during periods of high volatility. These investors may have 
been driven to herd due to high flow of information caused by uncertainty making it difficult 
to interpret information.  
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Most regression estimates are positive and statistically significant indicating an increasing 
relationship between equity return dispersion and high market volatility. This implies that 
investors mostly ignored market wide information in favour of information from superior 
investors. A possible explanation for this result is an excessive ‘flight to quality’ where the 
US investors may have rebalanced their portfolios whereby they shifted their investment 
from more risky assets (uncertain markets) to safer ones (Gebka and Wohar, 2013).  
This presents strong evidence that most of the investors in the US market do not herd during 
periods of high market volatility. Moreover, this evidence is contrary to the herding literature 
which argues that during periods of high volatility, investors have the tendency to herd due 
to increased risk and uncertainty about future market conditions (Holmes, et al., 2013). A 
closer analysis of the negative coefficients shows that herding is strongest in the Healthcare 
and Industrial Goods sectors. This gives an indication that during periods of high return 
volatility, investors in these sectors appear to suppress their own belief in favour of the 
market consensus resulting in a low dispersion of market returns.  
It is interesting to note that the results for low volatility are a significant contrast from those 
obtained for high return volatility. Indeed, we find evidence of herd formation in most 
sectors except for Automobile, Bank, Construction, Insurance, Real Estate, Travel and 
Leisure and Utility. Our results are consistent with the predictions of H2b, there is strong 
evidence that herd behavior is contingent upon volatility. This supports the herding literature 
which argues that intentional herding occurs during stable periods, where motivated by 
reputational concerns, poor performing managers herd behind high performing managers 
(Holmes, et al., 2013). Remarkably, as illustrated in Table 4.7 herding occurs in the 
Healthcare, Industrial Goods and Oil and Gas sectors irrespective of whether the sector 
volatility is high or low, which suggests that the level of investment in these sectors is driven 
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by demand rather than market volatility. Our results are consistent with those obtained by 
Gavriilidis, et al., (2013) who report that institutional industry herding is more prevalent 
when sector volatility is low. Specifically, they find herding at both high and low volatility 
for the Technology sector, only in low volatility periods for the Industrials sector and high 
volatility for Industrial and Oil and Gas sectors.  
4.5.3.3. The effect of volume on herding 
 
Tan, et al., (2008) argue that the extent of herding may be affected by trading volume. 
Therefore, to further investigate herd behaviour in periods of high and low trading volume, 
we utilise a dummy variable as in equation (7) to capture a possible asymmetric relationship 
between CSAD and trading volume. 
Table 4.8 Estimates of herding during periods of high and low volume for the overall 
US market 
Estimated  
Parameters          α          𝛾1       𝛾2             𝛾3     𝛾4           Adj. R
2  
                       
     0.0108 0.2682 0.3542 1.3925     -0.2175   25.32% 
                          (110.94) *** (13.19) *** (24.98) *** (2.06) ** (-0.85)    
 
Note: Table 4.8 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ |𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 +
𝛾4  (1 − 𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where 𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ is 1 for days with high market volume and 0 otherwise, based on a 30-day moving 
average  𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the the average value of market return, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute 
deviation of returns for the market, α is the constant, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 are coefficients and εt is the error 
term at time t.  The equation is estimated over the whole sample period. T-test statistics based on 
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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The results for the overall market are reported in Table 4.8. These results are similar to those 
obtained for return volatility, this similarity is not surprising as previous studies have 
demonstrated that there is a positive relationship between volume and volatility (Jones, Kaul 
and Lipson, 1994). A closer analysis of the results reveals the absence of herding in high and 
low trading volume, respectively. In periods of high trading volume, the 𝛾3   coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant, indicating that the cross-sectional dispersion is higher 
compared to levels suggested by rational asset pricing models. Hence, there is no asymmetric 
effect of herding during periods of high trading volume. The evidence for low trading 
volume yields a negative 𝛾4   coefficient that is not significantly different from zero. 
Specifically, in contrast to H2c, herding is not contingent upon high (low) trading volume. 
However, comparing the coefficients, the 𝛾3   coefficient is greater than the 𝛾4  coefficient, 
this implies that equity return dispersion is greater when trading volume is high, thus, 
investors tend to follow the market consensus when the level of trading activity is high. The 
evidence shows that using market level data, investors do not herd regardless of the trading 
volume hence herding is not related to trading volume.  
Our results are inconsistent with the evidence provided by Economou, et al., (2011) who 
find evidence of herding in low volume periods for the both Greek and Italian stock markets. 
Evidence from the Chinese stock market reported by Tan, et al., (2008) is mixed, in high 
volume periods, herding is present in the Shanghai and Shenzhen A and B- share market, 
while for low volume periods herding is only observed in the B share market. To gain 
additional insight on whether herd behaviour exhibits an asymmetry associated with the 
trading volume, we examine evidence using the sector level data. 
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Table 4.9 Regression estimates for herd behaviour during high and low trading 
volume, US 
Industry             α                𝛾1                  𝛾2           𝛾3                  𝛾4          Adj. R
2           
Automobile  0.0078 0.2617 0.2821 1.3623 0.7614 25.81% 
 (61.53)
*** (14.97)*** (19.18)*** (3.78)*** (3.06)***  
Banks 0.0062 0.2457 0.2243 0.6009 0.6809 41.52% 
 (64.80)
*** (24.03)*** (24.37)*** (6.48)*** (8.41)***  
Basic Resources 0.0085 0.2906 0.3096 -0.3333 -0.2351 20.30% 
 (58.05)
*** (16.14)*** (22.35)*** (-0.93) (-1.38)  
Chemicals 0.0075 0.1768 0.2180 0.5627 0.5230 22.68% 
 (84.84)
*** (10.49)*** (20.45)*** (1.06) (3.21)***  
Construction 0.0082 0.2638 0.1583 0.1552 3.9137 27.48% 
 (64.08)
*** (14.43)*** (10.99)*** (0.39) (17.30)***  
Financials 0.0084 0.3080 0.3077 -0.2048 -0.0424 31.79% 
 (77.25)
*** (21.41)*** (28.10)*** (-0.74) (-0.32)  
Food & Beverage 0.0081 0.2944 0.3524 3.7521 -0.6331 17.83% 
 (80.68)
*** (12.74)*** (18.78)*** (3.90)*** (-1.27)  
Healthcare 0.0111 0.3575 0.4020 -0.6322 -2.3927 14.41% 
 (85.31)
*** (14.42)*** (21.12)*** (-0.75) (-5.90)***  
 
 
Industrial Goods 
 
 
0.0090 
 
 
0.2401 
 
 
0.3037 
 
 
-0.3470 
 
 
-1.3788 
 
 
15.67% 
 (95.29)
*** (13.47)*** (21.13)*** (-0.66) (-4.54)***  
Insurance 0.0062 0.3050 0.3052 1.2692 1.9507 52.83% 
 (69.75)
*** (23.73)*** (28.66)*** (6.34)*** (15.93)***  
Media 0.0078 0.3306 0.3322 -0.0858 -0.2173 25.72% 
 (66.01)
*** (17.56)*** (23.72)*** (-0.18) (-0.96)  
Oil & Gas 0.0090 0.2114 0.3561 -0.3051 -2.2187 20.54% 
 (85.32)
*** (27.35)*** (20.37)*** (-3.38)*** (-5.32)***  
Personal & 
Household 0.0097 0.3257 0.3643 -0.4633 -0.5018 
22.92% 
 (92.12)
*** (16.95)*** (21.74)*** (-0.79) (-1.41)  
Real Estate 0.0075 0.2548 0.3117 0.5062 -0.0533 34.90% 
 (84.42)
*** (19.49)*** (29.79)*** (2.64)*** (-0.54)  
Retail 0.0108 0.3386 0.3807 0.9175 -1.6773 19.55% 
 (86.27)
*** (16.70)*** (21.61)*** (1.71)* (-4.59)***  
Technology 0.0117 0.3716 0.3967 -0.4730 -0.9105 28.14% 
 (75.99)
*** (18.17)*** (25.95)*** (-1.03) (-3.94)***  
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Note:  
Table 4.9 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ |𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2   +
𝛾4  (1 − 𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where 𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ is 1 for days with high sector volume and 0 otherwise, based on the previous 30-
day moving average  𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the average value of sector return in each sector, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the cross-
sectional absolute deviation of returns for the sector, α is the constant, 𝛾1  , 𝛾2  , 𝛾3  , 𝛾4  are coefficients 
and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term at time t.  The equation is estimated over the whole sample period. T-test 
statistics based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.  The t-test statistic tests for the difference in level of significance between 
the 𝛾3   and , 𝛾4   coefficients. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
The results presented in Table 4.9 shows that during high trading volume periods, the 𝛾3   
coefficients are negative and statistically significant in only the Oil and Gas sector. An 
explanation for herding in this sector could be due to the increased participation of 
sophisticated traders’ because of the high level of trading activity within the sector, making 
it easier for less informed traders to mimic their trades (Economou, Gavriilidis and 
Yordanov, 2015).  
This gives an indication that high trading volume does not affect the dispersion of returns in 
the US sectors examined. Specifically, this is inconsistent with H2c, herding is not 
contingent upon trading volume. However, our results are in contrast with those obtained by 
Gavriilidis, et al., (2013), who find that Spanish fund managers’ herd more in periods with 
high volume specifically in the Technology, Utilities and Consumer Service sectors. 
An analysis of herding during low volume periods shows negative and statistically 
significant 𝛾4   coefficients in the Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Oil and Gas, Retail and 
Telecommunication 0.0069 0.5826 0.6165 3.9659 1.5254 46.57% 
 (42.91)
*** (24.71)*** (28.73)*** (7.38)*** (3.76)***  
Travel & Leisure 0.0099 0.2918 0.3245 1.7653 0.8918 29.03% 
 (71.69)
*** (15.13)*** (26.07)*** (4.11)*** (6.54)***  
Utilities 0.0086 0.2858 0.4247 2.0291 0.8026 28.62% 
  (82.03)*** (11.92)*** (26.35)*** (2.16)*** (2.85)***   
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Technology sectors. Herding is strongest in Healthcare and Oil and Gas. The evidence of 
herding in these sectors during periods of low trading volume may be due to the difficulty 
fund managers investing in these sectors might face in selling their portfolios during low 
volume periods which may drive them to herd (Economou, et al., 2015). 
Remarkably, herding is present in the Oil and Gas sector at both periods of low and high 
trading volume, indicating that the investors in this sector herd regardless of the level of 
trading activity. This herding may have resulted from the unprecedented surge in oil prices 
recorded in 2003-2008. Indeed, Boyd, Buyuksahin, Haigh and Harris (2015) find supportive 
evidence of herding in oil futures market which may be due to the disagreement among 
money managers who follow dispersed information flows. Gavriilidis, et al., (2013) also 
report significant herding of Spanish funds in the Oil and Gas sector during quarters of 
declining sector volume.  
Overall, the results for herding conditioned on trading volume at both the market and sector 
level, provide limited evidence in support of the presence of stronger levels of herding during 
high (low) volume periods. This contrasts with herding literature which suggests that herd 
behaviour may be more significant when trading volume is high. However, there is strong 
supportive evidence that US investors exhibit ‘negative herding’ as most of the coefficients 
during the high and low volume periods are positive and statistically significant. 
 
4.5.4. Herding and market stress 
4.5.4.1. Dot Com Bubble 
The Dot com bubble which occurred in the late 1990s was triggered by the significant 
investment in the Technology sector. However, due to the sector’s lack of sustained growth 
without profitability, investors panicked and sold these internet stocks which lead to a 39% 
decline in the NASDAQ-100 Index, on the 9th of October 2002. This, in turn, resulted in a 
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collapse of stock prices between the spring of 2000 to October 2002 (Wheale and Amin, 
2003). 
Previous literature suggests that investors have a greater tendency to herd during periods of 
extreme price movement (Christie and Huang, 1995). Consequently, we examine the Dot 
com bubble period to determine whether it influenced US investors’ herd behaviour. To 
achieve this as stated earlier, we divide the daily data into sub-samples as follows: Pre-Dot 
com bubble phase (01/01/1990- 31/12/1994), Dot com bubble (01/01/1995 - 10/03/2000), 
Dot com bubble crash (13/03/2000- 9/10/2002). The results for the overall market and 
sectors are discussed in the sections below.  
4.5.4.1.1. Results for the overall market 
Regressions are estimated for the three sub-samples using Equation (4). Table 4.10 presents 
the results of the regression for the overall market. It is important to note that the coefficient 
for 𝛾2   is negative and significant during the pre-bubble and bubble phases which implies 
that investors ignore their assessment of the stocks and follow the market consensus. This is 
consistent with the prediction of H3 that herding is stronger during the Dot Com bubble. 
Therefore, these returns display greater correlation in trades during such periods. As a result, 
investors will require more stocks in their portfolios to achieve the benefits of diversification.  
Remarkably, there is no evidence of herding during the bubble crash period which is 
inconsistent with the literature that argues that herding occurs during periods of high price 
movement and volatility. The results for the bubble crash are consistent with those obtained 
by Galariotis, et al., (2016) who report that there is no evidence of herding during the Dot-
com bubble burst. It is important to point out that these results are similar even though they 
use a shorter sample period (1989-2011), S&P 100 index and a bubble burst period that is 
slightly shorter (January 2000 - June 2000). 
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The test of herding effect in the pre, bubble and bubble crash phases of the Dot Com crisis 
shows that herding occurs in the pre-bubble and bubble phases and not during the bubble 
crash suggesting that investors only herd in the bubble forming period. During the pre-
bubble and bubble periods investors may have decided to herd with other investors who 
embraced the Dot Com mania, because they preferred to fail with the crowd than to be wrong 
alone. A possible explanation for the absence of herding recorded during the bubble crash is 
that stock prices had returned to their pre-bubble levels maybe probably due to the 
government’s intervention. The absence of herding could also be due to investors having a 
pessimistic view of the future development in the market. In addition, herding during a crisis 
could dissipate because the pre-crisis fundamentals that supported that herding may no 
longer be valid. (Economou, et al., 2015b).  A closer examination of herd behaviour results 
at the sector level will give more insight on whether herd behaviour is widespread.  
Overall, a clear pattern established in finance literature can be gleaned from our results, 
where a possible rise in prices during the bubble building phase (marked by herding) is 
followed by a sharp fall(s) in stock prices at the bubble burst phase, accompanied by high 
return volatility. Our results lend support to the theoretical argument earlier discussed that 
irrational investors make their decisions based on herd instincts and psychological biases 
cause bubbles.  
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Table 4.10 Regression estimates for market herd behaviour for the Dot Com bubble, 
US 
Period       α       𝛾1          𝛾2  Adj. R
2 
Pre-bubble  0.0117 0.4342 -5.7797 23.47% 
 (81.26)
 *** (11.76) *** (-3.51) ***  
Bubble  0.0126 0.4651 -2.4761 24.06% 
 (66.27)
 *** (13.33) *** (-2.40) *** 
 
 
Bubble 
crash 
0.0158 0.3820 -0.7625 22.31% 
  (38.87) *** (6.54) *** (-0.50)    
 
Note: Table 4.10 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average of the market returns in at time t, the squared market return 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  is used to capture the nonlinearity in the relationship, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute 
deviation of returns for the market, α is the constant, 𝛾1   and 𝛾2   are coefficients, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error 
term at time t. The model is run for the separately for the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. 
Pre-bubble refers to the period between 1/01/1990 and 31/12/1994. Bubble refers to the period 
between 01/01/1995 and 10/03/2000. Bubble crash refers to the period between 13/03/2000 and 
09/10/2002. T-test statistics based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.11 Regression estimates for industry herd behaviour for the Dot Com bubble 
  
Pre-bubble  
  
 Bubble  
  
Bubble 
Crash 
  
Industry    α 𝛾1   𝛾2  Adj. R
2    α 𝛾1   𝛾2   Adj. R
2 α 𝛾1   𝛾2   Adj. R
2 
Automobile  0.0094 0.0605 8.8787 19.71% 0.0076 0.3286 0.6149 20.35% 0.0090 0.3002 -1.1871 17.77% 
 
(30.34) ***  (1.31) (7.09) *** 
 
(29.17) *** (8.15) *** (0.55) 
 
(20.67) *** 
-0.7049 
) 
(7.27) *** (-1.62) * 
 
Banks 0.0090 0.4266 -1.2691 25.94% 0.0072 0.2741 -0.7373 28.40% 0.0063 0.2603 -1.1976 30.82% 
 
(44.48) *** (10.24) ***  (-0.85) 
 
(43.08) *** (11.25) *** (-1.22) 
 
(24.73) *** (9.89) *** (-2.43) ** 
 
Basic Resources 0.0083 0.1348 5.7468 10.05% 0.0101 0.3395 0.3271 18.47% 0.0124 0.2215 0.7170 10.80% 
 
(27.26) *** (2.35) ** (2.73) *** 
 
(28.82) *** (8.79) *** (0.43) 
 
(18.88) *** (3.14) *** (0.50) 
 
Chemicals 0.0080 0.3332 -2.8771 15.15% 0.0083 0.3447 -2.3232 18.77% 0.0081 0.2701 -1.7833 19.96% 
 
(41.99) *** (7.90) *** (-1.69) * 
 
(42.62) *** (10.20) *** (-2.28) *** 
 
(26.86) *** (8.70) *** (-3.05) *** 
 
Construction 0.0076 0.3701 1.0505 19.18% 0.0077 0.4642 -2.2443 18.14% 0.0132 0.0019 8.5748 55.08% 
 
(25.95) *** (6.44) *** (0.51) 
 
(27.12) *** (9.67) *** (-1.61) 
 
(24.10) *** (0.05) (17.33) *** 
 
Financials 0.0093 0.3712 -0.9918 24.14% 0.0108 0.3812 -1.1373 25.54% 0.0117 0.2174 1.5007 31.18% 
 
(43.44) *** (9.72) *** (-0.84) 
 
(38.31) *** (12.46) *** (-2.01) ** 
 
(26.17) *** (5.28) *** (2.15) ** 
 
Food & Beverage 0.0100 0.2771 8.0382 22.34% 0.0111 0.3625 -0.2830 15.78% 0.0100 0.3511 0.5803 23.71% 
 
(39.79) *** (5.29) *** (4.03) *** 
 
(46.11) *** (7.89) *** (-0.17) 
 
(31.61) *** (6.99) *** (0.41) 
 
Healthcare 0.0145 0.3740 -3.0707 14.53% 0.0147 0.4541 -3.0237 18.29% 0.0160 0.5154 -4.5396 18.90% 
 
(57.86) *** (9.31) *** (-2.64) *** 
 
(57.09) *** (11.96) *** (-3.23) *** 
 
(30.05) *** (7.80) *** (-2.97) *** 
 
Industrial Goods 0.0101 0.3942 -4.4054 21.03% 0.0108 0.4533 -1.4784 26.62% 0.0142 0.2832 -0.8263 14.26% 
 
(67.67) *** (10.07) *** (-2.42) ** 
 
(53.58) *** (12.45) *** (-1.34) 
 
(32.60) *** (4.69) *** (-0.54) 
 
Insurance 0.0076 0.2850 1.5384 21.50% 0.0076 0.3494 0.5060 30.72% 0.0081 0.3639 -1.7283 33.32% 
 
(49.06) *** (7.59) *** (0.99) 
 
(39.17) *** (10.37) *** (0.51) 
 
(26.71) *** (11.99) 
*** 
(-3.32) *** 
 
Media 0.0094 0.3164 3.0494 25.66% 0.0099 0.4346 -2.1762 21.49% 0.0111 0.2399 1.2173 26.27% 
 
(33.43) *** (7.38) *** (2.62) *** 
 
(33.43) *** (12.30) *** (-2.94) *** 
 
(22.82) *** (5.38) *** (1.65) * 
 
Oil & Gas 0.0108 0.3927 -4.7139 14.24% 0.0106 0.3896 -1.4228 30.28% 0.0114 0.1344 2.5852 31.11% 
 
(50.51) *** (8.72) *** (-2.77) *** 
 
(45.72) *** (12.39) *** (-1.85) * 
 
(30.24) *** (3.81) *** (4.02) *** 
 
Personal & 
Household 
0.0115 0.3451 -1.4001 17.49% 0.0117 0.4488 -1.9016 21.75% 0.0133 0.3622 -1.4673 16.73% 
 
(55.38) *** (8.76) *** (-1.08) 
 
(51.47) *** (12.05) *** (-1.87) * 
 
(30.86) *** (6.51) *** (-1.14) 
 
Real Estate 0.0090 0.3872 8.2659 29.08% 0.0077 0.4755 -0.6184 29.24% 0.0096 0.3665 8.0689 36.27% 
 
(40.58) *** (7.03) *** (3.37) *** 
 
(50.22) *** (12.87) *** (-0.47) 
 
(25.68) *** (4.89) *** (3.08) *** 
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Retail 0.0146 0.1820 5.7788 21.47% 0.0145 0.4616 -3.0106 22.36% 0.0149 0.3989 -1.1247 23.80% 
 
(50.93) *** (4.18) *** (4.77) *** 
 
(57.56) *** (13.49) *** (-3.86) *** 
 
(30.50) *** (8.06) *** (-1.28) 
 
Technology 0.0154 0.3319 -1.8471 17.48% 0.0177 0.2816 -0.1385 19.07% 0.0205 0.3136 -0.7049 
-0.7049 
 
-0.7049 
0.7049 
28.20% 
 
(52.54) *** (8.18) *** (-1.74) * 
 
(48.18) *** (8.39) *** (-0.23) 
 
(30.49) *** (8.27) *** (-1.65) *** 
 
Telecom 0.0069 0.5244 1.4885 32.14% 0.0094 0.2801 11.7829 43.47% 0.0151 0.2929 8.3063 46.69% 
 
(24.94) *** (9.83) *** (0.79) 
 
(26.41) *** (5.90) *** (10.59) *** 
 
(16.60) *** (3.56) *** (5.91) *** 
 
Travel & Leisure 0.0095 0.2768 -0.4105 13.29% 0.0114 0.4043 -0.0024 19.39% 0.0138 0.4023 0.7879 38.67% 
 
(32.17) *** (7.31) *** (-0.47) 
 
(31.84) *** (8.64) *** (0.00) 
 
(23.78) *** (10.71) *** (3.33) *** 
 
Utilities 0.0090 0.3960 -3.3160 14.87% 0.0103 0.1530 7.9190 18.57% 0.0128 0.4264 3.2452 41.89% 
 
(53.74) *** (8.55) *** (-1.50) 
 
(56.17) *** (3.57) *** (4.47) *** 
 
(23.92) *** (7.63) *** (3.53) *** 
 
 
Note: Table 4.11 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average of sector returns in at time t, the squared sector return 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  is used to capture the nonlinearity in the relationship, 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns for the sector, α is the constant, 𝛾1   and 𝛾2  are coefficients, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term at time t. The 
model is run for the separately for the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods.  Bubble refers to the period between 01/01/1995 and 10/03/2000. Bubble crash 
refers to the period between 13/03/2000 and 09/10/2002. T-test statistics based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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4.5.4.1.2. Results for industry sectors 
Having found some evidence of herd behaviour during the pre-bubble and bubble phases for 
the overall market, we next focus on sector-based results to investigate probable herd 
behaviour among US investors in specific sectors. To achieve this, we run similar tests on 
the companies classified into sectors. 
Table 4.11 presents the regression results for equation (4). At a first glance, herding is present 
in some sectors across different periods. A closer examination reveals that, in the pre-bubble 
phase, negative and significant 𝛾2 coefficients of interest are reported in the Healthcare, 
Industrial Goods, Oil and Gas, Technology, and Chemicals sectors. This suggests that these 
five industries display greater correlation in returns during stable periods, due to herd 
behaviour. Specifically, herding observed in the Technology sector supports the theory of 
bubble formation proposed by Barberis and Huang (2008) which argue that investors may 
have caused Internet Technology stocks to be overvalued because they expected to obtain 
lottery-like gains if the new technology was successful.  
During, the bubble phase, the negative significant 𝛾2   coefficients of interest are reported in 
the Chemicals, Healthcare, Financials, Media, Oil and Gas, Personal and Household and 
Retail. It is interesting to note that herding occurred in the Oil and Gas sector during the pre-
bubble and bubble phases. This gives an indication that these stocks were overvalued when 
compared to their intrinsic values and were possibly popular stocks maybe more popular 
than technology stocks, thus creating a herd behaviour. This herd behavior may have resulted 
in an increased demand for Oil and Gas stocks. Sornette, Woodard and Zhou (2008), explain 
that before 2005, the supply for US Oil and Gas exceeded its demand, however, since 2006, 
the sector experienced increased uncertainty and speculation.  Furthermore, Johansen and 
Sornette (1999) contend that herding is not only prevalent during bubbles but herd behaviour 
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also leads to ‘anti-bubbles’, whereby market evaluation of stocks decelerates following all-
time highs.  
Herding that was hitherto absent during the bubble burst phase at the market level, surfaces 
in 6 sectors. Statistically significant negative 𝛾2  coefficients are recorded in the Automobile, 
Banks, Chemicals, Healthcare, Insurance and Technology sectors. Noticeably, herding 
occurred in the Technology sector during the crash phase, which suggests that the dramatic 
fall in Internet stocks during this phase, led investors to follow the market consensus. It is 
also noteworthy that herding occurs in the Healthcare sector during all three phases of the 
Dot com bubble. This finding suggests that during these phases, investors in these sectors 
display herd behaviour regardless of the prevailing market condition. Our results contrast 
with that of BenSaida (2017), who employed a modified version of the CSAD on all stocks 
in the US market and do not find herding during the Dot com bubble. The contrast in results 
may be due to the different herding measures employed and the sample size. 
Overall, the results for herding at different phases of the Dot com bubble reveals that US 
sectors most likely herd before and during the bubble, but not during the bubble crash, 
inconsistent with H3, there is limited evidence that herding in the US sectors is stronger 
during the Dot Com crisis.  
 
4.5.4.2. Global Financial Crisis 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has been described as the worst financial crisis in the US 
since the Great Depression. The crisis was brought about by the real-estate bubble and led 
to serious damage in the financial market. House prices increased in the US and were 
accompanied by a fast increase in credit. However, this led to a decline in lending standards 
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which resulted in intensified loan defaults and an eventual crisis in the financial market 
(Claessens, Kunt, and Moshirian, 2009).   
Indeed, the events surrounding the crisis gave rise to an increased level of research on 
investor herding during financial crisis amongst behavioural finance academics. In the same 
light, we investigate the GFC related herding behaviour by dividing the daily data into sub-
samples as follows:  Pre-crisis (01/05/2002- 31/07/2007), Crisis (01/08/2007 - 30/03/2009) 
and Post crisis (01/04/2009 - 11/10/2016). The results for the overall market and sectors are 
discussed in the sections below.  
4.5.4.2.1. Results for the overall market 
Table 4.12 contains the regression estimates for the overall market. Regressions are 
estimated for the three sub-samples using Equation (4). Noticeably, herding is only observed 
in the pre-crisis phase, the 𝛾3   coefficient is negative and significant. Investors may have 
herded during this period due to the uncertainty regarding the fundamental value of the 
assets. 
The evidence gives an indication that herding vanished from the US market following the 
commencement of the GFC. In all, there is no supportive evidence for H4 that herding effect 
is stronger during the GFC. The result supports the Hwang and Salmon’s (2004) argument 
that herding is more prevalent during tranquil market conditions. The intuition behind this 
argument is that high volatility during extreme market conditions makes it difficult to 
observe the direction of the market and thus, makes it difficult to herd towards the market. 
In contrast, during tranquil conditions, investors have a better view of the direction of the 
market and can thus herd towards it more easily. It is interesting to note that the 𝛾3   
coefficient is positive and significant during the post-crisis period. A possible explanation is 
that after the crisis, US investors exhibited localised herding, where they may have moved 
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as a group into (out) of assets/markets resulting in price increase (decrease) as well as an 
increased dispersion across assets (Gebka and Wohar, 2013). Another explanation is the 
overconfidence of investors probably due to positive returns after the crisis resulting in 
focusing on their own information and ignoring the market wide consensus (Goodfellow, et 
al., 2009). If this occurs at a large scale then it could lead to greater dispersion in views and 
return, which in turn increases the CSAD. Hence, our results do not support the argument 
that herding is more prevalent in extreme market conditions, therefore herding may not have 
contributed to the effects of the crisis.  
It is worth noting that our results are inconsistent with those obtained by Chiang and Zheng 
(2010) and Galariotis, et al., (2015) who find that herding occurs in the US market during 
the crisis. The contrasting results obtained may be due to the difference in sample sizes and 
time horizons. From the developing market's perspective, our results are similar to those 
obtained by Economou, et al., (2011) for the Spanish and Italian stock markets. They find 
that these markets did not herd during the GFC and further explain that these returns anti-
herd, that is, diverge from market returns. Furthermore, our results are inconsistent with 
those obtained by Mobarek, et al., (2015), who report evidence of herd behaviour in France, 
Italy, Spain and the Nordic market during the GFC period. In addition, our results are 
different from the evidence provided by Guney, et al., (2017), who find herding occurred in 
most of the markets examined, during and after the crisis.  
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Table 4.12  Regression estimates for market herd behaviour for the Global Financial 
Crisis, US 
Period 
            α         𝛾1               𝛾2         Adj. R
2 
Pre- crisis 
0.0086 0.3036 -3.5040 19.52% 
 (61.27)
 *** (8.99) *** (-2.27) **  
Crisis 
0.0125 0.3888 -0.7204 50.49% 
 (22.23)
 *** (8.86) *** (-1.32)   
Post- 
crisis 0.0078 0.2299 1.4306 35.77% 
  (64.79) *** (13.20) *** (3.53) ***   
 
Note: Table 4.12 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average of sector returns in at time t, the squared sector returns 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  is used to capture the nonlinearity in the relationship, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute 
deviation of returns for the sector, α is the constant, γ1, and γ2 are coefficients, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term 
at time t. The model is run for the separately for the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. Pre-
crisis refers to the period between 01/05/2002 and 31/07/2007. Crisis refers to the period between 
01/08/2007 and 30/03/2009. Post crisis refers to the period between 01/04/2009 and 11/10/2016. T-
test statistics based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
4.5.4.2.2. Results for sectors 
The results presented in Table 4.13 corresponds to the base model in Equation (4). The 
results are estimated for each sector for the three sub-sample periods. The results from the 
pre-crisis phase show significantly negative 𝛾3   coefficients for the Financials, Food and 
Beverage, Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Oil and Gas, Personal and Holding, Retail, 
Technology sectors. The presence of herding in these sectors may be due to optimistic 
investors investing in these sectors in a herd-like manner. This optimism may have been in 
response to the prevailing low interest rates following the Dot com bubble. Optimism may 
have also made investors exhibit overconfidence bias regarding the expected value of stocks 
in these sectors. With the US having the largest and most liquid financial market in the world, 
we note that herding took place in the high-growth Financials sector. This herding may have 
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been attributed to the increased lending by banks, thus increasing the attractiveness of the 
sector resulting in investors herding towards the Financials sector.  
 During the crisis phase, the coefficients are negative and significant for the following 
sectors: Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Oil and Gas, Technology and Utilities. This suggests 
that the outbreak of the crisis promoted herding towards these sectors. A possible 
explanation for herding during this period is that investors may have reacted emotionally 
amidst the uncertainty such that their investment decision making was affected by the 
availability heuristics and thus used immediate examples when evaluating investment 
decisions. Our results are different from that of BenSaida (2017), who finds activities 
herding in 10 out of 12 sectors of all domestic US firms during the GFC. The difference in 
results may be due to difference in sample size and specification of crisis period. 
For post crisis results we report negative significant coefficients in the following sectors: 
Healthcare, Oil and Gas. From these results, we find that herd behaviour manifested pre, 
during and post the crisis in Healthcare, Technology and Oil and Gas. This implies that there 
is a decrease of the returns in these sectors relative to the market return with or without crisis 
conditions. Furthermore, there is limited evidence for H4 that herding effect is stronger 
across sectors during the GFC. Consistent with the results for the overall market, the results 
for the sectors indicates that there is limited evidence of herding activities during the GFC.  
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Table 4.13 Regression estimates for industry herd behaviour for the Global Financial Crisis, US 
    Pre-crisis         Crisis 
  
Post-crisis     
Industry α 𝛾1   𝛾2   Adj. R
2 α 𝛾1   𝛾2   Adj. R
2 α     𝛾1   𝛾2  Adj. R
2 
Automobile  0.0081 0.2253 3.0540 17.18% 0.0116 0.3196 0.2781 33.76% 0.0063 0.2255 0.7910 27.64% 
 
(25.31) *** (4.62) *** (2.19) ** 
 
(11.32) *** (4.84) *** (0.38) 
 
(32.52) *** (10.74) *** (2.09) *** 
 
Banks 0.0038 0.1604 -0.5860 17.67% 0.0099 0.2522 0.4850 48.42% 0.0043 0.2308 0.4625 44.07% 
 
(39.40) *** (8.91) *** (-1.00) 
 
(8.28) *** (5.50) *** (1.75) * 
 
(25.34) *** (18.01) *** (4.05) *** 
 
Basic 
Resources 
0.0074 0.2373 -0.7551 13.47% 0.0119 0.2510 -0.2182 23.98% 0.0076 0.1998 2.1298 25.95% 
 
(25.44) *** (6.07) *** (-0.74) 
 
(11.33) *** (4.59) *** (-0.49) 
 
(27.98) *** (7.17) *** (4.20) *** 
 
Chemicals 0.0062 0.1750 0.2500 11.47% 0.0100 0.1818 0.9508 35.21% 0.0059 0.2104 -0.3651 23.05% 
 
(33.47) *** (4.89) *** (0.19) 
 
(14.11) *** (3.89) *** (1.95) * 
 
(43.16) *** (12.00) *** (-0.93) 
 
Construction 0.0072 0.2090   1.7690 14.01% 0.0125 0.1685 1.0679 33.01% 0.0065 0.2156 0.4286 21.80% 
 
(24.86) *** (4.50) *** (1.23) 
 
(15.91) *** (3.34) *** (1.87) * 
 
(33.96) *** (9.88) *** (0.96) 
 
Financials 0.0072 0.2564 -1.6799 20.19% 0.0136 0.2089         
0.4096 
38.00% 0.0058 0.2208 0.5727 37.61% 
 
(43.81) *** (8.87) *** (-1.80) ** 
 
(16.45) *** (4.98) *** (1.17) 
 
(42.62) *** (16.00) *** (2.79) *** 
 
Food & 
Beverage 
0.0064 0.4251 -7.5557 16.08% 0.0095 0.3242 -0.5159 33.05% 0.0057 0.1896 1.6922 17.41% 
 
(36.84) *** (8.60) *** (-2.77) *** 
 
(19.49) *** (6.40) *** (-0.60) 
 
(48.06) *** (7.79) *** (1.86) * 
 
Healthcare 0.0086 0.3874 -4.2881 18.45% 0.0106 0.3156 -1.0218 32.52% 0.0071 0.2544 -2.2000 17.33% 
 
(43.58) *** (8.85) *** (-2.24) ** 
 
(23.48) *** (7.67) *** (-1.82) * 
 
(58.85) *** (12.65) *** (-3.65) *** 
 
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0072 0.2639 -2.9762 17.55% 0.0096 0.2727 -0.9262 35.53% 0.0058 0.1863 0.2745 29.36% 
 
(51.16) *** (8.73) *** (-2.37) ** 
 
(21.65) *** (7.46) *** (-1.84) * 
 
(57.82) *** (12.80) *** (0.79) 
 
Insurance 0.0055 0.1338 6.2956 37.34% 0.0076 0.4968      
0.2674 
65.87% 0.0047 0.2014 2.8159 52.77% 
 
(40.92) *** (5.14) *** (7.86) *** 
 
(8.02) *** (9.41) ***     (0.61) 
 
(30.73) *** (12.36) *** (12.40) *** 
 
Media 0.0060 0.2158 0.7510 20.25% 0.0091 0.2394    0.5164 37.99% 0.0063 0.1770 1.7969 29.41% 
 
(37.56) *** (7.16) *** (0.77) 
 
(13.94) *** (5.23) ***   (1.03) 
 
(42.36) *** (9.05) *** (4.28) *** 
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Oil & Gas 0.0070 0.1812 -1.9791 14.38% 0.0105 0.1973 -0.3707 42.88% 0.0077 0.2238 -0.5963 25.84% 
 
(44.76) *** (8.08) *** (-3.08) *** 
 
(23.30) *** (9.05) *** (-2.36) ** 
 
(47.79) *** (12.77) *** (-1.77) * 
 
Personal & 
Household 
0.0075 0.3388 -3.3771 19.37% 0.0112 0.4026 -1.3450 40.57% 0.0070 0.2762 1.0105 35.65% 
 
(43.28) *** (8.54) *** (-1.95) * 
 
(18.03) *** (7.67) *** (-1.69) * 
 
(50.81) *** (14.23) *** (2.23) ** 
 
Real Estate 0.0061 0.2185 -0.8125 15.36% 0.0082 0.3504 -0.2508 56.07% 0.0048 0.2516 0.2680 47.47% 
 
(35.39) *** (6.49***) (-0.65) 
 
(10.57) *** (9.99) *** (-0.98) 
 
(38.11) *** (20.33) *** (1.82) * 
 
Retail 0.0083 0.2815 -3.1914 15.12% 0.0111 0.2973 -0.7919 34.76% 0.0074 0.2478 -0.2187 22.61% 
 
(49.40) *** (8.77) *** (-2.70) ** 
 
(20.70) *** (7.30) *** (-1.40) 
 
(56.53) *** (11.86) *** (-0.38) 
 
Technology 0.0098 0.3317 -2.7780 23.05% 0.0122 0.2577 -1.0071 26.60% 0.0079 0.2135 -0.9884 19.21% 
 
(43.92) *** (9.90) *** (-2.98) *** 
 
(23.04) *** (6.54) *** (-1.94) * 
 
(58.75) *** (11.25) *** (-2.09) ** 
 
Telecom 0.0063 0.5534 4.2335 42.02% 0.0084 0.6220  -0.3325 44.57% 0.0058 0.4764 5.4390 43.15% 
 
(19.69) *** (10.93) *** (2.82) *** 
 
(6.61) *** (6.85) *** (-0.30) 
 
(23.54) *** (13.01) *** (5.54) *** 
 
Travel & 
Leisure 
0.0088 0.2401 1.8279 16.60% 0.0143 0.3311 -0.0057 34.34% 0.0081 0.2816 0.0204 28.26% 
 
(34.05) *** (5.73) *** (1.42) 
 
(13.99) *** (5.14) *** (-0.01) 
 
(43.41) *** (13.15) *** (0.05) 
 
Utilities 0.0081 0.2666 1.4262 17.45% 0.0092 0.4786 -1.3438 48.75% 0.0068 0.2230 -0.7262 11.99% 
  (39.62) *** (6.20) *** (0.88)   (17.63) *** (10.56) *** (-2.43) **   (47.22) *** (8.41) *** (-0.80)   
 
Notes: Table 4.13 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average of sector returns in at time t for each sector, the squared sector return 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  is used to capture the nonlinearity in the 
relationship, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns for the sectors, α is the constant, γ1, and γ2 are coefficients, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term at 
time t. The model is run for the separately for the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. Pre-crisis refers to the period between 01/01/2003 and 09/10/2007. 
Crisis refers to the period between 10/10/2007 and 06/03/2009. Post crisis refers to the period between 09/03/2009 and 11/10/2016. T-test statistics based on 
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The t-test statistic tests for the difference in level 
of significance between the γ1 and γ2 coefficient. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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4.6. Conclusions  
 
This chapter investigates the impact of market conditions on industry herd behaviour by 
testing for its presence in the US stock market from January 1990 to October 2016. We use 
firm level data from the S&P 500 classified into 19 different sectors. We examine whether 
or not herd behaviour is contingent upon high (low) market return, days with high (low) 
volatility and trading volume. We also investigate the impact of two crises which originated 
from the US, the Dot Com bubble and the GFC on herding. 
We test for herding using the widely used CSAD measure which is based on the intuition 
that in the presence of herding there is a decrease in the CSAD during periods of extreme 
market movements. As illustrated in Table 4.14 results show that market wide herding is 
absent in the US market. However, limited evidence of herding becomes visible at the sector 
level, especially in the Healthcare, Industrial Goods and Oil and Gas sectors. When we 
closely investigate this evidence, we find weak evidence of herding asymmetry with respect 
to up and down-market conditions. Further, we find evidence that herding is more significant 
on days with low trading and low volatility. We also report weak evidence that herding is 
prevalent during days with low trading volume. 
When we examine the effect of the Dot com bubble on herding and we find that the US herds 
during the pre-bubble and bubble periods, however herding is manifested in various sectors 
during and after the bubble. During the GFC crisis we find that the US market only herds 
during the pre-crisis period, although herding is present across sectors during and after the 
GFC. 
Our findings have important implications for US financial market investors and stock market 
regulatory authorities. From the investors’ perspective, it is important to know the impact of 
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industry herding as it could potentially affect their investment strategies, especially those 
interested in investing in specific sectors. For the regulatory authorities, our evidence 
suggests that it would be useful to encourage investors to diversify their sector investments. 
Regulatory authorities can achieve this by providing information on the correlations of 
different markets and sectors to the public. As this information can potentially inform the 
investors’ investment decisions.  
We suggest some issues that future studies can examine. First, we employ the CSAD model 
to measure herding. It would be interesting to see whether other models like CAMP-based 
models produce similar results especially at the sector level. Second, we find that herding is 
prevalent in the Healthcare and Oil and Gas sectors respectively. Future studies can conduct 
an in-depth investigation on these sectors to provide empirical evidence on the sub-sectors 
that herd in these sectors. Third, we use the S&P 500 index as a proxy for the US market, 
future studies can provide recent evidence using all data from all the listed firms in the US 
market. Finally, it would be interesting to examine cross-sector herding interactions.  
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Table 4.14 Summary of US Results 
 
 
Test Market findings Industry findings 
Herding No Yes (Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Oil & Gas, 
Retail and Technology) 
Market Returns No Up days(Chemicals, Healthcare, Industrial 
Goods, Oil & Gas and Technology) 
Down days (Basic Resources, Food & 
Beverage, Healthcare, Industrial Goods and 
Retail) 
Trading Volume  No High (Oil & Gas) 
Low (Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Oil & 
Gas, Retail and Technology)  
Volatility Only in low 
volatility 
High(Healthcare, Industrial goods and Oil and 
Gas) 
Low(all except: Automobile, Bank, 
Construction, Insurance, Real Estate, Travel 
and Leisure and Utility) 
Crisis: Dot com 
bubble 
Pre-bubble and 
post-bubble 
Pre-bubble (Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Oil 
and Gas, Technology, and Chemicals) 
Bubble (Chemicals, Healthcare, Financials, 
Media, Oil and Gas, Personal and Household 
and Retail) 
Post-bubble (Automobile, Banks, Chemicals, 
Healthcare, Insurance and Technology) 
GFC Only pre-crisis  Pre-crisis (Financials, Food and Beverage, 
Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Oil and Gas, 
Personal and Holding, Retail, Technology) 
Crisis (Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Oil and 
Gas, Technology and Utilities) 
Post-crisis (Healthcare, Oil and Gas) 
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Chapter 5 Herding and its determinant in the Chinese stock markets: A sectoral 
analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chinese markets provide an interesting setting for investigating herding due to its unique 
segmented structure, where two different classes of shares are traded simultaneously. Given 
that the Chinese market has also been associated with a lack of transparency and frequent 
government intervention, it is important to understand the behaviour of investors. 
Consequently, various studies have investigated the existence of herd behaviour in the 
Chinese market (Tan, et al., 2008; Lao and Singh, 2011; Yao, et al., 2014; and Luo and 
Schinckus, 2015), with few studies at the sector level (Demirer and Kutan, 2006; Lee, et al., 
2013; and Zheng, et al., 2017). In general, these studies provide evidence of herding towards 
the market consensus. The research by Tan, et al., (2008) is closely related to ours, however, 
they only focused on the market, not sectors. Therefore, this study aims to bridge this gap in 
the literature by investigating herding asymmetry at both market and sector levels.  
Using the Cross-Sectional Absolute Deviation model developed by Chang, et al., (2000), we 
conduct our research on the sample of all firms listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai 
exchanges from January 1990 to October 2016, classified into 19 sectors. We investigate the 
presence of herding when market returns are rising (declining), market volatility and trading 
volume are high (low). The rationale behind this investigation is that the conditions in the 
market may not be like sector conditions, which has been confirmed by the evidence 
provided by Yao, et al., (2014) that herding is more prevalent at the industry level in the 
Chinese market.  To further test the strength of our results, we examine the effect of crises 
on market (sector) herding. We select two recent major crises: the Asian crisis and the Global 
Financial Crisis. Also, we investigate the impact of the US market (sector) returns on herding 
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in Chinese markets (sectors). The rationale for this is due to the strong trade relationship 
between the US and China as well as the empirical evidence by Chiang and Zheng (2010) 
that the US returns plays a role in herding in China.  
Overall, our results indicate that investors in Chinese markets significantly herd at the market 
level and sector level, with herding more prevalent in the Shenzhen stock exchange.  The 
other findings are discussed in section 4.5. The remainder of this chapter is organised as 
follows. The next section reviews literature and empirical evidence of herding. Section 3 
describes the research methodology and design. Section 4 reports and discusses the results, 
and section 5 concludes. 
5.2 Contextual Framework – Chinese Stock Market 
5.2.1 The Chinese stock market: structure and characteristics 
 5.2.1.1 Stock market structure  
Stock trading in China dates to the 18th century, however, the two official stock exchanges: 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE), were only 
established in 1990. Based on market capitalisation, the SZSE and the SHSE rank 8th and 4th 
in the world, respectively48. Figure 1 illustrates the exponential growth in the market between 
1991 and 2016. Combined, both markets have grown to become the second largest stock 
markets in the world by market capitalisation, with over 3,400 listed firms and $8.5 trillion 
market capitalisation as at 2017 (Carpenter and Whitelaw, 2017). According to the World 
Federation Exchanges statistics for 2017, the Chinese market has the highest trading volume, 
globally. The SZSE and SHSE combined have a trading volume of approximately $5.4 
trillion compared to the approximately $2.9 trillion for the NYSE and NASDAQ.  
                                                 
48 Rankings as of April 2018, obtained from The World Federation of Exchanges  
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Industries in China have also experienced rapid expansion, which has been supported by its 
high savings, investment and export-oriented culture (Lee and McKibbin, 2018). As at 2013, 
the industrial sector, which consists of manufacturing, construction, public utilities and 
mining accounts for about 27% of China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World Bank 
National Accounts Data, 2017). In fact, by 2010 China became the largest manufacturing 
country in the world (Nagaraj, 2017). As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, the manufacturing 
industry is the major industry in both exchanges.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Number of Listed Firms on the Chinese Stock Exchanges   (Carpenter & 
Whitelaw, 2017) 
 138 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Shenzhen Stock Exchange: Sector Distribution (2017) 49 
 
Figure 5.3 Shanghai Stock Exchange: Sector Distribution (2017) 50 
                                                 
49 Source: 2017 Shenzhen Stock Exchange Factbook 
50 Source: 2017 Shanghai Stock Exchange Factbook  
Shenzhen Stock Exchange: Sector Distribution
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing
Utilities Construction Wholesale & Retail
Transportation Hotels & Catering IT
Finance Real Estate Business Support
Research & Development Environmental Protection Resident Services
Education Public Health Media
Conglomerates
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There are two different classes of shares traded on either the Shenzhen or Shanghai 
exchanges. A-shares which are dominated by domestic investors and denominated in the 
local currency, Renminbi (RMB). The B-share market which was only open to foreign 
investors until 2001 is now dominated by foreign and domestic investors; denominated in 
US dollars (Shanghai) and Hong Kong dollars (Shenzhen).  
5.2.1.2 Market Characteristics  
Shenzhen and Shanghai exchanges have different characteristics. Regarding market size, 
Shenzhen is smaller than the Shanghai (in 2016 the market capitalisation for the Shenzhen 
and Shanghai market was $3.2 trillion and $4.1 trillion, respectively51). Regarding trading 
volume, as at 2018, the trading volume for Shenzhen stock exchange was reported at 
approximately 15 trillion Renminbi, while the trading volume for Shanghai stock exchange 
was reported at approximately 40 trillion Renminbi.  
The size of firms in both exchanges is also different. The Shenzhen market consists of small 
to medium-sized firms, in contrast, the Shanghai market consists of large, state-owned firms. 
Consequently, the Shenzhen market is dominated by less educated investors and is less 
influenced by the government, as opposed to the Shanghai market which is deemed to have 
more sophisticated investors and receives more investment from the government (Demirer 
and Kutan, 2006). Researchers have also documented differences between both markets (see 
for example Sjoo and Zhang, 2000 and Wang, Kutan and Yang, 2005). One of such 
differences is the information asymmetry between both exchanges. Sjoo and Zhang (2000) 
provide evidence that for the Shenzhen market, information flows from domestic to foreign 
investors. Furthermore, Wang et al., (2005) find both the Shenzhen and Shanghai exchanges 
exhibit significant sector information flows which extend to the market level. 
                                                 
51  2016 Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange Factbooks 
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In general, developing markets including China have strengths and weaknesses that are 
significantly different from those of advanced markets. Some of the strengths possessed by 
these markets that contribute to economic growth include a large labour force, a good saving 
culture, the growth in middle-class citizens and government support (Lao and Singh, 2011).   
Despite these strengths, developing markets have been plagued by inefficiencies and 
anomalies (Li, 2008). These inefficiencies may be due to the dominance of less educated 
retail investors, government dominance, lack of transparency and poor quality of financial 
reporting (Demirer and Kutan, 2006). Demirer and Kutan (2006) argue that the financial 
reporting requirements for listed companies in China are not as comprehensive and stringent 
as that for advanced countries. Moreover, the appointment of some managing directors of 
state-owned firms by the Chinese government has also been widely criticised (Liu and Lu, 
2007). The government appoints these managing directors because they are the controlling 
shareholders. However, this control increases the likelihood of channelling resources from 
the firms for their benefit (Liu and Lu, 2007). 
In response to these weaknesses, the Chinese government has launched various reforms to 
improve the efficiency of the stock market (for example, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2008 
reforms52). These reforms focused on different aspects of the market ranging from increasing 
investor protection to strengthening corporate governance (Liu and Wang, 2017). Academic 
research has provided conflicting evidence of the impact of these reforms on market 
efficiency. While Chong, Lam and Yan (2012) examine the profitability of trading strategies 
and find that market efficiency has improved since the 2005 state share reform, Carpenter, 
Lu and Whitelaw (2014) argue that the Chinese market exhibits anomalies. Despite the 
                                                 
52 These reforms are carried out by the Chinese government ( Li, 2012)  
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conflicting evidence, the reforms are a welcome development. There are other unique 
characteristics of Chinese investors which are discussed in the next section.  
5.2.2 Characteristics of Chinese Investors 
Chinese investors are the most ambitious, optimistic and aggressive investors in the world, 
according to a recent Legg Mason Global Investment survey53. In fact, they expect to receive 
a 97% rate of return on their investment in 2018. Interestingly, Mei, Scheinkman and Wei 
(2005) argue that the overconfidence of the Chinese investors is due to the lack of trading 
experience.  
The Chinese market consists of individual and institutional investors. Individual investors 
who dominate the market account for an estimated 80% of the markets’ trading volume54, 
they are commonly classified as being less experienced and less informed than institutional 
investors. Institutional investors in China consist of mutual funds, insurance companies and 
authorised securities firms. As of 2012, institutional investors accounted for 17.40% of 
Chinese investors55, a small percentage compared to individual investors. However, between 
2004 and 2011 the percentage of tradeable assets held by institutional investors has increased 
from 25 per cent to 44 per cent (Deng and Xu, 2011). 
Academic research on the impact of these institutional investors reveal, interesting findings. 
Notably, in their study, Tian, Wu and Wu (2018) find that institutional investors on the SHSE 
buy significantly more stocks that individual investors during extreme market swings, thus 
may contribute to the destabilisation of the market during such periods. Institutional 
investors also engage in trend-chasing in rising market conditions, potentially driving prices 
                                                 
53 According to the 2017 Legg Mason Global Investment Survey based on sample size 4,500 investors from 
Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, Taiwan and China) 
54According to the China Securities Regulatory Commission  
 
55 sse.com.cn 
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away from their fundamental values. Other researchers investigate the behaviour dynamics 
of Chinese investors and provide insights on different factors that influence this behaviour.  
Using a survey of 1,547 individual investors, Wang, Shi and Fan (2006) show that Chinese 
investors engage in speculation, underestimate risks and exhibit poor investment skills. Also, 
institutional information such as market policy greatly influences investment decisions 
stemming from the collectivism culture in China.  
Chen, Kim, Nofsinger and Rui (2007) examine decision making in the Chinese stock market 
using data from brokerage accounts. They find that Chinese investors exhibit three 
behavioural biases: (i) disposition effect whereby they sell winning stocks but not losing 
stocks, (ii) they may be overconfident, and consequently trade very often, (iii) representative 
bias, they believe that future returns are based on past returns. However, they contend that 
experienced investors are less likely to exhibit these biases. 
Li, Rhee and Wang (2017) investigate the difference between institutional and individual 
investors in herding with a measure based on trading volume. They provide evidence that 
while institutional investors are more prudent about their investments, individual investors 
allocate their trade evenly. Also, they provide evidence that individual investors significantly 
depend on public information and are consequently affected by market sentiment. They note 
that regardless of their differences, both types of investors glean information from each 
other’s trade.  
The collective oriented culture in developing markets has also been highlighted as a 
contributing factor to market inefficiency (Chang and Lin, 2015). With the presence of this 
culture, it is easy for investors to engage in collective behaviour such as herding. Indeed, 
Chang and Lin (2015) report that the Confucian culture (a cornerstone of Chinese culture) 
influences herding in the Chinese market. This culture promotes behavioural norms such as 
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collectivism, low individualism and uncertainty avoidance. Therefore, these characteristics 
increase investors’ tendency to herd.  
With the increase in internet use, more Chinese investors obtain investment information from 
social trading sites like imaibo.net and xueqiu.com. (Tham, 2016). The author argues that 
dependence on these sites aggravates herding because these sites study the actions of 
informed investors. Furthermore, Tham (2016) associates the swings in the Shanghai market 
that occurred in 2014/15 to the index sensitivity to blog sentiments.  
 Chong, Liu and Zhu (2017) examine the underlying motives of herd behaviour in the 
Chinese market, using the CSAD model. They find that the following factors motivate 
herding: (i) the number of analysts following: Higher levels of herding are observed when 
followings are above the median, (ii) speculation, (iii) the riskiness of the stock, (iv) 
companies with high turnover ratio.  
5.3. Hypothesis Development 
 
5.3.1. Industry Herding 
Most studies on herd behaviour in the Chinese market find evidence in support of herding 
(Tan, et al., 2008, Lao and Singh, 2011 and Lee, et al., 2013). Indeed, Demirer and Kutan 
(2006) suggest that herding is more likely to occur in the non-financial sectors dominated by 
retail investors than in financial sectors dominated by institutional investors. Literature has 
shown that investors tend to herd in and out of industries (see for example Choi and Sias 
(2004) and Gebka and Wohar (2013)) for several reasons. One, investors may be motivated 
to herd due to overconfidence bias (propounded by Daniel, et al., (1998)). Two, investors 
may keep investing in an industry where they have obtained a positive return because they 
believe they possess superior stock picking skills, which leads them to take more risks. 
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 Industry herding can also be driven by the representative heuristic and conversavatism bias 
(presented by  Kahneman & Tversky (1972)). This is because an investor may prefer to 
invest in an industry that had abnormally high prior returns (that they extrapolate the retuns 
for the whole industry), which destabilses stock prices. Thus, investors can collectively react 
favourably to positive information about a particular industry. Consistent with the above 
expectations, we predict that there is herding in the chinese market. 
H1. There is herding effect in the Chinese market and industry.  
5.3.2. Determinants of Industry Herding  
5.3.2.1. Market/sector return: 
Investors have a propensity to herd when market returns are declining because such periods 
are marked by increased uncertainty relating to investment profitability. Lao and Singh 
(2011) find that Chinese investors herd more when the market is declining. They suggest 
that a possible explanation of the observed herding from a behavioural finance perspective 
is loss aversion; losses have greater emotional impact than gain, and thus people select 
options where gains are probable (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986).  Because the Chinese 
market is dominated by individual investors who are deemed to be inexperienced and less 
informed than their institutional peers, they tend to herd more when the market is declining 
to avoid the pain of making losses.  
Periods of rising market return can also prompt investors to herd. Indeed, Tan, et al., (2008), 
Chiang, et al., (2010) and Chiang, et al., (2013) provide evidence that herding is stronger in 
the Chinese when the market is rising. Chiang, et al., (2013) suggest that herding is stronger 
when the market is rising because investors focus more on large stocks as they herd. Large 
stocks are traded more frequently and receive high levels of analyst coverage. As a result, 
individual investors in the Chinese market who typically lack investment expertise and 
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frequently follow analyst recommendations, tend to follow the market consensus in their 
trades. In addition, Tan, et al., (2008), explain that this herding might be a consequence of 
government intervention, where investors in stocks owned by companies financed by the 
government are more likely to herd in rising markets due to optimism and overconfidence. 
Based on these studies, we predict that there is a relationship between herding and market 
returns with differences in behaviour in periods rising and declining returns. This prediction 
is specified in the following hypothesis:   
H2a: Industry herding is contingent upon market/sector returns 
5.3.2.2. Market/sector volatility: 
There is a probable relationship between herd behaviour and stock return volatility (Tan, et 
al., 2008). Tan, et al., (2008) provide evidence that herding is prevalent in the Chinese market 
during periods of high volatility. Similarly, Javaira and Hassan (2011) find that the Pakistani 
investors herd during periods of high volatility.  Gavriilidis, et al., (2013) argue that herding 
can occur in either low or high volatility conditions. Periods of increasing volatility may 
create an environment with increased information flow where less skilled managers prefer 
to mimic their better-skilled peers. Furthermore, high information flow during high volatility 
periods may prompt investors to herd due to difficulties in information processing. 
Conversely, during periods of decreasing volatility, these less skilled managers may be 
driven to herd because of the ease with which the trades of their better-skilled peers can be 
viewed. Holmes, et al., (2013) also suggest that investors are more likely to herd in periods 
of low volatility. Moreover, Economou, et al., (2011) document herding in low volatility 
periods for Italian and Portuguese markets. Consistent with these expectations, we predict 
that a relationship between herding and volatility with differences in behaviour in periods 
high and low volatility.  This prediction is stated in the following hypothesis:   
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H2b: Industry herding is contingent upon market /sector volatility 
5.3.2.3. Market/sector volume: 
Tan, et al., (2008) argue that the extent of herding may be affected by trading volume. High 
trading volume can contribute to herding when investors trade vastly on a stock. For 
example, if an investor perceives that a stock is highly profitable, they would increase their 
investment into the stock, hence increasing its liquidity. Other investors who are uncertain 
about the future profitability, invest in the stock base on its liquidity neglecting their private 
information, leading to a herd formation. Low volume may also prompt or inhibit herding. 
During low volume periods, herding is less feasible because trades cannot be executed. Low 
volume may also boost herding if investors only trade stocks in which the low volume is 
concentrated at.  
Evidence from the Chinese stock market reported by Tan, et al., (2008) is mixed, in high 
volume periods, herding is present in the Shanghai and Shenzhen A and B- share market, 
while for low volume periods herding is only observed in the B share market. In the same 
vein, Lao and Singh (2011), find that investors in Shanghai A-share market herd during high 
volume conditions. They explain that due to the collective nature of the Chinese culture, they 
may be lured to mimic other investors with similar investment objectives to trade more 
actively. They suggest that high trading volume may be indicative of the presence of herd 
behavior.  Interestingly, Yao et al., (2014) report that the Shanghai B-market herds in both 
high and low volume states. Consistent with these expectations, we predict that there is a 
relationship between herding and volume with differences in behaviour in periods high and 
low volume.  This prediction is stated in the following hypothesis:   
H2c: Industry herding depends on market/sector volume.  
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5.3.3. Herd behaviour in periods of crisis 
The 1997 currency crisis in East Asia has been described as one of the major currency crises 
of the 1990s (Goldstein, 1998). It had a devastating effect on the economies of Thailand, 
Korea, Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia. Bowe and Domuta (2004) investigate herding 
among foreign and domestic investors in the Jakarta Stock Exchange and find evidence that 
both herd pre, during and post-crisis. Chiang and Zheng (2010) find evidence of herd 
behaviour during the crisis in the all the neighbouring markets (US, Indonesia, Korea and 
Singapore) examined except Malaysia. Hwang and Salmon (2004) reach an opposite 
conclusion, they find that herding behaviour in the Korean market during the Asian crisis 
helped to reduce herd behaviour. China was the only country in the region that experienced 
growth during the crisis (Goldstein, 1998). Fernald and Babson (1999) argue that China was 
immune from the crisis because it had strengthened its currency through devaluation, had 
faster productivity, low debt, and a strong foreign reserve. However, growth in foreign trade 
slowed down (Kaminsky, 1999). 
In fact, Zheng, et al., (2017) find herding in 8 out of 10 industries examined during crises 
periods in their study which includes the Asian crisis. Therefore, the hypothesis is as follows:  
H3: herd behaviour changes during the Asian crisis 
A decade after the asset bubble burst during the Asian crisis another bubble burst occurred 
in the US Real Estate sector which triggered the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis. Some 
authors suggest that the Dotcom bubble helped to create the housing bubble because after 
the crash investors turned to the Real Estate stocks as a secure investment alternative 
(Wheale and Amin, 2003; DeLong and Magin, 2006 and Goodnight and Green, 2010). 
Indeed, due to contagion, the crisis spread to major global markets (Corsetti, Pericoli, and 
Sbracia, 2005). Even the financially resilient Chinese market was not spared from the effects 
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of the crisis mainly because of greater international integration and financial linkages via 
exports (Overholt, 2010). When the crisis started China experienced a sharp decline in 
exports, foreign companies deserted the market, and millions of workers lost their jobs 
(Overholt, 2010). In fact, house prices fell for the first time since 2005 and this provides a 
strong case for investigating the impact of the crisis on herding in the Chinese markets. Lao 
and Singh (2011) state that crisis reduced confidence level of Chinese investors, its market 
declined by 65.14%56. Chiang and Zheng (2010), document evidence of herding in the 
Chinese market during the GFC. Consistent with these studies, we predict that herding 
changes during the GFC, which is specified in the following hypothesis: 
H4: herd behaviour changes during the GFC period.  
5.3.4. The role of the US market in herding in China 
Chiang and Zheng (2010) argue that the US market plays a significant role in global markets.  
The US has a close relationship with global markets especially China (Wei, 1996)57. The 
US-China relationship has been described as the greatest tie between an advanced country 
and an emerging country (Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013).  Trade relations between both 
countries have increased over the years, the total share of US spending on Chinese goods 
increased from 0.6 per cent in 1990 to 4.6 per cent in 2007 and has even created trade 
frictions between both countries (Autor, et al., 2013). According to data from the Department 
of Commerce on the industry sector relations between both countries, while the US exports 
40 percent of its agricultural pesticides to China, it imports 75 percent of its dolls from China. 
Financial investment relationship between both countries has also grown with more US 
companies investing in China after the 2005 reforms (Carpenter and Whitelaw, 2017). As a 
result of this relationship, it is expected that the US market plays a role in herding in the 
                                                 
56 Source: Bloomberg Financial, 2009  
57 Wei, S. J. (1996). Foreign direct investment in China: sources and consequences. In Financial Deregulation 
and Integration in East Asia, NBER-EASE Volume 5 (pp. 77-105). University of Chicago Press. 
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Chinese market. Chiang and Zheng (2010) and Luo and Schinckus (2015) and Li, et al., 
(2017)58 provide evidence that herding in the Chinese market is influenced by the US. 
Consistent with these studies, we expect the US to influence herding in China and specify 
the following hypothesis:  
H5: US returns impact herding in the Chinese markets (sectors) 
5.4. Research Methodology 
 
5.4.1. Data 
The data which are obtained from Thomson Datastream consist of daily closing prices, the 
trading volumes of all firms listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges. In line 
with Chiang and Zheng (2010) who suggest that US returns play a role in herding in the 
Chinese markets, we also collect data on the US market. As the Chinese market is young 
when compared to other developed markets, daily updated data are used to ensure that firms 
that have not been listed for the entire sample period are not excluded.  
The data covers the period 01/01/1990 to 18/10/2016, from the inception of the stock 
exchanges and includes two periods of significant volatility in the Chinese markets: the 
Asian crisis and GFC. To carry out our analysis, we isolate periods before and after the Asian 
crisis spanning from January 1993 to September 2001. The choice of this period reflects 
significant dates from previous studies (For example, Bowe and Domuta, 2004). On this 
basis, we divide our sub-sample into three sub-periods: 
a) January 01, 1993- July 01, 1997: pre-crisis period. This period coincides with the 
period when East Asian countries were regarded as miracle economies and saw 
increased investment because of investor confidence.  
                                                 
58This finding was only for data before 2015 
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b) July 02, 1997 – December 30, 1997: crisis period. On July 02, 1997, Thailand 
devalued its currency relative to the dollar due to speculative pressures and marked 
the beginning of the crisis. In subsequent months the currencies of Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Korea and Hong Kong weakened. In December 1997, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank approved bailouts for South 
Korea. The IMF started a process of strengthening financial systems of the affected 
economies. In this context, we chose December 30, 1997, as the end of the crisis. 
c) January 01, 1998- September 10, 2001: post-crisis period: The months that followed 
the bailouts and reforms saw the crisis contained and subsequent recovery in the 
stock markets.  
If herding changes following these periods, we expect to find differences in herd behaviour 
pre, during and post-crisis. The sample will be subdivided into pre-crisis, crisis and post-
crisis periods to compare herd behaviour during the financial crisis and normal periods. 
Similar to the Asian crisis, we examine herding pre, during and post GFC. Similar to the 
previous chapter we examine the crisis in three phases: pre-crisis phase (01/05/2002 to 
31/07/2007), crisis phase (01/08/2007 to 30/03/2009, and the post-crisis phase (01/04/2009 
to 18/10/2016). If herding changes following these periods, we expect to find differences in 
herd behaviour pre, during and post-crisis. The inclusion of these crises periods is in line 
with previous studies which provide evidence that herding behaviour is more plausible 
during periods of extreme market movement. 
The final dataset includes 13,986 daily observations, for both stock exchanges. The sample 
contains 1,481 Shenzhen firms and 978 Shanghai firms. The daily log differenced returns 
Ri,t are calculated as: 
 𝑅𝑖.𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
) × 100  
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Where, 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is the stock price on firm i at time 𝑡. All prices are denominated in the Chinese 
local currency, Renminbi.   
Within each stock exchange the firms are classified into 19 sectors based on Thomson’s 
Datastream classification: Automobile, Banks, Basic Resources, Chemicals, Construction, 
Consumer Services, Financials, Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Insurance, Media, Personal & 
Household, Real Estate, Retail, Travel and Leisure, Oil and Gas, Utilities, 
Telecommunications, and Technology.  
5.4.2. Model Specification  
To test, the first hypothesis (H1), we employ the CSAD model of Chang, et al., (2000) which 
is widely used to test for herding towards market consensus. 
We measure the CSAD as follows: 
       𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 =
1
𝑁
 ∑ |𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡|
𝑁
𝑖=1                                                                                                        (1)   
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the log differenced return on stock i at time t, N is the number of stocks the 
market and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average of market returns at time t. 
The model for testing herding is estimated as follows:  
    𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡                          (2)    
 where|𝑅𝑚,𝑡|is the market (sector) return used to capture the nonlinearity in the 
relationship, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  is the squared market return, α is the constant, γ1, and γ2 are coefficients 
and εt is the error term at time t. Therefore, in the absence of herding effects, we expect γ1 > 
0 and γ2 > 0 in equation (2).  
  To test hypothesis H2a, the specification of the Tan, et al., (2008) by Chiang and Zheng 
(2010) which is regarded as more robust is implement. To achieve this, we estimate the 
following model: 
 152 | P a g e  
 
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝑢𝑝|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑝)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝑢𝑝(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝛾4  (1 −
𝐷𝑢𝑝)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                             (3) 
𝐷𝑢𝑝  is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for days with positive market returns and a value 
of 0 for days with negative market returns, α is the constant, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 are coefficients. 
The coefficients of interest are γ3 and γ4. Therefore, in the absence of herding effects, we 
expect γ 3 > 0 and γ 4 > 0 in equation (3) and statistically insignificant. If herding effects are 
prevailing, we expect γ 3 < 0 and γ 4 < 0 and statistically significant, with γ 3 < γ 4 if these 
effects are more significant during days with positive market returns. 
To test for the second hypothesis, H2b, the following model is estimated: 
   𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ |𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 +
𝛾4  (1 − 𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                     (4) 
Where𝐷𝜎
2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ is 1 for days with high market volatility and 0 otherwise.  
Volatility is defined as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the previous 30 day moving 
average. In line with Tan, et al., (2008) volatility is calculated as the square of the market 
return. In the absence of herding effects, we expect γ 1 > 0 and γ 2 > 0 in equation (4). If 
herding effects are prevailing, we expect γ 3 < 0 and γ 4 < 0 and statistically significant, with 
γ 3 < γ 4 if these effects are more evident during days with high market volatility.  
To test for the third hypothesis, H2c, the following model is estimated: 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ |𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 +
𝛾4  (1 − 𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                     (5) 
𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ  is 1 for days with a high trading volume and 0 otherwise. Trading volume is 
defined as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the previous 30 day moving average. 
To test for hypotheses H3 and H4, we estimate equation (2) with for each of the sub-sample 
periods. A cross-sectional dummy variable regression proposed by Chiang and Zheng 
(2010), a modification of the Chang, et al., (2000) measure, will be used to measure if 
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herding is more apparent in periods of these crises. Therefore, if the effect of herding is more 
prevalent during the crisis periods then we expect 𝛾2  < 0 in equation (2) and statistically 
significant.  
In order to investigate the robustness of our results, the regressions in Eqn. (2), (3), (4) and 
(5) are estimated in two subsamples of data. We split the whole sample into a 10-year period 
starting from 01/01/1996 to 18/10/2016 and a 5-year starting from 01/01/2011 to 18/10/2016. 
In addition, these subsamples provides insights on the time-varying nature of herding.  
To test hypothesis H5, we use Eqn. (2) and include the US market (sector) returns as detailed 
in the equation below:  
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝛾3  𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑈𝑆,𝑡 + 𝛾4  𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑚,𝑡
2 +  𝜀𝑡                                           (6) 
Where   𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑈𝑆,𝑡  and 𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑚,𝑡
2  are US market (sector) variables. 
The equation is estimated at both market and sector levels, for the whole sample and the two 
sub-periods.  
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5.5 Results  
5.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 reports the descriptive statistics of average daily log differenced returns and CSAD 
for the market (i.e., all industries) and the 19 individual industries for the SZSE and SHSE 
over the full sample period. Panel A shows the daily returns and the CSAD for the SZSE. 
The number of firms ranges from 4 (Telecommunications) to 419 (Industrial Goods). It is 
not surprising that Industrial Goods has the highest number of firms since it is the largest 
industry in China as stated earlier. The average daily return for the market is 0.004%, with 
values ranging from -0.2716% to 0.2722%. The standard deviation is low at 0.0215%. The 
daily mean return for the individual industries ranges from and 0.0001% (Food and 
Beverage, Industrial Goods, Media, Oil and Gas and Retail) to 0.0027% (Automobile) with 
a minimum value of -1.0427% (Automobile) and a maximum of 1.2790 % (Automobile). 
The standard deviation of returns ranges from 0.0211% (Utilities) to 0.2521% (Technology). 
The low standard deviation for the Utilities sector may be due to dominance by state-owned 
firms and industry concentration. Most of the returns are positively skewed meaning it is 
more likely to observe large returns than small returns. The returns for Food and Beverage, 
Personal and Household and Telecommunications are negatively skewed. The observed 
negative skewness is consistent with the finding of Chen, Hong and Stein (2001) that 
skewness is most pronounced in stocks that have experienced increased trading volume 
compared to trends in prior periods. The kurtosis has a high value across all industries, 
indicating extreme volatility.  
The CSAD for the market is 0.0158%, suggesting that the return of the individual sectors do 
not move simultaneously with the market return. The minimum and maximum range from  
0.000% to 0.1022%, the standard deviation is at a low value of 0.0009%. The mean value 
for the CSAD for the industries ranges between 0.0021% (Banks) and 0.3096% (Food and 
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Beverage). This implies that the Banks behave more similarly as a group compared to other 
industries, which may be due to the highly regulated nature of the sector. Indeed, 
Brunnermeier, Sockin and Xiong (2017) suggest that the Chinese government imposes strict 
regulation and monitoring in the Banking sector because it plays a crucial role in the 
provision of finance and government planning. Note worthily, the Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited and Agricultural 
Bank of China are on the 2017 Financial Stability Board list of global systemically important 
banks.  
 The mean for the industries ranges from a minimum of 0.000% and a maximum of 3.4258% 
(Food and Beverage). The standard deviation is between a low of 0.0047% (Banks) and a 
high of 0.3247% (Food and Beverage). All the sector returns are positively skewed. A 
noteworthy statistic is the high value of the kurtosis particularly for the Travel and Leisure; 
this indicates that for the Shenzhen market, large shocks are likely to be present and the log 
returns may not be normally distributed. The high values obtained for the skewness and 
kurtosis is due to the presence of outliers in the data.   
Panel B provides the descriptive statistics for the SHSE. The number of firms ranges from 4 
(Insurance) to 241 (Industrial Goods). Mean daily return for the market is 0.0005%, with 
values ranging from a low of -0.1628% and 0.6082%. The standard deviation is at a low 
value of 0.0226%. The daily mean returns for the individual sectors ranges from -0.0008% 
(Insurance) to 0.0009% (Construction) with a minimum of -0.3677% (Technology) and a 
maximum of 1.0771% (Real Estate). The standard deviation of returns ranges from 0.0188% 
(Banks) to 0.2938 % (Technology). The level of CSAD for the market has a mean value of 
0.0156% and ranges with a low value of 0.0000% to a high value of 0.6400%. The standard 
deviation is low at 0.0121%. The returns for the mean daily market return and CSAD are 
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positively skewed, and the kurtosis values are extremely high. The kurtosis may reflect the 
presence of large shocks in the market. 
Across the sectors, the mean value for the CSAD ranges between 0.0056% (Banks and 
Telecommunications) and 0.1546% (Travel and Leisure). It implies that these sectors behave 
more similarly as a group compared to other industries, which may be due to its highly 
regulated nature. The minimum and maximum values range between -2.9732% (Financials) 
and 2.8458% (Financials). All the CSADs are positive and therefore highly skewed. The 
kurtosis for Basic Resources, Industrial Goods, Personal and Household and Utilities sectors 
are extremely high, which may reflect the presence of large shocks in these sectors.  
Our findings for the SHSE are in line with that of Lao and Singh (2011) who report a low 
daily CSAD mean and standard deviation for the Shanghai A-share market of 0.0156 and 
0.0067, respectively. Further, our sector results are consistent with the summary statistics of 
Demirer and Kutan (2006), who report high volatility of daily returns and a low level of 
dispersion for the Finance and Insurance sector. They suggest that it implies the co-
movement of its stocks which may be due to its regulated nature. Overall, our results are 
consistent with the empirical evidence which suggests that advanced markets such as the US 
have larger mean values for return dispersions than emerging markets (for example, Chang, 
et al., 2000 and Chiang, et al., 2010). Tan, et al., (2008) suggest that this may be due to the 
presence of sophisticated investors in advanced markets who have access to various sources 
of information and analytical tools and thus results in higher means and standard deviation.  
All the coefficients are estimated using Newey- West standard errors to obtain 
heteroscedastic and autocorrelation standard errors.   In the next section, we analyse the 
results of the herding tests.  
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics, China 
Panel A: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
 
Industry #Firms Mean Maximum Minimum Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Daily market return       
Market (All 
industries) 1481 0.0004% 0.2722% -0.1716% 0.0215% 0.3559 11.7623 
Automobile  57 0.0027 1.2790 -1.0427 0.0943 4.2866 36.5085 
Banks 2 0.0005 0.2263 -0.2007 0.0253 0.6958 11.3475 
Basic Resources 85 0.0002 0.3319 -0.2162 0.0229 0.5660 21.6643 
Chemicals 148 0.0002 0.3395 -0.2016 0.0236 0.4423 18.5427 
Construction 91 0.0003 0.2836 -0.1801 0.0219 0.1833 13.5727 
Financials 12 0.0004 0.3505 -0.2338 0.0268 1.1196 22.8692 
Food & Beverage 83 0.0001 0.0953 -0.1077 0.0259 -0.5168 5.5637 
Healthcare 112 0.0006 0.2436 -0.1986 0.0225 0.4248 13.2039 
Industrial Goods 419 0.0001 0.2453 -0.1555 0.2132 0.0988 11.1931 
Media 18 0.0001 0.3511 -0.2151 0.0264 0.8135 17.7743 
Oil & Gas 25 0.0001 0.2578 -0.1842 0.0232 0.1429 12.7223 
Personal & 
Household 115 0.0002 0.1522 -0.1103 0.1973 -0.1287 8.2053 
Real Estate 68 0.0004 0.2889 -0.1820 0.0221 0.4679 15.7882 
Retail 43 0.0001 0.3006 -0.1746 0.0230 0.2447 15.1178 
Technology 142 0.0003 0.3527 -0.2017 0.2521 0.7313 17.3205 
Telecommunication 4 0.0003 0.9542 -0.1059 0.0288 -0.3870 4.3574 
Travel & Leisure 26 0.0002 0.3157 -0.1980 0.0237 0.3638 15.2949 
Utilities 31 0.0004 0.3055 -0.1630 0.0211 0.2293 16.5600 
 
 
Cross-sectional absolute deviation       
Market (All 
industries)  0.0158% 0.1022% 0.0009% 0.0085% 1.6101 9.2250 
        
Automobile  0.0441 0.7640 0.0000 0.0573 4.2866 32.1514 
Banks  0.0021 0.0458 0.0000 0.0047 3.4459 18.6019 
Basic Resources  0.0136 0.0908 0.0000 0.0081 1.1507 8.0450 
Chemicals  0.0140 0.1456 0.0000 0.0085 1.9220 22.0681 
Construction  0.0152 0.1223 0.0000 0.0091 1.9959 16.0056 
Financials  0.0125 0.4848 0.0000 0.0138 17.5910 25.3946 
Food & Beverage  0.3096 3.4258 0.0000 0.3247 2.0567  9.9111 
Healthcare  0.0140 0.1268 0.0000 0.0092 1.7519 16.2933 
Industrial Goods  0.0158 0.1285 0.0000 0.0095 2.6619 22.9574 
Media  0.1174 0.2556 0.0000 0.0111 2.6702 41.6646 
Oil & Gas  0.0132 0.2341 0.0000 0.0108 2.5392 34.4415 
Personal & 
Household  0.0163 0.1897 0.0000 0.0106 3.5528 36.1801 
Real Estate  0.0015 0.1503 0.0000 0.0091 2.3598 23.7287 
Retail  0.0001 0.1571 0.0000 0.0094 2.1775 19.7970 
Technology  0.0148 0.1237 0.0000 0.0090 1.2120 9.9516 
Telecommunication  0.0134 0.0641 0.0000 0.0118 1.0792  4.0422 
Travel & Leisure  0.0132 0.2249 0.0000 0.0094 2.8703 46.7169 
Utilities   0.1344 0.0834 0.0000 0.0081 1.3250 7.9642 
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Panel B: Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
Industry #Firms Mean Maximum Minimum Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Daily market return       
Market (All 
industries) 978 0.0005% 0.6082% -0.1628% 0.0226% 3.2539 87.7238 
Automobile  42 0.0002 0.3431 -0.1456 0.0231 0.8464 27.5101 
Banks 9 0.0008 0.0971 -0.1082 0.0188 0.0943 7.5033 
Basic Resources 97 0.0006 0.8050 -0.1929 0.0263 5.0306 145.6433 
Chemicals 74 0.0002 0.2551 -0.1985 0.0222 0.2678 15.1184 
Construction 59 0.0009 0.2971 -0.1760 0.0230 0.6507 17.4813 
Financials 15 0.0002 0.3363 -0.1982 0.0252 0.7744 16.4635 
Food & Beverage 52 0.0002 0.2240 -0.1269 0.0208 0.1998 12.5563 
Healthcare 69 0.0007 0.2539 -0.1750 0.0213 0.2913 14.0694 
Industrial Goods 214 0.0005 0.5395 -0.2185 0.2260 2.0217 61.2833 
Insurance 4 -0.0008 0.0954 -0.1012 0.0245 0.0366 5.5019 
Media 12 0.0002 0.2749 -0.2581 0.0251 0.1489 14.1569 
Oil & Gas 11 0.0005 0.1426 -0.1056 0.0223 -0.1369 7.7698 
Personal & 
Household 70 0.0002 0.2374 -0.1683 0.0213 0.1869 13.1935 
Real Estate 69 0.0004 1.0771 -0.1786 0.0278 9.5714 361.4347 
Retail 53 0.0007 0.4054 -0.1836 0.0250 2.1049 34.4499 
Technology 47 0.0006 0.5108 -0.3677 0.2938 1.5591 47.1606 
Telecommunication 2 0.0002 0.2632 -0.1225 0.0271 0.3253 9.8872 
Travel & Leisure 29 0.0003 0.2598 -0.1116 0.0216 0.3068 12.7757 
Utilities 50 0.0002 0.3431 -0.2591 0.0231 0.8464 27.5101 
 
Cross-sectional absolute deviation       
Market (All 
industries)  0.0156% 0.6400% 0.0000% 0.0121% 22.1994 1068.752 
        
Automobile  0.0136 0.3379 0.0000 0.0097 10.6658 18.5447 
Banks  0.0056 0.1015 0.0000 0.0056 2.6776 26.0112 
Basic Resources  0.0144 0.7658 0.0000 0.0133 27.2542 1501.434 
Chemicals  0.0154 0.1421 0.0000 0.0092 2.2293 19.9751 
Construction  0.0148 0.1097 0.0000 0.0091 1.5515 10.9704 
Financials  0.0119 2.8458 -2.9732 0.1360 0.6797 131.6574 
Food & Beverage  0.0266 0.3097 0.0000 0.0223 3.9018 30.0966 
Healthcare  0.0154 0.1864 0.0000 0.0106 3.2841 27.3713 
Industrial Goods  0.0157 0.6928 0.0000 0.0136 23.5613 1049.273 
Insurance  0.0063 0.0440 0.0000 0.0054 1.8385 8.4817 
Media  0.0127 0.0746 0.0000 0.0095 1.1055 5.5204 
Oil & Gas  0.0102 0.2686 0.0000 0.0102 4.0342 83.8790 
Personal & 
Household  0.0155 0.1592 0.0000 0.0093 2.6847 28.2714 
Real Estate  0.0148 0.3815 0.0000 0.0106 13.0951 392.5501 
Retail  0.0131 0.1054 0.000 0.0081 1.0133 8.1278 
Technology  0.0142 0.1728 0.000 0.0104 1.9675 19.3050 
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Notes: 
This table presents the average daily market return 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 and CSAD for the market (all industries) 
and the 19 individual industries for the full sample period (January 1990 to October 2016). Panel A 
presents the statistics for SZSE while panel B presents those for SHSE. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡  is defined as the average 
of daily returns. CSAD is defined by the measure: 
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 =
1
𝑁
 ∑ |𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡|
𝑁
𝑖=1   
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the logged differenced return on stock i at time t and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average 
of market returns at time t. 
 
 
5.5.2 Industry herding and its determinants 
 
In this section, we present the results for herding at the market and sector level estimated 
using equations (2), (3), (4) and (5). All estimations are conducted for the SZSE and SHSE, 
using the full sample period (1990-2016), and two sub-periods (1996-2016 and 2011-2016).  
 
5.5.2.1 Empirical results for market herding 
 
In general, the results support hypothesis H1 that Chinese investors herd around the market 
consensus. Table 5.2 reports the results of estimating the herding regression in Eqn. (2), 
where a significantly negative value of 𝛾2 indicates the presence of herding. Looking at the 
overall results presented in the table, it shows that the adjusted R-squared ranges from 8% 
to 37.96%, suggesting that the estimated equation for each market has some explanatory 
power. That is, the CSADs are highly interdependent on the market return and vice versa. 
An analysis of the results in Panel A shows that the 𝛾2 coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant across all the periods, indicating that herding behaviour exists in the SZSE.  
The estimated coefficients of 𝛾2  reported in Panel B for the 1990 and 2011 sub-periods are 
significantly negative, suggesting that the SHSE herds during these periods. However, the 
coefficient for the 1996 sub-period is significantly positive, indicating that investors engage 
in ‘negative herding’, that is, ignore and do not herd towards the market consensus. The 
Telecommunication  0.0068 0.1700 0.000 0.0109 2.6593  16.2115 
Travel & Leisure  0.1546 0.1636 0.000 0.0113 2.8030 22.45311 
Utilities   0.0136 0.3376 0.000 0.0097 10.6658 295.6490 
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observed herd behaviour is inconsistent with the predicted increased level of dispersion as 
proposed by rational asset pricing models.  
The finding of significant herding across both exchanges and periods is not surprising due 
to information asymmetry in the two markets. A possible explanation for the observed 
herding may be due to the dominance by individual investors. According to research the 
Chinese stock market is dominated by unsophisticated retail investors (they own as high as 
80% of the stocks59), who may have limited private information on the stocks (Demirer and 
Kutan, 2006). The dominance of these investors increases the tendency to mimic the trade 
of more informed investors by following the markets’ consensus. The significant herd 
behaviour observed in these results is consistent with prior studies on the Chinese stock 
market using the CSAD model (see for example, Tan, et al., 2008; Chiang, et al., 2010; Lao 
and Singh, 2011; Lee, et al., 2013; Yao, et al., 2014, Luo and Schinckus, 2015 and Zheng, 
et., 2017).  
Our results are different from those obtained by Demirer and Kutan (2006) and Fu and Lin 
(2010) who find no evidence of herding in the Chinese stock market.  The difference in the 
models used may account for why we obtained different results from Demirer and Kutan’s 
(2006) study; they use the CSSD model, but, we use the CSAD model. We may have 
obtained different results from Fu and Lin (2010) because they use monthly data. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 Source: China International Capital Corporation (CICC) 2015 report 
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Table 5.2 Estimates of market herding in the Chinese stock markets  
Panel A: Regression results for Shenzhen stock Exchange 
Year    1990   1996   2011 
α   0.0108   0.0104   0.0106 
   (76.14) ***  (61.29) ***  (36.52) *** 
𝛾1                   0.3599   0.5057   0.4190  
   (29.19) ***  (25.97) ***  (12.50) *** 
𝛾2         -0.2848   -3.7792   -1.1749 
      (-1.76) *  (-10.16) ***  (-1.99) * 
Adj. R2      40.74%   34.27%   37.96%          
 
 
Panel B: Regression results for Shanghai stock Exchange 
 
Year    1990   1996   2011 
α   0.0125   0.0106   0.0099 
   (52.51)  ***  (68.06) ***  (37.54) *** 
𝛾1                   0.2377   0.4846   0.3970  
   (10.02) ***  (29.71) ***  (13.45) ***   
𝛾2         -0.3652   0.4846   -1.3189 
      (-7.11)  ***  (-12.59) ***  (-2.75) *** 
Adj. R2      8.00%   28.96%   31.78%          
 
 
Notes: Table 5.2 reports the estimates from the following equation: 
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡  
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average returns of the N actively traded stocks for period t, the 
squared market return 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  is used to capture the nonlinearity in the relationship, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 is the cross-
sectional absolute deviation of securities’ returns, α is the constant, γ1, and γ2 are coefficients, and 𝜀𝑡 
is the error term at time t. The 1990 sample period covers 01/01/1990 to 18/10/2016, the 1996 sample 
period covers 01/01/1996 to 18/10/2016 and the 2011 sample period covers 01/01/2011 to 
18/10/2016.The sub-sample periods were split based on the percentage annual increase of the number 
of firms. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 162 | P a g e  
 
 
5.5.2.2 Empirical results for industry herding  
 
Having found that herd behaviour exists at the market level, we analyse the results obtained 
for both stock exchanges across all the sample periods to examine whether the results are 
consistent. An analysis of the results in Table 5.3 provides strong evidence of herding in 
both stock exchanges, which supports H1 that Chinese investors herd at the industry level. 
The regression for each industry is estimated using Eqn. (2), γ2 is the coefficient of interest. 
Looking at the overall results presented in the table, it shows that the adjusted R-squared 
ranges from 11.61% to 69.11%, it suggests that the estimated equation for each market has 
some explanatory power. That is, the CSADs are highly interdependent on the market return 
and vice versa. Panel A shows the results for the sectors in the SZSE across all the sample 
periods. For the full sample, negative and significant γ2 coefficients are reported in 
Automobile, Banks, Basic Resources, Chemicals, Food and Beverage, Media, Oil and Gas, 
Real Estate, Technology, Telecommunication, and Utilities. For the 1996 sub-period, all 
industries except Automobile and Financials report negative and significant γ2 coefficients, 
which indicates that during this period investors in the SZSE tend to herd towards the 
industry consensus. However, for the 2011 sub-period herding appears to slightly dissipate, 
the γ2 coefficient is negative and significant for Banks, Chemicals, Construction, Financials, 
Food and Beverage, Industrial Goods, Real Estate, Retail, Technology, 
Telecommunications, Travel and Leisure, and Utilities. Further analysis of the industry 
results demonstrates an interesting herding trend for the Financials industry, the γ2 
coefficient is positive and not significant during 1990 and 1996 but becomes negative and 
significant in 2011.  
Given that the Chinese financial industry is highly regulated, it is surprising to find that 
investors in this sector ignore the industry consensus as a group in only one sub-period. The 
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observed herding is consistent with localised herding, where the movement of a subset of 
investors increases the dispersion of returns when they move in (out) of industries, which is 
in accordance to the predictions of rational asset pricing models (Gebka and Wohar, 2013). 
Our evidence contrasts with those of Yao, et al., (2014) who show that herding is absent for 
Financials. The difference in results may be due to our use of different sub-periods, which 
further demonstrates the time-varying characteristics of industry herding in the Chinese 
market. The varying results obtained in sub-periods further provides information that 
herding maybe be conditioned based on certain periods. Our result is consistent with Chiang, 
et al., (2012), who emphasise that herding in the Chinese market is time-varying. Thus, the 
coefficients they estimate are sensitive to new information. 
The results of the regression estimates for the SHSE are reported in Panel B. Like the SZSE, 
most of the regressions yield negative and significant γ2 coefficients, indicating that herding 
is present in most sectors across all sub-periods. However, herding occurs in more sectors 
compared to the SZSE. This contrasts with the explanation by Demirer and Kutan (2006) 
that herding occurs more in the Shenzhen market because the firms are smaller, and the 
investors are less informed. The difference may be because we do not distinguish between 
the different share classes. However, this is not the focus of this study. A closer analysis of 
the coefficients for the full sample shows negative and significant γ2 coefficients for all 
industries except for Basic Resources, Financials, Food and Beverage, HealthCare, 
Industrial Goods, Oil and Gas, Personal Holding, Real Estate and Utilities, indicating that 
investors in these do not industries herd. Stronger levels of herding are reported for the 1996 
sub-period, the γ2 coefficient is negative and significant for all sectors except Financials, and 
Food and Beverage. For the 2011 sub-period, most coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant except for Food and Beverage, and Oil and Gas. This suggests limited evidence 
of time-varying herding in the SHSE, as the herding trend only varies for the full sample. It 
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is worth noting that none of the γ2 coefficients for the Oil and Gas industry is negative and 
statistically significant across all sample periods. Thus no form of herd behaviour takes place 
in this sector. We anticipated this result because the prices of Oil and Gas industry is highly 
regulated by the Chinese government, with the market playing a limited role (Wu, 2003). 
Overall, there is strong evidence of herding in Chinese sectors which shows time-varying 
properties. Our evidence supports the proposition by Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) that 
investors intentionally mimic other investors when there is uncertainty about the quality of 
their private information. Moreover, we also find that investors in both markets herd in 
different industries, which may be due to the difference in both markets as earlier discussed. 
Our results are in line with Lee, et al., (2013) who also find herding in SHSE and SZSE 
sectors. However, in contrast to our results, they find that SZSE herds more than SHSE. A 
possible reason for the difference in result may be due to the regression model they used 
which includes the CSAD of the IT sector. Our results are also consistent with Chiang, et al, 
(2012)’s finding of industry level herding for both SHSE and SZSE. Yao, et al., (2014) also 
provide evidence consistent with herding in majority of the industry groups they examine 
except Agriculture, Mining and Financials. Also, our results support those of Zheng, et al., 
(2017) who find evidence of herding in all industries for the Chinese market except Utilities.         
Notably, our evidence differs from those of Demirer and Kutan (2006) who examine sector 
index returns for SHSE and SZSE and find no evidence that supports the presence of herding 
in Chinese markets. As previously stated, the difference in the results may be due to the 
methodology employed in their study which mainly examines herding only during periods 
of market stress. However, herding might occur at other periods over the whole return 
distribution. An explanation for the observed herding may be linked to turbulence in the 
market. Later in this chapter, we will examine the herd behaviour during crisis periods.  
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Table 5.3 Estimates of industry herding in Chinese stock markets 
Panel A:  Regression results for the Shenzhen stock exchange  
                                               1990                                                                       1996                                                   
                                                                          2011 
Industry   α 𝛾1 𝛾2 91.51%                                                                                                        0.0080 0.7413 0.1588 88.02%                                                                  0.0095 0.6793    -0.3152      69.11% 
 
Adj. R2           α 0.7885   -0.1924 91.51%                                                                                      0.0080 0.7413 0.1588 88.02%                                                                  0.0095 0.6793    -0.3152      69.11% 
 
  
𝛾1 𝛾2                      Adj. R
2         
0.0
064 0.7885   -0.1924 91.51%                                        0 00 0 0.7413 0.1588 88. 2%                                                            0.0095 0.6793    -0.3152      69.11% 
 
    α 𝛾1 𝛾2 Adj. R
2 -0.1924  91.51%                        0.0080 0.7413 0. 588 88.02%                                                          0.0095 0.6793    -0.3152      69.11% 
 
Automobile  0.0064   0.7885     -0.1924    91.51%                                                                                                        0.0080 0.7413 0.1588 88.02%                                                                  0.0095 0.6793    -0.3152      69.11% 
 (17.67)
 *** (64.98) *** (-6.26) ***  (28.65)
 *** (56.28) *** (2.17) **  (19.64) *** (17.30) *** (-0.60)   
Banks 0.0012 0.0873    -0.5671 4.04% 0.0012    0.1241 -0.9182 5.61% 0.0020    0.2509    -1.7611    20.31% 
 (15.40)
 *** (12.73) *** (-10.05) ***  (12.17)
 *** (11.34) *** (-6.80) ***  (12.16) *** (11.51) *** (-5.24) ***  
Basic Resources 0.0102    0.2741      -1.1427      16.50% 0.0093    0.4605    -3.4194    26.69% 0.0094   0.3939    -0.4755     43.72% 
 (59.37)
 *** (16.55) *** (5.97) ***  (34.54)
 *** (11.52) *** (-4.51) ***  (35.05) *** (13.10) *** (-0.96)   
Chemicals 0.0107     0.2378 -0.5932     15.55% 0.0097    0.4696    -3.3893    29.83% 0.0104 0.3852    -1.1508    38.62% 
 (61.78)
 *** (12.98) *** (-2.04) **  (59.60)
 *** (26.13) *** (10.65) ***  (37.07) *** (12.74) *** (-2.40) **  
Construction 0.0106 0.3220 -0.2962 28.89% 0.0102    0.4873    -3.9585    26.08% 0.0106    0.4119    -1.8308   35.61% 
 (65.66)
 *** (23.45) *** (-1.63)   (58.37)
 *** (27.75) *** (-13.60) ***  (35.40) *** (12.71) *** (-3.35) ***  
Financials 0.0095      0.1245      1.3120      23.04% 0.0099    0.1069    2.2823    34.05% 0.0084    0.4772 -3.7447   25.77% 
 (14.00)
 *** (1.54)  (1.16)  (10.45)
 *** (0.92)  (1.38)  (0.00) (14.13) *** (-6.87) ***  
Food & 
Beverage 0.1241 11.3738 -27.7877 29.55% 0.1241 11.3738    -27.7877    29.55% 0.0866 4.3900    -22.9611    11.61% 
 (14.73)
 *** (12.70) *** (-2.12) **  (14.73)
 *** (12.70) *** (-2.21) **  (19.91) *** (8.27) *** (-2.27) **  
Healthcare 0.0105 0.2685 -0.8244 14.24% 0.0097    0.5165    -3.9702    30.63% 0.0096    0.4217    -1.4255   41.55% 
 (27.76)
 *** (5.41) *** (-1.08)   (57.34)
 *** (26.49) *** (-11.38) ***  (27.76) *** (5.41) *** (-1.08)   
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Industrial Goods 0.0106 0.3703 -0.1758 35.35% 0.0104    0.4871    -3.4776    30.94% 0.0105   0.4147    -1.2541    41.25% 
 (55.75)
 *** (17.43) *** (-0.51)  (55.46)
 *** (20.62) *** (-7.23) ***  (34.84) *** (17.43) *** (12.21) ***  
Media 0.0089 0.3983 -2.3824 5.49% 0.0089    0.3648    -2.2040    12.98% 0.0111    0.2311   4.5484 44.50% 
 (33.89)
 *** (8.73) *** (-4.18) ***  (26.65)
 *** (8.41) *** (-2.78) ***  (9.49) *** (1.17)  (1.05)   
Oil & Gas 0.0084      0.3983      -2.3824     15.47% 0.0080     0.5651    -4.2388    23.30% 0.0110   0.2483   1.8973    28.89% 
 (32.53)
 *** (14.21) *** (-5.94) ***  (24.71)
 *** (11.35) *** (-4.03) ***   (10.90) *** (1.40)  (0.47)   
Personal & 
Household 0.1036 0.3683 0.9746 35.01% 0.0010    0.5083    -3.3603    30.01% 0.0100   0.4278    -0.5385    42.37% 
 (30.73)
 *** (6.75) *** (0.87)  (50.06)
 *** (18.54) *** (-5.55) ***  (34.42) *** (11.74) *** (-0.74)  
Real Estate 0.0099 0.3795 -0.4264 39.17% 0.0096     0.5305     -3.7073    33.71% 0.0088  0.4943    -2.1956    42.36% 
 (63.20)
 *** (24.10) *** (-1.76) *  (52.97)
 *** (22.94) *** (-7.42) ***  (30.67) *** (-3.94) *** (15.32) ***  
Retail 0.0108 0.2729 -0.5501 17.70% 0.0099     0.5037    -3.8873    25.33% 0.0090   0.5002    -2.7256    35.70% 
 (47.45)
 *** (10.90) *** (-1.59)   (54.59)
 *** (24.13) *** (-10.10) ***   (28.76) *** (11.55) *** (-3.08) ***  
Technology 0.0109 0.2663     -0.9249   15.37% 0.0105    0.4161   -2.1134    27.68% 0.0107    0.4347    1.5771   41.15% 
 (53.47)
 *** (14.72) *** (-4.45) ***  (27.66)
 *** (7.45) *** (-1.94) *  (32.00) *** (13.86) *** (-3.07) ***  
Telecom 0.0066 0.5334 -5.3161 13.27% 0.0066    0.5334    -5.3161 13.27% 0.0072    0.6151    -4.4800   28.25% 
 (19.45)
 *** (18.18) *** (-14.03) ***  (19.45)
 *** (18.18) *** (-14.03) ***  (15.45) *** (13.31) *** (-5.99) ***  
Travel & Leisure 0.0103   0.2113   -.5733  9.47% 0.0097 0.4445 -3.1094 23.39% 0.0086     0.4830    -1.8152    40.00% 
 (48.57)
 *** (8.11) *** (-1.26)   (43.08)
 *** (14.93) *** (-5.38) ***  (31.44) *** (14.79) *** (-3.35) ***  
Utilities 0.0094   0.3233   -0.9882   24.73% 0.0087    0.4879    -3.5398    29.57% 0.0082    0.4473    -2.2740    35.99% 
  (56.28) *** (17.85) *** (-3.80) ***   (50.58) *** (22.57) *** (-8.61) ***   (29.54) *** (14.59) *** (-4.56) ***    
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Panel B: Regression results for the Shanghai stock exchange 
 
                                                                  1990                1996 2011 
Industry             α                   𝛾1                         𝛾2                                  Adj. R
2                α                   𝛾1                   𝛾2                  Adj. R
2              α          𝛾1                         𝛾2                         Adj. R
2                   
Automobile  0.0105      0.3203      -0.3646      28.94%                                                                      0.0099 0.4521 -3.3293    26.78% 0.0099    0.3787    -1.3354    33.75% 
    (65.93) *** (22.53) *** (-1.88) *  (60.08)
 *** (26.39) *** (-10.85) ***  (33.14) *** (11.48) *** (-2.38) ***  
Banks 0.0026      0.2952      -1.9460      22.92% 0.0024 0.2895    -1.8463    22.44% 0.0031      0.3080   -2.0584 32.47% 
 (22.45)
 *** (16.06) *** (-4.73) ***  (19.46)
 *** (13.77) *** (-3.75) ***  (19.46) *** (12.14) *** (-3.86) ***  
Basic 
Resources 0.0115      0.1528      0.8885      54.68% 0.0097     0.5042    -3.8277    28.11% 0.0089    0.4002   -1.4306     39.68% 
 (45.58)
 *** (7.53) *** (9.43) ***  (54.67)
 *** (24.29) *** (-10.18) ***  (34.42) *** (14.83) *** (-3.32) ***  
Chemicals 0.0110      0.3109 -0.3316      29.68% 0.0101    0.4698    -3.4039    30.10% 0.0101    0.3868    -1.5469    38.17% 
 (58.62)
 *** (15.32) *** (-0.97)   (62.34)
 *** (27.30) *** (-11.18) ***   (37.16) *** (14.08) *** (-3.61) ***   
Construct 0.0106 0.1702 -0.8171 21.89% 0.0096    0.5156    -3.8952   28.85% 0.0091    0.4272    -2.1533   35.62% 
 (47.30)
 *** (12.47) *** (-2.39) **  (56.68)
 *** (29.70) *** (-14.15) ***  (32.76) *** (14.73) *** (-4.78) ***  
Financials 0.0201      -1.2839      19.8616      6.06% 0.0153   -0.3984    10.9166    2.92% 0.0054    0.3658    -1.1495    3.41% 
 (7.34)
 *** (-3.64) *** (3.07) ***  (4.21)
 *** (-0.72) (1.10)  (1.97) ** (0.86)  (-0.15)  
Food & 
Beverage 0.0170 -0.7531 16.0454 35.85% 0.0170 0.4830    4.5574    36.27% 0.0152   0.4856    5.0996    39.87% 
 (7.59)
 *** (-2.41) ** (2.71) ***  (53.99)
 *** (11.83) *** (5.40) ***  (26.04) *** (5.86) *** (2.84) ***  
Healthcare 0.0097 0.4105 0.0748 40.79% 0.0095    0.4865    -3.0758    33.02% 0.0090 0.4442     -1.9757  41.54% 
 (51.87)
 *** (17.46) *** (0.20)   (51.54)
 *** (19.08) *** (-6.06) ***  (36.45) *** (15.29) *** (-3.99) ***  
Industrial  
Goods 0.0114 0.2426 1.8716 63.49% 0.0102    0.4964   -3.8095     30.72% 0.0094    0.4042    -1.6744     38.02% 
 (45.01)
 *** (12.76) *** (20.71) ***  (64.65)
 *** (29.83) *** (-13.45) ***  (35.15) *** (13.50) *** (-3.42) ***  
Insurance 0.0036      0.2272      -1.8410      15.21% 0.0036   0.2272    -1.8410    15.21% 0.0034   0.2150 -1.0570    23.79% 
 (24.07)
 *** (14.61) *** (-7.68) ***  (24.07)
 *** (14.61) *** (-7.68) ***  (19.53) *** (9.59) *** (-2.42) ***  
Media 0.0097 0.1620 -1.1333 10.38% 0.0084     0.4915    -4.2805    19.90% 0.0070   0.4571   -3.7939    28.01% 
 (33.96)
 *** (6.52) *** (-5.12) ***  (43.42)
 *** (24.22) *** (-12.79) ***  (24.84) *** (17.30) *** (-9.57) ***  
Oil & Gas 0.0078      0.3122      -2.7960      6.04% 0.0078      0.3122      -2.7960      6.04% 0.0101   0.1152   5.3299    38.63% 
 (10.86)
 *** (2.87) *** (-1.48)   (10.86)
 *** (2.87) *** (-1.48)   (7.90) *** (0.52)  (1.12)   
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Personal & 
Household 0.0108 0.3458 -0.1161 34.69% 0.0099 0.5138    -3.8687   30.46% 0.0104 0.3699    -0.9479  36.34% 
 (60.23)
 *** (16.85) *** (-0.34)  (62.05)
 *** (30.47) *** (-14.32) ***  (36.30) *** (12.32) *** (-2.13) **  
Real Estate 0.0109 0.2475 0.0878 39.21% 0.0098  0.4862    -3.6217    32.31% 0.0091   0.4433    -1.9366   41.26% 
 (28.97)
 *** (8.64) *** (4.38) ***  (60.62)
 *** (27.98) *** (-11.29) ***  (33.67) *** (15.15) *** (-3.97) ***  
Retail 0.0096 0.2830 -0.9685 21.51% 0.0094 0.4585   -3.5931  28.38% 0.0086    0.4349    -2.1925  39.44% 
 (59.60)
 *** (18.04) *** (-6.66) ***  (63.28)
 *** (29.03) *** (-13.79) ***  (33.68) *** (14.49) *** (-4.29) ***  
Technology 0.0110      0.2339      -0.7089      12.18% 0.0100 0.5162  -3.9953    29.01% 0.0098   0.4415    -2.1157    38.90% 
 (48.15)
 *** (12.01) *** (-5.85) ***  (56.51)
 *** (27.93) *** (-13.04) ***  (33.14) *** (15.63) *** (-5.21) ***  
Telecom 0.0029 0.2789 -1.6058 9.10% 0.0026 0.3947     -2.8419  12.09% 0.0023 0.7938   -7.1026    30.68% 
 (13.32)
 *** (11.08) *** (-4.51) ***  (3.73)
 *** (4.25) *** (-1.95) ***  (6.74) *** (19.66) *** (-15.45) ***  
Travel & 
Leisure 0.0089 0.4961 -0.8060 40.06% 0.0083 0.6705    -6.0555    33.93% 0.0073  0.5200    -2.2322  42.41% 
 (48.45)
 *** (24.82) *** (-2.38) **  (51.85)
 *** (37.83) *** (-20.07) ***  (27.60) *** (14.14) *** (-3.09) ***  
Utilities 0.0100 0.2600 -0.1348 21.20% 0.0088 0.4714 -3.5068 29.95% 0.0081 0.4031    -1.4422    41.39% 
  (29.63) *** (5.91) *** (-0.21)    (60.31) *** (28.35) *** (-12.39) ***   (35.64) *** (15.00) *** (-3.59) ***   
 
 
Notes:  
Tables 5.3 reports the estimates from the following equation: 
   𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the average value of market return in each sector, the squared market return 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 is used to capture the non-linearity in the relationship, α is the 
constant, γ1, and γ2 are coefficients, and εt is the error term at time t, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns for the sector, the equation is 
estimated over the whole sample period for each sector. We utilised the DataStream industry classification. The equation is estimated for three sample periods 
for Shanghai and Shenzhen markets to test whether the results are robust regardless of the number of firms in the sample. The 1990 sample period covers 
01/01/1990 to 18/10/2016, the 1996 sample period covers 01/01/1996 to 18/10/2016 and the 2011 sample period covers 01/01/2011 to 18/10/2016.The sub 
sample periods were split based on the percentage annual increase of the number of firms. T-test statistics based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The t-test statistic tests for the difference in level of significance between the γ1, and 
γ2   coefficient. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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5.5.3 Determinants of industry herding 
 
5.5.3.1 The effect of market returns on herding 
 
In this section, we examine whether herd behaviour is contingent upon rising and declining 
market conditions, a dummy variable as specified in Eqn. (3) was used to capture the 
differences in the CSADs,  𝛾3  and 𝛾4  represents coefficients for rising and declining market 
conditions respectively. Results for the markets are analysed in the first section, which is 
followed by an analysis of industry results.  
 
5.5.3.1.1 Results for the aggregate market 
 
Table 5.4 presents the regression estimates for both markets Panel A reports the results for 
SZSE looking at the coefficient 𝛾3  for rising market it can be observed that it is only negative 
and significant for the 1996 sub-period. This indicates that all investors during this sub-
period have strong herd behaviour tendencies towards the market consensus. Furthermore, 
the results suggest that the level of herding in the SZSE is isolated to a specific sample 
period. Whereas, investors’ behaviour in other sample periods are in line with the predictions 
of rational asset pricing models that asset dispersion increases during periods of significant 
price movement (Demirer and Kutan, 2006). In contrast, for declining market conditions,  𝛾4 
coefficients are negative and significant across all sub-periods, a strong indication that SZSE 
herding is more likely to occur during declining market conditions. This finding supports 
McQueen, et al. (1996)’s proposition that investors tend to herd more in declining markets 
due to the decrease in small stocks beta.  
When we examine the results for SHSE, we observe different results. Panel B indicates that 
the 𝛾3  coefficient for rising market conditions is negative and significant across all sub-
periods, indicating that herding is more pronounced in rising markets. We observe 
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contrasting results when we examine 𝛾4  coefficients for declining market conditions, it is 
only negative and significant during the 1996 sub-period, again herd behaviour outside this 
period is consistent with rational asset pricing models. 
In general, we find evidence of herding asymmetry in Chinese markets; herding is different 
in rising and declining market conditions. More, specifically, our results are mixed for both 
markets. While SZSE investors tend to herd during declining market conditions, those in 
SHSE are more likely to herd during rising market conditions. According to Tan, et al., 
(2008) the difference in the results may be because of government intervention. They explain 
that because SZSE comprises smaller firms (not predominantly stated-owned), its investors 
are less likely to follow the market consensus during declining market conditions, because 
they have confidence that the government will intervene to prevent the market from 
collapsing. As a result of their confidence in the government, they trade based on their own 
information and are less prone to panic trades. On the other hand, investors in SHSE tend to 
be more optimistic and confident of government support during rising market conditions. 
Analysing the results in its entirety reveals that consistent with hypothesis H2A, herding is 
contingent upon market returns. In relation to the adjusted R squared, the explanatory power 
of the CSAD is stronger for SZSE than SHSE.  
Our results for the herding in rising and declining market conditions are in line with findings 
from previous studies, including those that study the Chinese market and those that study 
SZSE and SHSE separately. Our results are consistent with those reported in Chiang and 
Zheng’s (2010) investigation of herding in up and down markets which provides evidence 
that the Chinese market herds in both up and down markets. They also show that the 
observed herding is stronger in up markets. We obtain similar results as Lao and Singh 
(2011) who find evidence that Chinese investors herd more when the market is declining, 
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which may be due to loss aversion of the dominant group of inexperienced individual 
investors. 
Furthermore, our results are also similar to those of Chiang, et al., (2013), who use the CSAD 
model to examine herding in Pacific-Basin market including the Chinese market and find 
that herding is stronger during rising markets than declining markets. They suggest that 
herding is stronger when the market is rising because investors focus more on large firms as 
they herd. Chiang, et al., (2010) also find evidence that herding is more pronounced in rising 
market conditions. 
Regarding studies that separate SZSE and SHSE our results are consistent with Tan, et al., 
(2008), Yao, et al., (2014) and Luo and Schinckus (2015). For the SHSE, Tan, et al., (2008) 
find that herding is more pronounced in SHSE in rising market conditions. Further, for the 
SZSE, Yao et al. (2014), show evidence that investor’s herd more in the A-share markets 
and the Shenzhen B-market in declining market conditions. In the same light, Luo and 
Schinckus (2015) observe that Shanghai A-share investors herd when the market is rising, 
as opposed to Shenzhen B-shares investors who herd when the market is declining. However, 
our results are different from those reported by Fu and Lin (2010), who find that both SZSE 
and SHSE markets herd during declining markets. 
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Table 5.4 Estimates of herding during periods of rising and declining market returns 
in Chinese stock markets  
Panel A: Shenzhen stock exchange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Shanghai stock exchange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Table 5.4 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝑢𝑝|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑝)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝑢𝑝(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝛾4  (1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑝)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
Dup is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for days with positive market returns and a value of 0 
otherwise, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market’s average return, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of 
returns for the market, α is the constant, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 are coefficients and 𝜀𝑡is the error term at time 
t.The 1990 sample period covers 01/01/1990 to 18/10/2016, the 1990 sample period covers 
01/01/1996 to 18/10/2016 and the 2011 sample period covers 01/01/2011 to 18/10/2016. The sub 
sample periods were split based on the percentage annual increase of the number of firms. T-test 
Year    1990                         1996  2011 
  α                  0.0106               0.0104                     0.0106      
                      (60.50) ***         (57.90)  ***              (35.59) *** 
 𝛾1                 0.3486                0.4595                    0.3475      
                     (22.64) ***           (16.10) ***              (9.09) ***  
 𝛾2                0.4355                 0.5838                   0.5552 
                     (13.47) ***            (25.26)***              (14.83) *** 
 𝛾3                -0.0289               -3.9718                  -1.0832      
                     (-0.19)                 (-5.11)***               (-1.13)  
𝛾4                 -1.5932                -4.4471                 -3.0022       
                     (-2.48) **             (-10.40)***               (-4.87) *** 
Adj. R2          41.44 %                34.65%                45.02% 
Year                1990                         1996  2011 
  α                  0.0124                 0.0120                   0.0117      
                      (43.49) ***           (73.54)  ***              (41.35) *** 
 𝛾1                 0.2700                0.3715                    0.1831      
                     ( 6.47)***             (16.55)***               (4.34) ***  
 𝛾2                0.2245                 0.2382                     0.1674       
                     ( 8.05) ***            (11.18)***                (4.33) *** 
 𝛾3                -0.4208              -3.5021                   2.7939       
                     (-5.39) ***           (-6.61)***                  (2.58) *** 
𝛾4                 -0.5457             -1.0866                     0.3617       
                     ( -1.23)              (-2.67)***                  (0.47)   
Adj. R2           8.18%             13.88%                   21.57% 
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statistics based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.  The t-test statistic tests for the difference in level of the significance between 
the γ3 and γ4 coefficients. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.
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5.5.3.1.2 Results for industry sectors 
 
Table 5.5 presents the regression results for herding in industries in rising and declining 
market conditions. An analysis of the overall results shows that the adjusted R-squared 
ranges from 4.04% to 91.54%, it suggests that the estimated equation for each market has 
reasonably high explanatory power, that is, the CSADs are highly interdependent on the 
market return and vice versa.  
Panel A shows the results for the SZSE across all the periods. During rising market 
conditions, the 𝛾3  coefficient for the full sample is negative and significant for Automobile, 
Banks, Basic Resources, Media, Oil and Gas, Personal and Household, Real Estate, Retail, 
Technology, Telecommunications, and Utilities. Stronger levels of herding become evident 
for the 1996 sub-period, we report negative and significant 𝛾3  coefficients for all the sectors 
except for Financials, Food and Beverage, Oil and Gas, and Real Estate. There are slightly 
more industries with non-negative and non-significant  𝛾3  coefficients for the 2011 sub-
period: Healthcare, Media, Oil and Gas, Personal and Household, Travel and Leisure and 
Utilities. Our results indicate that herding dissipates over the sub-periods with more investors 
aligning to the predictions of rational pricing models. Notably, these results reveal a stronger 
evidence in support of herding compared to the overall SZSE results reported in Table 5.4, 
where we only find herding in the 1996 sub-period, suggesting that investors are more likely 
to herd at the industry level in rising market conditions. This finding supports the predictions 
of Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) that investors have a greater tendency of herding at the 
industry level.  
When we consider the 𝛾4  coefficients for declining market conditions, we observe strong 
evidence of herding. Herding is strong in the full sample, negative and statistically 
significant coefficient 𝛾4  are reported for all industries except Personal and Household. This 
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suggests that most investors tend to collectively invest in particular sectors. Similar results 
are reported for the 1996 sub-period where the 𝛾4  coefficients are negative and significant 
in all industries except Automobile and Personal Household. Herding reaches its highest 
level in the 2011 sub-period, the 𝛾4  coefficients are negative and significant in all industries. 
The herding over the sample periods shows an increasing trend, indicating that as the market 
declines the tendency to herd in the SZSE increases. Thus, more investors depart from the 
predictions of rational asset pricing models. These results are consistent with the previous 
evidence in Table 5.4 that herding is more prevalent in SZSE in declining market conditions. 
Panel B reports the regression results for SHSE across the three sub-periods. Like the SZSE, 
the majority of the 𝛾3  coefficients for rising market conditions are negative and significant, 
indicating the presence of herd behaviour in the sectors. More specifically, for the full 
sample, we report negative and significant 𝛾3 coefficients for Banks, Construction, 
Insurance, Media, Oil and Gas, Retail, Technology and Telecommunications. Herding 
becomes more pronounced for the 1996 sub-period, 𝛾3  coefficients are negative and 
significant for the all sectors except Financials, Food and Beverage, and Personal and 
Household. Herd formation appears to strengthen for the 2011 sub-period, negative and 
significant 𝛾3  coefficients are reported for more industries: Automobile, Banks, 
Construction, Industrial Goods, Media, Insurance, Real Estate, Technology, 
Telecommunication and Utilities.  This finding suggests that herding has an increasing trend 
overtime.  
We also report strong evidence of herding for declining market conditions. For the full 
sample, we obtain negative and significant 𝛾4  coefficients for all industries except Banks, 
Food and Beverage, Industrial Goods, Real Estate, Telecommunications and Utilities. On 
analysis of the 1996 sub-period even more industries herd, 𝛾4  coefficients are negative and 
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statistically significant for all industries except Banks, Food and Beverage, Financials and 
Telecommunications. Herding becomes slightly stronger in the 2011 sub-period, 𝛾4  
coefficients are negative and statistically significant for all industries except Banks, Food 
and Beverage, Insurance. Interestingly, we report positive and significant coefficients for the 
Food and Beverage sector across all sub-periods, suggesting equity returns increase during 
periods of significant price changes as predicted by rational asset price models.  It is worth 
noting that we find no evidence of herding for the Banks, none of its coefficients are negative 
and significant across all sub-periods, suggesting that investors in the Banking sector do not 
herd in declining market conditions. This may be due to the dominance of state ownership 
in the banking sector, thus subject to more government intervention, which in turn reduces 
the uncertainty during declining market conditions and hence the tendency to herd (García-
Herrero, Gavilá and Santabárbara, 2009). 
Overall our results provide evidence that industry herd behaviour is asymmetric and is more 
prevalent in rising market conditions. For the both SZSE and SHSE, we find evidence that 
herding occurs in both rising and declining markets but is more prevalent in latter. This result 
is consistent with hypothesis H2a which states that industry herding is contingent upon rising 
(declining) market returns. In fact, we find that industry herding is stronger in rising market 
conditions in the SHSE than in the SZSE, while SZSE herds more in declining market 
conditions. 
These results support the evidence provided by Lee, et al., (2013). Our results also agree 
with their finding that herding is more prevalent in rising markets for sectors in the SHSE.  
Our findings are also consistent with Zheng, et al., (2017) who report that 7 out of the 10 
industries examined for the Chinese market herded more during rising markets. They explain 
that restraints on short-selling minimises the effect of herding when the market is declining.  
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Table 5.5 Estimates of industry herding during periods of rising and declining 
returns in Chinese stock markets 
Panel A: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
 
 
                                                               1990  
Industry               α           𝛾1                   𝛾2      𝛾3                𝛾4             Adj.R
2 
      
Auto 0.0065 0.8017 0.7725 -0.2017 -0.1787 91.54%                                                                              
   (17.55) *** (60.68) *** (44.96) *** (-5.19) *** (-4.03) ***  
Banks 0.0011 0.0918 0.0805 -0.6059 -0.5013 4.04% 
 (15.63)
 *** (10.73) *** (9.72) *** (-7.99) *** (-7.14) ***  
Basic  
Resources 0.0100 0.2703 0.3251 -1.0378 -1.9320 16.91% 
 (56.48)
 *** (16.18) *** (11.68) *** (-7.08) *** (-4.23) ***  
Chemicals 0.0104 0.2251 0.3375 -0.3231 -2.1014 17.26% 
 (66.24)
 *** (15.30) *** (18.50) *** (-1.26) (-8.34) ***  
Construct 0.0104 0.3160 0.3781 -1.2450 -1.2466 29.19% 
 (55.35)
 *** (20.13) *** (11.68) *** (-1.11)  (-1.94) *  
Financials 0.0087 0.1821 0.2624 1.3950 -1.2841 26.49% 
 (17.35)
 *** (2.21) ** (7.09) *** (1.12) (-2.71) ***  
Food & 
Beverage 0.1319 8.5423 12.011 39.0885 -48.520 30.42% 
 (14.83)
 *** (6.39) *** (11.49) *** (1.44) (-3.55) ***  
Healthcare 0.0103 0.3590 0.4724 0.2080 -2.048 15.20% 
 (37.82)
 *** (4.76) *** (13.33) *** (-0.53)  (-4.39) ***  
Industrial 
Goods 0.0103 0.2275 0.3621 -0.4116 -2.1330 36.16% 
 (47.39)
 *** (17.30) *** (11.06) *** (0.88)  (-2.32) **  
Media 0.0086 0.2104 0.2836 -0.9894 -2.3112 6.17% 
 (33.89)
 *** (8.63) *** (9.75) *** (-4.70) *** (-5.79) ***  
Oil & Gas 0.0081 0.3967 0.4802 -2.0899 -3.8375 16.14% 
 (33.75)
 *** (15.45) *** (15.29) *** (-7.14) *** (-7.78) ***  
Personal& 
Household 0.0102 0.3146 0.4764 2.4983 -1.4487 36.23% 
 (36.25)
 *** (6.42) *** (8.26) *** (2.21) ** (-1.08)  
Real  
Estate 0.0097 0.3841 0.4419 -0.2523 -1.6470 39.82% 
 (44.70)
 *** (19.23) *** (9.95) *** (-0.91)  (-1.87) *  
Retail 0.0106 0.2632 0.3442 -0.3266 -1.6614 16.17% 
 (51.52)
 *** (14.96) *** (12.83) ***  (-5.77) *** (-2.44) **  
Tech 0.0106 0.2702 0.3488 -0.8268 -2.2841 28.16% 
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 (78.63)
 *** (26.61) *** (20.44) *** (-4.16) *** (-5.25) ***  
Telecom 0.0065 0.5784 0.5166 -6.2735 -4.9320 13.35% 
 (18.96)
 *** (15.42) *** (14.97) *** (-11.04) *** (-11.08) ***  
Travel & 
Leisure 0.0100 0.2114 0.2751 -0.3505 -1.7209 10.26% 
 (52.07)
 *** (8.03) *** (11.99) *** (-0.66) (-5.13) ***  
Utilities 0.0092 0.3234 0.3975 -0.8388 -2.2597 25.30% 
  (54.54) *** (21.40) *** (13.17) *** (-5.11) *** (-4.12) ***   
 
 
                                                               1996  
 
Industry               α           𝛾1                   𝛾2                   𝛾3                       𝛾4             Adj.R
2 
      
Auto 0.0080 0.7510 0.7335 -0.1870 0.0938 88.09%                                                                          
   (28.81) *** (60.36) *** (37.77) *** (2.50) ** (0.79)   
Banks 0.0012 0.1302 0.1138 -0.9815 -0.7909 5.16% 
 (12.55)
 *** (9.44) *** (9.24) *** (-5.50) *** (-4.55) ***  
Basic  
Resources 0.0093 0.4171 0.5126 -2.8345 -4.1216 27.07% 
 (36.20)
 *** (7.20) *** (20.50) *** (-2.03) ** (-10.56) ***  
Chemicals 0.0097 0.4277 0.5348 -3.3802 -4.019 30.85% 
 (58.94)
 *** (18.96) *** (25.30) *** (-6.18) *** (-11.06) ***  
Construct 0.01015 0.4798 0.5524 -5.0780 -4.3971 27.53% 
 (58.18)
 *** (24.94) *** (26.93) *** (-13.23) *** (-13.01) ***  
Financials 0.0088 0.1788 0.3009 2.4628 -1.4212 39.13% 
 (12.49)
 *** (1.47)  (5.97) *** (1.31) (-2.15) **  
Food & 
Beverage 0.1319 8.5423 12.0109 39.0885 -48.5196 30.42% 
 (14.83)
 *** (6.39) *** (11.49) *** (1.44) (-3.55) ***  
Healthcare 0.0097 0.4880 0.5784 -4.2573 -4.5344 31.46% 
 (57.54)
 *** (21.73) *** (25.68) *** (-8.00) *** (-11.49) ***  
Industrial 
Goods 0.0104 0.4290 0.5670 -3.1695 -4.3713 32.18% 
 (50.50)
 *** (10.32) *** (24.21) *** (-2.70) *** (-10.74) ***  
Media 0.0084 0.3525 0.5167 -1.7706 -24.8581 14.26% 
 (39.38)
 *** (13.78) *** (21.63) *** (-2.70) *** (-15.04) ***  
Oil & Gas 0.0080 0.4915 0.6285 -2.6743 -5.3561 23.75% 
 (23.07)
 *** (5.54) *** (20.38) *** (-1.13)  (-12.18) ***  
Personal& 
Household 0.0098 0.4477 0.5718 -2.5954 -4.2034 30.56% 
 (36.25)
 *** (6.42) *** (8.26) *** (2.21) ** (-1.08)  
Real  
Estate 0.0097 0.4664 0.5985 -2.8520 -4.5888 34.40% 
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 (49.72)
 *** (11.94) *** (24.88) *** (1.16)  (-10.47) ***  
Retail 0.0099 0.4720 0.5644 -4.0478 -4.4697 25.99% 
 (54.16)
 *** (17.56) *** (23.55) ***  (-5.73) *** (-10.48) ***  
Tech 0.0105 0.3311 0.5209 -0.4306 -3.8994 29.06% 
 (78.63)
 *** (26.61) *** (20.44) *** (-4.16) *** (-5.25) ***  
Telecom 0.0065 0.5784 0.5166 -6.2735 -4.9320 13.35% 
 (18.96)
 *** (15.42) *** (14.97) *** (-11.04) *** (-11.08) ***  
Travel & 
Leisure 0.0097 0.3890 0.5002 -2.0428 -4.0372 23.81% 
 (46.48)
 *** (10.34) *** (21.63) *** (-2.16) ** (-10.62) ***  
Utilities 0.0086 0.4618 0.5367 -3.6271 -4.0003 30.05% 
  (44.14) *** (11.29) *** (23.30) *** (-3.36) *** (-10.73) ***   
 
 
                                                               2011  
Industry               α           𝛾1                   𝛾2      𝛾3                𝛾4             Adj.R
2 
      
Auto 0.0096 0.5543 0.7965 2.2434 -2.7013 72.34% 
   (20.92) *** (18.86) *** (15.48) *** (7.15) *** (-3.78) ***  
Banks 0.0028 0.2674 0.2243 -1.7334 -1.6936 20.90% 
 (12.37)
 *** (9.56) *** (9.22) *** (-3.49) *** (-4.79) ***  
Basic  
Resources 0.0093 0.3796 0.4685 -1.4639 -1.3419 44.73% 
 (34.32)
 *** (10.84) *** (13.07) *** (-1.80) * (-2.42) ***  
Chemicals 0.0105 0.3231 0.4964 -1.1643 -2.5683 40.80% 
 (36.62)
 *** (9.00) *** (14.71) *** (-1.35)  (-5.09) ***  
Construct 0.0102 0.3667 0.5384 -2.6458 -3.3320 38.56% 
 (34.28)
 *** (8.98) *** (14.54) *** (-2.62) ** (-5.78) ***  
Financials 0.0085 0.4259 0.5023 -2.7087 -4.1651 25.88% 
 (24.61)
 *** (9.24) *** (12.85) *** (-2.77) *** (-7.23) ***  
Food & 
Beverage 0.0850 4.4233 5.3642 -42.2174 -33.6695 12.21% 
 (18.48)
 *** (5.53) *** (8.19) *** (-2.09) ** (-3.17) ***  
Healthcare 0.0097 0.3385 0.52247 -0.4487 -2.7514 43.25% 
 (34.60)
 *** (9.68) *** (14.59) *** (-0.49)  (-4.77) ***  
Industrial 
Goods 0.0105 0.3395 0.5434 -0.9585 -2.9377 43.80% 
 (50.50)
 *** (10.32) *** (24.21) *** (-2.70) *** (-10.74) ***  
Media 0.0103 0.1173 0.6137 9.4261 -3.9847 55.87% 
 (39.38)
 *** (13.78) *** (21.63) *** (-2.70) *** (-15.04) ***  
Oil & Gas 0.0116 -0.1475 0.4176 14.4318 -2.3895 43.24% 
 (15.37)
 *** (-0.67)  (6.84) *** (2.08) ** (-2.86) ***  
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Personal& 
Household 0.0100 0.3568 0.5440 -0.1965 -2.2140 44.00% 
 (32.95)
 *** (7.04) *** (13.05) *** (-0.12) (-2.98) ***  
Real  
Estate 0.0087 0.4859 0.5828 -3.3201 -3.1772 43.47% 
 (30.03)
 *** (13.48) *** (14.67) *** (-3.77) *** (-5.06) ***  
Retail 0.0090 0.4482 0.6028 -3.0754 -3.9434 37.29% 
 (30.05)
 *** (10.88) *** (12.11) ***  (-2.85) *** (-4.17) ***  
Tech 0.0106 0.3388 0.5372 -1.5487 -2.8418 42.59% 
 (78.63)
 *** (26.61) *** (20.44) *** (-4.16) *** (-5.25) ***  
Telecom 0.0072 0.6376 0.5943 -4.8357 -4.1978 28.20% 
 (15.55)
 *** (12.55) *** (10.72) *** (-5.46) *** (-4.60) ***  
 
Travel & 
Leisure 
0.0086         
(30.70) *** 
0.4495 
(10.37) *** 
0.5470 
(13.90) *** 
-1.9016 
(-1.57) *** 
-2.6209 
(-4.41) *** 40.47% 
Utilities 0.0083 0.3573 0.5341 -1.0097 -3.3795 37.26% 
  (29.13) *** (8.58) *** (14.82) *** (-0.92) (-6.45) ***   
 
 
 
Panel B: Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
                                                               1990  
Industry                           α                       𝛾1                   𝛾2                 𝛾3                     𝛾4                          Adj.R
2 
      
Automobile  0.0103 0.3277 0.3694 -0.1840 -1.3676 29.47%                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 (54.57)
 *** (17.62) *** (12.48) *** (-0.85) (-2.53) **  
Banks 0.0026 0.3462 0.2514 -2.9535 -1.0829 23.57% 
 (22.57)
 *** (19.16) *** (10.24) *** (-9.14) *** (-1.61)   
Basic  
Resources 0.0108 0.1561 0.3618 0.9012 -1.9076 56.46% 
 (40.71)
 *** (5.34) *** (15.55) *** (11.21) *** (-5.45) ***  
Chemicals 0.0107 0.3137 0.4143 0.0808 -2.0042 31.21% 
 (36.62)
 *** (9.00) *** (14.71) *** (-1.35)  (-5.09) ***  
Construction 0.0104 0.3211 0.3655 -0.7558 -1.8329 22.27% 
 (44.42)
 *** (12.43) *** (8.98) *** (-2.98) *** (-2.48) **  
Financials 0.0007 3.2795 -0.5980 12.3721 -46.7060 60.06% 
 (-0.17) (7.91)
 *** (-0.80) (2.26) ** (-3.47) ***  
Food &  
Beverage 0.0171 0.6123 0.5578 2.8701 3.9018 35.86% 
 (47.43)
 *** (13.55) *** (13.15) *** (4.08) *** (5.85) ***  
HealthCare 0.0095 0.3873 0.5051 0.4554 -1.4898 41.44% 
 (34.60)
 *** (9.68) *** (14.59) *** (-0.49)  (-4.77) ***  
Industrial 
Goods 0.1194 0.2012 0.1302 1.8813 3.8649 64.65% 
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 (27.02)
 *** (7.91) *** (1.11)  (17.45) *** (1.83) *  
Insurance 0.0036 0.2463 0.2092 -2.0234 -1.6862 15.39% 
 (24.07)
 *** (13.21) *** (11.26) *** (-6.60) *** (-5.35) ***  
Media 0.0093 0.2867 0.2731 -1.7939 -1.8114 10.39% 
 (38.51)
 *** (11.06) *** (8.35) *** (-5.37) *** (-3.81) ***  
Oil & Gas 0.0078 0.2562 0.3735 -2.1519 -3.5097 6.44% 
 (15.37)
 *** (-0.67)  (6.84) *** (2.08) ** (-2.86) ***  
Personal& Household 0.0105      0.3349      0.4514      0.2637      -1.9965         35.70% 
 (53.16)
 *** (15.83) *** (12.89) *** (0.81) (-3.05) ***  
Real Estate 0.0109 0.2400 0.2534 0.0950 0.0109 39.21% 
 (21.12)
 *** (6.24) *** (2.23) ** (3.15) *** (0.05)  
Retail 0.0093 0.2779 0.3755 -0.9028 -2.2688 22.48% 
 (57.73)
 *** (15.72) *** (15.10) ***  (-6.93) *** (-5.46) ***  
Technology 0.0108 0.2188 0.2816 -0.5909 -1.1559 13.03% 
 (51.23)
 *** (9.74) *** (13.94) *** (-6.33) *** (-6.37) ***  
Telecom 0.0030 0.2991 0.2299 -1.8111 -1.0047 9.30% 
 (9.28)
 *** (10.27) *** (3.65) *** (-5.26) *** (-0.94)   
Travel &  
Leisure 0.0086 0.5128 0.5931 -0.5162 -2.8883 41.03% 
 (44.64)
 *** (21.81) *** (22.39) *** (-1.39) (-5.18) ***  
Utilities 0.0104 0.2644 0.1341 -0.5625 1.9543 25.93% 
  (23.19) *** (10.34) *** (1.26) (-3.14) *** (1.11)   
 
                                                               1996  
Industry                           α                       𝛾1                   𝛾2                 𝛾3                     𝛾4                          Adj.R
2 
      
Automobile  0.00098 0.4453 0.5020 -4.2393 -3.6018 27.82% 
 (58.47)
 *** (19.70) *** (24.82) *** (-7.80) *** (-10.18) ***  
Banks 0.0026 0.3462 0.2514 -2.9535 -1.0829 23.57% 
 (22.57)
 *** (19.16) *** (10.24) *** (-9.14) *** (-1.61)   
Basic  
Resources 0.0097 0.4705 0.5462 -3.5121 -4.3204 28.36% 
 (53.34)
 *** (15.46) *** (-4.70) *** (-4.70) *** (-12.90) ***  
Chemicals 0.0100 0.4646 0.5313 -4.6456 -3.7542 31.74% 
 (61.76)
 *** (22.37) *** (27.27) *** (-9.74) *** (-11.23) ***  
Construction 0.0095 0.5194 0.5397 -4.8213 -3.8220 29.41% 
 (54.27)
 *** (20.74) *** (27.34) *** (-8.94) *** (-12.31) ***  
Financials 0.0112 1.7644 -1.6843 12.3849 -4.0565 79.73% 
 (10.61) (8.60)
 *** (-8.80)  (2.98) ** (-0.95)   
Food &  
Beverage 0.0169 0.5592 0.4380 2.5302 5.5681 36.39% 
 (52.44)
 *** (9.41) *** (10.16) *** (1.60) (6.34) ***  
HealthCare 0.0095 0.4435 0.5489 -2.9687 -3.6929 33.81% 
 (48.79)
 *** (10.62) *** (26.03) *** (-2.68) *** (-11.86) ***  
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Industrial 
Goods 0.0101 0.4799 0.5534 -4.6296 -4.1607 31.97% 
 (63.01)
 *** (7.91) *** (1.11)  (17.45) *** (1.83) **  
Insurance 0.0036 0.2463 0.2092 -2.0234 -1.6862 15.39% 
 (24.07)
 *** (21.19) *** (29.74) *** (-8.53) *** (-13.90) ***  
Media 0.0083 0.5031 0.4984 -4.7866 -4.2104 19.96% 
 (41.27)
 *** (17.30) *** (20.42) *** (-7.29) *** (-10.98) ***  
Oil & Gas 0.0078 0.2562 0.3735 -2.1519 -3.5097 6.44% 
 (15.37)
 *** (-0.67)  (6.84) *** (2.08) ** (-2.86) ***  
Personal&  
Household 0.0098     0.5087    0.5598      -4.7750      -4.1340         31.25% 
 (53.16)
 *** (15.83) *** (12.89) *** (0.81) (-3.05) ***  
Real Estate 0.0097 0.4813 0.5441 -4.7516 -3.9317 33.78% 
 (59.30)
 *** (22.07) *** (26.58) *** (-9.12) *** (-10.55) ***  
Retail 0.0094 0.4429 0.5082 -4.1609 -3.9411 29.26% 
 (62.29)
 *** (22.69) *** (27.66) *** (-10.02) *** (-12.85) ***  
Technology 0.0099 0.5096 0.5577 -4.6884 -4.2130 29.65% 
 (52.52)
 *** (16.28) *** (28.36) *** (-6.11) *** (-15.28) ***  
Telecom 0.0024 0.5339 0.3057 -5.2981 -1.2208 13.97% 
 (4.68)
 *** (13.66) *** (2.96) *** (-13.02) *** (-0.68)  
Travel &  
Leisure 0.0082 0.6777 0.6987 -7.0336 -6.0457 34.36% 
 (51.74)
 *** (31.95) *** (34.40) *** (-15.61) *** (-18.75) ***  
Utilities 0.0087 0.4763 0.4999 -4.3583 -3.5745 30.04% 
  (59.44) *** (21.94) *** (27.30) *** (-8.99) *** (-11.57) ***   
 
                                                                                  2011  
Industry                                α                𝛾1                   𝛾2                 𝛾3                     𝛾4                                    Adj.R
2 
      
Automobile                    0.0099 0.3291 0.4632                         -1.3323 -2.3337 35.04% 
 (38.06)
 *** (9.39) *** (15.40) *** (-1.70) * (-5.00) ***  
Banks 0.0030 0.3217 0.2800 -1.9882 -1.9133 32.86% 
 (22.57)
 *** (19.16) *** (10.24) *** (-9.14) *** (-1.61)   
Basic  
Resources 0.0089 -0.3423 0.4613 -0.7396 -2.2189 40.36% 
 (33.75)
 *** (9.42) *** (14.77) *** (-0.82)  (-4.83) ***  
Chemicals 0.0101 0.3152 0.4969 -1.3958 -2.8545 40.81% 
 (36.63)
 *** (8.93) *** (16.56) *** (-1.57)  (-6.42) ***  
Construction 0.0091 0.3959 0.4898 -2.4220 -2.7996 36.48% 
 (31.88)
 *** (10.96) *** (14.01) *** (-3.23) *** (-5.42) ***  
Financials 0.0074 0.9930 -0.7977 5.5323 -1.3246 93.90% 
 (9.03)
 *** (4.91) *** (-13.52) *** (1.38) (-1.98) **  
Food &  
Beverage 0.0152 0.4995 0.4490 5.3779 5.5255 39.84% 
 (27.01)
 *** (4.86) *** (5.13) *** (1.67) * (2.82) ***  
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HealthCare 0.0090 0.3553 0.5439 -0.9208 -3.2483 43.38% 
 (36.36)
 *** (10.27) *** (15.76) *** (-1.00)  (-6.14) ***  
Industrial 
Goods 0.0101 0.4799 0.5534 -4.6296 -4.1607 31.97% 
 (63.01)
 *** (21.19) *** (29.74) *** (-8.53) *** (-13.09) ***  
Insurance 0.0034 0.2252 0.2063 -1.2658 -0.8608 23.74% 
 (19.49)
 *** (9.26) *** (7.07) *** (-2.82) ***  (-1.24)   
Media 0.0070 0.4534 0.4718 -3.9146 -3.9069 27.99% 
 (24.32)
 *** (13.41) *** (14.65) *** (-5.94) *** (-8.59) ***  
Oil & Gas 0.0093 0.0166 0.4773 10.6467 -2.7210 53.03% 
 (23.50)
 *** (0.21)  (9.83) *** (4.71) *** (-2.96) ***  
Personal&  
Household 0.0104     0.2825  0.4893    -0.4234      -2.4467         38.79% 
 (35.96)
 *** (7.75) *** (14.44) *** (-0.49) (-5.25) ***  
Real Estate 0.0091 0.3946 0.5431 -2.0260 -3.1313 42.91% 
 (32.99)
 *** (10.55) *** (15.58) *** (-2.05) ** (-5.88) ***  
Retail 0.0087 0.3639 0.5113 -2.0260 -3.1313 40.57% 
 (33.61)
 *** (9.79) *** (14.99) *** (-1.53)  (-5.75) ***  
Technology 0.0097 0.4169 0.5141 -2.5087 -2.9087 39.82% 
 (32.21)
 *** (11.60) *** (15.40) *** (-3.23) *** (-6.40) ***  
Telecom 0.0022 0.8387 0.7598 -7.8425 -6.6233 30.72% 
 (6.58)
 *** (16.06) *** (15.99) *** (-11.01) *** (-12.40) ***  
Travel &  
Leisure 0.0074 0.4732 0.5639 -1.4133 -2.8631 42.57% 
 (27.97)
 *** (11.16) *** (13.14) *** (-1.30) (-3.65) ***  
Utilities 0.0081 0.3601 0.4893 -1.7958 -32.3289 43.11% 
  (35.42) *** (11.37) *** (14.92) *** (-2.74) *** (-4.97) ***   
 
Note: Table 5.5 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝑢𝑝|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑝)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝑢𝑝(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝛾4  (1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑝)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
Dup is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for days with positive sector returns and a value of 0 
otherwise, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the average value of sector returns for each sector, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the cross-sectional 
absolute deviation of returns for the sectors, α is the constant, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 are coefficients and 𝜀𝑡is 
the error term at time t.  . The 1990 sample period covers 01/01/1990 to 18/10/2016, the 1996 sample 
period covers 01/01/1996 to 18/10/2016 and the 2011 sample period covers 01/01/2011 to 
18/10/2016.The sub sample periods were split based on the percentage annual increase of the number 
of firms. T-test statistics based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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5.5.3.2 The effect of volatility on herding 
 
In this section, we investigate the relationship between herding and volatility. Specifically, 
we test for possible asymmetries in herd behaviour tendencies when the market is 
characterised by high (low) return volatility. A dummy variable as specified in Eqn. (4) was 
used to capture the differences in the CSADs 𝛾3  and 𝛾4  represents coefficients for rising 
and declining volatility conditions respectively. Results for the markets are analysed in the 
first section, which is followed by an analysis of industry results.  
 
5.5.3.2.1 Results for the aggregate market 
 
To test whether herding varies with market volatility, we define volatility as high (low) when 
the observed volatility exceeds (is below) the previous 30-day average. The effect of 
volatility is examined using the specifications in Eqn. (4) for the SZSE and SHSE for the 
full sample and two sub-periods, the regression estimates are presented in Table 5.6. Panel 
A reports the results for the SZSE, the  𝛾3  coefficient for herding when market volatility is 
high is only negative and statistically significant in 1996 sub-period, indicating that during 
this period, investors have a strong tendency to mimic the trades of other investors. However, 
this herd behaviour diminished in the 2011 sub-period, consistent with the predictions of 
rational asset pricing models. The estimated 𝛾4  for low volatility is negative and statistically 
significant for the whole sample and 1996 sub-period, suggesting that investors herd during 
these periods. However, in the 2011 sub-period, the negative coefficient 𝛾4 is statistically 
insignificant, indicating the absence of herd behaviour. This result implies that, there is no 
nonlinear relationship between market returns and CSAD. In addition, the observed herding 
trend demonstrates the time-varying characteristic of herd behaviour.  
Panel B reports the regression results for the SHSE. The result shows that estimates for the   
𝛾3  coefficient is negative and statistically significant for the full sample and 1996 sub-
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period, indicating that investors herd during periods of high return volatility. However, this 
herding diminishes in 2011, the negative coefficient 𝛾3   is statistically insignificant. When 
we consider the results for low volatility, we find that the coefficient 𝛾4 is negative and 
statistically significant for the 1996 and 2011 sub-periods. This result shows evidence 
consistent with herding during these periods.  
From the results for both markets, we observe that in general, herd behaviour is asymmetric 
with respect to market volatility and more prevalent when the return volatility is low. 
Therefore, our findings are consistent with H2b which predicts that herding is contingent 
upon volatility in Chinese markets. Regarding the adjusted R squared, the explanatory power 
of the CSAD is stronger for SHSE than SZSE, because on average the SZSE has higher R 
squared values. 
 Our results are inconsistent with the literature which suggests that investors are more likely 
to herd during periods of low volatility (market stress). Specifically, our results contradict 
earlier findings of Tan, et al., (2008), who provide evidence that investors in the Chinese 
markets only herd in periods of high return volatility. The difference may be due to the data, 
as they only examine herding in dual-listed Chinese stocks. Our results are also contrary to 
those from other Asian markets. Lam and Qiao (2015) do not find evidence of herding in the 
Hong Kong markets in either high or low volatility conditions. Also, results are also 
consistent with those of Javaira and Hassan (2011), only find herding when market volatility 
is high in the Pakistani market.  
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Table 5.6 Estimates of herding during periods of high and low volatility in Chinese 
stock markets 
Panel A: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Table 5.6 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ |𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝛾4  (1 −
𝐷𝜎
2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where Dσ2-High is 1 for days with high market volatility and 0 otherwise, based on the previous 30-
day moving average. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market’s average return, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute 
deviation of returns for the market, α is the constant, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 are coefficients and εt is the error 
term at time t. The 1990 sample period covers 01/01/1990 to 18/10/2016, the 1990 sample period 
Year    1990                         1996  2011 
  α                  0.0093               0.0088                     0.0096    
                      (50.03) ***       (40.97)  ***              (25.83) *** 
 𝛾1                 0.3650               0.4840                      0.3536     
                     (29.54) ***          (20.80)***               (10.14) ***  
 𝛾2                0.7378              0.9804                    0.7003       
                     (18.83) ***        (20.34)***                   (8.66) *** 
 𝛾3                -0.1868            -2.9327                     0.1211       
                     (-1.30)             (-6.29)***                   (0.18)  
𝛾4                 -8.1337            -16.9460                     -2.2914       
                     (-5.33) ***           (-7.41)***                   (-0.60) 
Adj. R2           43.62%         37.14%                      47.55% 
Year    1990                         1996  2011 
  α                  0.0118                0.0091                      0.0088      
                      (22.50) ***           (45.06)  ***              (26.69) *** 
 𝛾1                 0.2006               0.4637                     0.3534      
                     (11.81) ***           (26.00)***               (11.93) ***  
 𝛾2                0.3400                0.9569                     0.7096       
                     (1.66) ***              (19.42)***               (10.44) **  
 𝛾3                -0.2830              -2.8179                     -0.4179       
                     (-8.52) ***              (-8.95)***                (-0.81)   
𝛾4                 5.7024              -17.0337                     -5.7021       
                     ( 0.61)                 (-7.30)***                  (-1.90) *  
Adj. R2        12.31%                36.59%                     45.11% 
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covers 01/01/1996 to 18/10/2016 and the 2011 sample period covers 01/01/2011 to 18/10/2016.The 
sub sample periods was split based on the percentage annual increase of the number of firms.  The 
equation is estimated over the whole sample period. T-test statistics based on Newey-West 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
5.5.3.2.2 Results for industry sectors 
 
Table 5.7 provides the regression results for industry herd behaviour during periods of high 
and low return volatility obtained by estimating Eqn. (4). The results for the SZSE are 
presented in Panel A. When we examine the full sample, the industry results show that 
herding is prevalent during periods of high volatility which is contrary to the evidence of no 
herding observed for the aggregate market. The 𝛾3 coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant for all the sectors except Chemicals, Financials, Food and Beverage, Health Care, 
Industrial Goods, Personal and Household, Real Estate, and Travel and Leisure. For the 1996 
sub-period, the evidence indicates that the level of herding increases, the  𝛾3 coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant in most sectors except Automobile, Financials, Food 
and Beverage and Technology. During this period, these investors may have been driven to 
herd due to the high flow of information caused by stock volatility making it difficult to 
obtain reliable information. We obtain interesting results for the 2011 sub-period.  The 𝛾3 
coefficient is negative and significant in all industries except Automobile, Chemicals, 
Construction, Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Media, Oil and Gas, and Technology, which 
indicates the presence of herding.  
We observe much stronger levels of herd behaviour during periods of low volatility, for the 
full sample, all the industries yield negative and significant 𝛾4 coefficients. Therefore, there 
is strong evidence that during this period, investors have a stronger tendency to herd towards 
the industry consensus when volatility is low. Specifically, for the 1996 sub-sample, we find 
evidence of herd formation in all sectors except Automobile and Telecommunications, the 
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regression result yields mostly negative and statistically significant 𝛾4 coefficients. Our 
findings are like those we obtained for the aggregate market (herding behaviour in both high 
and low volatility). However, for the 2011 sub-period in low volatility states, we only report 
negative and statistically significant 𝛾4 coefficients in the Automobile, Banks, Financials, 
Telecommunication and Utilities sectors. The absence of industry herding in low volatility 
is consistent with the results reported for low volatility for the 2011 sub-period in Table 5.6. 
The results across the sub-periods indicate that herding gradually decreases over time, 
especially during low volatility. Therefore, reducing herding when volatility is low. It is 
interesting to note that, herding occurs in the Banks and Utilities sectors across all sub-
periods. This reduction may be due to the uncertainty created by the regular government 
reforms and deregulation in these sectors (Bosworth and Collins, 2008).  
Focusing on the SHSE results in Panel B, we observe a herding trend like that of the SZSE. 
We find that for the full sample, the 𝛾3 coefficient is negative and significant in all sectors 
except Automobile, Chemicals, Healthcare, Personal and Household, Oil and Gas, and 
Utilities. The results suggest that industry herding is prevalent in high volatility. For the 1996 
sub-period, we observe that the 𝛾3 coefficient is negative and significant in all industries 
except Financials, Insurance, Industrial Goods and Oil & Gas. The results for the 2011 sub-
period show herd formation, the 𝛾3 coefficient is negative and significant in half of the 
sectors, indicating that the evidence of herding in high volatility is mixed. However, herd 
formation is stronger in low volatility, for the full sample, the  𝛾4  coefficient is negative and 
significant in all sector except Basic Resources and Technology. For the 1996 sub-period, 
we report that herding is stronger during low volatility, the 𝛾4 coefficient is negative and 
significant in all industries except Financials and Telecommunications. Similarly, for the 
2011 sub-period we obtained mixed evidence of herding in low volatility states, 𝛾4 
coefficient is negative and significant in more than half of the sectors. The overall results for 
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the SHSE is consistent with most of the results for the aggregate market in Table 5.6, except 
for the 2011 sub-period where herding does not exist during high volatility at the aggregate 
market, which may explain the mixed evidence of industry herding.  
In summary, the results for industry herding in high and low volatility states is similar for 
both stock exchanges. We report herding in both high and low volatility states. However, 
the evidence shows that herding is stronger when volatility is low. Our results are consistent 
with the predictions of hypothesis H2b; there is strong evidence that herding is contingent 
upon volatility. Also, our results are inconsistent with the predicted increased dispersion 
during periods of market stress of rational asset pricing models. Our findings support the 
theory of intentional herding, where due to uncertainty higher herding is expected in stocks 
during periods of high volatility. The herding we observe can be explained from an 
informational cascade context. Investors are likely to herd during periods of high volatility 
due to the uncertainty marked by less accurate public information. This uncertainty can lead 
to a faster cascade formation, thus increasing investors’ tendency to herd when volatility is 
high. However, this cascade can dissolve when investors react to unexpected public 
information. Due to lack of empirical evidence on the industry herding (to the best of our 
knowledge) conditioned upon volatility, our results are compared to the results of research 
on industry herding in Hong Kong. Our results support those of Lam and Qiao (2015) who 
report similar results: industry herding exists in both high and low volatility periods in the 
Hong Kong market. 
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Table 5.7 Estimates of industry herding during periods of high and low volatility in 
Chinese Industries 
Panel A: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
 
                                                               1990  
Industry               α           𝛾1                   𝛾2      𝛾3                𝛾4             Adj.R
2 
      
Auto 
0.0077 0.8046 0.7072 -0.2110 -0.4244 91.89 % 
   
(19.81) *** (67.69) *** (32.03) *** (-6.95) *** (-2.84) *** 
 
Banks 
0.0008 0.0931 0.1799 -0.5817 -3.7729 4.49 % 
 
(11.69) *** (12.25) *** (13.26) *** (-9.89) *** (-9.41) *** 
 
Basic  
Resources 
0.0088 0.2896 0.6416 -1.1360 -9.6932 19.47 % 
 
(45.19) *** (18.32) *** (16.73) *** (-6.80) *** (-7.38) *** 
 
Chemicals 
0.0094 0.2682 0.5978 -0.6445 -10.5693 18.68 % 
 
(47.30) *** (15.19) *** (16.27) *** (-1.26)  (-8.34) *** 
 
Construct 
0.0091 0.3343 0.6986 -0.2438 -9.3990 30.93 %  
 
(46.18) *** (26.64) *** (18.53) *** (-1.67) * (-6.51) *** 
 
Financials 
0.0084 0.1434 0.3832 1.2731 -5.1749 23.64 % 
 
(14.99) *** (1.74) * (5.81) *** (1.12) (-3.29) *** 
 
Food & 
Beverage 
0.0873 9.5660 18.8345 0.7149 -113.822 32.36 % 
 
(9.47) *** (9.84) *** (10.22) *** (0.05) (-1.72) * 
 
Healthcare 
0.0090 0.3044 0.6875 -0.9404 -15.1337 16.54 % 
 
(26.22) *** (5.92) *** (11.88) *** (-1.21)  (-7.60) *** 
 
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0090 0.3769 0.7726 -0.0312 -9.4211 37.66 % 
 
(42.84) *** (20.02) *** (18.22) *** (-0.11)  (-5.79) *** 
 
Media 
0.0086 0.2462 0.3571 -1.2628 -28.8070 7.90 % 
 
(28.62) *** (9.32) *** (7.82) *** (-4.33) *** (-7.30) *** 
 
Oil & Gas 
0.0073 0.4329 0.7402 -2.5046 -15.0016 16.99 % 
 
(27.51) *** (14.98) *** (18.00) *** (-6.13) *** (-12.10) *** 
 
Personal& 
Household 
0.0089 0.3477 0.7581 21.5158 -7.8274 36.80 % 
 
(32.51) *** (6.48) *** (15.72) *** (1.37) (-4.44) *** 
 
Real  
Estate 
0.0087 0.3832 0.6756 -0.3555 -5.9590 40.93 % 
 
(45.87) *** (23.19) *** (19.29) *** (-1.40) (-4.73) *** 
 
Retail 
0.0094 0.2922 0.6581 -0.5082 -10.9616 20.05 % 
 
(38.43) *** (12.83) *** (13.16) ***  (-1.70) * (-6.22) *** 
 
Tech 
0.0100 0.2768 0.4752 -0.9213 -5.3670 16.33 % 
 
(41.92) *** (15.66) *** (11.58) *** (-4.81) *** (-4.29) *** 
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Telecom 
0.0056 0.6065 0.8418 -5.9983 -17.9231 14.86 % 
 
(13.50) *** (19.75) *** (11.01) *** (-15.18) *** (-6.79) *** 
 
Travel & 
Leisure 
0.0093 0.2321 0.4616 -0.6225 -7.9631 10.46 % 
 
(40.03) *** (8.85) *** (9.75) *** (-1.37) (-4.89) *** 
 
Utilities 
0.0082 0.3333 0.6460 -0.9389 -8.3897 26.93 % 
  
(45.68) *** (20.96) *** (17.35) *** (-4.44) *** (-6.06) ***   
 
                                                               1996  
Industry               α           𝛾1                   𝛾2                   𝛾3                       𝛾4             Adj.R
2 
      
Auto 
0.0085 0.7501 0.72760 0.1139 -0.3843 87.86 %               
   
(26.39) *** (56.50) *** (23.23) *** (1.55)  (-0.72)  
Banks 
0.0009 0.1275 0.2152 -0.9036 -3.8899 5.85 % 
 
(9.32) *** (11.15) *** (11.30) *** (-6.63) *** (-5.78) ***  
Basic  
Resources 
0.0080 0.4401 0.8506 -2.8346 -12.9423 30.15 % 
 
(31.38) *** (11.19) *** (15.72) *** (-3.86) *** (-5.78) ***  
Chemicals 
0.0084 0.4413 0.8550 -2.6261 -12.3442 33.72 % 
 
(40.77) *** (22.38) *** (18.13) *** (-7.36) *** (-5.88) ***  
Construct 
0.0087 0.4760 0.9508 -3.3461 -17.2895 29.36 % 
 
(39.05) *** (24.36) *** (19.01) *** (-10.03) *** (-7.62) ***  
Financials 
0.0084 0.1273 0.4659 2.2513 -6.7529 34.85 % 
 
(10.29) *** (1.07)  (4.67) *** (1.35) (-3.07) ***  
Food & 
Beverage 
0.0863 9.3945 18.9737 20.0451 -117.1859 32.52 % 
 
(9.39) *** (19.93) *** (10.46) *** (1.61) (-1.80) *  
Healthcare 
0.0084 0.4921 0.9051 -3.2217 -14.1381 33.35 % 
 
(38.46) *** (21.56) *** (16.62) *** (-7.64) *** (-5.37) ***  
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0089 0.4704 0.9409 -2.7841 -16.0885 34.50 % 
 
(41.09) *** (18.34) *** (21.09) *** (-5.27) *** (-8.12) ***  
Media 
0.0077 0.4098 0.7489 -2.3685 -16.8546 15.56 % 
 
(25.09) *** (9.30) *** (15.88) *** (-2.93) *** (-11.70) ***  
Oil & Gas 
0.0070 0.5579 0.8524 -3.8856 -12.5345 23.80 % 
 
(23.66) *** (10.70) *** (14.53) *** (-3.54) *** (-5.27) ***  
Personal& 
Household 
0.0086 0.4854 0.8708 -2.6571 -12.5861 32.21 % 
 
(40.88) *** (16.66) *** (21.29) *** (-4.10) *** (-7.16) ***  
Real  
Estate 
0.0083 0.5116 0.9077 -3.0446 -13.2632 36.19 % 
 
(37.17) *** (19.91) *** (17.22) *** (-5.50) *** (-5.36) ***  
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Retail 
0.0084 0.4662 0.9185 -0.9578 -13.4106 28.74 % 
 
(40.31) *** (20.04) *** (21.32) ***  (-6.61) *** (-6.95) ***  
Tech 
0.0089 0.3955 0.8280 -1.4447 -11.3371 16.33 % 
 
(28.14) *** (7.25) *** (14.90) *** (-1.36)  (-5.30) ***  
Telecom 
0.0074 0.7800 0.6880 -6.2123 -0.3622 38.83 % 
 
(10.88) *** (13.24) *** (13.18) *** (-6.62) *** (-0.43)   
Travel & 
Leisure 
0.0081 0.4399 0.9124 -2.6245 -15.8640 26.68 % 
 
(34.08) *** (15.02) *** (18.85) *** (-4.63) *** (-7.75) ***  
Utilities 
0.0072 0.4795 0.9472 -3.0342 -17.6026 32.44 % 
  
(34.57) *** (20.00) *** (17.76) *** (-6.75) *** (-7.32) ***   
 
                                                               2011  
Industry               α           𝛾1                   𝛾2                  𝛾3                      𝛾4             Adj.R
2 
      
Auto 
0.0091 0.7199 0.8308 -0.7589 -5.8615 68.33 
   
(17.01) *** (15.85) *** (11.83) *** (-1.24) (-3.14) ***  
Banks 
0.0017 0.2634 0.3567 -1.8489 -6.1903 20.57 
 
(9.03) *** (11.11) *** (6.73) *** (-5.20) *** (-2.33) **  
Basic  
Resources 
0.0087 0.3051 0.5400 1.0674 2.8676 48.82 
 
(25.58) *** (10.26) *** (7.08) *** (7.08) *** (0.80)   
Chemicals 
0.0097 0.2985 0.5685 0.2835 0.7211 44.73 
 
(27.32) *** (10.00) *** (7.87) *** (0.55)  (0.23)   
Construct 
0.0094 0.3428 0.7031 -0.4882 -3.4683 41.88 
 
(24.10) *** (10.13) *** (7.97) *** (-0.79)  (-0.82)   
Financials 
0.0074 -1.1061 -1.8538 17.1084 27.9586 6.40 
 
(18.69) *** (-2.94) *** (-4.35) *** (2.28) ** (2.94) ***  
Food & 
Beverage 
0.0787 3.2749 5.5748 -12.0189 -48.8180 16.04 
 
(17.40) *** (8.66) *** (6.34) *** (-2.03) ** (-1.38)   
Healthcare 
0.0089 0.3639 0.6027 -0.3650 0.4512 46.18 
 
(24.84) *** (7.93) *** (7.93)*** (-0.60)  (0.13)   
Industrial 
Goods 
0.095 0.3475 0.6788 0.0519 -2.2327 46.79 
 
(25.49) *** (9.73) ***  (9.37) *** (0.07)  (-0.70)   
Media 
0.0097 0.1860 0.5633 5.4837 2.9126 47.87 
 
(10.89) *** (0.98)  (3.40) *** (1.33) (0.45)  
Oil & Gas 
0.0098 0.2026 0.5570 2.9050 -2.7633 31.39 
 
(13.17) *** (1.10) (4.53) *** (0.69) (-0.64)   
Personal& 
Household 
0.0091 0.3299   0.6541     1.4102      2.5222 48.86 
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(24.92) *** (8.40) *** (8.16) *** (1.65) * (0.67)  
Real  
Estate 
0.0080 0.4323 0.6785 -1.0792 -0.0295 46.51 
 
(21.79) *** (13.10) *** (8.56) *** (-1.77) * (-0.01)  
Retail 
0.0082 0.4519 0.7411 -1.7852 -4.2440 38.97 
 
(22.04) *** (9.38) *** (9.11) *** (-1.76) * (-1.15)  
Tech 
0.0094 0.3808 0.7304 -0.3531 -4.3841 45.56 
 
(22.60) *** (11.39) *** (9.87) *** (-0.60)  (-1.45)  
Telecom 
0.0064 0.5751 0.7584 -3.6610 -5.5328 29.09 
 
(12.07) *** (10.91) *** (89.24) *** (-4.14) *** (-2.06) **  
 
Travel & 
Leisure 
0.0067 0.4791 0.7282 -1.4243 -3.5840 44.55 
Utilities 
(20.38) *** (11.86) *** (8.25) *** (-1.77) * (-0.86)  
  
0.0074 0.4291 0.7089 -1.8213 -7.3524 37.55 
 
Panel B: Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
                                                                               1990  
Industry                           α                       𝛾1                   𝛾2                 𝛾3                     𝛾4                          Adj.R
2 
      
Automobile  
0.0092 0.3260 0.6316 -0.2749 -6.4432 31.09 % 
 
(46.00) *** (22.61) *** (14.64) *** (-1.46)  (-3.79) ***  
Banks 
0.0022 0.2887 0.4225 -1.7421 -5.5991 23.38 % 
 
(18.01) *** (14.36) *** (13.51) *** (-3.93) *** (-3.81) ***  
Basic  
Resources 
0.0102 0.1475 0.4570 0.9046 -2.1531 56.45 % 
 
(27.80) *** (6.91) *** (5.09) *** (10.38) *** (-0.75)   
Chemicals 
0.0095 0.3202 0.6763 -0.1999 -6.7507 32.28 % 
 
(38.57) *** (15.36) *** (10.58) *** (-0.60)  (-2.59) ***  
Construction 
0.0094 0.3265 0.6354 -0.8231 -8.7026 23.49 % 
 
(37.64) *** (13.06) *** (12.99) *** (-2.46) ** (-4.89) ***  
Financials 
0.0181 -1.2557 -0.8420 19.8339 10.8911 6.05 % 
 
(5.63) *** (-3.52) *** (-1.18)  (3.07) ** (0.41) ***  
Food &  
Beverage 
0.0168 0.5773 0.5904 3.2505 8.5224 36.18 % 
 
(38.99) *** (12.47) *** (6.35) *** (4.47) *** (2.42) **  
HealthCare 
0.0084 0.3961 0.7129 0.3034 -3.7108 42.89 % 
 
(40.66) *** (16.69) *** (15.10) *** (0.83) (-2.02) **  
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0097 0.2495 0.6511 1.8823 -4.9624 65.10 % 
 
(3.68) *** (12.04) ***  (13.08) *** (22.72) *** (-2.99) ***  
Insurance 
0.0031 0.2187 0.3597 -1.6051 -5.2800 15.95 % 
 
(17.30) *** (12.82) *** (9.39) *** (-6.04) *** (-3.44) ***  
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Media 
0.0084 0.3081 0.4919 -1.8486 -8.1989 12.57 % 
 
(35.79) *** (13.52) *** (14.84) *** (-6.58) *** (-11.53) ***  
Oil & Gas 
0.0068 0.3760 0.6194 -3.2844 -16.2173 8.48 % 
 
(12.09) *** (3.22) ** (8.01) *** (-1.62)  (-8.89) ***  
Personal& Household 
0.0092 0.3347 0.7293     0.1298      -6.9144 37.82 % 
 
(45.83) *** (17.21) *** (16.41) *** (0.42) (-3.87) ***  
Real Estate 
0.0098 0.2518 0.4706 0.0856 -3.1825 40.20 % 
 
(22.55) *** (8.07) *** (7.29) *** (3.81) *** (-1.86) *  
Retail 
0.0085 0.2893 0.5721 -0.9553 -6.7711 23.87 % 
 
(41.00) *** (18.19) *** (11.34) *** (-6.92) *** (-4.14) ***  
Technology 
0.0106 0.2184 0.3190 -0.6609 -0.3450 13.24 % 
 
(30.03) *** (11.59) *** (3.62) *** (3.75) *** (-0.14)   
Telecom 
0.0028 0.2901 0.3234 -1.6626 -3.8657 9.26 % 
 
(14.30) *** (11.18) *** (10.31) *** (-4.50) *** (-4.11) ***  
Travel &  
Leisure 
0.0075 0.4996 0.8429 -0.6868 -8.2335 41.38 % 
 
(36.60) *** (24.59) *** (20.91) *** (-2.07) ** (-5.77) ***  
Utilities 
0.0087 0.2732 0.5981 -0.1371 -7.5757 25.84 % 
  
(25.04) *** (5.99) *** (8.45) *** (-0.21) (-3.20) ***   
 
                                                               1996  
Industry                           α                       𝛾1                   𝛾2                 𝛾3                     𝛾4                          Adj.R
2 
      
Automobile  
0.0082 0.4471 0.9495 -2.7861 -18.4705 30.50 % 
 
(38.43) *** (23.50) *** (16.99) *** (-8.11) *** (-6.80) ***  
Banks 
0.0027 0.1817 0.3408 0.7137 -3.0650 22.32 % 
 
(17.50) *** (14.32) *** (9.82) *** (2.76) *** (-2.00) **   
Basic  
Resources 
0.0083 0.4876 0.9172 -3.1975 -15.2593 30.91 % 
 
(39.89) *** (22.61) *** (20.38) *** (-8.29) *** (-8.15) ***  
Chemicals 
0.0086 0.4460 0.9364 -2.6016 -16.0543 34.39 % 
 
(40.01) *** (22.86) *** (17.24) *** (-7.44) *** (-6.36) ***  
Construction 
0.0081 0.5062 0.0968 -3.3219 -16.9756 31.58 % 
 
(37.16) *** (26.82) *** (18.66) *** (-11.05) *** (-7.12) ***  
Financials 
0.0123 -0.4524 0.2001 11.9779 8.1574 3.49 % 
 
(4.21) *** (-0.81) (0.35)  (1.20) (0.37)  
Food &  
Beverage 
0.0168 0.4526 0.5171 5.0359 6.3763 36.35 % 
 
(46.06) *** (10.53) *** (6.27) *** (5.71) *** (1.85) *  
HealthCare 
0.0080 0.4665 0.9418 -2.4184 -15.6318 36.66 % 
 
(47.78) *** (32.37) *** (25.77) *** (-10.69) *** (-10.26) ***  
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0087 0.4792 0.9479 -3.1301 16.7351 34.22 % 
 196 | P a g e  
 
 
(39.92) *** (25.98) *** (16.42) *** (-9.99) *** (-5.98) ***  
Insurance 
0.0037 0.1094 0.2756 0.3479 -3.1072 14.13 % 
 
(19.86) *** (11.97) *** (7.19) *** (1.11)  (-2.05) **  
Media 
0.0075 0.4801 0.7208 -3.8993 -9.2538 21.00 % 
 
(32.99) *** (22.93) *** (16.02) *** (-11.09) *** (-5.33) ***  
Oil & Gas 
0.0083 0.1461 0.4339 -0.2052 -12.2678 5.53 % 
 
(22.71) *** (5.35) *** (8.13) *** (-0.77) (-9.51) ***  
Personal& Household 
0.0084 0.4844  0.9557      -3.0399      -15.5948 34.00 % 
 
(42.44) *** (26.92) *** (20.21) *** (-10.19) *** (-7.09) ***  
Real Estate 
0.0084 0.34667 0.8886 -2.9076 -14.4848 35.53 % 
 
(42.40) *** (24.28) *** (21.70) *** (-7.96) *** (-8.34) ***  
Retail 
0.0082 0.4386 0.8523 -2.9615 -14.1212 31.92 % 
 
(43.61) *** (25.22) *** (19.62) *** (-10.11) *** (-7.28) ***  
Technology 
0.0086 0.4952 0.8899 -3.3181 -13.4856 32.00 % 
 
(40.60) *** (26.19) *** (19.41) *** (-10.61) *** (-6.54) ***  
Telecom 
0.0029 0.3917 0.3214 -2.8656 -0.5610 12.10 % 
 
(5.29) *** (3.83) *** (3.95) *** (-1.80) * (-0.22)  
Travel &  
Leisure 
0.0069 0.6710 1.1263 -5.6362 21.4951 35.73 % 
 
(34.39) *** (34.58) *** (21.65) *** (-16.79) *** (-8.58) ***  
Utilities 
0.0073 0.4573 0.9355 -2.8836 16.6684 33.50 % 
  
(39.04) *** (24.84) *** (19.07) *** (-9.05) *** (-7.22) ***   
 
                                                               2011  
Industry                           α                       𝛾1                   𝛾2                 𝛾3                     𝛾4                          Adj.R
2 
 
      
Automobile  
0.0089 0.3311 0.6568 -0.3573 -3.7280 37.75 % 
 
(22.52) *** (9.42) *** (7.06) *** (-0.57) (-0.80)   
Banks 
0.0027 0.3196 0.3408 -2.1007 -9.7472 32.87 % 
 
(14.53) *** (11.65) *** (9.80) *** (-3.70) *** (-4.05) ***  
Basic  
Resources 
0.0079 0.3658 0.6893 -0.6516 -6.7399 42.47 % 
 
(25.12) *** (13.31) *** (12.23) *** (-1.41)  (-3.66) ***  
Chemicals 
0.0091 0.3413 0.6597 -0.6695 -5.4188 41.81 % 
 
(26.44) *** (12.18) *** (9.27) *** (-1.47)  (-1.80) *  
Construction 
0.0082 0.3780 0.6695 -1.2147 -3.5330 39.29 % 
 
(21.84) *** (12.40) *** (7.48) *** (-2.45) ** (-0.81)   
Financials 
0.0059 0.3522 0.2007 -1.1743 5.6710 3.22 % 
 
(2.78) *** (0.75)  (0.56) (-0.15) (0.45)  
Food &  
Beverage 
0.0154 0.4754 0.4257 5.1688 8.7139 39.82 % 
 
(23.17) *** (5.56) *** (3.19) *** (2.81) *** (1.87) *  
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HealthCare 
0.0080 0.4054 0.7477 -1.1600 -5.5521 45.85 % 
 
(25.40) *** (14.16) *** (9.94) *** (-2.18) **  (-1.53)   
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0086 0.3574 0.6303 -0.8241 -2.6842 41.83 % 
 
(24.91) *** (11.48) *** (8.44) *** (-1.55)  (-0.81)   
Insurance 
0.0029 0.1967 0.3340 -0.6878 -2.9739 24.91 % 
 
(14.46) *** (7.88) *** (6.93) *** (-1.41)  (-1.35)  
Media 
0.0065 0.4288 0.5752 -3.3630 -4.0394 29.48 % 
 
(19.09) *** (15.57) *** (9.44) *** (-7.89) *** (-1.90) *  
Oil & Gas 
0.0083 0.1242 0.6623 5.6254 -10.8278 40.96 % 
 
(8.09) *** (0.56)  (3.87) *** (1.19)  (-2.06) **  
Personal& Household 
0.0094 0.3201 0.6518     -0.0019 -4.3501 40.10 % 
 
(27.37) *** (11.06) *** (10.83) *** (-0.00) (-1.98) **  
Real Estate 
0.0081 0.4133 0.7309 -21.2146 -6.2015 44.34 % 
 
(24.25) *** (13.90) *** (11.83) *** (-2.32) ** (-2.58) ***  
Retail 
0.0076 0.3917 0.7181 -1.4019 -6.2661 43.07 % 
 
(25.02) *** (12.72) *** (12.53) *** (-2.53) ** (-2.95) ***  
Technology 
0.0084 0.4099 0.8226 -1.2537 -9.2660 43.25 % 
 
(23.30) *** (14.41) *** (12.84) *** (-2.91) *** (-3.79) ***  
Telecom 
0.0024 0.7892 0.7682 -7.0846 -5.3076 30.85 % 
 
(6.07) *** (18.11) *** (8.79) *** (-14.16) *** (-1.69) *  
Travel &  
Leisure 
0.0067 0.4791 0.7282 -1.4243 -3.5841 44.55 % 
 
(20.38) *** (11.86) *** (8.25) *** (-1.77) * (-0.86)   
Utilities 
0.0072 0.3486 0.6978 -0.4341 -4.3544 46.34 % 
  
(24.12) *** (13.15) *** (9.02) *** (-1.03) (-1.17)    
 
Notes: Table 5.7 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ |𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝜎2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝛾4  (1 −
𝐷𝜎
2−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where Dσ2-High is 1 for days with high sector volatility and 0 otherwise, based on the previous 30-
day moving average. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the average value of sector return for each sector, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the cross-
sectional absolute deviation of returns for the market, α is the constant, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 are coefficients 
and εt is the error term at time t. . The 1990 sample period covers 01/01/1990 to 18/10/2016, the 
1996 sample period covers 01/01/1996 to 18/10/2016 and the 2011 sample period covers 01/01/2011 
to 18/10/2016.The sub sample periods was split based on the percentage annual increase of the 
number of firms.  The equation is estimated over the whole sample period. T-test statistics based on 
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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5.5.3.3. The effect of volume on herding 
 
Finance literature highlights the relationship between trading volume and herding. For 
instance, Lan and Lai (2011) find that trading volume triggers herding. However, Chiang 
and Zheng (2010) do not find any evidence that excess trading volume plays a significant 
role in determining the movements of cross-sectional dispersions. Moreover, Boyd, 
Buyuksahin, Haigh and Harris (2016) suggest that greater information reduces the incentives 
to herd.  From a theoretical perspective, the intentional herding theory infers that lower 
trading volume is related to higher levels of herding (Galariotis, et al., 2015). We, therefore, 
investigate herd behaviour in periods of high and low trading volume using a dummy 
variable as in equation (5) to capture a possible asymmetric relationship between trading 
volume and CSAD at the market and industry level. The results are discussed in the sections 
below.   
 
5.5.3.3.1. Results for the aggregate market 
 
Table 5.8 presents the results for the regression estimates for the SZSE and SHSE. Panel A 
reports the results for the SZSE across the three sample periods. For the full sample period, 
we do not find evidence of herd behaviour in high volume states, the 𝛾3  coefficient is 
negative and not statistically significant. However, when we examine the coefficients for the 
two sub-periods, we observe that herding is present as the coefficients are negative and 
significant. Focusing on the results for low volume, there is no evidence of herding in any 
period, none of the 𝛾4  coefficients are negative and significant. This is consistent with the 
increased dispersion predicted by rational asset pricing models and depicts a volume 
asymmetry. 
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Panel B reports the results for the SHSE for all the sub-periods. An analysis of the 1990 and 
1996 sub-period, shows that the 𝛾3 coefficients are negative and statistically significant, 
which confirms the presence of herding in high volume states. The observed herding does 
not persist in 2011 as the coefficient turns statistically insignificant, which suggests there is 
no nonlinear relationship between market returns and CSAD. The same pattern of herd 
formation is revealed in low volume states. We obtain negative and significant  𝛾4  
coefficients for the 1990 and 1990 sub-periods which becomes positive and significant in 
2011, again indicating the observed herding is short-term and thus dissipates in later periods. 
Furthermore, our results suggest there is no asymmetric relationship between herding and 
trading volume for majority of the sub-periods.  
In summary, the evidence for the effect of volume on herding in both markets is mixed. 
While investors in the SZSE only exhibit herd behaviour when trading volume is high, for 
the SHSE, investors herd in both high and low volume in identical sub-periods. An intuitive 
explanation for the observed herding in SZSE maybe associated with the large number of 
small and medium-sized companies listed on the market 60which may result in increased 
volume of trade especially by retail investors61. Consequently, it is expected that volume 
would be driven by information flow. Thus, the arrival of unexpected news can lead to 
uncertainty and increase investors’ tendency to imitate the trade of others. Indeed, Chang et 
al., (2000) provide evidence that herding is driven by uncertain information. Our results can 
also be explained from a liquidity perspective, whereby investors may herd in either low or 
high volume states. When trading volume is high, the market is more liquid, and there is 
more information, which makes trading easier. Investors are motivated to herd in such 
                                                 
60 as of 30th June 2010, out of the 1,012 listed companies on the market, 437 companies were listed on the 
Small and Medium Enterprise Board, with a total trading volume of USD 1.1 trillion in 201160 
61 It’s important the increased number of participants in the market increases the level of noise in the market 
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conditions because they can earn returns more quickly. On the other hand, low trading 
volume is marked by inadequate information, under these condition investors might believe 
that other investors are more informed than they are and hence mimic their trades. Our results 
are consistent with hypothesis H2C; herding is contingent upon trading volume. 
Herding volume asymmetry has been examined in China and other Asian countries. Our 
results for the SHSE is consistent with those of Yao et al., (2014) who report that the 
Shanghai B-market herds in both high and low volume states, however, they do not find 
herding in the Shenzhen market. Tan, et al (2008) also find herding in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen A and B-share market in high volume states, in low volume states herding only 
takes places in B-share markets. Also, Lao and Singh (2011) find that herd behaviour in the 
Shanghai A-share market is stronger when trading volume is high.  Our results are also 
consistent with those obtained in other Asian markets. Lan and Lin (2011) and Lam and 
Qiao (2015) find herding in high volume states in the Hong Kong market. However, our 
results are different from those reported by Javaira and Hassan (2015) who find no herding 
in Pakistani markets in high and low volume states.  
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Table 5.8 Estimates of herding during periods of high and low volume in Chinese 
stock markets 
Panel A: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Table 5.8 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ |𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝛾4  (1 −
𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where 𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ is 1 for days with high sector volume and 0 otherwise, based on a 30-day moving 
average  𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the the average value of sector return for each sector, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the cross-sectional 
absolute deviation of returns for the market, α is the constant, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4are coefficients and εt is 
Year    1990                         1996  2011 
  α                  0.0108             0.0110                    0.0107    
                      (67.36) ***         (59.14)  ***              (76.04) *** 
 𝛾1                 0.3818             0.5350                     0.4376    
                     (28.70)***           (11.61)***               (24.17) ***  
 𝛾2                0.3333             0.3158                    0.3671      
                     (11.99) ***          (18.60)***                   (29.67) *** 
 𝛾3                -0.3370            -6.5057                     -2.9119       
                     (-2.21)              (-2.75)***                   (-7.30) *** 
𝛾4                 -0.4532            29.7771                    0.0510 
                     (-0.75)               (1.09)                         (0.11) 
Adj. R2           41.15%         31.69%                      37.62% 
Year    1990                         1996  2011 
  α                  0.0123                0.0121                  0.0114     
                      (46.92) ***           (73.57)  ***            (39.75) *** 
 𝛾1                 0.3241               0.3615                  0.1800      
                     (7.85) ***           (15.34)***               (4.70) ***  
 𝛾2                0.2114                0.2364                   0.2909      
                     (9.94) ***              (11.39)***               (5.89)  *** 
 𝛾3                -0.5001              -2.5410                  -1.1378       
                     (-6.89) ***              (-4.63)***               (-0.84)   
𝛾4                 -0.8849              -1.5096                    0.8200 
                     ( -3.28) ***          (-4.02)***                (1.17)  
Adj. R2        9.46%                14.38%                     20.21% 
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the error term at time t. The regression is estimated for the full sample and two sub-periods. The 1990 
sample period covers 01/01/1990 to 18/10/2016, the 1996 sample period covers 01/01/1996 to 
18/10/2016 and the 2011 sample period covers 01/01/2011 to 18/10/2016. The sub sample periods 
were split based on the percentage annual increase of the number of firms. T-test statistics based on 
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Table 5.9 Estimates of industry herding during periods of high and low volume in 
Chinese stock markets 
Panel A: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
                                                               1990  
Industry               α           𝛾1                   𝛾2      𝛾3                𝛾4             Adj.R
2 
      
Auto 
0.0064 0.7875 0.7900 -0.1966 -0.1903 91.51 % 
   
(16.95) *** (43.35) *** (60.09) *** (-3.79) *** (-5.37) *** 
 
Banks 
0.0011 0.0990 0.0747 -0.6626 -0.4550 4.15 % 
 
(15.93) *** (10.72) *** (9.89) *** (-9.31) *** (-5.94) *** 
 
Basic  
Resources 
0.0102 0.3117 0.2408 -1.2390 -1.0924 17.20 % 
 
(60.59) *** (14.84) *** (13.92) *** (-4.77) *** (-5.00) *** 
 
Chemicals 
0.0111 0.2665 0.1168 -0.9570 -0.0065 18.00 % 
 
(41.11) *** (8.50) *** (2.43) ** (-2.36) ** (1.25)  
 
Construct 
0.0106 0.3705 0.2837 -0.3764 -0.4034 30.00 % 
 
(62.94) *** (26.35) *** (11.93) *** (-2.52) ** (-0.87)  
 
Financials 
0.0100 0.1991 -0.0474 0.2804 3.6845 30.59 % 
 
(17.68) *** (4.07) *** (-0.45)  (0.35) (2.16) ** 
 
Food & 
Beverage 
0.1238 11.7879 10.9312 -30.1174 -24.0091 29.54 % 
 
(14.71) *** (11.06) *** (10.16) *** (-1.70) * (-1.46)  
 
Healthcare 
0.0105 0.2934 0.2458 -0.8895 -0.8205 14.50 % 
 
(28.32) *** (5.20) *** (4.07) *** (-0.97)  (-0.75)  
 
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0106 0.4110 0.3226 -0.4066 0.1435 35.82 % 
 
(51.19) *** (18.28) *** (8.96) *** (-1.15)  (0.19)  
 
Media 
0.0089 0.2214 0.1950 -1.1690 -1.0443 5.51 % 
 
(38.89) *** (7.56) *** (9.19) *** (-3.35) *** (-2.84) *** 
 
Oil & Gas 
0.0084 0.4615 0.3371 -2.9329 -1.8040 16.16 % 
 
(34.29) *** (12.41) *** (13.27) *** (-4.90) *** (-4.41) *** 
 
Personal& 
Household 
0.0104 0.4120   0.3289      0.9188   -0.9441 35.57 % 
 
(28.63) *** (8.28) *** (3.97) *** (0.82) (0.51) 
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Real  
Estate 
0.0010 0.4322 0.3544 -0.4631 -0.9298 40.82 % 
 
(56.23) *** (21.53) *** (13.86) *** (-1.47)  (-1.93) * 
 
Retail 
0.0108 0.3178 0.2420 -0.6080 -0.7551 18.76 % 
 
(44.87) *** (12.26) *** (6.21) *** (-1.69) * (-1.12) 
 
Tech 
0.0109 0.3176 0.2202 -0.9949 -0.9535 17.02 % 
 
(52.04) *** (16.95) *** (8.16) *** (-4.80) *** (-2.42) ** 
 
Telecom 
0.0067 0.5614 0.5062 -5.7870 -4.8525 13.28 % 
 
(19.42) *** (16.00) *** (14.13) *** (-12.01) *** (-9.47) *** 
 
Travel & 
Leisure 
0.0106 0.1806 0.1360 -0.8047 1.599 12.90 % 
 
(29.15) *** (6.96) *** (1.68)  (-2.98) *** (1.01)    
Utilities 
0.0095 0.3604 0.2771 -1.1548 -0.6333 25.29 %  
  
(51.09) *** (16.51) *** (9.10) *** (-3.71) *** (-1.11)    
 
 
                                                               1996  
Industry               α           𝛾1                   𝛾2                   𝛾3                       𝛾4             Adj.R
2 
      
Auto 
0.0081 0.7360 0.7402 0.2333 0.1362 88.03 % 
   
(31.22) *** (59.68) *** (47.08) *** (3.51) *** (1.50)   
Banks 
0.0012 0.1391 0.1120 -1.0119 -0.8513 5.78 % 
 
(12.85) *** (9.61) *** (9.95) *** (-5.76) *** (-5.17) ***  
Basic  
Resources 
0.0093 0.4839 0.4360 -3.2408 -3.5301 27.30 % 
 
(38.62) *** (9.22) *** (18.31) *** (-2.82) *** (-9.09) ***  
Chemicals 
0.0097 0.5254 0.4057 -4.0556 -2.6265 30.54 % 
 
(59.48) *** (25.75) *** (18.67) *** (-10.19) *** (-6.13) ***  
Construct 
0.0103 0.5327 0.4353 -4.4220 -3.4135 26.59 % 
 
(58.44) *** (26.98) *** (21.34) *** (-12.24) *** (-9.44) ***  
Financials 
0.0105 0.1957 -0.0960 0.9061 5.2354 43.40 % 
 
(23.39) *** (2.59) *** (-1.84) * (0.68) (6.27) ***  
Food & 
Beverage 
0.1238 11.7879 10.9312 -30.1174 -24.0091 29.54 % 
 
(14.71) *** (11.06) *** (10.16) *** (-1.70) * (-1.46)   
Healthcare 
0.0097 0.5505 0.4734 -4.2058 -3.6014 31.02 % 
 
(57.49) *** (23.46) *** (21.66) *** (-8.66) ***  (-8.64) ***  
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0104 0.5215 0.4414 -3.5397 -3.2310 31.63 % 
 
(54.86) *** (15.99) *** (19.74) *** (-4.15) *** (-7.47) ***  
Media 
0.0089 0.3829 0.3377 -2.3136 -1.9138 13.03 % 
 
(15.30) *** (7.98) *** (2.65) *** (-3.14) *** (-0.74)  
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Oil & Gas 
0.0080 0.6623 0.4887 -5.8438 -3.1086 16.16 % 
 
(27.54) *** (23.39) *** (7.81) *** (-11.97) *** (-2.41) **  
Personal& 
Household 
0.0098 0.5633   0.4500      -3.8514  -2.7998 30.66 % 
 
(50.08) *** (16.92) *** (14.35) *** (-4.51) *** (-3.87) ***  
Real  
Estate 
0.0097 0.5570 0.4945 -3.4865 -3.6935 34.41 % 
 
(53.88) *** (18.67) *** (21.59) *** (-4.39) *** (-8.01) ***  
Retail 
0.0010 0.5211 0.4534 -3.3898 -3.6849 26.15 % 
 
(55.17) *** (19.47) *** (20.71) *** (-5.60) *** (-9.38) ***  
Tech 
0.0104 0.4083 0.4283 -1.0435 -3.2952 29.35 % 
 
(35.84) *** (6.71) *** (15.65) *** (-0.77)  (-7.41) ***  
Telecom 
0.0067 0.5614 0.5062 -5.7870 -4.8525 13.28 % 
 
(19.42) *** (16.00) *** (14.13) *** (-12.01) *** (-9.47) ***  
Travel & 
Leisure 
0.0097 0.4731 0.4191 -3.0221 -3.2717 24.00 % 
 
(45.92) *** (12.61) *** (17.79) *** (-3.70) *** (-7.45) ***  
Utilities 
0.0086 0.5655 0.4145 -4.6831 -2.5246 30.45 % 
  
(51.70) *** (26.73) *** (15.64) *** (-11.58) *** (-4.53) ***   
 
                                                               2011  
Industry               α           𝛾1                   𝛾2      𝛾3                𝛾4             Adj.R
2 
      
Auto 0.0095 0.6968 0.6591 -0.4515 -0.1455 69.10 % 
   (19.63)
 *** (15.66) *** (13.38) *** (-0.71) (-0.20)   
Banks 0.0020 0.2815 0.2264 -1.9814 -1.6268 20.81 % 
 
(12.34) *** (8.80) *** (10.60) *** (-3.72) *** (-4.40) ***  
Basic  
Resources 0.0094 0.4419 0.3517 -1.3787 0.3814 43.93 % 
 
(35.04) *** (13.76) *** (9.64) *** (-2.47) ** (0.59)   
Chemicals 0.0104 0.4162 0.3545 -1.7610 -0.5829 38.70 % 
 
(37.10) *** (12.91) *** (9.57) *** (-2.85) *** (-0.98)   
Construct 0.0106 0.4484 0.3730 -2.5964 -1.0458 35.77 % 
 
(35.57) *** (12.96) *** (9.71) *** (-3.88) *** (-0.87)   
Financials 0.0085 0.4594 0.4747 -2.8481 -4.0895 26.19 % 
 
(25.80) *** (11.78) *** (13.63) *** (-4.33) *** (-7.06) ***  
Food & 
Beverage 0.0856 4.4774 4.8963 -42.8481 -22.5140 12.33 % 
 
(19.57) *** (8.57) *** (6.47) *** (-4.16) *** (-1.64) *  
Healthcare 0.0096 0.4470 0.3959 -1.8722 -0.9799 41.57 % 
 
(34.56) *** (12.14) *** (11.33) *** (-2.28) ** (-1.73) *  
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Industrial 
Goods 0.0105 0.4524 0.3781 -2.2624 -0.3484 41.49 % 
 
(35.04) *** (12.69) *** (9.25) *** (-3.07) *** (-0.44)  
Media 0.0104 0.6076 0.1393 -4.6786 7.2605 51.52 % 
 
(16.85) *** (10.93) *** (0.97)  (-4.86) *** (2.16) ***  
Oil & Gas 0.0109 0.3951 0.1383 -2.0865 4.9146 32.14 % 
 
(13.16) *** (5.77) *** (0.60)  (-1.99) ** (0.85)   
Personal& 
Household 0.0100 0.4640   0.3914      -1.3175 0.2186 42.45 % 
 
(34.59) *** (11.39) *** (9.35) *** (-1.35) (0.27)  
Real  
Estate 0.0087 0.5315 0.4501 -2.9816 -1.2313 42.53 % 
 
(30.62) *** (15.29) *** (11.17) *** (-4.75) *** (-1.50)  
Retail 0.0091 0.5092 0.4840 -2.4846 -2.7779 35.79 % 
 
(29.99) *** (12.43) *** (9.44) *** (-2.75) *** (-2.47) **  
Tech 0.0106 0.45156 0.4124 -1.8512 -1.2398 41.13 %  
 
(31.86) *** (13.14) *** (10.83) *** (-2.75) *** (-1.98) **  
Telecom 0.0073 0.5845 0.6316 -3.8211 -4.8446 28.22 % 
 
(15.87) *** (11.55) *** (12.09) *** (-4.46) *** (-5.50) ***  
 
Travel & 
Leisure 0.0086 0.5202 0.4527 -2.3706 -1.3729 40.07 % 
Utilities (31.37)
 *** (13.71) *** (11.82) *** (-2.95) *** (-2.14) **  
  0.0081 0.5215 0.3818 -3.4010 -1.2877 36.70 % 
 
Panel B: Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
                                                               1990  
Industry                           α                       𝛾1                   𝛾2                 𝛾3                     𝛾4                          Adj.R
2 
      
Automobile  
0.0106 0.3687 0.2689 -0.7914 0.1745 29.55 % 
 
(55.39) *** (15.53) *** (10.35) *** (-2.38) ** (0.34)  
Banks 
0.0026 0.3434 0.2490 -2.7719 -1.0867 23.51 % 
 
(21.61) *** (18.01) *** (8.97) *** (-8.43) *** (-1.38)   
Basic  
Resources 
0.0108 0.1990 0.2710 0.8746 -0.7713 57.48 % 
 
(48.35) *** (8.87) *** (9.99) *** (16.96) *** (-2.03) **  
Chemicals 
0.0120 0.3670 0.2798 -0.6422 -0.0065 31.21 % 
 
(60.82) *** (12.81) *** (19.12) *** (-1.31)  (-0.04)   
Construction 
0.0105 0.3646 0.2915 -0.9425 -1.0951 22.94 % 
 
(42.60) *** (13.24) *** (7.04) *** (-2.63) *** (-1.48)   
Financials 
0.0221 -1.1061 -1.8538 17.1084 27.9586 6.40 % 
 
(8.75) *** (-2.94) *** (-4.35) *** (2.28) ** (2.94) ***  
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Food &  
Beverage 
0.0169 0.5929 0.6510 3.4985 2.0030 35.94 % 
 
(45.05) *** (10.66) *** (16.57) *** (3.63) *** (3.62) ***  
HealthCare 
0.0098 0.4440 0.3530 -0.3285 0.8587 41.14 % 
 
(40.85) *** (19.01) *** (7.19) *** (-1.12)  (0.93)   
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0117 0.2319 0.1786 2.7258 1.9287 64.54 % 
 
(32.48) *** (2.61) *** (9.22) *** (1.71) * (19.36) ***  
Insurance 
0.0036 0.2447 0.2128 -1.9743 -1.7515 15.38 % 
 
(24.09) *** (12.24) *** (12.28) *** (-5.76) *** (-6.41) ***  
Media 
0.0093 0.3414 0.2235 -2.2099 -1.4148 11.37 % 
 
(40.69) *** (11.68) *** (8.95) *** (-5.58) *** (-4.21) ***  
Oil & Gas 
0.0077 0.3516 0.2971 -2.3004 -3.5868 8.03 % 
 
(12.77) *** (2.36) ** (6.69) *** (-0.79)  (-7.40) ***  
Personal& Household 
0.0107 0.3768    0.3415      -0.0264      -0.6340 35.42 % 
 
(61.81) *** (17.63) *** (14.32) *** (-0.07) (-1.46)  
Real Estate 
0.0106 0.3035 0.2692 0.0365 -0.9516 40.88 % 
 
(26.89) *** (6.85) *** (9.18) *** (1.06)  (-2.43) **  
Retail 
0.0096 0.3177 0.2515 -1.0898 -0.8752 22.04 % 
 
(56.32) *** (12.31) *** (15.19) *** (-3.45) *** (-6.12) ***  
Technology 
0.0109 0.2872 0.2032 -1.0029 -0.5741 12.88 % 
 
(53.95) *** (12.70) *** (11.52) *** (-6.67) *** (-5.74) ***  
Telecom 
0.0028 0.2951 0.2908 -1.4891 -2.0697 9.47 % 
 
(12.21) *** (10.87) *** (8.61) *** (-3.58) *** (-4.20) ***  
Travel &  
Leisure 
0.0090 0.5270 0.4277 -1.2986 0.3061 40.53 % 
 
(40.79) *** (20.11) *** (11.22) *** (-3.57) *** (0.38)   
Utilities 
0.0101 0.3103 0.1709 -0.9622 1.1966 25.84 % 
  
(26.80) *** (12.80) *** (2.19) ** (-4.89) *** (0.94)   
 
                                                               1996  
Industry                           α                       𝛾1                   𝛾2                 𝛾3                     𝛾4                          Adj.R
2 
      
Automobile  
0.0099 0.5338 0.3610 -4.5403 -1.8462 27.95 
 
(61.08) *** (27.47) *** (19.63) *** (-11.93) *** (-5.34) ***  
Banks 
0.0026 0.3434 0.2490 -2.7719 -1.0867 23.51 
 
(21.61) *** (18.01) *** (8.97) *** (-8.43) *** (-1.38)   
Basic  
Resources 
0.0097 0.5633 0.4508 -4.4559 -3.2369 28.70 
 
(53.90) *** (19.89) *** (20.54) *** (-7.15) *** (-8.52) ***  
Chemicals 
0.0101 0.5382 0.39786 -4.4889 -2.2453 30.86 
 
(62.98) *** (26.72) *** (21.44) *** (-11.24) *** (-6.51) ***  
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Construction 
0.0095 0.5977 0.4471 -5.1091 -2.9275 29.63 
 
(56.76) *** (27.86) *** (23.54) *** (-12.72) *** (-9.58) ***  
Financials 
0.0121 -0.5444 0.5609 18.5546 -10.3719 7.17 
 
(5.63) *** (-1.27) (1.49) *** (2.14) ** (-1.33)  
Food &  
Beverage 
0.0169 0.4912 0.4745 4.3994 4.7152 36.25 
 
(53.84) *** (11.41) *** (8.79) *** (4.79) ***  (3.79) ***  
HealthCare 
0.0095 0.5264 0.4388 -3.4679 -2.5841 33.42 
 
(53.52) *** (15.97) *** (20.53) *** (-4.70) *** (-6.28) ***  
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0102 0.5676 0.4297 -4.8755 -2.8622 31.49 
 
(65.05) *** (28.24) ***  (24.27) *** (-12.19) *** (-9.14) ***  
Insurance 
0.0036 0.2447 0.2128 -1.9743 -1.7515 15.38 
 
(24.09) *** (12.24) *** (12.28) *** (-5.76) *** (-6.41) ***  
Media 
0.0083 0.5480 0.4408 -4.8485 -3.7989 20.44 
 
(43.95) *** (23.44) *** (19.21) *** (-11.05) *** (-9.33) ***  
Oil & Gas 
0.0077 0.3516 0.2971 -2.3004 -3.5868 8.03 
 
(12.77) *** (2.36) ** (6.69) *** (-0.79) (-7.40) ***  
Personal& Household 
0.0099 0.5686    0.4567    -4.5757     -3.1375 30.96 
 
(62.40) *** (28.09) *** (24.89) *** (-13.11) *** (-9.70) ***  
Real Estate 
0.0097 0.5471 0.4267 -4.5650 -2.7460 32.91 
 
(60.81) *** (27.15) *** (21.66) *** (-10.78) *** (-7.08) ***  
Retail 
0.0095 0.5200 0.3946 -4.3961 -2.7782 29.17 
 
(63.46) *** (27.18) *** (22.94) *** (-11.92) *** (-9.35) ***  
Technology 
0.0100 0.5722 0.4602 -4.6363 -3.3567 29.58 
 
(57.20) *** (28.05) *** (21.58) *** (-13.79) *** (-8.42) ***  
Telecom 
0.0025 0.3875 0.4195 -2.3298 -3.5872 12.44 
 
(4.56) *** (3.03) *** (10.63) *** (-1.06)  (-8.46) ***  
Travel &  
Leisure 
0.0082 0.7360 0.6109 -6.8272 -5.3715 34.49 
 
(52.04) *** (33.21) *** (30.73) *** (-16.46) *** (-14.52) ***  
Utilities 
0.0088 0.5362 0.4091 -4.5100 -2.5482 30.18 
  
(61.28) *** (26.25) *** (23.81) *** (-11.58) *** (-8.77) ***   
 
 
 
                                                               2011  
Industry                           α                       𝛾1                   𝛾2                 𝛾3                     𝛾4                          Adj.R
2 
Automobile  
0.0099 0.4209 0.3330 -1.5682 -0.9023 34.28 
 
(33.39) *** (11.98) *** (8.76) *** (-2.53) ** (-1.32)  
Banks 
0.0031 0.3715 0.2555 -2.7835 -1.5982 34.07 
 
(20.27) *** (11.42) *** (10.50) *** (-4.30) *** (-2.57) **  
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Basic  
Resources 
0.0094 0.4419 0.3517 -1.3787 0.3814 43.93 
 
(35.04) *** (13.76) *** (9.64) *** (-2.47) ** (0.55)   
Chemicals 
0.0100 0.4049 0.3711 -1.8306 -1.3140 38.14 
 
(37.03) *** (12.99) *** (11.78) *** (-3.17) *** (-2.55) **  
Construction 
0.0091 0.4756 0.3905 -2.8079 -1.6229 35.87 
 
(32.67) *** (13.68) *** (12.21) *** (-4.15) *** (-3.25) ***  
Financials 
0.0058 0.4458 0.1818 0.6004 -0.5553 5.25 
 
(2.49) *** (1.55) *** (0.37)  (-0.06) (-0.06)  
Food &  
Beverage 
0.0152 0.4435 0.5320 6.2735 3.9055 39.89 
 
(26.21) *** (6.15) *** (4.50) *** (4.30) *** (1.37)   
HealthCare 
0.0090 0.4657 0.4222 -2.2016 -1.7322 41.58 
 
(36.48) *** (13.87) *** (12.74) *** (-3.41) *** (-2.82) ***  
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0094 0.4626 0.3567 -2.7303 -0.8654 38.43 
 
(35.20) *** (13.69) ***  (10.45) *** (-4.07) *** (-1.51)   
Insurance 
0.0034 0.2075 0.2231 -0.5667 -1.5774 24.48 
 
(19.29) *** (6.30) *** (10.17) *** (-0.75)  (-4.51) ***  
Media 
0.0070 0.5019 0.4154 -4.2674 -3.3492 28.44 
 
(24.84) *** (16.53) *** (13.13) *** (-8.78) *** (-6.32) ***  
Oil & Gas 
0.0094 0.0916 0.3572 8.8380 -2.1185 51.08 
 
(17.39) *** (0.70)  (6.87) *** (2.69) *** (-2.42) **  
Personal& Household 
0.0103 0.4110    0.3308    -1.6473     -0.3000 36.50 
 
(36.22) *** (12.22) *** (9.47) *** (-2.95) *** (-0.53)  
Real Estate 
0.0091 0.4762 0.4180 -2.6245 -1.4286 41.33 
 
(33.59) *** (14.67) *** (12.01) *** (-4.20) *** (-2.27) **  
Retail 
0.0070 0.1983 0.1114 -0.4320 0.2549 13.90 
 
(19.74) *** (6.04) *** (2.11) ** (-1.84) * (0.31)  
Technology 
0.0098 0.5036 0.3840 -3.2316 -1.0709 39.38 
 
(33.00) *** (15.83) *** (11.57) *** (-7.35) *** (-1.88) *  
Telecom 
0.0023 0.8261 0.7616 -7.5536 -6.6012 30.68 
 
(6.76) *** (16.77) *** (15.16) *** (-14.15) *** (-9.60) ***  
Travel &  
Leisure 
0.0074 0.5566 0.47780 -3.2443 -1.1494 42.62 
 
(28.62) *** (13.71) *** (12.12) *** (-3.74) *** (-1.48)   
Utilities 
0.0081 0.4335 0.3769 -1.7017 -1.1614 41.53 
  
(35.69) *** (14.30) *** (11.92) *** (-3.43) *** (-2.35) **   
 
Notes: Table 5.9 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ |𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  (1 − 𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3  𝐷
𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝛾4  (1 −
𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)(𝑅𝑚.𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
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Where 𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑙−𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ is 1 for days with high sector volume and 0 otherwise, based on a 30-day moving 
average  𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the the average value of sector return for each sector, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the cross-sectional 
absolute deviation of returns for the sector, α is the constant, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 are coefficients and εt is the 
error term at time t. The regression is estimated for the full sample and two sub-periods. The 1990 
sample period covers 01/01/1990 to 18/10/2016, the 1996 sample period covers 01/01/1996 to 
18/10/2016 and the 2011 sample period covers 01/01/2011 to 18/10/2016.The sub sample periods 
were split based on the percentage annual increase of the number of firms. T-test statistics based on 
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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. 
5.5.3.3.2 Results for industry sectors 
Having found mixed evidence of herding in high and low volume for the aggregate market, 
we now focus on the industry sectors to examine whether the observed herding is 
concentrated in specific sectors. Table 5.9 provides the regression estimates for both 
markets. The results for SZSE across the three periods are reported in Panel A. For the full 
sample, the 𝛾3  coefficient is negative and significant when trading volume is high in all 
industries except the Financials, Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Personal and Household and 
Real Estate, indicating the presence of herd behaviour. This finding is different from the 
results is Table 5.8, which indicate no herding for the full sample. Our evidence supports the 
literature which suggests that investors are more likely to herd at the industry level. When 
we analyse the results for the 1996 sub-period, we observe that for high volume states, the 
𝛾3  coefficient is negative and significant in all sectors except Automobile, Financials and 
Technology. This result suggests that herding is prevalent in most sectors, therefore herding 
affect the dispersion of returns when trading volume is high. It is interesting to note that the 
Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Personal and Household and Retail sectors herd in both high 
and low volume states. We also note that for the Automobile sector, ‘negative’ herding 
occurs when the trading volume is high, but it diminishes in low volume state. For the 2011 
sub-period, we find that when trading volume is high, the 𝛾3  coefficient is negative and 
significant for all sectors except Automobile and Personal and Household.  
For the full sample, when trading volume is low, the 𝛾4  coefficient is negative and 
significant in all industries except Chemicals, Construction, Food and Beverage, Healthcare, 
Financials, Industrial Goods, Personal and Household, Retail, Travel and Leisure and 
Utilities. This is evidence that during this period investors focusing on the same sector herd 
towards the industry consensus when trading volume is low.  
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For the 1996 sub-period, the 𝛾4  coefficient is negative and significant for all sectors except 
Automobile, Financials, Food and Beverage and Media, indicating the prevalence of herd 
behaviour. For the 2011 sub-period, when trading volume is low the 𝛾4  coefficient is 
negative and significant for all sectors except Automobile, Basic Resources, Chemicals, 
Construction, Industrial Goods, Oil and Gas, Personal and Household and Retail sectors. It 
is interesting to note that herding is absent in the Financial sector when the trading volume 
is high, whereas, the coefficient becomes positive and significant when the trading volume 
is low indicating ‘negative’ herding. It is possible that investors in the sector find it easier to 
decipher the information of others when the trading volume is low, thus causing them to 
largely ignore their personal industry information in favour of that of others. Once again, the 
results are different from the aggregate results in Table 5.8, where there is no evidence of 
herding in low volume states. Overall, for the SZSE herding issignificant when trading 
volume is high, which may imply that its liquidity-oriented investors herd around industries 
where they can make a quick profit.  
The results for SHSE are reported in Panel B. During high volume periods, the 𝛾3  coefficient 
for the full sample is negative and significant in all industries except Basic Resources 
Chemicals, Financials, Food and Beverage, Industrial Goods, Healthcare, Oil and Gas, 
Personal and Household and Real Estate, which provides a limited evidence of herding in 
most industries when trading volume is high. A stronger evidence of herding is reported in 
the 1996 sub-period. When the trading volume is high, the 𝛾3  coefficient is negative and 
significant for all industries except Financials, Food and Beverage, Oil and Gas, and 
Telecommunications, indicating herd behaviour in most industries. For the 2011 sub-period, 
the strong level of herding across industries persists when the trading volume is high as we 
report negative and significant coefficients in all industries expect Financials, Food and 
Beverage and Insurance.  
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The evidence for low trading volume state for the full sample shows that the 𝛾4  coefficient 
is negative and significant for Basic Resources, Insurance, Media, Oil and Gas, Real Estate, 
Retail, Technology, and Telecommunications. Herding becomes stronger for the 1996 sub-
period, the 𝛾4  coefficient is negative and significant for all sectors except Banks, Food and 
Beverage and Financials, indicating the presence of herd behaviour in most sectors. 
However, herding appears to dissipate in the 2011 sub-period when the trading volume is 
low, more sectors do not herd (Automobile, Basic Resources, Financials, Food and 
Beverage, Industrial Goods, Personal and Household, Retail and, Travel and Leisure), the 
𝛾4  coefficient is negative and significant for all other sectors. We note that ‘negative’ 
herding exists in the Food and Beverage sector in both high and low trading volume 
conditions. This suggests that investors in this sector ignore the industry consensus as a 
group. 
Our overall results indicate that there is a relationship between herding and trading volume 
in the Chinese stock market, which exhibits similar patterns in both stock exchanges over 
time. All industries across the sub-periods show that herding starts with massive increases 
then declines when the trading volume is low in the last sub-periods. We find the strongest 
evidence of herding during the 1996 sub-period, which may have links with the panic selling 
that occurred during the Asian crisis (the impact of the crisis on herding is examined in a 
later section). Specifically, this is consistent with hypothesis H2C; industry herding is 
contingent upon trading volume.   
Our results are consistent with Zheng, et al., (2017) who show that industry herding in the 
Chinese market occurs in only six out of ten industries when trading volume is high. On the 
other hand, when trading volume is low, more than five industries exhibit herd behaviour. 
They explain that investors tend to herd when markets are illiquid, thus when trading volume 
is low, public and private information is scarce and induces herding.    
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5.5.4 Herding and market stress 
Christie and Huang (1995) suggest that herding is more likely to occur during periods of 
market stress. However, later studies report conflicting results on the impact on herding 
during crises. For example, regarding the effect of the Asian Crisis (AC thereafter) on the 
Chinese market, Demirer and Kutan (2006) and Tan, et al., (2008) do not find evidence of 
herding during the crisis, while Zheng, et al., (2017) confirm herd behaviour during the 
crisis. Consequently, in this section, we investigate the effect of the AC and GFC on market 
and sector level herding. 
 
5.5.4.1 The Asian Crisis 
 
The East Asian crisis that occurred in July 1997 has been cited as one of the major foreign 
currency crises of the 1990s (Goldstein, 1998). The crisis started in Thailand and resulted in 
a contagion that spread to other parts of Asia. Although the cause of the crisis has been 
disputed, academics argue that it was caused by the loss of confidence and panic of investors. 
According to Corsetti, et al., (1998) the exchange rate plummeted because of the 
overreaction of the market and herding.  
While studies on the impact of the crisis on herding focus on the countries that were directly 
affected by the crisis (For example, Kim and Wei, 2002; Bowe and Domuta, 2004 and 
Chiang and Zheng, 2010), we set out to examine the impact of the crisis on herding the 
Chinese market and sectors. Few studies examine the impact of the AC on the herding on 
the Chinese market (See Demirer and Kutan, 2006; Tan, et al., 2008; Zheng, et al., 2017). 
Thus, this investigation enhances the existing literature.  
To examine the impact of the AC on herding, we run the regression with the base model in 
equation 2. The regression is run using this equation for the three sub-periods.   
 
 214 | P a g e  
 
5.5.4.1.1 Results for the overall market 
 
Table 5.10 presents the results for the impact of the AC on herding in the Chinese market 
estimated using Eqn. (2) for the three sub-periods. The results for the SZSE are shown in 
Panel A. The 𝛾2  coefficient is negative and significant pre, during and post crisis, suggesting 
the presence of herd behaviour. Indeed, this means that investors in the SZSE appear to herd 
regardless of the state of the market. This agrees with the literature on contagion effect, given 
the Chinese market was not directly affected by the crisis. Interestingly, the nonlinear 
coefficient is most negative during the post-crisis period, which implies that the crisis 
revealed the new fundamentals and gave rise to a new market consensus on which the 
investors herded. 
We observe interesting results when we examine the results for the SHSE reported in panel 
B. We find evidence of herding pre and after the crisis but not during the crisis. A possible 
explanation for the observed herding is that investors in this market tend to herd during 
tranquil times as it is easier to view the trade of others. This herd formation is consistent 
with the theory that herding is generated by information asymmetry as investors infer that 
their peers possess relevant information that they do not. Therefore, they are driven by the 
intent to herd regardless of their personal information.  In contrast, at the onset of the crises, 
investors preferred to focus on their information and thus, ignored the market consensus 
because of the crisis (Calvo and Mendoza, 1997). Further, we conjecture that the Chinese 
investors may have been optimistic and exhibited the overconfidence bias because of the 
governments’ fiscal policy and pro-active risk prevention measures it took before the crisis. 
Thus this reduced the tendency to herd. Consequently, investors preferred to trade based on 
their private information. 
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To summarise, our results are in favour of herding in the Chinese markets; we obtain 
evidence consistent with herding across all sub-periods except during the crisis period for 
the SHSE. Our results are largely in line with the prediction of H3 that herding is stronger 
during the AC, which is particularly interesting given that the Chinese market was seen to 
be immune from the effects of the crisis. In comparison to previous studies, our results differ 
from Demirer and Kutan (2006) who find no evidence of herding in SZSE and SHSE during 
the AC. However, the herding measure they employ in their study focuses on measuring 
herding during extreme market movement and may not detect herding during tranquil 
periods. In the same vein, our results are also in contrast with those of Tan, et al (2008), do 
not find evidence that herd behaviour is affected by the AC in SZSE and SHSE. The 
difference may be due to the herding measure employed, the period and the crisis sub-period 
specification. However, our results are like those obtained for other emerging markets 
affected by the crisis. Bowe and Domuta (2004) investigate herding among foreign and 
domestic investors in the Jakarta Stock Exchange and find evidence that both herd pre, 
during and post-crisis. Chiang and Zheng (2010) find evidence of herd behaviour during the 
crisis in the all the neighbouring markets (US, Indonesia, Korea and Singapore) examined 
except Malaysia. Hwang and Salmon (2004) reach an opposite conclusion, they find that 
herding behaviour in the Korean market during the AC helped to reduce herd behaviour. 
Having obtained evidence for the aggregate market, we examine the impact of the crisis on 
sectors. 
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Table 5.10 Regression estimates for herd behaviour for the Asian Crisis 
 
Panel A: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
 
Period               α                 𝛾1                     𝛾2           Adj. R
2 
Pre- crisis 0.0091 0.4438 -0.5406 52.50% 
 
  (26.84) *** (19.47) *** (-3.45) *** 
 
Crisis 0.0130 0.5571 -5.4481 27.51% 
 
(24.48) *** (12.37) *** (-9.85) *** 
 
Post- crisis 0.0103 0.4696 -3.0602 34.47% 
  (59.67) *** (24.93) *** (-8.55) ***   
 
 
Panel B: Shanghai stock exchange  
 
 
Period      α 𝛾1                       𝛾2         Adj. R
2 
Pre- crisis 0.0135 0.2552 -0.3987 5.57% 
 
  (23.74) *** (5.31) *** (-4.31) *** 
 
Crisis 0.0157 0.1786 -1.3897 4.49% 
 
(26.69) *** (2.61) *** (-1.02)  
 
Post- crisis 0.0116 0.3046 -1.9887 14.85% 
  (67.04) *** (14.73) *** (-4.88) ***   
 
Notes: Table 5.10 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average of the N market returns in each sector at time t, the squared 
market return 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  is used to capture the nonlinearity in the relationship, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 is the cross-sectional 
absolute deviation of returns for the market, α is the constant, γ1, and γ2 are coefficients, and 𝜀𝑡 is the 
error term at time t. The model is run for the separately for the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. 
Pre-crisis refers to the period between 1/01/1993 and 01/07/1997. Crisis refers to the period between 
02/07/1997 and 30/12/1997. Post-crisis refers to the period between 01/01/1998 and 10/09/2001. T-
statistics based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
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5.5.4.1.2 Results for industry sectors 
 
Regression results for the sectors during the AC estimated using Eqn. (2) are presented in 
Table 5.11. Panel A reports the results for the SZSE across the three sub-crisis periods. 
During the pre-crisis period we find strong evidence of herding, the 𝛾2   coefficents are 
negative and significant for all sectors except Chemicals, Healthcare, Media, Personal and 
Household, Retail, and Travel and Leisure sectors. The results for the crisis period show that 
investors herd significantly, the 𝛾2  coefficient is negative and significant for all sectors 
except the Automobile and Healthcare sectors. A similar level of herd behaviour persists 
post-crisis with all sectors except Automobile, Financials, Media and Real Estate sectors 
showing negative and significant 𝛾2  coefficients. We note that the coefficients for the 
Automobile and Financials sectors are positive and significant, indicating that during this 
period, investors in these sectors exhibited 'negative’ herding, they largely ignore the 
industry consensus in favour of their private information. These results are consistent with 
the herd behaviour across all the crisis periods we report in Table 5.10.  
The evidence of herding during the AC is further confirmed in Panel B which presents the 
results for the SHSE. During, the pre-crisis period all the 𝛾2  coefficients are negative and 
significant in all sectors but Basic Resources, Chemicals, Construction, Financials, Food and 
Beverage, Industrial Goods, Healthcare, Personal and Household, and Real Estate indicating 
the presence of herd behaviour in more than half of the sectors. However, we report positive 
and significant 𝛾2  coefficients for Basic Resources, Financials, Food and Beverage, 
Industrial Goods and Real Estate sectors, indicating the presence of ‘negative’ herding. It is 
important to point out the Oil and Gas sector and Food and Beverage were in excluded in 
the analysis for the pre-crisis and crisis periods due to insufficient data. For the crisis period, 
all the 𝛾2  coefficients are negative and statistically significant in all but the Food and 
Beverage sector, suggesting that almost all sectors display greater correlation in returns 
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during the crisis due to herding. Therefore, during the crisis investors may have been loss 
averse, fearing potential loss and hence more inclined to herd. For the post-crisis period we 
report negative and significant 𝛾2  coefficients in all but the Construction, Financials, Food 
and Beverage and Oil and Gas sectors. From these results, we note that the investors in the 
Food and Beverage sector herd negatively across all crisis sub-periods, suggesting localised 
herding. Consequently, investors in this sector may have moved as a group into the sector 
resulting in an increased dispersion of returns. The results we obtain for the pre-and post-
crisis periods are consistent with those in Table 5.10, while the results for the crisis period 
is inconsistent, as herding absent in the aggregate market becomes evident in the sector 
results. 
Overall the evidence of the impact of the AC on industry herding indicates that it triggered 
herding in the Chinese market, pre, during and post-crisis, with the strongest level of herding 
exhibited in the SHSE during the crisis period. Our evidence is in contrast the literature that 
herding occurs during periods of market stress (Christie and Huang, 1995). On the contrary, 
we find that herding occurs in the industry sectors regardless of whether or not the market is 
in stress, which is consistent with H3. Possible explanations for the observed herding are 
like those provided in the previous section. Our findings are somewhat consistent with those 
obtained by Zheng, et al., (2017). They find herding in 8 out of 10 industries examined (Oil 
and Gas, Basic Materials, Industrial Goods, Consumer Goods, Healthcare, Consumer 
Services, Financials and Technology) during crises periods in their study which includes the 
AC. They report stronger levels of herding during tranquil periods, all the industries herd, 
probably due to prevailing pessimistic investor sentiment.  
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Table 5.11 Regression estimates for industry herd behaviour for the Asian Crisis 
Panel A: Shenzhen Stock Exchange  
   Pre-crisis           Crisis       Post 
Crisis 
     
Industry α 𝛾1   𝛾2   Adj. R
2 α 𝛾1   𝛾2   Adj. R
2 α 𝛾1   𝛾2  Adj.R
2 
Automobile  -0.0002 0.8064 -0.2043 94.08% 0.0098 0.7082 0.3466 88.14% 0.0085 0.7113 0.3870 84.86% 
 (-0.20) (38.38) *** (-5.22) ***  (10.83) *** (15.14) *** (1.20)   (31.66) *** (52.86) ** (4.37) ***  
Banks Insufficient 
data  
For the 
sample 
period 
      0.0012 0.1590 -1.2418 7.30% 
         (12.43) *** (13.48) *** (-8.09) ***  
Basic 
Resources 
0.0089 0.1459 -0.5438 3.96% 0.0121 0.2066 -1.5503 7.49% 0.0091 0.4754 -3.5301 32.07% 
 (17.41) *** (5.48) *** (-4.89) ***  (20.72) *** (3.87) *** (-2.05) **  (54.84) *** (26.29) *** (-10.69) ***  
Chemicals 0.0078 0.1424 -0.0241 10.14% 0.0129 0.2567 -2.9565 7.48% 0.0096 0.4601 -3.0436 33.21% 
 (16.22) *** (5.58) *** (-0.09)   (22.21) *** (5.08) *** (-4.21) ***  (58.22) *** (25.58) *** (-9.40) ***  
Construction 0.0075 0.4284 -0.5654 38.60% 0.0139 0.2482 -1.2634 11.36% 0.0102 0.4477 -3.2980 26.57% 
 (17.78) *** (15.20) *** (-3.42) ***  (20.12) *** (3.79) *** (-1.20)   (56.10) *** (24.63) *** (-10.66) ***  
Financials 0.0046 0.1170 -0.2526 9.08% 0.0111 0.1999 -2.3625 2.76% 0.0109 -0.0292 5.5833 66.14% 
 (13.37) *** (5.69) *** (-2.18) **  (14.82) *** (3.19) *** (-2.99) ***  (45.54) *** (-1.21)  (16.40) ***  
Food & 
Beverage 
Insufficient 
data for  
sample 
period 
      0.1241 11.3738 -27.7877 29.55% 
         (14.73) *** (12.70) *** (-2.12) **  
Healthcare 0.0085 0.1501 0.0376 7.87% 0.0148 0.2401 -1.5144 9.83% 0.0096 0.4576 -2.9056 32.91% 
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 (11.75) *** (2.15) ** (0.05)   (20.09) *** (3.59) *** (-1.29)   (57.03) *** (23.76) *** (-8.10) ***  
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0081 0.5350 -0.7722 43.17% 0.0146 0.2970 -1.9074 15.74% 0.0101 0.4689 -3.2694 32.88% 
 (16.27) *** (12.93) *** (-2.09) ***  (22.84) *** (4.74) *** (-1.75) *  (58.79) *** (25.21) *** (-9.36) ***  
Media 0.0007 0.0035 -0.0323 0.007% 0.0069 0.2932 -2.5017 5.82% 0.0090 0.3966 -0.1256 27.61% 
 (4.37) *** (0.69)  (-1.44)   (8.10) *** (4.25) *** (-2.76) ***  (9.10) *** (2.39) ** (-0.04)  
Oil & Gas 0.0035 0.2314 -1.2500 6.56% 0.0061 0.6836 -5.0932 24.62% 0.0085 0.5259 -3.8482 23.05% 
 (7.44) *** (5.82) *** (-4.76) ***  (6.32) *** (6.99) *** (-3.18) ***  (21.26) *** (8.01) *** (-2.67) ***  
Personal & 
Household 
0.0087 0.6028 0.4628 48.89% 0.0146 0.2566 -1.8779 11.26% 0.0094 0.5003 -2.7480 36.52% 
 (13.97) *** (7.29) *** (0.33)   (18.39) *** (4.50) *** (-2.46) **  (51.38) *** (20.56) *** (-4.67) ***  
Real Estate 0.0080 0.4140 -0.4579 48.48% 0.0144 0.5738 -3.6434 58.70% 0.0093 0.4303 -1.1606 38.57% 
 (22.49) *** (16.30) *** (-1.71) *  (22.84) *** (10.73) *** (-4.61) ***  (33.88) *** (11.55) *** (-1.23)  
Retail 0.0093 0.2277 -0.1693 14.58% 0.0146 0.2680 -2.2418 14.58% 0.0097 0.4606 -3.3493 26.44% 
 (17.67) *** (6.34) *** (-0.63)   (23.08) *** (4.86) *** (-2.68) ***  (54.67) *** (23.95) *** (-9.59) ***  
Technology 0.0078 0.1725 -0.4073 7.74% 0.0136 0.3523 -3.4156 9.57% 0.0098 0.4756 -3.2024 32.63% 
 (15.80) *** (6.72) *** (-4.52) ***  (17.61) *** (4.92) *** (-3.35) ***  (52.50) *** (25.08) *** (-9.29) ***  
Telecom Insufficien
t data for  
sample 
period 
      0.0066 0.5334 -5.3161 13.27% 
         (19.45) *** (18.18) *** (-14.03) ***  
Travel & 
Leisure 
0.0055 0.1225 0.0939 8.11% 0.0130 0.2562 -2.1597 7.66% 0.0094 0.4593 -3.1198 26.50% 
 (10.59) *** (2.81) *** (0.17)   (18.12) *** (4.28) *** (-2.56) **  (50.76) *** (22.34) *** (-7.92) ***  
Utilities 0.0089 0.2898 -0.6903 19.69% 0.0125 0.2760 -2.0946 11.90% 0.0084 0.4653 -3.2799 30.41% 
  (19.95) *** (9.96) *** (-4.13) ***   (20.33) *** (4.66) *** (-2.14) **   (52.91) *** (26.52) *** (-10.88) ***   
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Panel B: Shanghai Stock Exchange 
   Pre-crisis           Crisis       Post 
Crisis 
     
Industry α 𝛾1   𝛾2   Adj. R
2 α 𝛾1   𝛾2   Adj. R
2 α 𝛾1   𝛾2  Adj.R
2 
Automobile  0.0099 0.3707 -0.4456 32.60% 0.0129 0.3497 -3.0168 13.59% 0.0096 0.4519 -3.3027 27.93% 
 (20.12) *** (11.33) *** (-2.06) ***  (21.37) *** (5.38) *** (-2.96) ***  (56.53) *** (26.16) *** (-10.93) ***  
Banks Insufficient 
data for  
sample 
period 
      0.0026 0.2952 -1.9460 22.92% 
         (22.45) *** (16.06) *** (-4.73) ***  
Basic 
Resources 
0.0101 0.0914 0.9936 68.64% 0.0125 0.6959 -6.8244 25.22% 0.0093 0.4915 -3.6136 30.69% 
 (20.31) *** (2.96) *** (13.57) ***  (17.46) *** (8.88) *** (-6.24) ***  (54.93) *** (27.11) *** (-11.94) ***  
Chemicals 0.0115 0.3332 -0.2637 28.48% 0.0136 0.4341 -4.9866 14.14% 0.0098 0.4580 -3.0843 32.58% 
 (22.12) *** (8.54) *** (-0.72)   (20.46) *** (5.30) *** (-2.78) ***  (58.48) *** (25.87) *** (-3.87) ***  
Construction 0.0105 0.2109 -0.2056 16.64% 0.0115 0.6590 -5.6015 29.78% 0.0093 0.4780 -2.3238 1.71% 
 (19.93) *** (5.31) *** (-0.63)   (16.58) *** (8.37) *** (-3.93) ***  (52.45) *** (1.64) (-0.40)  
Financials 0.0238 -2.5492 26.4547 7.70% 0.0069 2.0373 -55.0429 9.25% 0.0080 0.4436 -2.9349 2.39% 
 (1.99) ** (-2.77) *** (3.83) ***  (1.96) ** (2.75) *** (-2.84) ***  (4.56) *** (1.13) (-0.41)   
Food & 
Beverage 
0.0247 0.7173 1.9686 32.41% 0.0164 -0.4524 5.6378 37.88% 0.0167 0.4381 4.9760 36.30% 
 (16.74) *** (7.81) *** (2.67) ***  (21.34) *** (5.10) *** (4.47) ***  (49.75) *** (9.95) *** (5.29) ***  
Healthcare 0.0085 0.5983 -0.7188 48.87% 0.0117 0.5092 -4.2817 23.44% 0.0091 0.5136 -3.7627 35.11% 
 (17.91) *** (14.62) *** (-1.61)   (17.88) *** (6.20) *** (-2.69) ***  (58.23) *** (28.50) *** (-11.60) ***  
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0105 0.3194 1.7366 74.73% 0.0146 0.4803 -4.7105 20.90% 0.0098 0.4794 -3.5654 20.90% 
 (15.26) *** (6.75) *** (32.29) ***  (21.45) *** (6.45) *** (-3.07) ***  (60.54) *** (28.22) *** (-12.23) ***  
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Insurance         0.0036 0.2272 -1.8410 15.21% 
         (24.07) *** (14.61) *** (-7.68) ***  
Media 0.0053 0.0810 -0.5141 1.20% 0.0123 0.5195 -5.5860 11.23% 0.0079 0.5149 -4.5716 23.91% 
 (10.32) *** (2.99) *** (-3.64) ***  (12.65) *** (4.61) *** (-2.21) **  (42.66) *** (28.61) *** (-16.61) ***  
             
Oil & Gas Insufficient 
data for  
sample 
period 
      0.0080 0.4170 -3.5508 11.42% 
         (9.86) *** (3.28) *** (-1.57)   
             
Personal & 
Household 
0.0111 0.4046 -0.1756 41.21% 0.0140 0.5216 -5.6871 18.82% 0.0095 0.4909 -3.5173 32.85% 
 (23.51) *** (10.87) *** (-0.51)  (19.42) *** (6.10) *** (-2.93) ***  (58.47) *** (28.95) *** (-12.88) ***  
Real Estate 0.0089 0.2324 0.1076 46.91% 0.0134 0.2970 -2.7151 11.07% 0.0095 0.4868 -3.3301 34.98% 
 (9.45) *** (4.33) *** (2.42) ***  (21.50) *** (4.10) *** (-1.78) *  (56.69) *** (27.53) *** (-10.30) ***  
Retail 0.0064 0.2627 -0.8122 22.67% 0.0127 0.2454 -2.7848 7.14% 0.0092 0.4636 -3.3202 30.78% 
 (23.04) *** (12.77) *** (-6.34) ***  (22.23) *** (3.86) *** (-2.25) **  (57.90) *** (27.16) *** (-11.52) ***  
Technology 0.0080 0.1720 -0.4799 6.57% 0.0128 0.6207 -6.6998 21.72% 0.0096 0.5011 -3.8669 31.36% 
 (19.34) *** (6.42) *** (-5.14) ***  (17.37) *** (7.15) *** (-3.99) ***  (55.24) *** (29.50) *** (-14.40) ***  
Telecom         0.0032 0.4548 -3.3115 14.91% 
         (3.84) *** (4.14) *** (-1.91) *  
Travel & 
Leisure 
0.0063 0.7323 -1.6316 56.06% 0.0130 0.7395 -7.5611 25.54% 0.0080 0.6370 -5.6692 34.79% 
 (13.19) *** (20.70) *** (-4.87) ***  (14.11) *** (6.91) *** (-3.02) ***  (49.33) *** (34.34) *** (-17.82) ***  
Utilities 0.0099 0.3707 -0.4456 32.60% 0.0124 0.3375 -2.1611 14.54% 0.0084 0.4507 -3.2143 31.30% 
  (20.12) *** (11.33) *** (-2.06) **   (19.87) *** (5.00) *** (-1.90) ***   (57.27) *** (26.67) *** (-11.09) ***   
Notes: Table 5.11 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
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where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average of the N market returns in each sector, at time t, the squared market return 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  is used to capture the nonlinearity 
in the relationship, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns for the sectors, α is the constant, γ1, and γ2 are coefficients, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error 
term at time t. The model is run for the separately for the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. Pre-crisis refers to the period between 1/01/1993 and 
01/07/1997. Crisis refers to the period between 02/07/1997 and 30/12/1997. Post-crisis refers to the period between 01/01/1998 and 10/09/2001. T-statistics 
based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 224 | P a g e  
 
5.5.4.2 Global Financial Crisis  
Research has documented that co-movements during crises spread through contagion 
(Gebka and Wohar, 2013). Indeed, there is evidence of high levels of linkages between 
developed and emerging markets (For example, Gallo and Otranto, 2005). This linkage also 
results in the spread of crises beyond its country of origin to neighbouring markets and the 
world at large. The GFC which originated from the US spread internationally to economies 
and sectors of both developed and emerging markets. As a result, more finance researchers 
have focused their attention on the negative effect of these linkages on herding (For example 
Chiang and Zheng, 2010 and Yao, et al., 2014). Given the significant trade relationship 
between the US and China, we examine the impact of the GFC on Chinese stock markets.  
Therefore, we investigate the GFC related herding behaviour by dividing the daily data into 
sub-samples as follows:  Pre-crisis (01/05/2002- 31/07/2007), Crisis (01/08/2007 - 
30/03/2009) and Post-crisis: (01/04/2009 - 18/10/2016). The results for the aggregate market 
and sectors are discussed in the sections below.  
5.5.4.2.1. Results for the aggregate market 
Table 5.12 contains the regression estimates for both markets. Regressions are estimated for 
the three sub-samples using Equation (2). The results for the SZSE are reported in Panel A. 
Herding is observed across all the crisis phases, all the 𝛾2   coefficients are negative and 
significant. This result implies that these investors herded regardless of whether the market 
was in a tranquil or crisis state. It also provides evidence of the effect of greater financial 
integration and linkages via exports as earlier discussed. This effect is particularly 
pronounced in the SZSE because of its export-oriented nature which makes its investors 
informed of developments in international markets (Demirer and Kutan, 2006). 
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The results for the SHSE are reported in Panel B. The evidence suggests that herding occurs 
before the crisis and during the crisis, the 𝛾2   coefficients are negative and significant. 
However, the observed herding diminished after the crisis. We interpret this to mean that as 
tranquillity returned to the market, investors preferred to follow their own private 
information rather than that of the market.  
The observed herding is of interest given that the crisis originated in the US and further 
demonstrates how its effect was amplified in the Chinese markets. These investors may have 
been driven to herd due to the contagion during the GFC (Chiang and Zheng, 2010). Our 
results of herding during the crisis is consistent with the literature that the uncertainty in 
periods of market stress such as crises drives investors to herd, thus confirms the predictions 
of H4. The herding we report pre-crisis is consistent with Hwang and Salmon’s (2004) 
argument that herding is more prevalent during tranquil market condition. During such 
periods investors can respond quickly to the release of news by adjusting their investment 
decisions in line with the aggregate market.  
Our results are consistent with those reported by Laih and Liau (2013) who provide evidence 
of herding in pre and post-crisis periods in the Chinese market during the GFC. Our results 
are also in line with Chiang and Zheng (2010) and Lao and Singh (2011) who find that herd 
behaviour is more prevalent in the Chinese market during the GFC. We report results that 
are in contrast with Yao, et al., (2014) who find no evidence the Chinese markets herd during 
the GFC. The differences in result may be due to sample and crisis period specifications.  
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Table 5.12 Regression estimates for herd behaviour in the Chinese markets around 
the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Panel A: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
 
Period             α         𝛾1               𝛾2         Adj. R
2 
Pre- crisis 0.0102 0.4763 -2.9739 31.82% 
 
  (31.00) *** (12.78) *** (-3.65) *** 
 
Crisis 0.0137 0.3945 -2.9609 32.97% 
 
(17.47) *** (7.16) *** (-4.09) *** 
 
Post- crisis 0.0110 0.3925 -1.1851 38.48% 
  (41.75) *** (13.76) *** (-2.27) **   
 
Panel B: Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
Period 
            
α 
        𝛾1               𝛾2         Adj. R
2 
Pre- crisis 0.1171 0.3163 -1.8103 14.51% 
 
  (33.84) *** (7.47) *** (-1.88) * 
 
Crisis 0.0173 0.1834 -2.0167 3.43% 
 
(20.42) *** (2.90) *** (-2.34) ** 
 
Post- crisis 0.0119 0.2194 -0.2716 16.71% 
  (47.17) *** (7.03) *** (-0.42)    
 
Notes: Table 5.12 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average of the N market returns at time t, the squared market return 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  is used to capture the nonlinearity in the relationship, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute 
deviation of returns for the market, α is the constant, γ1, and γ2 are coefficients, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error 
term at time t. The model is run separately for the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. Pre-crisis 
refers to the period between 01/05/2002 and 31/07/2007. Crisis period refers to the period between 
01/08/2007 and 30/03/2009. Post-crisis refers to the period between 01/04/2009 and 18/10/2016. T-
statistics based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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5.5.4.2.2. Results for industry sectors 
 
Regression results for the industry sectors during the GFC estimated using Eqn. (2) are 
presented in Table 5.13. Panel A reports the results for the SZSE across the 3 sub-crisis 
periods. During the pre-crisis period we find strong evidence of herding, the 𝛾2   coefficents 
are negative and significant for all sectors except the Automobile, Banks, Food & Beverage, 
Financials, and Travel and Leisure sectors. Noticeably, we find evidence of ‘negative’ 
herding in the Financials sector as the 𝛾2   coefficient is positive and significant, indicating 
that the return dispersion is higher than the predictions of rational asset pricing models. This 
behaviour can be described as localised herding where investors move simultaneously in 
(out) of sectors resulting in increased return dispersion (Gebka and Wohar, 2013). Herd 
behaviour is more pronounced during the crisis period, the 𝛾2  coefficient is negative and 
significant in all sectors except the Automobile, Financials and Oil and Gas sectors where 
we observe positive and significant coefficients. The prevalence of industry herding during 
this period may be due to the reduced confidence and increased loss aversion of the investors. 
Another possible reason is that the crisis resulted in a ‘flight to safety’ whereby investors 
rebalance their portfolios with less risky assets during periods of uncertainty. The observed 
herd behaviour persists post-crisis as majority of the sectors except Automobile, Financials, 
Personal and Households, Real Estate, Media, Food and Beverage, and Oil and Gas show 
negative and significant 𝛾2  coefficients. The above results further confirms herding across 
all the crisis periods we find in Table 5.12.  
We obtain similar results for the SHSE reported in Panel B. The results for the pre-crisis 
period show strong evidence of herding in most cases, the 𝛾2  coefficient is negative and 
significant in all sectors except Financials and Telecommunications. Evidence of herding 
becomes stronger during the crisis, the 𝛾2  coefficient is negative and significant in all sectors 
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except the Food and Beverage sector. Again, the herding persists post-crisis, 𝛾2  coefficients 
are negative and significant in all sectors except the Financials, Food and Beverage and Oil 
and Gas sectors. The results we obtain for the pre-crisis and crisis periods are consistent with 
those in Table 5.12. However, the results for the post-crisis period is at odds with those in 
Table 5.12, the herding absent in the aggregate market becomes evident in the sector results.  
Given that China is the world’s leading consumer of food and beverage products62, it is 
important to point out that its sector is strongly driven by ‘negative’ herding. We report 
positive and significant 𝛾2  coefficients for all the crisis sub-periods examined. This suggests 
that investors in the sector herd together against industry consensus regardless of whether 
the market is in a tranquil or crisis state. A possible explanation of this herd behaviour may 
be due to the sophistication of the investors in this sector which increases their reluctance to 
make losses and hence results in the homogeneity of their investment decisions.  
The overall results for industry herd behaviour during the GFC reveal that investors in the 
Chinese market herd significantly pre, during and post-crisis, consistent with H4. Evidently, 
the GFC triggered herding activity as a result of a strong contagion effect.  The findings for 
the crisis phase characterise the presence of intentional herding, where due to the uncertainty 
in the markets investors are motivated by an intent to invest in the same sectors as their peers. 
In contrast herding during the pre and post-crisis period may have been driven by the 
overconfidence bias stemming from their optimistic outlook of the market. Moreover, our 
results are somewhat consistent with those obtained by Zheng, et al., (2017). They find 
herding in 9 out of 10 industries examined (Oil and Gas, Basic Materials, Industrial Goods, 
Consumer Goods, Healthcare, Consumer services, Financials and Technology) during crises 
periods in their study which includes the GFC. They report stronger levels of herding during 
                                                 
62 Source: Report: The Food & Beverage Market in China, EU SME 
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tranquil periods, all the industries herd, probably due to prevailing pessimistic investor 
sentiment. From an international context, our results are like that of BenSaida (2017) who 
provides evidence of herding in 10 out of 12 sectors of all the domestic US firms during the 
GFC.  
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Table 5.13 Regression estimates for industry herd behaviour in the Chinese markets around the Global Financial Crisis 
Panel A: Shenzhen Stock Exchange   
   Pre-crisis           Crisis       Post 
Crisis 
     
Industry α 𝛾1   𝛾2   Adj. R
2 α 𝛾1   𝛾2   Adj. R
2 α 𝛾1   𝛾2  Adj.R
2 
Automobile  0.0071 0.7799 0.1079 89.49% 0.0157 0.4876 1.0207 69.95% 0.0340 0.0100 0.6423 73.82% 
 (15.02)*** (37.27) *** (0.78)   (9.61) *** (6.93) *** (2.29) **  (4.08) *** (25.17) *** (25.39) ***  
Banks 0.0035 0.0163 -0.1113 00.09% 0.0051 0.3057 -3.0369 9.34% 0.0024 0.2353 -1.6800 16.77% 
 (2.82) *** (1.47)  (-0.91)   (7.09) *** (6.13) *** (-5.67) ***  (15.71) *** (12.46) *** (-5.64) ***  
Basic 
Resources 
0.0091 0.5174 -4.3293 27.56% 0.0132 0.4075 -3.6194 23.78% 0.0098 0.3832 -1.1760 37.71% 
 (27.74) *** (15.50) *** (-7.52) ***  (14.66) *** (7.21) *** (-5.15) ***  (40.02) *** (14.00) *** (-2.31) **  
Chemicals 0.0092 0.4891 -2.9449 32.71% 0.0134 0.4402 -3.5786 30.66% 0.0109 0.3584 -1.0489 35.34% 
 (30.04) *** (14.61) *** (-4.60) ***  (15.75) *** (7.67) *** (-4.85) ***  (43.21) *** (13.89) *** (-2.47) **  
Construction 0.0101 0.4520 -3.1220 25.58% 0.0160 0.4687 -1.6193 12.36% 0.0110 0.3909 -1.9067 31.84% 
 (28.64) *** (12.02) *** (-4.15) ***  (13.16) *** (5.73) *** (-4.26) ***  (40.88) *** (14.15) *** (-4.02) ***  
Financials 0.0100 0.2318 4.7954 70.05% 0.0120 -0.1745 6.6353 91.13% 0.1202 7.9997 10.0742 22.10% 
 (21.26) *** (5.29) *** (18.53) ***  (16.17) *** (-4.73) *** (22.37) ***  (13.90) *** (7.20) *** (0.46)  
Food & 
Beverage 
0.4640 22.8677 -47.2278 33.62% 0.2885 13.7133 -81.3592 40.18% 0.0057 0.0203 0.1842 17.66% 
 (3.10) *** (2.16) ** (-0.50)  (12.66) *** (9.59) *** (-4.92) ***  (48.17) *** (2.61) *** (7.55) ***  
Healthcare 0.0091 0.5076 -2.9896 30.29% 0.0125 0.3505 -2.2355 33.62% 0.0100 0.3867 -1.1735 38.61% 
 (26.24) *** (11.40) *** (-3.13) ***  (16.29) *** (6.71) *** (-3.44) ***  (41.13) *** (14.48) *** (-2.38) **  
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Industrial 
Goods 
0.0101 0.4958 -3.7152 31.08% 0.0128 0.3812 -2.9641 29.34% 0.0109 0.3818 -1.2150 36.88% 
 (30.62) *** (13.78) *** (-5.09) ***  (16.44) *** (6.86) *** (-3.99) ***  (40.72) *** (13.30) *** (-2.29) **  
Media 0.0084 0.4171 -2.4632 17.83% 0.0120 0.4908 -4.8549 13.89% 0.0111 0.2385 1.3591 24.32% 
 (17.79) *** (7.96) *** (-2.33) **  (10.55) *** (6.59) *** (-5.55) ***  (12.60) *** (1.55)  (0.38)   
Oil & Gas 0.0066 0.7108 -6.3095 27.01% 0.0106 -0.0080 0.1961 42.94% 0.0077 0.0082 0.2207 25.89% 
 (16.24) *** (15.67) *** (-8.37) ***  (23.34) *** (-1.16) (8.98) ***  (47.83) *** (1.55) (12.52) ***  
Personal & 
Household 
0.0089 0.5000 -4.0793 28.76% 0.0120 0.4908 -4.8549 13.89% 0.0104 0.3785 -0.3547 37.59% 
 (28.75) *** (15.12) *** (-7.02) ***  (10.55) *** (6.59) *** (-5.55) ***  (40.27) *** (12.26) *** (-0.56)   
Real Estate 0.0102 0.5251 -3.1966 32.70% 0.0113 0.5738 -3.6434 58.70% 0.0093 0.4303 -1.1606 38.57% 
 (27.05) *** (10.21) *** (-2.26) **  (16.03) *** (10.73) *** (-4.61) ***  (33.88) *** (11.55) *** (-1.23)  
Retail 0.0098 0.4305 -2.6555 23.60% 0.0137 0.3229 -2.7099 14.74% 0.0096 0.4405 -2.3568 31.39% 
 (26.63) *** (10.55) *** (-3.22) ***  (14.63) *** (5.18) *** (-3.55) ***  (35.17) *** (12.44) *** (-3.16) ***  
Technology 0.0010 0.4345 -2.6179 26.70% 0.0131 0.4098 -3.6636 23.37% 0.0109 0.4830 -1.4311 38.40% 
 (27.50) *** (11.51) *** (-3.32) ***  (15.34) *** (7.04) *** (-4.98) ***  (37.00) *** (15.03) *** (-3.12) ***  
Telecom Insufficie
nt data for  
sample 
period 
  0.0029 0.1805 -1.9963 2.52% 0.0074 0.5643 -4.3738 22.44% 
     (4.28) *** (3.65) *** (-4.15) ***  (18.42) *** (14.22) *** (-6.84) ***  
Travel & 
Leisure 
0.0102 0.3878 -1.0514 22.75% 0.0142 0.3290 -3.1535 12.70% 0.0093 0.4229 -11.8062 32.19% 
 (21.73) *** (5.39) ** (-0.54)  (15.91) *** (5.17) *** (-4.07) ***  (36.85) *** (15.14) *** (-3.71) ***  
Utilities 0.0086 0.4607 -3.2151 27.67% 0.0116 0.4331 -3.6256 25.59% 0.0087 0.4072 -1.9726 32.77% 
  (28.39) *** (13.35) **** (-4.97) ***   (13.84) *** (7.50) *** (-4.96) ***   (35.71) *** (15.51) *** (-4.35) ***   
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Panel B: Shanghai Stock Exchange  
 
   Pre-crisis           Crisis       Post 
Crisis 
     
Industry α 𝛾1   𝛾2   Adj. R
2 α 𝛾1   𝛾2   Adj. R
2 α 𝛾1   𝛾2  Adj.R
2 
Automobile  0.0100 0.4743 -3.4118 24.15% 0.0131 0.3006 -2.3751 17.49% 0.0104 0.3632 -1.3605 30.23% 
 (27.84) *** (13.47) *** (-4.98) ***  (15.17) *** (5.48) *** (-3.61) ***  (38.64) *** (12.92) *** (-2.76) ***  
Banks 0.0034 0.2718 -0.7842 22.11% 0.058 0.3429 -3.1925 25.46% 0.0032 0.2889 -1.8972 32.65% 
 (9.36) *** (4.08) *** (-0.46)   (11.15) *** (9.55) *** (-6.98) ***  (23.41) *** (13.40) *** (-4.00) ***  
Basic 
Resources 
0.0097 0.5110 -4.0561 28.37% 0.0140 0.3815 -3.4097 23.03% 0.0094 0.3822 -1.6799 34.97% 
 (29.20) *** (13.88) *** (-5.47) ***  (15.72) *** (6.74) *** (-4.95) ***  (40.01) *** (16.65) *** (-4.48) ***  
Chemicals 0.0096 0.4684 -2.9773 30.10% 0.0141 0.3897 -2.9773 28.49% 0.0104 0.3713 -1.5074 35.77% 
 (30.35) *** (13.65) *** (-4.24) ***  (15.75) *** (6.48) *** (-4.24) ***  (42.95) *** (15.64) *** (-3.87) ***  
Construction 0.0096 0.4431 -2.1274 28.76% 0.0135 0.4523 -4.2778 18.50% 0.0096 0.3938 -1.9705 32.33% 
 (27.11) *** (11.10) *** (-2.41) **  (15.54) *** (6.67) *** (-5.20) ***  (39.19) *** (15.95) *** (-4.95) ***  
Financials 0.0136 -0.8420 16.3147 6.72% 0.0092 1.1135 -17.8326 1.60% 0.0052 0.4436 -2.9349 2.39% 
 (4.75) *** (-0.16)  (1.25)   (2.63) ** (2.10) ** (-1.84) *  (2.04) ** (1.13)  (-0.41)   
Food & 
Beverage 
0.0177 0.3090 7.1979 31.88% 0.0303 -0.0017 7.6359 27.57% 0.0162 0.4068 6.1587 37.62% 
 (31.54) *** (4.83) *** (5.96) ***  (14.79) *** (-0.01) (2.75) ***  (30.64) *** (5.52) *** (3.73) ***  
Healthcare 0.0096 0.5306 -3.8444 35.10% 0.0134 0.3592 -2.7955 26.04% 0.0095 0.4018 -1.7188 37.67% 
 (31.48) *** (15.68) *** (-5.52) ***  (15.54) *** (6.10) *** (-3.79) ***  (42.85) *** (16.37) *** (-3.91) ***  
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Industrial 
Goods 
0.0102 0.4959 -3.8416 29.86% 0.0133 0.4057 -3.6542 26.73% 0.0010 0.3696 -1.5150 34.09% 
 (32.20) *** (15.38) *** (-6.48) ***  (16.56) *** (7.54) *** (-5.16) ***  (41.76) *** (14.67) *** (-3.56) ***  
Insurance 0.0042 0.1754 -1.9321 3.31% 0.0051 0.2180 -2.2841 6.72% 0.0035 0.1964 -0.8696 21.19% 
 (5.88) *** (3.21) *** (-3.13) ***  (7.82) *** (5.22) *** (-5.17) ***  (22.40) *** (9.56) *** (-2.12) ***  
Media 0.0082 0.5605 -4.6707 24.84% 0.0108 0.5700 -5.7538 23.24% 0.0075 0.4409 -3.7243 25.15% 
 (20.74) *** (11.96) (-4.99) ***  (11.78) *** (-9.59) *** (-8.38) ***  (29.23) *** (18.48) *** (-10.11) ***  
             
Oil & Gas 0.0083 0.6018 -5.3649 23.42% 0.0121 0.5427 -5.7910 19.80% 0.0098 0.1596 4.6784 36.85% 
 (22.51) *** (14.84) *** (-8.63) ***  (13.40) *** (8.00) *** (-6.50) ***  (8.30) *** (0.77)  (1.01)   
             
Personal & 
Household 
0.0089 0.5245 -3.8176 31.37% 0.0131 0.35711 -3.0048 23.88% 0.0105 0.3565 -1.0187 34.11% 
 (29.34) *** (15.92) *** (-6.91) ***  (16.28) *** (7.06) *** (-5.11) ***  (41.91) *** (14.04) *** (-2.61) **  
Real Estate 0.0104 0.4900 -3.2947 29.82% 0.0131 0.4512 -3.4872 37.96% 0.0094 0.4059 -1.7700 38.36% 
 (28.26) *** (11.26) *** (-3.13) ***  (15.95) *** (8.08) *** (-4.77) ***  (39.71) *** (16.73) *** (-14.35) ***  
Retail 0.0093 0.5343 -4.0173 28.94% 0.0136 0.3504 -2.8732 22.89% 0.0096 0.4405 -2.3568 31.39% 
 (28.05) *** (14.28) *** (-5.79) ***  (16.49) *** (6.37) *** (-4.14) ***  (35.17) *** (12.44) *** (-3.16) ***  
Technology 0.0099 0.4559 -3.457 28.22% 0.0135 0.3155 -2.9276 14.49% 0.0102 0.3994 -1.8250 38.40% 
 (29.32) *** (14.79) *** (-6.50) ***  (15.89) *** (5.92) *** (-4.75) ***  (39.20) *** (16.49) *** (-4.90) ***  
Telecom 0.0049 0.3748 0.6467 28.53% 0.0050 0.6078 -5.6271 16.18% 0.0030 0.7142 -6.1897 27.45% 
 (5.00) *** (2.72) *** (0.25)   (4.85) *** (8.03) *** (-7.00) ***  (9.58) *** (19.87) *** (-14.03) ***  
Travel & 
Leisure 
0.0089 0.6016 -5.2418 33.68% 0.0119 0.4528 -4.5965 21.43% 0.0079 0.4647 -2.0667 37.67% 
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 (28.52) *** (17.69) *** (-7.29) ***  (14.22) *** (8.78) *** (-7.71) ***  (33.88) *** (15.66) *** (-3.48) ***  
Utilities 0.0083 0.4636 -3.4451 31.25% 0.0113 0.4194 -3.8480 27.41% 0.0084 0.3763 -1.3324 35.45% 
  (30.72) *** (16.57) *** (-7.95) ***   (15.17) *** (8.63) *** (-6.62) ***   (39.32) *** (14.73) *** (-3.57) ***   
 
Notes: Table 5.13 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average of the N sector returns at time t, the squared market return 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  is used to capture the nonlinearity in the relationship, 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns for the sectors, α is the constant, γ1, and γ2 are coefficients, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term at time t. The 
model is run for the separately for the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. Pre-crisis refers to the period between 01/05/2002 and 31/07/2007. Crisis 
period refers to the period between 01/08/2007 and 30/03/2009. Post-crisis refers to the period between 01/04/2009 and 18/10/2016. T-statistics based on 
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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5.5.5 Impact of the US market on herding in the Chinese Market  
 
In the last two decades, there has been a substantial increase in global financial integration. 
Along with the benefits of integration such as growth capital flows between industrial and 
developing economies comes the adverse effects of financial contagion (Prasad, Rogoff, Wei 
and Kose, 2005). Chiang and Zheng (2010) point out that herd behaviour in a country can 
be influenced by herd behaviour in neighbouring and or global markets. Indeed, they provide 
evidence that investors herd around the US market. Accordingly, we investigate the impact 
of the US market on herding in the Chinese markets and sectors using data from the SZSE 
and SHSE. This investigation is important given that U.S. exports to China increased by 
491% between 2002 and 201763. Therefore, we include the US market (sector) return squared 
and CSAD as shown in equation 6. We analyse the results in the sections below.  
5.5.5.1 Results for the aggregate market 
Table 5.14 presents the results of the regression estimated for both markets across our sub-
periods. From the results for the SZSE reported in Panel A, we observe that across the 
periods herd behaviour is absent as reflected by the negative but not statistically 
significant 𝛾4 coefficients. Thus, the evidence suggests that the SZSE does not herd with the 
US market. Interestingly, the results for the SHSE reported in Panel B contrast with these 
results. The 𝛾4 coefficients are negative and significant across all the sub-periods, indicating 
a dominant impact of the US return dispersion in the SHSE. Consequently, fluctuations in 
the US market returns induces herd behaviour in the SHSE.  
We conjecture that investor composition is a reasonable explanation for the differences in 
the results we obtain for both markets. Chen, Nofsinger and Rui (2004) suggest that because 
major Chinese firms and choice universities are in Shanghai, the investors are likely to more 
                                                 
63 Source: China-U.S. Trade Issues 
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sophisticated and informed than most parts of China. As a result, these investors may be 
more informed about global markets such as the US which increases the tendency to herd 
with these markets. In addition, the difference in size of the firms in both exchanges can 
provide another explanation for the differences in the results. The SHSE consists of mainly 
larger firms while SZSE consists of smaller firms. Larger firms are more likely involved in 
international trade and are therefore more prone to herd with the markets where these firms 
are located. Furthermore, the results can be explained by the increased trading relationship 
between the US and China: the imports from China to the US increased by 80% between 
2000 and 2017 (United States Census Bureau, 2018), making China the top trading partner 
of the US. This rapidly developing relationship further increases the tendency to herd. 
Overall, our results are in line with the predictions of H5; US returns play a role in herding 
in the Chinese markets. Our results for the SHSE are consistent with those reported by Luo 
and Schinckus (2015), they find the US has positive influence on herding in the Shanghai 
A-share market. Similarly, our results partly consistent with those of Chiang and Zheng 
(2010) who provide evidence that US returns influence herding in the Chinese stock market. 
Having obtained evidence from the aggregate market, we examine the sector results in the 
next section.  
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Table 5.14 Analysis of the impact of the US market on herding behaviour in the 
Chinese markets 
Panel A: Shenzhen Stock Exchange  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Table 5.14 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝛾3  𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑈𝑆,𝑡 + 𝛾4  𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑚,𝑡
2 +  𝜀𝑡                                                
Year    1990                         1996       2011 
  α                  0.0108               0.0104                   0.0106      
                      (76.01) ***       (59.69)***                 (36.58)***  
 𝛾1                 0.0005             -0.5025                   -0.0723 
                     (0.14)               (-11.59) ***              (-8.84)***    
 𝛾2                 0.3600              0.5034                    0.4233     
                     (29.15) ***         (24.57) ***              (12.61)***    
 𝛾3                 -0.2848           -3.6938                  -1.2826      
                     ( -1.76) *           ( -9.21) ***               (-2.13) ** 
𝛾4                  -0.0083              -0.0079                 -0.0019  
                     ( -1.21)             ( -1.18)                    (-0.14)    
 
 Adj. R2        40.74 %             33.03%                42.28% 
Year    1990                             1996  2011 
  α                  0.0122               0.0121                    0.0118    
                      (66.86)***           (74.69)***               (42.65)***   
 𝛾1                 0.2601               0.2651                     0.1765     
                     (18.46) ***         (15.30)***                 (5.28)***   
 𝛾2                  -0.3371            -0.9223                   1.0676      
                     (-14.23) ***        ( -2.88) ***                (1.59)    
𝛾3                  -0.3847             -0.6555                    1.5562 
                     (-9.53) ***         ( -2.66)***                 (3.40)*** 
𝛾4                  -0.0211             -0.0225                    -0.0280 
                     (-2.62) ***         ( -2.95)***                 (-1.84)*  
 
 Adj. R2        10.15 %               17.30%                    22.25% 
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where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average of the N market returns at time t, the squared market return 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  is used to capture the nonlinearity in the relationship, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑈𝑆,𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute 
deviation of returns for the US market and 𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑚,𝑡is the return for the US market, α is the constant, 
𝛾1, and 𝛾2   are coefficients, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term at time t. The model is run for the whole period 
and the 1996 and 2011 sub-periods. T-statistics based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
5.5.4.5.2. Results for industry sectors 
 
In this section we analyse sector results to investigate the impact of US sector returns on 
herd behaviour in corresponding Chinese sectors. Due to the close trading relationship 
between the US and China it is more likely to observe imitative behaviour especially in 
industries that trade heavily with the US64.  To this end, we conduct similar tests using sector 
data.  
Table 5.15 presents the regression results for Eq. (6). The results for the SZSE across the 
sub-periods are reported in Panel A. For the full sample, we observe negative and significant 
 𝛾3 coefficients in only the Banks, Industrial Goods, Personal and Household, Technology 
and Telecommunications sectors, indicating that investors in these sectors herd with their 
US counterparts. In addition, the results suggest ‘negative’ herd behaviour in Basic 
Resources, Chemicals, Food and Beverage, Media, Oil and Gas, and Real Estate, with 
positive and significant coefficients. This suggests that investors in these six sectors 
simultaneously herd away from the industry consensus of their US counterparts resulting a 
in increased dispersion in returns than that predicted by asset pricing models. For the 1996 
sub-period, we obtain negative and significant  𝛾3 coefficients in only the Automobile, 
Construction, Financials, Industrial Goods, Technology and Telecommunications, implying 
that investors in these sectors strongly follow the analyses and information of their 
                                                 
64 According to the United States International Trade Commission from 2013-2016 the top 5 China in sectors 
that traded with the US are Agriculture, Transportation equipment, electronic products, chemical and related 
products, minerals and metals. 
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corresponding US sectors. The herding coefficient   𝛾3 is significant and positive in Banks, 
Food and Beverage and Real Estate sectors. This indicates that during this period, investors 
make investment decisions based on their private information rather than the trading 
behaviour or sector news of US investors in corresponding sectors.  The results for the 2011 
sub-period suggests that herding occurs in almost half of the sectors: Automobile, 
Chemicals, Construction, Financials, Industrial Good, Media, Personal and Households, 
Technology and Travel and Leisure sectors. From our results we find that the technology 
sector in China herds with that of the U.S. across all sub-periods. This could be due to the 
significant amount of computer equipment imports from China, the second of the top five 
U.S. import from China65. Overall these results are in contrast those in the reported in Table 
5.14, where we find no evidence of herding, which is consistent with the argument that 
herding is more likely to occur at the sector level.    
The evidence for SHSE is reported in Panel B. There is limited evidence of herd behaviour 
during the 1990 period, as shown by the negative and significant 𝛾3 coefficients in the 
Automobile, Telecommunications and Travel and Leisure sectors. However, we find 
‘negative’ herding in the Banks, Basic Resources, Media, Oil and Gas, Real Estate and Retail 
sectors. A few more industries herd during the 1996 sub-period, we report negative and 
significant coefficients in the Automobile, Industrial Good, Oil and Gas, Personal and 
Households and Technology sector while the we find ‘negative’ herding in the Banks sector. 
Herd behaviour further increases during the 2011 sub-period where we find negative and 
significant 𝛾3 coefficients in the Automobile, Chemicals, Construction, Financials, 
Industrial Goods, Oil and Gas and Technology sectors. We note that herding occurs in the 
Automobile sector across all sub-periods, this is interesting because according to the US 
                                                 
65 Source: China- U.S. Trade Issues 
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Census Bureau, China imports substantial auto parts from the US which has increased by 
almost 90% between 2002 and 2016 (US Census Bureau, 2016). Similarly, US annual auto 
trade with China increased by almost 100% during the same period (US Census Bureau, 
2016). The significant increase in auto trade between both countries is a possible explanation 
for the persistent herd behaviour we find.  
In summary, our results for the impact of U.S. sectors on herding in Chinese sectors provide 
limited evidence of herding. Further, we find that more sectors in SZSE exhibit herd 
behaviour compared to the SHSE. In addition, a few sectors herd ‘negatively’ with the U.S. 
sectors. We observe this as evidence that investors in the Chinese sectors seem to mimic the 
trading decisions of their U.S. counterparts, particularly in sectors where there is significant 
trade between both countries. Furthermore, there is limited evidence in support of H5. Our 
results are somewhat like those of Zheng, et al., (2017) that show that Chinese industries do 
not follow the US market closely.  
Table 5.15 Analysis of impact of the US market on industry herding behaviour in the 
Chinese markets 
Panel A: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
 
                                                               1990  
Industry               α           𝛾1                   𝛾2              𝛾3                   𝛾4              Adj.R
2 (%)  
      
Auto 
0.0066 0.7885 -0.1925             0.0094 -0.4024 91.51 
   
(17.77) *** (64.98) *** (-6.26) ***      (  4.12) *** (-1.24)   
Banks 
0.0010 0.0847 -0.5506        0.0020 -0.3201 5.72 
 
(13.90) *** (12.53) *** (-9.94) ***      (0.89)  (4.48) ***  
Basic  
Resources 
0.0101 0.2725 -1.1357       0.0008 0.3066 16.66 
 
(59.29) *** (16.45) *** (-5.96) ***     (0.19) (4.39) ***  
Chemicals 
0.0107 0.2372 -0.5897         0.0023 0.4544 15.66 
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(61.27) *** (12.95) *** (-2.03) **        (0.54) (3.06) ***  
Construct 
0.0106 0.3225 -0.2990         0.0003 -0.1206 28.89 
 
(65.46) *** (23.39) *** (-1.64)               (0.07) (-0.96)   
Financials 
0.0094 0.1246 1.3113         0.0582 0.0330 23.03 
 
(14.06) *** (1.54)  (1.16)                 (9.55) *** (-0.39)  
Food & 
Beverage 
0.1214 11.2548 -27.6944       0.5037 45.7895 29.69 
 
(14.37) *** (12.51) *** (-2.11) **        (2.25) ** (2.88) ***  
Healthcare 
0.0105 0.2682 -0.8234         -0.0169 0.0978 14.22 
 
(27.74) *** (5.40) *** (-1.08)                (-3.56) *** (0.42)   
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0107 0.3712 -0.1813          0.0026 -0.4153 35.37 
 
(56.04) *** (17.41) *** (-0.53)                  (0.57) (-1.98) **  
Media 
0.0088 0.2085 -1.1153           0.0078 0.4722 5.55 
 
(32.81) *** (8.74) *** (-4.18) ***        (1.47) (2.60) ***  
Oil & Gas 
0.0083 0.3976 -2.3785          0.0102 0.2606 15.54 
 
(32.21) *** (14.16) *** (-5.93) ***            (1.82) * (3.38) ***  
Personal& 
Household 
0.0104 0.3707 0.9610          0.0130 -0.7953 35.08 
 
(30.71) *** (6.80) *** (0.85)            (2.40) ** (-2.93) ***  
Real  
Estate 
0.0099 0.3783 -0.4208         0.0113 0.1489 39.20 
 
(63.22) *** (23.95) *** (-1.67) *         (2.80) *** (3.13) ***  
Retail 
0.0108 0.2724 -0.5477          0.0010 0.2637 17.70 
 
(47.51) *** (10.87) *** (-1.58)            (0.21) (1.22)  
Tech 
0.0110 0.2659 -0.9241          0.0051 -0.2481 15.40 
 
(53.03) *** (14.70) *** (-4.45) ***        (1.18) (-2.70) ***  
Telecom 
0.0068 0.5335 -5.2911         -0.0032 -0.8755 13.47 
 
(19.48) *** (18.18) *** (-13.92) ***       (-0.39) (-2.56) **  
Travel & 
Leisure 
0.0102 0.2096 -0.5642       0.0118 0.3767 9.61 
 
(47.79) *** (8.03) *** (-1.24)         (2.44) ** (0.02)  
Utilities 
0.0094 0.3232 -0.9882         0.0029 0.0094 26.93 
  
(56.06) *** (17.83) *** (-3.80) ***      (0.60) (0.66)   
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                                                               1996  
Industry               α           𝛾1                   𝛾2               𝛾3             𝛾4          Adj.R
2 (%)  
      
Auto 
0.0082 0.7418 0.1566           0.0162 -0.7437 88.04            
   
(28.26) *** (56.36) *** (2.14) **          (5.50) *** (-2.31) **  
Banks 
0.0011 0.1212 -0.8988           0.0027 0.2759 6.90 
 
(11.12) *** (11.20) *** (-6.72) ***        (0.95) (4.17) ***  
Basic  
Resources 
0.0093 0.4602 -3.4206          -0.0181 0.0782 26.71 
 
(34.27) *** (11.49) *** (-4.50) ***       (-3.93) *** (1.25)   
Chemicals 
0.0097 0.4700 -3.3944           -0.0398 0.0113 29.83 
 
(59.14) *** (26.13) *** (-10.67) ***     (-8.87) *** (0.08)   
Construct 
0.0103 0.4887 -3.9656         -0.0500 -0.2413 26.13 
 
(58.14) *** (27.77) *** (-13.59) ***   (-10.34) *** (-2.01) **  
Financials 
0.0100 0.1082 2.2778          0.0704 -0.2148 34.07 
 
(10.53) *** (0.93) (1.38)                  (11.10) *** (-2.25) **  
Food & 
Beverage 
0.1214 11.2548 -27.6944       0.5037 45.7895 29.69 
 
(14.37) *** (12.51) *** (-2.11) **        (2.25) ** (2.88) ***  
Healthcare 
0.0097 0.5165 -3.9707         -0.0396 -0.0842 30.60 
 
(57.08) *** (26.45) *** (-11.38) ***      (-8.22) *** (0.41)   
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0104 0.4883 -3.4854         -0.0443 -0.3854 30.98 
 
(55.11) *** (20.66) *** (-7.24) ***          (-9.57) *** (-2.04) **  
Media 
0.0089 0.3648 -2.2043           -0.002 0.0089 12.95 
 
(26.58) *** (8.42) *** (-2.78) ***         (-0.04) (0.24)  
Oil & Gas 
0.0080 0.5656 -4.2447         -0.0070 -0.0096 23.30 
 
(24.41) *** (11.36) *** (-4.03) ***       (-1.15) (-0.13)  
Personal& 
Household 
0.0098 0.5093 -3.3633         -0.0288 -0.3575 30.02 
 
(49.47) *** (18.60) *** (-5.56) ***       (-5.57) *** (-1.63)  
Real  
Estate 
0.0096 0.5293 -3.7016         -0.0308 0.1037 33.72 
 
(52.80) *** (22.91) *** (-7.42) ***          (-6.47) *** (1.94) *  
Retail 
0.0099 0.5041 -3.8918         -0.0375 -0.1038 25.32 
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(54.51) *** (24.09) *** (-10.11) ***     (-7.06) *** (-0.45)  
Tech 
0.0107 0.4156 -2.1125        -0.0146 -0.4995 27.95 
 
(27.84) *** (7.44) *** (-1.95) *         (28.68) *** (-4.92) ***  
Telecom 
0.0068 0.5335 -5.2911         -0.0032 -0.8755 13.47 
 
(19.48) *** (18.18) *** (-13.92) ***        (-0.39) (-2.56) ***  
Travel & 
Leisure 
0.0097 0.4441 -3.1086        -0.0112 0.0722 23.38 
 
(42.87) *** (14.91) *** (-5.38) ***        (-2.24) ** (1.14)  
Utilities 
0.0087 0.4881 -3.5424         -0.0295 -0.0116 26.56 
  
(50.19) *** (22.57) *** (-8.61) ***       (-6.15) *** (-0.06)   
 
                                                               2011  
Industry               α           𝛾1                   𝛾2                     𝛾3                                 𝛾4                       Adj.R
2 (%) 
Auto 
0.0098 0.6773 -0.2868          0.0527 -1.5505 
                                                       
69.20 
   
(18.87) *** (17.21) *** (-0.55)                  (6.98) ***   (-1.71) *  
Banks 
0.0021 0.2514 -1.7655          0.0203 -0.1665 20.29 
 
(-0.74)  (11.55) *** (-5.27) ***           (3.58) ***  (-0.74)   
Basic  
Resources 
0.0094 0.3962 -0.4895         -0.0463 -01212 43.79 
 
(33.84) *** (13.16) *** (-0.98)           (-5.38) *** (-0.41)   
Chemicals 
0.0105 0.3849 -0.5290        -0.0630 -0.5290 38.71 
 
(36.26) *** (12.67) *** (-1.64) ***      (-7.42) *** (-1.64) **  
Construct 
0.0108 0.4134 -1.8137        -0.0743 -1.0617 35.93 
 
(58.14) *** (12.75) *** (-3.32) ***      (-8.63) *** (-3.01) **  
Financials 
0.0086 0.4794 -3.7216         -0.0065 -1.3396 26.39 
 244 | P a g e  
 
 
(25.55) *** (14.36) *** (-6.95) ***       (-0.76) (-4.04) ***  
Food & 
Beverage 
0.0863 4.3954 -23.1741      -0.6085 4.4042 11.54 
 
(19.53) *** (8.25) *** (-2.28) ***         (-3.45) *** (0.29)  
Healthcare 
0.0097 0.4215 -1.4255         -0.0524 -0.0285 41.48 
 
(33.83) *** (13.44) *** (-2.60) ***      (-6.34) *** (0.97)   
Industrial 
Goods 
0.0106 0.4155 -1.2299        -0.0694 -0.9904 41.39 
 
(34.57) *** (12.21) *** (-1.99) **           (-8.18) *** (-2.45) **  
Media 
0.0112 0.2321 4.5491           0.0447 -0.9258 44.52 
 
(9.48) *** (1.17)  (1.05) **         (4.23) *** (-2.01) **  
Oil & Gas 
0.0111 0.2513 1.9043          0.0399 -0.5426 28.98 
 
(10.52) *** (1.42)  (0.47)                  (3.53) *** (-1.48)  
Personal& 
Household 
0.0102 0.4273 -0.4603        -0.0652 -1.4024 42.58 
 
(34.12) *** (11.63) *** (-0.63)               (-6.73) *** (-3.15) ***  
Real  
Estate 
0.0089 0.4943 -2.1740         -0.0516 -0.5185 42.40 
 
(30.52) *** (15.30) *** (-3.90) ***       (-5.69) *** (-1.19)   
Retail 
0.0091 0.5018 -2.7427         -0.0631 -0.3354 35.68 
 
(28.19) *** (11.59) *** (-3.10) ***       (-6.33) *** (-0.49)  
Tech 
0.0108 0.4341 -1.5478         -0.0505 -0.8667 41.20 
 
(31.55) *** (13.82) *** (-3.01) ***           (-6.19) *** (-1.88) *  
Telecom 
0.0073 0.6132 -4.4512          0.0073 -0.6420 28.13 
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(14.88) *** (13.16) *** (-5.91) ***        (0.71)  (-0.71)  
Travel & 
Leisure 
0.0088 0.4837 -1.7916         -0.0376 -0.8612 40.13 
 
(30.77) *** (14.81) *** (3.32) ***            (-3.76) *** (2.23) **  
Utilities 
0.0082 0.4480 -2.2876         -0.0449 0.0919 35.98 
  
(29.27) *** (14.61) *** (-4.56) ***          (-4.92) ***  (0.13)  
 
 
Panel B: Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
                                                               1990  
Industry                    α                  𝛾1                  𝛾2                      𝛾3                     𝛾4                     Adj.R
2 (%)  
      
Automobile  0.0106 0.3212 -0.3697              0.0144 -0.2519         28.96 
 
(66.14) *** (22.52) *** (-1.91) *                     (3.27) *** (-2.04) **  
Banks 0.0026 0.2945 -1.9525              0.0055 0.0829 23.00 
 
(22.10) *** (15.99) *** (-4.73) ***                 (1.38) (2.52) **  
Basic 
Resources 0.0114 0.1518 0.8902             -0.0112 0.3534 54.75 
 
(45.75) *** (7.48) *** (9.48) ***            (-2.44) ** (4.63) ***  
Chemicals 0.0110 0.3226 -0.3323             0.0141 -0.0445 29.66 
 
(58.62) *** (15.30) *** (-0.97)                     (3.18) *** (-0.28)   
Construction 0.0106 0.3108 -0.8168           0.0102 0.0313 21.88 
 
(47.41) *** (12.44) *** (-2.39) **               (2.21) ** (0.26)   
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Financials 0.0197 -1.2901 19.8914           3.8317 1.5310 6.06 
 
(7.33) *** (-3.65) *** (3.08) ***          (7.01) *** (1.76) *  
Food & 
Beverage 0.0170 0.6057 3.0236             0.0002 0.3660 35.83 
 
(43.14) *** (13.94) *** (4.43) ***          (0.02) (0.32)  
Health Care 0.0097 0.4103 0.0764           -0.0035 0.1506 40.78 
 
(51.32) *** (17.44) *** (0.21)                    (-0.71) (0.55)   
Industrial 
Goods 0.0114 0.2431 1.8703            -0.0293 -0.3746 63.50 
 
(45.97) *** (12.73) *** (20.70) ***        (-6.32) *** (-1.55)   
Insurance 0.0036 0.2264 -1.8431          0.0100 0.1011 15.26 
 (23.63) *** (14.58) *** (-7.70) ***        (2.49) ** (1.50)   
Media 0.0092 0.2773 -1.7801            0.0074 0.3809 10.44 
 
(38.70) *** (11.74) *** (-6.11) ***         (1.56) (2.22) **  
Oil & Gas 0.0076 0.3106 -2.7860        -0.0216 0.3624 6.20 
 
(10.63) *** (2.85) *** (-1.47)                (-3.53) *** (4.91) ***  
Personal& 
Household 0.0108 0.3465 -0.1203          0.0060 -0.2681 34.68 
 
(60.23) *** (16.84) *** (-0.35)            (1.32) (-1.18)  
Real Estate 0.0109 0.2463 0.0891         -0.0071 0.2943 39.32 
 
(29.17) *** (8.56) *** (4.42) ***        (-1.66) (5.07) ***  
Retail 0.0096 0.2826 -0.9663        -0.0025 0.3927 21.54 
 
(59.22) *** (18.02) *** (-6.66) ***      (-0.65) (2.12) **  
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Technology 0.0109 0.2340 -0.7089         0.0038 0.1360 12.18 
 
(47.54) *** (12.02) *** (-5.85) ***      (0.92) (1.31)   
Telecom 0.0030 0.2791 -0.5252        0.0079 -0.5252 9.13 
 
(13.56) *** (11.12) *** (-4.52) ***      (1.60) (-2.90) ***  
Travel & 
Leisure 0.0089 0.4983 -0.8175         0.0255 -0.3117 40.12 
 
(48.62) *** (24.90) *** (-2.41) **       (4.97) *** (2.31) **  
Utilities 0.0100 0.2599 -0.1347     -0.0326 0.1001 21.19 
  (29.64) *** (5.91) *** (-0.21)            (-6.67) *** (0.54)  
  
                                                               1996  
Industry                    α                     𝛾1               𝛾2                   𝛾3                  𝛾4               Adj.R
2 (%)  
      
Automobile  0.0099 0.4533 -3.3343             -0.0414 -0.2414 26.82 
 
(59.90) *** (26.43) *** (-10.86) ***       (-8.77) ***   (-2.12) **  
Banks 0.0026 0.2945 -1.9525            0.0055 0.0829 23.00 
 
(22.10) *** (15.99) *** (-4.73) ***         (1.38) (2.52) **  
Basic 
Resources 0.0097 0.5039 -3.8278            -0.0204 0.0607 28.10 
 
(54.28) *** (24.23) *** (-10.17) ***       (-4.14) ***   (0.83)   
Chemicals 0.0101 0.4698 -3.4062          -0.0516 0.0097 30.08 
 
(61.82) *** (27.27) *** (-11.18) ***     (-11.27) ***   (0.06)   
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Construction 0.0096 0.5163 -3.8973         -0.0312 -0.1478 28.85 
 
(56.62) *** (29.68) *** (-14.16) ***        (-6.26) ***   (-1.26)   
Financials 0.0152 -0.4006 10.9240        2.1507 0.3073 2.91 
 
(4.14) *** (-0.73)  (1.10)        (13.83) ***   (0.42)  
Food & 
Beverage 0.0154 0.4820 5.1561       -0.0017 -1.0129 39.80 
 
(26.24) *** (5.81) *** (2.87) ***     (-0.17) (-0.49)  
Health Care 0.0090 0.4456 -1.9760      -0.0374 -0.6136 41.53 
 
(35.06) *** (15.40) *** (-4.01) ***     (-7.94) ***   (0.85)   
Industrial 
Goods 0.0096 0.4075 -1.6758      -0.0462 -1.3843 38.37 
 
(34.99) *** (13.60) *** (-3.43) ***     (-9.98) ***   (-3.61) ***   
Insurance 0.0034 0.2149 -1.0550      -0.0897 -0.0103 23.74 
 (19.27) *** (9.57) *** (-2.41) ***   (-2.06) ** (-0.04)   
Media 0.0071 0.4580 -3.7920     -0.0109 -0.5475 28.04 
 
(24.74) *** (17.33) *** (-9.58) ***   (-2.08) **  (-1.07)   
Oil & Gas 0.0104 0.1184 5.3332      -0.0216 -0.9641 38.89 
 
(7.87) *** (0.54)  (1.13)         (-3.53) ***   (-2.12) **  
Personal& 
Household 0.0105 0.3702 -0.9171     -0.0386 -0.9576 36.41 
 
(35.93) *** (12.30) *** (-2.06) **    (-7.83) ***   (-1.94) *  
Real Estate 0.0091 0.4442 -1.9388     -0.0484 -0.2684 41.27 
 
(33.40) *** (15.21) *** (-4.00) ***    (-10.97) ***   (-0.55)  
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Retail 0.0086 0.4354 -2.2025      -0.0373 0.3194 39.44 
 
(32.44) *** (14.52) *** (-4.32) ***    (-8.32) ***   (0.46)  
Technology 0.0100 0.4431 -2.1035     -0.0341 -1.3583 39.20 
 
(32.71) *** (15.68) *** (-5.20) ***    (-7.06) ***   (-2.92) ***  
Telecom 0.0024 0.7932 -7.0820      -0.0008 -0.9618 30.69 
 
(6.85) *** (19.54) *** (-15.41) ***   (-0.15) (-1.27)   
Travel & 
Leisure 0.0074 0.5206 -2.2043      -0.0305 -0.7500 42.47 
 
(26.81) *** (14.15) *** (-3.07) ***       (-5.72) ***   (-1.53)  
Utilities 0.0081 0.4040 -1.4760     -0.0279 0.7204 41.45 
  (35.04) *** (14.92) *** (-3.64) ***    (-5.99) ***   (1.10)   
 
                                                               2011  
Industry                    α                     𝛾1               𝛾2                     𝛾3                    𝛾4           Adj.R
2 (%)  
      
Automobile  0.0100 0.3796      -1.3071          -0.0502 -0.8641 34.03 
 
(33.40) *** (11.58) *** (-2.37) ***       (-5.72) *** (-3.67) ***  
Banks 0.0031 0.3083 -2.0586           0.0191 -0.1512 32.43 
 
(19.46) *** (12.16) *** (-3.88) ***          (3.24) *** (-1.11)   
Basic 
Resources 0.0089 0.4017 -1.4230          -0.0321 -0.2658 39.72 
 
(33.58) *** (14.86) *** (-3.28) ***          (-3.91) *** (-1.08)   
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Chemicals 0.0102 0.3871 -1.5337         -0.0641 -0.4537 38.20 
 
(36.90) *** (14.10) *** (-3.60) ***     (-8.13) *** (-1.70) *  
Construction 0.0093 0.4310 -2.1665        -0.0402 -1.0875 35.93 
 
(32.54) *** (14.84) *** (-4.82) ***       (-4.78) *** (-3.60) ***  
Financials 0.0061 0.3754 -1.1825        1.0841 -4.7448 4.05 
 
(2.22) ** (0.89)  (-0.16)               (13.92) *** (-3.36) ***  
Food & 
Beverage 0.0154 0.4820 5.1561         0.0224 -1.0129 39.80 
 
(26.24) *** (5.81) *** (2.87) ***      (1.10) (-0.49)  
Health Care 0.0090 0.4456 -1.9760       -0.0538 -0.6136 41.53 
 
(35.06) *** (15.40) *** (-4.01) ***     (-6.51) *** (-0.85)   
Industrial 
Goods 0.0096 0.4075 -1.6758       -0.0538 -1.3843 38.37 
 
(34.99) *** (13.60) *** (-3.43) ***       (-6.47) *** (-3.61) ***  
Insurance 0.0034 0.2149 -1.0550      -0.0014 -0.0103 23.74 
 (19.27) *** (9.57) *** (-2.41) **        (-0.95) (-0.04)   
Media 0.0071 0.4580 -3.7920       -0.0100 -0.5475 28.04 
 
(24.74) *** (17.33) *** (-9.58) ***    (-1.35) (-1.07)   
Oil & Gas 0.0104 0.1184 5.3332        0.0703 -0.9641 38.89 
 
(7.87) *** (0.54)  (1.13)         (6.04) *** (-2.12) **  
Personal& 
Household 0.0105 0.3702 -0.9171     -0.0664 -0.9576 36.41 
 
(35.93) *** (12.30) *** (-2.06) ***   (-7.57) *** (-1.94)   
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Real Estate 0.0091 0.4442 -1.9388       -0.0552 -0.2684 41.27 
 
(33.40) *** (15.21) *** (-4.00) ***     (-6.64) *** (-0.55)  
Retail 0.0086 0.4354 -2.2025        -0.0404 0.3194 39.44 
 
(32.44) *** (14.52) *** (-4.32) ***     (-4.92) *** (0.46)  
Technology 0.0100 0.4431 -2.1035       -0.0419 -1.3583 39.20 
 
(32.71) *** (15.68) *** (-5.20) ***     (5.11) *** (-2.92) ***  
Telecom 0.0024 0.7932 -7.8020        0.0058 -0.9288 30.69 
 
(6.85) *** (19.64) *** (-15.41) ***    (0.53) (-1.27)   
Travel & 
Leisure 0.0074 0.5206 -2.2043        -0.0206 -0.7500 42.47 
 
(26.81) *** (14.15) *** (-3.07) ***      (-2.07) ** (-1.53)   
Utilities 0.0081 0.4040 -1.4760        -0.0536 0.7204 41.45 
  (35.04) *** (14.92) *** (-3.64) ***      (-6.78) *** (1.10)  
 
Notes: Table 5.15 reports the estimates from the following equation:  
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2  𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑈𝑆,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑚,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡                                                
 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡is the cross-sectional average of the N sector returns at time t, the squared market return 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  is used to capture the nonlinearity in the relationship, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑈𝑆,𝑡 is the cross-sectional absolute 
deviation of returns for the US sectors and 𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑚,𝑡is the return for the US sectors, α is the constant, 
γ1, and γ2 are coefficients, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term at time t. The model is run for the whole period 
and the 1996 and 2011 sub-periods. T-statistics based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 252 | P a g e  
 
Table 5.16 Summary of Results for herding in Chinese markets 
Test Shenzhen Stock Exchange  Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Market herding  Yes (all periods) Yes (Whole sample and 2nd sub-
period) 
Industry herding Whole period: Automobile, Banks, 
Basic Resources, Chemicals, Food 
and Beverage, Media, Oil and Gas, 
Real Estate, Technology, 
Telecommunication, and Utilities.  
 
1st sub-period: all except 
Automobile and Financials.  
 
2nd sub-period: Banks, Chemicals, 
Construction, Financials, Food and 
Beverage, Industrial Goods, Real 
Estate, Retail, Technology, 
Telecommunications, and Travel & 
Leisure, and Utilities.  
Whole period: except for Basic 
Resources, Financials, Food and 
Beverage, Health Care, Industrial 
Goods, Oil & Gas, Personal 
Holding, Real Estate and Utilities. 
 
1st sub-period: all except for 
Financials, and Food & Beverage. 
 
2nd sub-period: all except for Food 
and Beverage, and Oil and Gas 
Herding: rising 
(declining) 
market returns 
 
Market level 
Rising market: Yes (only in the 1st 
sub-period). 
 
Declining market: Yes (all periods). 
Rising market: Yes (only in the 1st 
sub-period). 
 
Declining market: Yes (only in the 
1st sub-period). 
Herding: rising 
(declining) 
market returns 
 
Sector level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whole period 
Rising market: Automobile, Banks, 
Basic Resources, Media, Oil and 
Gas, Personal and Household, Real 
Estate, Retail, Technology, 
Telecommunications, & Utilities. 
 
Declining market: all except 
Personal and Household. 
 
1st sub-period:  
Rising market: the all s except for 
Financials, Food and Beverage, Oil 
and Gas, and Real Estate 
 
Declining market: all except 
Automobile, Personal & Household. 
 
 
2nd sub-period:  
Rising market: all except for 
Healthcare, Media, Oil and Gas, 
Personal and Household, Travel and 
Leisure and Utilities. 
 
Whole period 
Rising market: Banks, 
Construction, Insurance, Media, Oil 
& Gas, Retail, Technology, & 
Telecommunications. 
 
Declining market: all except for 
Banks, Food and Beverage, 
Industrial Goods, Real Estate, 
Telecommunications & Utilities.  
 
1st sub-period:  
Rising market: all except for 
Financials, Food & Beverage, & 
Personal & Household. 
 
Declining market: Bank, 
Financials, Telecommunications. 
 
 
2nd sub-period:  
Rising market: Automobile, Banks, 
Construction, Industrial Goods, 
Media, Insurance, Real Estate, 
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Declining market: all  
 
 
 
 
Technology, Telecommunication & 
Utilities  
Declining market: all except for 
Bank, Food & Beverage, & 
Insurance. 
 
Herding: high 
(low) volatility 
 
Market level 
High volatility: Yes (1st sub-period). 
 
Low volatility: Yes (whole period & 
2nd sub-period). 
High volatility: Yes (whole period 
& 1st sub-period). 
Low volatility: Yes (2nd sub-
period). 
Herding: high 
(low) volatility 
 
Sector level 
Whole period 
High volatility: all except for 
Chemicals, Financials, Food and 
Beverage, Healthcare, Industrial 
Goods, Personal & Household, Real 
Estate, and Travel & Leisure  
Low volatility: all  
 
1st sub-period:  
High volatility: all except for 
Automobile, Financials, Food and 
Beverage and Technology  
Low volatility: all except for 
Automobile, & Telecommunication. 
 
 
2nd sub-period:  
High volatility: all expect for 
Automobile, Chemicals, 
Construction, Healthcare, Industrial 
Goods, Media, Oil & Gas, & 
Technology. 
 
Low volatility: Automobile, Banks, 
Financials, Telecommunications, & 
Utilities.  
 
Whole period 
High volatility: all except 
Automobile, Chemicals, 
Healthcare, Personal & Household, 
Oil & Gas, & Utilities. 
 
Low volatility: all except Basic 
Resources and Technology. 
 
1st sub-period:  
High volatility: all except 
Financials, Insurance, Industrial 
Good, and Oil & Gas 
 
Low volatility: all except Financials 
and Telecommunications. 
 
2nd sub-period:  
High volatility: Bank, Construction, 
Healthcare, Media, Real Estate, 
Retail, Technology, 
Telecommunications, Travel & 
Leisure. 
 
Low volatility: Banks, Basic 
Resources, Chemicals, Media, Oil 
& Gas, Personal & Household, 
Real Estate, Retail, Technology and 
Telecommunications. 
 
Herding: high 
(low) volume 
 
Market level 
High volume: Yes (1st and 2nd sub-
periods). 
 
Low volume: Nil 
High volume: Yes (whole period & 
1st sub-period). 
 
Low volume: Yes (whole period & 
1st sub-period) 
Herding: high 
(low) volume 
 
Sector level 
Whole period 
High volume: all except Financials, 
Healthcare, Industrial Goods, 
Personal & Household, & Real 
Estate.  
Whole period 
High volume: all except Basic 
Resources Chemicals, Financials, 
Food & Beverage, Industrial 
Goods, Healthcare, Oil and Gas, 
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Low volume: all except Chemicals, 
Construction, Food & Beverage, 
Healthcare, Financials, Industrial 
Goods, Personal & Household, 
Retail, Travel & Leisure & Utilities. 
 
1st sub-period:  
High volume: all except Automobile, 
Financials & Technology. 
  
Low volume: all except Automobile, 
Financials, Food and Beverage and 
Media. 
 
2nd sub-period:  
High volume: all except Automobile, 
& Personal & Household. 
 
Low volume: all except Automobile, 
Basic Resources, Chemicals, 
Construction, Industrial Goods, Oil 
and Gas, Personal & Household & 
Retail.  
Personal & Household & Real 
Estate.  
Low volume: Basic Resources, 
Insurance, Media, Oil & Gas, Real 
Estate, Retail, Technology, & 
Telecommunications  
1st sub-period:  
High volume: all except Financials, 
Food & Beverage, Oil & Gas, & 
Telecommunications. 
 
Low volume: all except Banks, 
Food and Beverage and Financials.  
 
 
2nd sub-period:  
High volume: all except Financials, 
Food & Beverage, and Insurance. 
 
Low volume: all except 
Automobile, Basic Resources, 
Financials, Food & Beverage, 
Industrial Goods, Personal & 
Household, Retail, & Travel & 
Leisure. 
Asian Crisis 
 
Market level 
Yes (all crisis phases) 
 
Yes (pre and post-crisis) 
Asian Crisis 
Sector level 
Pre-crisis: all except Chemicals, 
Healthcare, Media, Personal & 
Household, Retail, Travel & Leisure. 
 
Crisis: all except Automobile, & 
Healthcare. 
 
Post-crisis: all except Automobile, 
Financials, Media, & Real Estate. 
Pre-crisis: all except Basic 
Resources, Chemicals, 
Construction, Financials, Food & 
Beverage, Industrial Goods, 
Healthcare, Personal & Household, 
& Real Estate . 
 
Crisis: all except Food & Beverage  
 
Post-crisis: all except 
Construction, Financials, Food & 
Beverage, & Oil & Gas. 
GFC 
 
Market level 
Yes (all crisis phases) 
 
Yes (pre and during the crisis) 
GFC 
 
Sector level 
Pre-crisis: all except Automobile, 
Banks, Food & Beverage, Financials, 
Travel & Leisure. 
 
Crisis: all except Automobile, 
Financials & Oil & Gas. 
 
Pre-crisis: all except, Financials, & 
Telecommunication 
 
Crisis: all except Food & Beverage  
 
Post-crisis: all except Financials, 
Food & Beverage, & Oil & Gas. 
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Post-crisis: all except Automobile, 
Financials, Personal & Households, 
Real Estate, Media, Food & 
Beverage, and Oil & Gas. 
Impact of US 
returns   
Market level 
Nil (all periods) Yes (all periods) 
Sector level Whole period: Banks, Industrial 
Goods, Personal and Household, 
Technology, &Telecommunications. 
 
1st sub-period: Automobile, 
Construction, Financials, Industrial 
Goods, Technology & 
Telecommunications. 
 
2nd sub-period: Automobile, 
Chemicals, Construction, Financials, 
Industrial Goods, Media, Personal 
and Households, Technology and 
Travel and Leisure 
Whole period: Automobile, 
Telecommunication, Travel & 
Leisure. 
 
1st sub-period: Automobile, 
Industrial Goods, Oil & Gas, 
Personal & Household, & 
Technology.  
 
2nd sub-period: Automobile, 
Chemicals, Construction, 
Financials, Industrial Goods, Oil & 
Gas, & Technology.  
 
5.6. Summary and Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, we extended the investigation of industry herding to Chinese markets using 
individual data of 1,481 Shenzhen firms and 978 Shanghai firms classified into 19 sectors. 
Specifically, we investigate whether herd behaviour is contingent upon high (low) market 
return, days with high (low) volatility and, trading volume. Also, we examine the impact of 
the AC and GFC on herding. Furthermore, we examine the role the US market plays on 
market (industry) level herding in the Chinese markets. We test for herding using the CSAD 
model proposed by Tan, et al., (2008) on our sample from January 1990 to October 2016.  
Our findings are summarised in Table 5.16. We find evidence of herding at both the market 
level and industry level in China, although herding was more pronounced in SZSE. This is 
in line with the argument of Demirer and Kutan (2006) who point out that SZSE is more 
likely to herd because it consists of small firms and exporting firms and is seen to be less 
informed than SHSE. Regarding asymmetry, we find that industry herding is more prevalent 
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in the SZSE when the market is declining, particularly in sectors like Banks, Chemicals, 
Construction, Food and Beverage and Industrial Goods. Regarding volatility, we find that 
investors in SZSE herd more when volatility is low. However, in SHSE, herding is more 
prevalent on days with high volatility.  
We also report that SZSE market only herds on days with high trading volume at the market 
level. However, herding is more prevalent at the industry level and is strongest in the 1st sub-
period with all sectors herding except Automobile, and Telecommunication. When we 
examine the effect of the Asian crisis on herding, we find that the SZSE herds pre, during, 
and post-crisis at both the market and industry level. During the Global Financial Crisis, we 
find a similar herding trend, SZSE herded during all the crisis phases, for both stock 
exchanges there is strong evidence of herding in most sectors. On the role of the US market, 
we that at the market level, US returns only has an impact on herding in the SHSE. However, 
we find limited evidence of its impact on industry herding in both stock exchanges.  
The findings in this chapter have important policy implications. First, the finding implies 
that participants in the Chinese stock markets (sectors) maybe irrational when they make 
investment decisions. Policy makers and/or regulators should therefore consider the 
irrationality of Chinese market participants in their rule-making process and in their market 
reforms. Second, policy makers and/or regulators should be concerned of the potential for 
herding to destabilise the stock market. Three, market segmentation is a barrier for the 
efficient flow of price information because there are differences in the level of information 
available to market participants in the two markets. Four, another implication of our findings 
is that due to the co-movement of stocks, investors require a larger number of stocks to 
achieve diversification. Additionally, the Chinese market may be impacted by future crises 
due to contagion, as our findings show that the Chinese market was impacted by the Asian 
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crisis and the global financial crisis. Fifth, stricter stock market regulations may be required 
in the Chinese markets to curtail industry herd behaviour. Finally, the results on the impact 
of US returns on herding in the Chinese markets (sectors) imply that the trade relationship 
between both countries facilitates the transition of information between both markets. 
Therefore, policymakers should monitor this relationship and place restrictions where 
necessary. 
  Future herding research can examine a few issues. First, future research can examine 
industry herding in Chinese A and B shares. Previous studies (Dermirer and Kutan, 2006 
and Yao, et al., 2014), have reported differences in herding between both shares investors, 
this research can be extended by investigating if these differences affect industry herding. 
Second, our analysis employs the CSAD model since herding has time-varying properties. 
Future studies can employ dynamic herding models which uses approaches such as Markov 
switching. Such models examine industry herding by differentiating market states, volatility 
and trading volume when herding may or may not take place (for example, Blasco, et al., 
2012 and Balcilar, Demirer, and Hammoudeh, 2013). Third, our study employs daily data. 
Future studies can investigate industry herding in Chinese using high-frequency intraday 
data to provide more precise insights of herding (see, for example, Gleason, et al., 2004). 
Fourth, future work may consider herding during Chinese market crises (for example the 
2015-16 Chinese market turbulence). Finally, future studies can examine cross-market 
herding with other Asian markets like Hong Kong.  
 
 
 
 
 
 258 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 6 Summary and Suggestion for Future Research 
6.1. Introduction 
In this thesis we provide empirical evidence on the determinants of industry herding for the 
US and the Chinese markets. In this chapter, we reiterate our key findings and conclusions. 
It is organised as follows:  
Section 6.2 summarises the findings presented in the each empirical chapter in relation to 
the relevant hypotheses. The summary is structured to link the empirical evidence to the 
tested hypotheses and provide a conclusion of whether it has been accepted or rejected. 
Section 6.3 discusses the potential implications of the empirical evidence. 
Section 6.4 discusses the limitations of the empirical evidence. 
Section 6.5 discusses the recommendations for further research.   
6.2. Summary of findings 
6.1.1. The determinants of Industry herding in the US stock market  
The first empirical focuses on the first research question, which is investigating whether US 
investors herd towards the market (industry) consensus contingent upon the market return, 
trading volume and volatility. We also investigate the effect of the Dot Com Bubble and the 
GFC on herding at the market and sector level.  
By utilising stock prices for the S&P 500 index spanning from January 1990 to October 
2016, we measure herding with the well-known CSAD model. The first hypothesis was 
stated assumed that there is no herding effect in the US market/ industry.  
 Our results show that market wide herding is absent in the US market. Therefore we accept 
the null hypothesis H1 of no herding in the US market.  This finding indicates that at the 
market level, US investors do not ignore their beliefs in factor of the market consensus. It 
can be thus deduced that these investors may be overconfident and optimistic in their beliefs 
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and information. From an EMH perspective, it can be argued that US investors are rational 
and the market is informationally efficient.  
However, limited evidence of herding becomes visible at the sector level, especially in the 
Healthcare, Industrial good and Oil and Gas sectors. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no herding in the US industry.  This finding suggests that the herding absent at 
the market level surfaces at the sector level, which is consistent with Bikhchandani and 
Sharma’s (2001) suggestion that investors follow each other in and out of the same industry, 
commonly termed as ‘flight to quality’.  
At the market level, hypothesis H2a (i.e. Industry herding is contingent upon market/sector 
returns was rejected because there was no evidence of herding.  Hence, there is no evidence 
that herding is stronger (weaker) on days with rising (declining) market prices. In contrast, 
herding becomes evident at the industry level, hence the null hypothesis is accepted.  
Hypothesis H2b states industry herding is contingent upon market /sector volatility. At the 
market level, the hypothesis could not be accepted as investors only herd in periods of low 
volatility. Similarly, the hypothesis could not be accepted at the industry level, as there was 
limited evidence of herding.  
Hypothesis H2C postulates that industry herding is contingent upon market/sector volume. 
The rejection of the hypothesis at the both the market and industry level, therefore there is 
no relationship between herding and high (low) trading volume.  
Overall, there is a simultaneous acceptance of hypotheses H3 and H4 (i.e. herd behaviour is 
stronger during the Dot com (GFC) period) at both the market (industry) level. Specifically, 
that the US investors herd during the pre-bubble and bubble periods, however herding is 
manifested in various sectors during and after the bubble. During the GFC crisis we find that 
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the US market only herds during the pre-crisis period, although herding is clear across 
sectors during and after the GFC.  
6.1.2. The determinants of Industry herding in the Chinese stock markets 
The second empirical chapter focuses on the second research question, which is investigating 
determinants of market and industry herding in the Chinese markets. We also investigate the 
effect of the AC and GFC on herding at the market and sector level. Furthermore, we 
examine the role the US market plays on market (industry) level herding in the Chinese 
markets. 
We test for herding using the CSAD model on our sample all firms listed on the SZSE and 
SHSE.  
Hypothesis H1 postulates that herding exists in Chinese markets/industry. This is accepted 
because since there is evidence of herding at both the market level and industry level, 
although it is more pronounced in SZSE. 
Hypothesis H2a has been accepted (i.e. market/ industry herding is contingent upon market 
or sector returns), industry herding is more prevalent in the SZSE when the market is 
declining, particularly in sectors like Banks, Chemicals, Construction, Food and Beverage 
and Industrial Goods.  
Furthermore, there while SZSE herds more when volatility is low, SHSE herds more on days 
when volatility is high. Consequently, hypothesis H2b has been accepted as market 
(industry) herding is contingent upon market/sector volatility.  There is also evidence that 
SZSE market only herds on days with high trading volume at the market level. Therefore, 
hypothesis H2c is accepted: market (industry) herding is contingent upon market (sector) 
volume.  
 Hypotheses H3 and H4 (i.e. herd behaviour is stronger during the Asian crisis (GFC) period) 
at both the market (industry) level are accepted. There is evidence that the SZSE herds pre, 
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during post-crisis the AC at both the market and industry level. During the GFC we find a 
similar herding trend, SZSE herded during all the crisis phases.   
On the role of the US market, we find that at the market level, US returns only has an impact 
on herding in the SHSE. Therefore, hypothesis H5, i.e. US returns impact herding in the 
Chinese markets (sectors) is accepted. However, we find limited evidence of its impact on 
industry herding in both stock exchanges. 
6.3. Implications of the study 
Our findings have important implications for US financial market investors and stock market 
regulatory authorities. From the investors’ perspective, it is important to know the impact of 
industry herding as it could potentially affect their investment strategies, especially those 
interested in investing in specific sectors. For the regulatory authorities, our evidence 
suggests that it would be useful to encourage investors to diversify their sector investments. 
They can achieve this by providing information on the correlation between correlations of 
different markets and sectors to the public. This information will give investors a better 
insight on intensity of institutional herding and thus inform their investment decisions.  
The results may help provide greater insight into the co-movement in Chinese industry 
returns, which is different from the predictions of traditional models. Under the traditional 
view, co-movement in stocks is either driven by changes in cash flows or discount rates.  
An important implication of our findings is that due to the co-movement of stocks, investors 
require a larger number of stocks to achieve diversification. It is also important to point out 
that although the Chinese markets have been subject to various reforms recently, our results 
imply that more stringent market regulations are required to curtail industry herd behaviour. 
A possible implication of the evidence of herding during the AC and GFC is that the Chinese 
markets may be impacted by contagion. Our results on the impact of US returns on herding 
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in the Chinese markets (sectors) imply that the trade relationship between both countries 
facilitates the transition of information between both markets. Therefore, policymakers 
should monitor this relationship and place restrictions where necessary. 
6.4. Limitations of the study 
This section gives a brief summary of the limitations of this thesis. As earlier stated, this 
study is being carried out on the US and China stock market. For the US market we used the 
S&P500 index as a proxy in line with previous studies. It is therefore assumed that this 
sample is representative of the firms on the US stock market. Regarding the time frame of 
1999 -2016 which has been selected to include, recent crises periods, it is assumed that the 
specific time periods for these which are selected based on previous research sufficiently 
capture the effect of herding during these periods.   
As this research is confined to the analyses of herding towards the market consensus, the 
review of literature suggests that there is a wide range of other arears and issues that could 
be explored and potentially have an impact on herding. There are other contexts such as 
institutional investor herding (see for example Lakonishok et al., (1992), herding in financial 
analyst recommendations and newsletters (see for example Graham (1999) and herding in 
other markets such as commodity, derivative and real estate markets. To keep this study 
within manageable proportions, the focus is be restricted to only the issues raised in the 
research questions. Also, due to time, data and resource constraints this study focuses on 
herding using aggregate data from the stock market rather than considering other contexts 
aforementioned.  
Our investigation considers, herding in the US and Chinese financial market at the market 
and industry level. Theoretical arguments against the EMH, regarding the rationality and the 
independence of investor decision making have provided the basis towards testing its 
validity in the presence of an anomaly such as herding. Inferences from empirical research 
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indicates that some investors are not rational and mimic other investors. While research on 
herding has received attention from psychology and other fields in the social science, this 
study focuses on the field of behavioural finance. In addition, this study consolidates on 
pertinent past research my employing similar methods.  
6.5. Further research 
We suggest some issues that future studies on the US market can examine. First, we employ 
the CSAD model to measure herding. It would be interesting to see whether other models 
like CAMP-based models produce similar results especially at the sector level. Second, we 
find that herding is prevalent in the Healthcare and Oil and Gas sectors respectively. Future 
studies can conduct an in-depth investigation on these sectors to provide empirical evidence 
on the subsectors that herd in these sectors. Third, we use the S&P 500 index as a proxy for 
the US market, future studies can provide recent evidence using all data from all the listed 
firms in the US market. Finally, it would be interesting to examine cross-sector herding 
interactions.  
For the Chinese market, future herding research can examine a few issues. First, our research 
only focuses on herding in SZSE and SHSE; future research can also examine industry 
herding in Chinese A and B shares. As earlier stated, few studies have reported differences 
in herding between both share investors. Hence this research can be extended by 
investigating if these differences affect industry herding. Second, our analysis employs the 
CSAD model, since herding has time-varying properties, future studies can employ dynamic 
herding models which uses approaches such as Markov switching. Such models examine 
industry herding by differentiating market states, volatility and trading volume when herding 
may or may not take place. (For example, Blasco, et al., 2012 and Balcilar, Demirer, and 
Hammoudeh, 2013). Third, our study employs daily data future studies can investigate 
industry herding in Chinese using high-frequency intraday data to provide more precise 
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insights of herding (see, for example, Gleason, et al., 2004). Fourth, since we find evidence 
that Chinese market herd during crises that originate from other markets, future work may 
consider herding during Chinese market crises (for example the 2015-16 Chinese market 
turbulence). Finally, our research provides limited evidence of the impact of the US markets; 
future studies can examine cross-market herding with other Asian markets like Hong Kong. 
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